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Abstract 
This thesis investigates how collective action is achieved in the governance of 
transnational common pool resources, taking the example of the electromagnetic radio 
spectrum as a global common. The thesis asks what determines variation in operational 
and collective choice property arrangements in common pool resources such as the 
radio spectrum. The radio spectrum represents the totality of radio frequencies used for 
wireless communications around the world. It is a transnational resource that exhibits 
properties of other common pool resources: a) high rivalry in consumption and b) 
difficulty in excluding non-contributing beneficiaries from its use. This study 
demonstrates that the presence of a public actor – even one with established authority at 
transnational level such as the Commission of the European Union – cannot fully 
explain variations in the configuration of property arrangements in the radio resource. 
Instead, this study finds that private actors in the electronic communications industry – 
i.e. service operators and system developers – define rules of access and rules of use in 
the transnational radio resource, by means of negotiating the configuration of 
technology systems used to extract value from the resource. In addition, this study finds 
that industry actors are able to define common operational rules to access and use a 
transnational frequency pool even in complex situations of heterogeneous economic 
interests and heterogeneous technology capabilities. They reduce uncertainty in these 
complex situations by increasing participation in decision-making and by developing 
mechanisms of information exchange and mutual monitoring in industry associations. 
When industry actors agree these common rules of management, and reinforce them 
with common rules of exclusion, they are more likely to negotiate operational 
arrangements based on principles of common exclusive property rather than individual 
exclusive property in the transnational radio resource. These findings are derived from 
the analysis of four case studies, which trace the development of operational rules in 
five radio frequency bands across time. By revealing the central role of industry 
associations in defining property arrangements in transnational commons such as the 
radio spectrum, this research seeks to contribute to the debate about the nature and 
scope of private transnational governance of common goods. 
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Introduction      
The study of collective action, with its application in different social situations, 
including situations of shared resources, has been a central area of inquiry in the social 
sciences. Over time, studies have primarily focused on the inherent difficulties of 
groups to achieve collective action and to provide public goods (Hardin 1968, Hume 
1740, Olson 1965). In short, these problems of collective action describe a situation 
where individuals fail to sustainably achieve a group goal, even though each individual 
would benefit from contributing towards that goal. Philosopher David Hume was one of 
the first to describe this situation in A Treaties of Human Nature (1740), making direct 
reference to the inherent predisposition to collective inaction in shared resources:  
“Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in 
common. […] But ‘tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a 
thousand persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being difficult for 
them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to 
execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and 
expence, and wou’d lay the whole burden on others” (1740: 538).  
What Hume so accurately describes is not only a general predisposition to collective 
inaction, but also the predisposition to free-ride on collective arrangements produced by 
others in a natural setting that has the properties of a common pool resource – i.e. a 
shared resource characterised by high rivalry of consumption and difficulty of 
excluding non-contributing beneficiaries from its use (Dasgupta and Heal 1979, 
Friedman 1971, Gardner et al 1990, Gibson et al 2000, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2003). 
Recently, the study of collective action in shared resources has been revived following 
considerable research into the institutional arrangements that individuals create in order 
to cope with similar problems of organisation and provision (Feeny et al 1990, Ostrom 
et al 1988, Ostrom 1990, Wade 1987). E. Ostrom’s contribution challenged established 
assumptions in political economy, which proposed that groups can achieve stable and 
sustainable collective arrangements in shared resources only through public or 
individual ownership. In short, Ostrom’s research found that individuals, faced with 
problems of collective action in common resources, commit themselves to a variety of 
cooperative strategies that are “rarely either private or public” (Ostrom 1990: 14, 
Ostrom 1994, Ostrom et al 2012).  
Building an evidence-based theory of collective action, E. Ostrom showed that clearly 
defined groups are able to develop, monitor and enforce common property regimes that 
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ensure the sustainable access and use of a common pool resource. Ostrom’s approach, 
however, did not reject the rational choice tradition of collective action and maintained 
that individuals in a group are “purposeful actors who respond to incentives”, albeit in 
the presence of institutions that shape these incentives (Pennington 2012: 22). Since the 
development of this new institutional approach in the public choice literature1, there has 
been a growing interest in the study of institutional arrangements that could lead to a 
more stable and sustainable management of shared resource (Agrawal 2003, Bromley et 
al 1992, Cox et al 2010). As a result, a growing number of studies have designed, 
discussed and proposed institutional arrangements based on the self-governance of 
global commons such as our shared waters, forests, fossil fuels, atmosphere and even 
outerspace (Cox et al 2010, Singh 1994, Weeden and Chow 2011). There is no doubt 
that these studies have made a considerable contribution to evaluating alternative 
designs of institutional arrangements, which could lead to stable and sustainable 
management of shared resources at the global level. However, as some scholars have 
pointed out, this approach has also led to the identification of too great a variety of 
conditions for sustainable management (Agrawal 2003), while diverting attention from 
the original analysis of the problems of coordination that take place in large scale 
commons organised in different ways at local, national, transnational and international 
level (Héritier 2002, Holzinger 2008). Therefore, this thesis attempts to refocus our 
analytical lenses on why and how resource users decide to organise and collectively 
supply institutions in order to manage large-scale common pool resources of a 
transnational nature.   
                                                
1 Aligica and Boettke (2011) and Aligica and Sabetti (2014) have dedicated 
considerable attention to the wider contribution of the Bloomington School in 
forwarding a new institutionalist approach to theories of public choice. According to 
Aligica and Boettke (2011), this approach puts forward a new perspective on human 
action and, as a result, a new perspective of social order that connect the theory of 
choice with the theory of institutions through learning and knowledge exchanges (2011: 
29). Thus, Aligica and Boettke (2011) show that the “study of the commons emerges 
from a broader and deeper intellectual perspective” that rests of two evidence-based 
findings. First, the evidence of polycentric governance, which questions “the 
monocentric vision of social order and the market vs state dichotomy” (2011: 30). 
Second, the evidence of a social order based on knowledge and learning processes that 
coexist with other human processes based or derived from self-interestedness (2011: 
30).  
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This thesis recognises the essential contribution made by the literature studying the 
governance of common pool resources to our understanding of property systems2, rule 
systems3 and governance regimes4 in shared resources. There is, in fact, good reason to 
question whether public property and/or individual private property represent the only 
solutions to achieving sustainable governance of shared resources. There is also good 
reason to question whether heuristics based on the hierarchical governance of the state, 
the horizontal governance of the market or the spontaneous governance of the 
community produce discrete property solutions that can be described as public, private 
                                                
2 Property systems or property arrangements define the bundle of property rights that 
can be derived from a resource. Property systems do not refer to a single type of right, 
but to “an aggregate of rights” (Buck 1998: 3). This thesis will refer to property systems 
as an aggregate of two categories of rights – operational property rights and collective 
choice property rights – as derived from the rules regulating the consumption and 
maintenance of the global resource (Cole and Ostrom 2012, Schlager and Ostrom 
1992). A discussion about these categories of rights is provided in Section 1.1.4. 
Briefly, operational property rights refer to the rights of access (right to enter) and the 
right of use (right of withdrawal or extraction) of a resource, whereas collective choice 
rights refer to rights of management (to regulate), rights of exclusion (to determining 
access) and rights of alienation (to transfer management or exclusion rights), as defined 
by Schlager and Ostrom (1992: 251).  
3 In this thesis, the term “rules” does not follow the definitions of rules as “rules of the 
game” in the rational analysis of collective action. Thus, rules are the artefacts subject 
to human intervention – rather than physical or behavioural laws – “by which we 
intervene to change the structure of incentives” (Ostrom 1986). Thus, rules order 
relationships between individuals by providing stability of expectations and by limiting 
uncertainty (Ostrom 1990: 53). Operational rights as well as collective choice rights in 
the commons correspond to operational rules and collective choice rules, which are also 
nested in one another (Ostrom 1990: 51). 
4 This thesis acknowledges the debate around the definition of “modes of governance” 
as referring to politics, polity or policy (Treib et al 2007). Because “modes of 
governance” has been exposed to concept stretching, this thesis adopts the position that 
the core meaning of governance refers to “steering and coordination of interdependent 
(usually collective) actors based on institutionalised rule systems” (Benz qtd in Treib et 
al 2007: 3). Thus, Treib et al (2007) suggest that one way of limiting the boundaries of 
the concept, while allowing it to capture the politics, polity and policy dimensions, 
would be to locate it on a continuum between public authority and societal self-
organisation (2007: 5). This allows a mode of governance to include: a) the actor 
dimension (state versus non-state actors), b) the polity dimension (formalised versus 
non-formalised rules) and c) the policy dimension (procedural versus material rules). 
Lastly, special attention needs to be paid to the relationship between a system of 
governance and a mode of governance. V. Ostrom refers to a “system of governance” as 
polycentric depending on “the distribution of ruleship functions traditionally ascribed to 
a sovereign” (in Aligica and Sabetti 2014: 54). By this definition, polycentricity would 
be covered under the polity dimension of a mode of governance, rather than by allowing 
a distinction between a system of governance and a mode of governance.  
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or common (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Recent research has revealed a wide range of 
shared resources, each prone to different types of collective dilemmas and each 
revealing different rules and different configurations of authority for developing, 
monitoring and enforcing these rules. From local natural resources such as fisheries, 
pastures or forests (Bromley et al 1992, Gibson et al 2000, Barkin and Shambaugh 
1999) to global ones such as the oceans, the atmosphere or the electromagnetic radio 
spectrum (Benkler 1999, Dietz et al 2003, Hackett 2011, Levin 1971, Ostrom et al 
1999), to man-made ones such as city commons, scientific commons and knowledge 
commons like the worldwideweb (Hess 1995, Hess and Ostrom 2003, Nelson 2003), all 
these resources exhibit a variety of institutional arrangements that govern them, some 
more successfully than others. A quick analysis of these shared resources reveals that 
they exhibit multiple property systems based on a variety of rules of access and use 
(“operational rules”) as well a variety of rules of management, exclusion and alienation 
(“collective choice rules”), which concern socio-economic activity in the resource5 
(Cole and Ostrom 2012, Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Moreover, rule-making, 
monitoring and enforcement are rarely concentrated in a single and formalised node of 
authority. Instead, they are arranged in polycentric systems of governance comprising 
both public and private entities with different responsibilities in the wider system of 
authority that defines, monitors and enforces these rules (V. Ostrom 1999, Ostrom et al 
2012). It is, thus, this diversity that points at the difficulty of boxing property 
arrangements of transnational resources into private, common or public. And it is this 
diversity that makes it important and, indeed, fascinating to refocus our attention on the 
strategies employed by direct resource users to negotiate the supply of such diverse 
institutions in the context of “today’s bargained economies and societies” (Streeck and 
Schmitter 1985: 3).  
The electromagnetic radio spectrum is a very good example to enquire into the complex 
logic of collective action in transnational commons. The radio spectrum – representing 
the totality of radio frequencies used for wireless communications around the world6 – 
                                                
5 See supra note 2 for a definition of these rights. Also see Section 1.1.4 for a more 
detailed discussion of these rights, based on the work by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
and Cole and Ostrom (2012).  
6 The radio spectrum refers to a part of the electromagnetic spectrum ranging from 
approximately 3KHz to 300GHz. Radio frequencies in this part of the electromagnetic 
spectrum are largely but not entirely designated for wireless communications used in 
different sectors such as defence, aviation, broadcasting, mobile telecommunications. 
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is a transnational natural resource predisposed to recognised dilemmas in the commons. 
Radio frequencies are natural resources shared by a group of users characterised by 
increased rivalry of consumption, whereby extraction by one user affects extraction by 
another user, as well as by increased difficulty of excluding users (Coase 1959, Vany et 
al 1969, Faulhaber 2005). However, rather than being exposed to permanent congestion 
or exhaustion of supply, the radio spectrum has been governed by relatively stable and 
diverse institutions since its first use for mobile communications in the late 19th century 
(Benkler 1999, Benkler 2012, Faulhaber 2006, Lehr and Crowcroft 2005). The answer 
to this stable governance, at least by comparison with other global commons (Buck 
1998, Vogler 2000), has been largely attributed to the authority of public actors – be 
they governments or regulatory agencies – to allocate, redistribute or open access onto 
the radio resource under different conditions but by centralised means.  
Thus, considerable attention has been paid to the methods used by governments or 
regulatory agencies to manage radio frequencies by administering exclusive use 
(Shelanski and Huber 1998), by creating secondary markets for flexible exclusive use 
(Cave et al 2007, Vany et al 1969) or by opening up frequencies for common use (Brito 
2006, Benkler 2012). However, this perspective is challenged in this thesis on two 
grounds. First, it does not fully account for dynamics at the transnational level, given 
that the radio spectrum is an inherently transnational resource and given that the 
common good7 derived from it – i.e. wireless communications – is inherently mobile. 
Second, it does not fully account for the diversity of property arrangements that make 
up the governance of radio frequencies beyond those prescribed by the formal authority 
of national public actors.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
This thesis will only look at the organisation of radio frequencies designated for 
commercial use in wireless electronic communications (voice and data for 
communication services) and will not consider the organisation of radio frequencies 
used for non-commercial use such as public safety, emergency services or defence.  
7 This thesis adopts the definition of “common goods” put forward by Holzinger (2008). 
“Common goods will be used as a synonym for all goods that are not purely private. 
[…] Common goods are defined by the presence of externalities”. As Holzinger (2008) 
noted, “this definition has the advantage of capturing a number of different notions of 
goods such as pure public goods, club goods, CPRs, congestibles or network goods” 
(Holzinger 2008: 28).   
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In order to explain the diversity of property systems encountered in the governance of 
radio frequencies, this thesis asks the following research question:  
What determines the specific configuration of rights of access and use (operational 
property rights) and rights of management and exclusion (collective choice property 
rights) in a transnational common pool resource such as the radio spectrum?  
The thesis starts from the assumptions put forward by E. Ostrom that “a set of 
principals, faced with a collective action problem, can solve 1) the problem of 
supplying a new set of institutions, 2) the problem of making credible commitments and 
3) the problem of mutual monitoring” (Ostrom 1990: 42). In the case of the radio 
spectrum for commercial wireless communications, these principals are the private 
actors that draw direct economic benefit from this transnational resource: a) service 
operators of wireless communications and b) product/infrastructure developers of 
wireless communications. These private actors are businesses with national, 
transnational and international presence and are the direct extractors and creators of 
economic value in the (commercial) radio resource. They extract economic value from 
the spectrum resource by using wireless technology and, at the same time, they create 
economic value by using the resource as input into the production of wireless 
communications as common goods. During this complex extraction and production 
process, they sometimes choose to coordinate in industry associations formed around 
the development of technology solutions for the use of wireless frequencies. And, as E. 
Ostrom noted with reference to similar resources, these industrial actors use technology, 
which they or others produce, in order to “establish and sustain property rights on the 
resource” (E. Ostrom in Buck 1998: xiii).  
In this context, the thesis tests theoretical assumptions about the type of property 
systems most likely to result from a particular configuration of private interests, as 
derived from the public choice theory of collective action8. First, the thesis tests 
whether the organisation of private interests is the result of (re-)distributive measures 
                                                
8 As indicated above, E. Ostrom’s work is situated within the rational-choice tradition in 
economic and political theory (Pennington 2012: 22), with a particular mention that 
Ostrom’s work recognizes that actor strategies are constrained by bounded rationality 
and correspond to various choice dimensions – operational, collective choice, 
constitutional – that, in an institutional setting, are formed as choices of ideas and 
knowledge, which ultimately create given rule configurations or social orders (Aligica 
and Boettke 2009: 131).  
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taken by a public actor with rule-making authority in the radio spectrum at transnational 
level. Second, the thesis tests whether an association of industry actors, benefiting from 
reduced levels of diversity of interests among its members, is more likely to supply a 
property system based on low rivalry among members and high excludability of non-
members – i.e. exclusive common property. Conversely, the thesis tests whether an 
association of industry actors, characterised by high levels of diversity of interests and 
unequal distribution of capabilities among members, is more likely to supply a property 
system based on high rivalry among members and high excludability of non-members – 
i.e. exclusive individual property. Third, the thesis asks whether the organisation of 
radio frequencies on principles of exclusive common property is less likely to require 
the intervention of a public actor in monitoring commitments to operational rules on the 
spectrum resource. Conversely, the thesis asks whether the organisation of radio 
frequencies on principles of exclusive individual property is more likely to require the 
intervention of a public actor in monitoring operational rules on the spectrum resource.  
This research brings three main findings to the study of property arrangements in 
transnational common pool resources such as the radio spectrum – i.e. transnational 
common pool resources that rely on technology systems in order “to extract value as 
well as to establish and sustain property systems on [them]” (Ostrom in Buck 1998: 
xiii). The first finding is that the radio spectrum is governed by varying configurations 
of authority for defining, monitoring and enforcing property systems across time. 
Specifically, this research finds that industry actors are very active at the stage of 
defining rules of access and rules of use in the transnational radio resource, by means of 
negotiating the configuration of technology systems used to extract value from the 
resource. The second finding is that, depending on their distribution of economic 
interests and technology capabilities, industry actors can stabilise newly defined 
operational rules with mechanisms of mutual monitoring. Specifically, and surprisingly, 
this research finds that complex situations of heterogeneous economic interests and 
heterogeneous technology capabilities do not result in collective inaction. On the 
contrary, these situations of heterogeneity result in sustained collective action achieved 
in formal and informal industry associations with greater participation of industry actors 
in the definition of operational rules as well as with more developed mechanisms of 
information exchange and mutual monitoring. The third finding is that, when industry 
actors agree common rules of management and common rules of exclusion, they lower 
 24 
the level of internal rivalry among them and, subsequently, they are more likely to 
negotiate property arrangements based on principles of common exclusive property than 
on principles of individual exclusive property. In situations when common rules of 
management and common rules of exclusion are agreed, industry actors are less likely 
to rely on the authority of the public actor to monitor their commitments to operational 
rules in the common pool. Overall, these findings are consistent with theories of private 
group action as discussed by Dunleavy (1991) or, more specifically, theories of 
associative action as put forward by Streeck and Schmitter (1985), who argue for a 
fourth model of social order – i.e. the “associative order” – in order to explain the 
presence of “collective self-interest” of industry groups manifested as a form of “private 
government” (Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 3, 10). Translated at the transnational level, 
these findings are consistent with theories of transnational private regulation as 
discussed by Scott, Cafaggi and Senden (2011), who illustrate diverse configurations of 
authority in defining, monitoring and enforcing transnational common goods between 
public and private actors.  
The findings arrived at in this thesis are based on an in-depth analysis of four cases in 
the transnational organisation of the radio resource for the provision of commercial 
wireless communications. The cases address the regulation of five frequency bands in 
Europe, Region 19 of the radio spectrum, over different periods of time: -­‐ The regulation of the 900 MHz band for second generation cellular digital mobile 
communications in the late 1980s -­‐ The regulation of the 1.9 GHz and 2.1 GHz bands for third generation cellular digital 
mobile communications in the 1990s -­‐ The regulation of the 800 MHz band for mobile broadband in the late 2000s -­‐ The regulation of the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands for wireless local area networks in 
the early 2000s  
                                                
9 For regulatory purposes, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has 
divided the world into three Radio Regions: Region 1 comprising Europe, Middle East, 
Africa, the former Soviet Union; Region 2 comprising North and South America and the 
Pacific; Region 3 comprising South-East Asia, Australia and the Pacific Rim (ITU 
2011). As it will be explained in Chapter 1, the Radio Regions are further divided into 
administrative sub-regions. Europe – which will be roughly defined as covering the 
geographical area of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations (CEPT) – is such a sub-region. See List of Acronyms for definitions and 
country list, noting that membership in the CEPT changed across time.  
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The case studies were selected based on the diversity of industry actors who draw a 
direct economic benefit from using the specified frequency band. First, the case studies 
are derived from sectors with diverse industry structures such as the mobile 
communications, broadcasting and information technology industry, which allows for 
variability in interests and capabilities among actors. Second, the case studies span 
across different stages in the liberalisation of the electronic communications sector, 
which allows for variability in the position of the public actor in the regulation of 
communications markets and for analysis of the position of the public actor vis-à-vis 
private actors in the regulation of the radio resource. Third, each case study follows 
over a decade of interactions among industry actors organised in associations at regional 
and global level. Each case study holds constant the geographic dimension of the radio 
spectrum, by focusing exclusively on the regulation of radio frequencies in Europe, 
Radio Region 1. This region has not been selected because of the presence of the 
European Union (EU) polity in the wider Europe, Radio Region 1, which could 
constitute a selection bias due to the existence of established venues of coordination 
within the EU. On the contrary, this region has been selected for recognised problems of 
collective action in sharing the radio resource at transnational level, due to the high 
number of industry actors, positioned in a significant number of jurisdictions, situated in 
a relatively limited geography compared with other radio spectrum regions (Tomlinson 
1945, Savage 1989). The relatively high number of industrial actors interested in using 
a limited common resource provides variation in their preferences and in their 
capabilities, which helps test whether variations in private interests and in resources 
determine variations in the property arrangements witnessed in the radio spectrum. 
However, each case study accounts for the presence of the EU polity in the wider 
Europe, Radio Region 1. In fact, each case study reflects different stages in the 
development of the EU polity in the electronic communications sector, which helps test 
whether industry actors organise in response to the (re)-distributive preference of the 
European Commission as a transnational public actor and whether industry actors prefer 
its established policy venues to influence the choice of property arrangements in the 
regional radio resource.  
The case studies are analysed using a combined method of process tracing and network 
analysis. Each case study follows a three-stage analysis into: a) the formation of actor 
strategies in the institutional setting for governing wireless communications; b) the 
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negotiation of operational and collective choice rules based upon these actor strategies 
and c) the impact of the organisation of these actors on the choice of property systems 
that make up the regulation of each frequency band considered in the case studies. The 
method of process tracing is used in order to provide an internal account of these 
negotiations and is based on the analysis of meeting minutes of the European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
Each case study also contains the official positions of industry and policy experts 
present in key moments of the rule-making process. Network analysis, based on graph 
theory, is used to analyse the patterns of cooperation among industry actors involved in 
strategic associations, as recorded in the SDC Platinum Database by Thomson Reuters. 
This combined method of inquiry into the four case studies provides a thorough 
investigation into the diverse interests and resources of industry actors, the dynamics of 
their negotiations regarding the rule system that defines levels of rivalry and 
excludability among them as well as their position vis-à-vis public actors in the 
governance of the transnational radio resource.  
This research makes several contributions to the study of collective action in 
contemporary transnational commons. First, it makes a contribution to our 
understanding of collective action in shared resources of a transnational nature (Buck 
1998, Ostrom et al 1999, Vogler 2000, Wijkman 1982). Compared with other global 
commons – such as the high seas, the atmosphere or the outerspace – the radio spectrum 
is a shared resource that has been successfully appropriated by means of technological 
innovation without polluting, overexploiting or overcrowding it on a systematic basis. 
This thesis pays particular attention to the diversity of interests and the distribution of 
resources among private actors who are actively involved in producing new 
technologies that not only extract economic value from this natural resource but also 
permanently alter the degree of rivalry and the degree of excludability in the resource 
itself. Thus, this research makes a new contribution to the study of the governance of 
global commons that does not consider private actors as receivers but as conceivers of 
property systems that governs transnational commons.    
Second, this research makes a contribution to our understanding of the role of 
associative action as “an additional source of social order” (Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 
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2). Streeck and Schmitter (1985) are some of the first to propose this type of order as 
defining contemporary modes of governance. Since then, organisational models 
resembling the private interest associations described by Schmitter and Streeck (1999) 
have also been identified in the transnational regulation of common goods (Hallström 
2004, Cafaggi 2012, Scott et al 2011). This thesis makes a clear contribution to the 
growing specialist literature in private transnational regulation, by identifying the 
central role of private interest associations as rule-makers of transnational regimes for 
managing common goods and by postulating on situations when private interest 
associations share authority in monitoring or enforcing privately set rules and rights 
with public actors (Abbott and Snidal 2011, Buthe and Mattli 2011, Scott 2012, Werle 
2001).  
Third, this research makes a contribution to our understanding of property systems, 
particularly to the relationship between property systems, rule systems and modes of 
governance in common resources of a transnational nature. The diversity of property 
and regulatory arrangements identified in recent years (Cole and Ostrom 2012, German 
and Keeler 2010, Schlager and Ostrom 1992) has, indeed, come to question “naïve 
theories of property” (Eggertsson 1990) that assume the dominance of individual 
private property over hybrid forms of property (Dagan and Heller 2001, McKean 2000). 
This thesis pays particular attention to the property systems that results from collective 
arrangements negotiated by private actors organised in diverse industry associations. 
Thus, this research contributes to the literature that sees property systems as both 
explicit and hybrid, depending on the degree of rivalry and the degree of excludability 
negotiated by industry actors as direct users of transnational resources (Cole 2002, 
German and Keeler 2010, Ostrom 2002).  
More broadly, this research offers insight into the regulation of network industries with 
a particular focus on the evolution of regulation of telecommunications and, more 
generally, electronic communications (Alexiadis and Cave 2010, Cave et al 2007, 
Lodge 2010b, Lodge and Stirton 2007). In particular, this thesis draws attention to 
cycles of technology innovation in wireless communications, which do not always 
follow policies for the wider electronic communications market but, instead, follow the 
dynamics of rivalry and exclusion that are being negotiated in the radio resource. 
Lastly, this thesis offers insight into the wider organisation of interests in the area of 
electronic communications outside the polity of the European Union. In particular, it 
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draws attention to situations where industry actors, organised in private associations, 
prefer to negotiate and set rule systems outside the formal policy venues of the 
European Union (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999, Eising 2004, Pollack 1994).  
This thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the wider theoretical 
framework, which sets this thesis along three general lines of inquiry: who has authority 
to solve problems of collective action in transnational shared resources; what 
configuration of interests and capabilities can solve problems of collective action in 
transnational shared resources; and by what institutional means. After the main 
theoretical discussion is introduced, the chapter applies these main lines of inquiry onto 
the early history of the radio spectrum to verify whether this resource offers appropriate 
grounds for analysis. Chapter 2 introduces the main analytical framework to be applied 
across the cases, as well as the methods used for this analysis. It adopts a variant of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, as put forward by the 
literature on public choice institutionalism. Chapters 3-6 provide the empirical 
evidence for this study, looking at the regulation of the frequency bands identified 
above. Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of this study and discusses some of 
their implications to the wider literature on transnational private regulation and, 
specifically, on the governance of transnational common pool resources.  
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Chapter 1.  Collective Action in Shared Resources: The Theoretical 
Framework  
This chapter introduces the broad theoretical framework of the thesis, which looks at 
what determines the creation of new institutional arrangements designed to solve 
problems of collective action in shared resources. The chapter starts by outlining the 
common assumptions put forward by the rational choice theory of collective action, 
which portrays individuals as short-term self-interest maximizers, whose non-
cooperative decisions trigger the tragic overuse of shared resources. The chapter aligns 
itself with the proposition that, while self-interest maximisation is a trait of human 
behaviour, it is by no means the only trait of human behaviour. Thus, this thesis aligns 
itself with the behavioural theory of collective action, which portrays individuals as 
holding complex motivational structures in conditions of bounded rationality (Ostrom 
1998, Ostrom 2010, Simon 1957, Simon 1985). In the first part, the chapter frames the 
theoretical debate in relation with assumptions in rational choice theory about who 
solves problems of collective action, by what institutional means and at what level of 
provision. The chapter discusses the complexity of collective action problems in 
transnational resources in relation with these assumptions. In the second part, the 
chapter frames the theoretical debate in relation with institutional arrangements in the 
radio spectrum. The chapter shows that since the first use of radio frequencies for the 
production of wireless communications, private actors have been actively involved in 
the supply of property arrangements for the governance of the radio resource at 
transnational level. The chapter concludes that the radio spectrum represents fertile 
ground to test the relationship between public and private actors involved in decision-
making processes about common resources, the strategies adopted by industry actors 
and the property arrangements that make up the governance of transnational common 
pool resources.  
 
1.1 Framing the problem of collective action 
The study of collective action is at the core of the social sciences. Collective action 
refers to “activities that require the coordination of efforts by two or more individuals” 
(Cornes and Sandler 1996: 324). Interdependence among participants is central to 
achieving a collective outcome. However, at times, participants find it difficult to 
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exclude non-participants or non-contributing participants from drawing benefits from 
their collective action. This situation has been theorised as the problem of collective 
action (Olson 1965, Oliver et al 1985, Ostrom 2000). We witness problems of collective 
action at all levels of human interaction, from cleaning rotas in shared accommodations 
to citizen oversight of governments or to environmental protection in international 
relations. In fact, it is the pervasiveness of problems of collective action in our daily life 
that contributed to the development of a theory of collective action, which assumes 
individuals are unable to overcome the temptation to maximise their short-term, self-
interest for the benefit of the collective good. Hence, the need for an external authority 
– the state or the firm – to intervene by applying inducements or sanctions in order to 
correct non-cooperative behaviour (Hardin 1998). Problems of collective action have 
found a variety of applications in the provision of common goods. Depending on their 
application, they have been referred to as “the free-rider problem” (Grossman and Hart 
1980), “the credible commitment dilemma” (Lichbach 1995), “the tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin 1968) or “the tragedy of open access” (Fox 1993)10. From an 
analytical perspective, they follow rational choice theory, which portrays humans as 
short-term, self-interested maximizers. From a methodological perspective, they apply a 
variety of techniques from thought experiments (Hardin 1968, Olson 1965) to game 
experiments (Coleman 1986) to iterated game experiments with institutional analysis 
(Axelrod 1981).  
However, empirical evidence reveals that complete rationality is not as pervasive as the 
theory of rational choice has described it. High levels of cooperation – in the absence of 
an external authority capable of applying positive or negative incentives (Olson 1965) – 
can be found in diverse settings, from child rearing to mutual defence11 (Ostrom 1998). 
Besides, considerable empirical evidence has revealed that small and medium-size 
resources have been sustainably shared without external intervention (Agrawal 2003, 
Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Bromley et al 1992, Feeny et al 1990, Ostrom 1990). Based 
on this empirical evidence, even diverse groups can overcome difficulties in the 
provision of collective goods as long as they develop shared physical and social capital 
                                                
10 For a detailed, referenced outline of the different approaches see Ostrom (1998).   
11 In 1997, E. Ostrom opened the Presidential Address of the American Political 
Science Association with the argument: “You would not be reading this article if it were 
not for some of our ancestors learning how to undertake collective action to solve social 
dilemmas” (Ostrom 1998).  
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to regulate flows of income from a common resource (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 
Ostrom 2000). The presence of cooperation, just as the presence of non-cooperation, 
indicates that the assumption of self-interest – as a defining characteristic of rational 
individuals – is more limited than rational choice theory would have it (Oliver et al 
1985, Oliver 1993, Marwell et al 1988, Udehn 1993). Nevertheless, rejecting the 
assumption of non-cooperation altogether would be just as unrealistic as rejecting the 
assumption of cooperation in the first place. It is against this background that E. Ostrom 
advocated for a behavioural theory of collective action based on a model of individual 
behaviour consistent with empirical evidence of both cooperation and non-cooperation 
(Ostrom 1998: 1). In doing so, E. Ostrom showed that models of complete rationality 
have been incorrectly confused with a general theory of human behaviour (Ostrom 
1998: 9). Instead, a general theory of human behaviour needs to include both models of 
complete rationality and models of bounded rationality12 (Simon 1957, 1985).  
In order to explain cooperation, behavioural models question some of the assumptions 
used by rational choice models of collective action. First, behavioural models refute that 
individuals have homogenous preferences. Thus, they recognise that individuals have 
different strategies in a particular situation of interdependence. Second, behavioural 
models refute that participants have perfect knowledge about the structure of the 
situation and about the probable strategies of others. Thus, they recognise that 
individuals do not have full information about a situation of interdependence. Third, 
behavioural models refute that individual decisions are made independently and/or 
simultaneously. Thus, they recognise that individuals communicate in situations of 
interdependence in order to solve collective problems (Oliver 1993: 274, Ostrom 1998: 
4, Udehn 1993: 244).  
Consequently, once we relax some of the assumptions of rationality without refuting 
them altogether, we can enquire into why and how individuals sometimes choose to 
                                                
12 Simon describes the parameters of his theory of bounded rationality as follows: “It is 
impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of 
rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore is so great, the information he 
would need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation of objective rationality 
is hard to conceive. Individual choice takes place in an environment of ‘givens’ – 
premises that are accepted by the subject a bases for his choice […]” (Simon 1957: 79). 
Thus, not only are decisions bounded by the incomplete nature of human knowledge at 
any point in time, but also by the organisational environment that frames all possible 
choices available to an individual. 
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cooperate and sometime don’t (Ostrom 1998, Udehn 1993). This question constitutes 
the starting point of the present research. The next sections introduce how the problem 
of collective action has been theorised into a dilemma of open access in shared 
resources, particularly in common pool resources. The sections review the main debate 
between behavioural and rational choice assumptions about who solves dilemmas of 
open access, at what level of provision and by what institutional means, making 
particular reference to the complexity of these problems in transnational common pool 
resources.  
 
1.1.1 The problem of collective action in shared resources 
One of the first models describing the problem of collective action in shared resources 
has been “the tragedy of the commons” put forward by G. Hardin13 (1968). The essence 
of this model is that, faced with the possibility of extracting benefits from a limited 
resource, every self-interested individual – i.e. rational individual – will try to maximise 
their gain rather than the collective gain of all beneficiaries, resulting in the overuse of 
the resource. Thus, the rational behaviour of individuals in this interdependent situation 
increases temptation to shirk from contributing towards the provision of a collective 
arrangement for managing the resource. The problem is exacerbated in situations where 
the shared resource has the characteristics of a common pool resource.  
Ostrom defined a common pool resource as “a natural or man-made resource system 
that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential 
beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use”14 (Ostrom 1990: 30). Common pool 
resources are thus a type of common good broadly understood as a good that, unlike 
purely private goods, exhibits externalities (Holzinger 2008: 28, McKean 2000). Simply 
put, in common pool resources: a) exploitation by one user reduces the resource 
availability for other users and b) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and 
institutional means is costly to achieve (Ostrom et al 1999: 278). Thus, common pool 
resources are characterised by high rivalry of consumption (similar to private goods) as 
                                                
13 It should be noted that a number of notable philosophers and economists, such as 
Hume (1940), Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) had previously described such problems 
of collective action in shared resources.  
14 As Ostrom et al (1999: 278) noted, it is important to understand that “the term 
common-pool resources (CPRs) refers to resource systems regardless of the property 
rights involved”.  
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well as high difficulty of excluding non-contributing users (similar to public goods). 
Therefore, it is the subtractibility of the resource, combined with the jointness of the 
resource system, which make common pool resources prone to congestion and/or 
overuse (Gardner et al 1990, Friedman 1971, Ostrom 1990: 32). 
However, congestion and overuse – as consequences of problems of collective action – 
are not as endemic as rational choice theory would indicate. Over the past three 
decades, a substantial body of empirical evidence has revealed that individuals in 
interdependent situations, such as the use of a common pool resource, do not inevitably 
fail to provide collective arrangements for drawing economic benefits from the resource 
in a sustainable manner (Agrawal 2001, Baland and Platteau 1996, Bromley et al 1992, 
Cox et al 2010, Ostrom 1990). This evidence would then indicate that G. Hardin’s 
conclusion - by which “freedom in the commons brings ruin to all” (1968: 1244) – had 
been misrepresented as a general law of human behaviour (Feeny et al 1990: 2). 
Moreover, G. Hardin argued that the only way to avoid the destruction of common 
resources is by the intervention of an external authority holding responsibility to 
regulate the behaviour of users through a set of positive and/or negative incentives that 
might resemble public or private enterprise (Hardin 1998). The next section tackles 
whether the presence of an external authority with ability to set different property 
arrangements represents the only way to solve problems of collective action in 
transnational common pool resources.  
 
1.1.2 Who fixes problems of collective action in shared resources  
In a later extension to the “tragedy of the commons”, G. Hardin noted: 
“A ‘managed commons’ describes either socialism or the privatism of free 
enterprise. Either one may work, either one may fail: ‘the devil is in the 
detail’. But with an unmanaged commons, you can forget about the devil: 
as overuse of resources reduces carrying capacity, ruin is inevitable” (G. 
Hardin 1998: 683).  
Implicitly, Hardin’s statement argues for the presence of an external authority to devise, 
monitor and enforce inclusive (socialism) or exclusive (privatism) property 
arrangements in the commons in order to manage them out of inevitable ruin. Hardin 
qualifies his statements, arguing that either arrangement can fail to produce sustainable 
governance of a common resource. Accordingly, the devil is in the detail. Then, 
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intuitively, one needs to ask what detail this external intervention is trying to correct. 
Based upon rational assumptions, at a first level there is the problem of organisation 
and, at a second level, there is the problem of monitoring and enforcement.  
In this situation, an external authority such as a government would solve the first 
problem by proposing a set of positive or negative incentives that corrects the ‘ruinous’ 
behaviour of individuals extracting value from a common pool. The totality of these 
regulatory measures represents a new institutional arrangement that would alter the rate 
of access (excludability) and the rate of use (subtractability) in a common pool in favour 
of public or private enterprise. The ‘devil’ would then rest in the second level problem 
of monitoring and enforcement. Empirical studies have shown that users of common 
pool resources can sometimes reject the privatisation or the nationalisation of shared 
resources, with adverse effects such as increasing costs of monitoring and enforcement 
(Feeny et al 1990, Ostrom et al 1999, Wade 1987). This situation reveals that an 
external authority does not always create, monitor and enforce sustainable institutional 
arrangements that avoid the ‘ruin’ of common resources.    
Most importantly, a growing body of empirical evidence has revealed that direct 
resource users can create, monitor and enforce new institutional arrangements for 
successfully sharing resources, without the presence of an external authority (Bromley 
et al 1992, Blomquist and Ostrom 1985, Feeny et al 1990, Velez et al 2009). E. Ostrom 
referred to these direct users as appropriators because they withdraw units from the 
shared system and, generally, use these units as inputs for other production processes 
(1990: 31). Direct resource appropriators are, thus, capable and willing to restrict 
problems in the subtraction and provision of a common resource in order to obtain a 
higher joint benefit and/or to reduce joint harm (Ostrom 1990: 39). Examples of 
cooperation in the absence of external intervention have shown that appropriators can 
alter both first level (problems of organisation) and second level problems (problems of 
monitoring and enforcement) in common pool resources. 
In fact, growing evidence of self-governance in common resources has led to the 
identification of a number of institutional choices that are more likely to result in stable 
and sustainable systems of governance (Table 1.1). Accordingly, the likelihood of stable 
and sustainable self-management of common pool resources rests upon the creation of 
rules of use (allocation) and rules of exclusion (boundary) that are specifically designed 
to respond to the properties of the resource and the attributes of the resource user group 
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in conditions of accountable monitoring and sanctioning, following clearly defined 
authority in rule making, monitoring and enforcement (Table 1.1).    
Table 1.1 Rule Systems as Institutional Choices for Sustainable Governance of Common 
Pool Resources 
Source: Based on Ostrom (1990), Pennington (2012).  
Empirical evidence has revealed that appropriators change rules regarding the quantity, 
timing, location and/or technology of appropriation as well as rules about the overall 
maintenance of the resource in the short, medium and long term. And, similar to 
commons managed by external authority, their level of success remains “in the detail” 
(Hardin 1998). In fact, scholars promoting a closer analysis of the behaviour of resource 
users in conditions of conflict and cooperation have repeatedly stressed the importance 
of understanding why and how individuals interpret problems of appropriation and 
provision differently, rather than the importance of prescribing a set of optimal 
solutions to theoretically derived problems of collective action in the commons (Ostrom 
1990: 56, Ostrom 1998: 5). Only then, a set of optimal principles for institutional design 
can be proposed, keeping in mind that resource users have different attributes just as 
resource systems have different properties that require different solutions (Buck 1998, 
Bromley et al 1992, Ostrom 2003, 2012).  
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Thus, this growing body of literature has uncovered that direct users can adopt a 
combination of self-interest, reciprocity, assurance, altruism and/or conformity when 
faced with a situation of interdependence for sustaining common pool resources 
(Ostrom 1998, Velez et al 2009). The behaviour direct users adopt in a situation of 
interdependence is then linked to how they learn about the benefits and costs of their 
actions as framed by the existing rules setting (Ostrom 1990: 33). The sustainability of 
the property arrangements they create is then dependent on their ability to tailor 
property rules to the attributes of the resource and the resource users group. Following 
from these findings, the next section discusses whether this diversity of sustainable 
arrangements is primarily witnessed in small and medium size natural commons, with a 
degree of remoteness from public or private enterprise, or whether it can also be 
witnessed in transnational commons. 
  
1.1.3 Where to fix problems of collective action in shared resources 
The study of self-organisation, self-monitoring and self-enforcement of institutional 
arrangements in shared resources has been largely conducted on small and medium-size 
common pool resources. The benefit of this approach is a closer examination of 
behavioural responses to structural problems as well as to the actions of other 
participants in the commons. The limitation of this approach, however, is the “scaling 
up” problem (Ostrom 2009, Ostrom et al 1999: 281). This problem translates in at least 
three ways. First, large-scale common pool resources, such as the atmosphere, the 
oceans or the worldwideweb, are transnational pools with considerably higher number 
and more diverse appropriators. Second, large-scale resources are predisposed to 
multiple conflicts derived from overlapping commons within them. For instance, the 
worldwideweb has been identified as hosting four distinct commons: a social commons, 
an information commons, a budget commons and a technical infrastructure commons 
(Hess 1995). Third, large-scale common pool resources might not be as remote from 
public or private enterprise as local grazing grounds, water basins or local fisheries but 
are exposed to the lack of hierarchical authority characteristic of international relations 
(Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 11-13).  
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These problems can complicate the frameworks used to evaluate institutional 
arrangements in transnational commons. First, users of global commons15 are more 
diverse, have more complex motivational structures and interact in multi-level systems 
of governance at the local, national, regional and international level (Holzinger 2008, 
Keohane and Ostrom 1995). Consequently, regime analyses of global commons have 
revealed the limits of self-organisation, self-monitoring and self-enforcement in relation 
with the complexity of these transnational resources (Buck 1998, Goldman 1998, 
Vogler 2000, Wijkman 1982). Their results confirm that the technology for extracting 
value from these resources had evolved in the absence of an equal evolution of legal 
institutions designed to reduce negative externalities and avoid depletion (Ostrom in 
Buck 1998: xiii-xv). However, from an analytical perspective, these studies have 
focused primarily on the strategies of state actors at the international level. Regime 
analysis benefits from an understanding that governments cannot aggregate all interests 
within their jurisdictions and transpose them as clear positions in international 
negotiations. Besides, regime analysis recognises that non-state actors have some 
contribution in defining rules by providing policy expertise and coordination (Jackobsen 
2000, Vogler 2000, Sell 2000). Yet, this analytical approach can sometimes restrict non-
state actors to privileged beneficiaries of access to policy-making in exchange for the 
provision of otherwise costly knowledge and technical expertise (Buck 1998, Vogler 
2000).  
In transnational commons, this analytical approach can limit how we frame the problem 
and, most importantly, where we frame the solution to achieve a sustainable 
institutional arrangement. First of all, global commons have multiple uses and multiple 
users, which means that conflict in a global common is never unidimensional. For 
instance, ocean resources can simultaneously host consumptive conflicts that affect the 
fish population, excludable conflicts that affect access to water and/or negative 
externalities that affect pollution levels. The complexity of these situations indicate that 
problems of collective action in transnational commons go beyond recognised dilemmas 
of collective provision and span from defection problems to distribution and 
                                                
15 As indicated in supra note 7, this thesis adopts the definition of global commons put 
forward by Holzinger (2008). According to Holzinger, global common goods can be 
interpreted as a type or “subset of transnational common goods” (2008: 165).   
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disagreement problems16 (Holzinger 2008: 153-159).  Moreover, most of these conflicts 
occur at levels other than where their solutions are generally negotiated. Several studies 
reveal that most of these problems occur at individual, local or regional level, where 
access and use of the resource normally occur (Agrawal and Perrin 2009, Ostrom 2009). 
However, rule systems for these resources have generally been negotiated among state 
actors at international level and, as a result, disagreement over sustainable institutions 
has been presented as the ultimate example of defection or sub-optimal coordination. In 
this context, the complexity of conflict in transnational commons is not fully accounted 
for by rational choice models of collective action among state actors at the international 
level. Instead, tiered conflicts in global commons require refocusing analytical lenses at 
the level of the individual user of the resource where access and use take place (Ostrom 
2010).   
In order to correct the focus on state actors at international level, scholars examining 
collective action in global commons have proposed a polycentric approach to the study 
of institutions. This approach acknowledges that choices regarding the production, 
coordination, monitoring and enforcement of institutional arrangements can be achieved 
at autonomous and diverse levels of decision-making (McGinnis 2011, V. Ostrom 1999, 
V. Ostrom et al 1961). Essentially, proponents of polycentric governance noted that 
public economies are themselves organised in a decentralised and dynamic manner by 
which “many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their 
relationships with one another within a general system of rules where each element acts 
with independence of other elements” (V. Ostrom 1999: 57, V. Ostrom et al 1961). 
Following from these findings, the absence of hierarchical order in international 
systems of governance does not imply the absence of (optimal) distribution of authority, 
just as the presence of a government with authority in its jurisdiction does not imply the 
hierarchical imposition of rules (Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 11). If, as V. Ostrom 
noted, polycentric orders apply to most social interactions, then it is crucial to identify 
                                                
16 Holzinger (2008) has created a typology of problems of collective action in 
transnational common goods. These include: typical defection problems resulting from 
prisoner’s dilemmas games, coordination problems resulting from assurance games, 
distribution problems resulting from rambo games (where coordination in achieved, but 
a suboptimal outcome can result from it) as well as disagreement problems resulting 
from chicken or battle of the sexes games (2008: 154). The modeling of these games 
reveals that the situations in which institutional arrangements are provided as common 
goods can vary considerably and, subsequently, can inform strategic actions in different 
ways, leading to different problems of collective action.   
 39 
the distribution of rule-making, rule-monitoring and rule-enforcement in autonomous 
yet interdependent levels of authority in transnational commons (V. Ostrom 1999). As 
V. Ostrom explained, “systems of governance occur wherever complementary 
arrangements for formulating, using, monitoring, judging and enforcing rules exist” (V. 
Ostrom 2014: 46).  
Polycentricity in global governance has been documented in social science by the 
literature concerned with the making, monitoring and enforcement of complex 
transnational regulation. This approach has been successfully applied to the study of 
international standardisation (Abbott and Snidal 2011, Mattli 2001, Buthe and Mattli 
2011, Werle 2001) and (self)-regulation in global regimes (Haufler 2001, Mattli and 
Woods 2009), but has been less systematically transposed onto the analysis of 
governance in transnational commons (Cafaggi 2012b, Holzinger 2008). In this context, 
the benefits of the literature on global regimes, international standardisation and 
transnational private regulation are essential for the study of the global commons. First, 
they confirm the diversity of non-state actors involved in the development of global 
regimes, such as firms, NGOs, technical experts and epistemic communities operating 
outside national regulatory frameworks (Haufler 2001, Abbott and Snidal 2011). 
Second, they confirm the role of non-state actors in the monitoring and enforcement of 
global governance, rather than simply at the rule-making level (Cafaggi 2012a, Scott 
2012). Third, they confirm the complexity of authority in networked governance and the 
emergence of the state as “a rule-taker as opposed to a rule maker” (Braithwaite in 
Cafaggi 2011:21, Buthe and Mattli 2011, Scott 2010, Werle 2001).  
In particular, the literature on transnational private regulation can make a valuable 
contribution to the analysis of regulatory regimes in global commons because it allows 
for the recognition of diverse authority in the appropriation, provision and maintenance 
of shared resources (Abbott 2012, Abbott and Snidal 2009, Hoffman 2013). In addition, 
the analysis of transnational private regulation allows for the recognition of a diversity 
of entities with “jurisdictional integrity”, which are not always factored into the analysis 
of regulatory regimes in natural commons of a transnational nature (Skelcher 2005: 91). 
This literature acknowledges the legitimacy of club entities (Hooghe and Marks 2003), 
agency entities (Coen and Thatcher 2005) and polity entities (Jakobsen 2000) in 
defining, monitoring and enforcing rules in transnational systems of governance 
(Skelcher 2005). Lastly, the analysis of transnational private regulation allows for the 
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recognition of a variety of models “engaging businesses, association of firms and 
NGOs, sometimes in hybrid form and often including governmental actors” in 
contemporary systems of governance (Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011: 3). This hybrid 
mix of actors is also mirrored in hybrid institutional arrangements utilised for the 
production, maintenance and preservation of transnational commons (Hess and Ostrom 
2005). German and Keeler (2010) argue that contemporary natural resource 
management is increasingly governed by such hybrid institutions, which “do not fall 
within neatly inscribed units or categories of resource ownership or governance, but are 
characterised rather by their interdependence” (German and Keeler 2010: 572). This 
position brings benefits to the study of institutional arrangements in the global 
commons because it negates dichotomies such as market versus state authority, 
horizontal versus hierarchical structures and/or private versus public ownership as 
alternative modes of governance. This point is discussed in more detail in the next 
section, which considers whether property systems evolve from a specific distribution 
of authority or whether hybrid property arrangements can evolve in the governance of 
transnational commons.  
 
1.1.4 How to fix problems of collective action in shared resources 
In her study of the global commons, S. Buck offered a definition of common pool 
resources that shows the centrality of property systems vis-à-vis (problems of) 
collective action in the commons: “Common pool resources are subtractable resources 
managed under a property regime in which a legally defined user pool cannot be 
efficiently excluded from the resource domain” (Buck 1998: 5). Following this 
definition, the property regime that evolves from the open access nature of a common 
pool resource could lead to sub-optimal levels of consumption, maintenance and 
preservation of the common pool. Hence, it is relevant to explore how property 
arrangements are defined in common pools in order to evaluate their short or long term 
sustainability. There are, however, two main concerns regarding the models used to 
describe and prescribe property solutions in natural common pools, be they local or 
global. The first issue concerns the conceptual relationship between types of goods, 
types of owners and types of rights in general (German and Keeler 2010, McKean 
2000) and the second issue concerns the definition of property rights with particular 
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reference to common pool resources (Cole and Ostrom 2012, Schlager and Ostrom 
1992).  
The first issue concerns the discrete definition of property systems in common pool 
resources as private, common or public. As Cole and Ostrom (2012) noted, this 
categorisation has roots in Roman law definitions of property as res nullius (open 
access), res communes (common property), res publica (public property) and res 
privatae (private property). The issue of concern is not that the conceptualisation refers 
to discrete forms of property per se but that, although known to be referring to ideal 
types of property, this conceptualisation is still presented in normative debates in order 
to inform reforms of rule systems (Dagan and Heller 2001). This approach is restrictive 
because it associates types of rights to particular types of rights holders, i.e. public 
ownership (state), common ownership (collectivities) and private ownership 
(individuals). As noted by German and Keeler (2010), this approach can lead to 
problematic conclusions that only certain types of rights owners can successfully hold 
certain types of rights (German and Keeler 2010: 574). Scholars of institutional analysis 
in common pool resources have previously reported this conceptual limitation. McKean 
(2000) noted that: 
“the confusion of the publicness and privateness of goods (a natural given), 
rights (an institutional invention) and owners of rights (entities that make 
different representational claims) has led to serious errors (McKean 2000: 
32, emphasis in the original).  
McKean (2000) noted that, in particular, confusions between goods and rights have 
sometimes led to prescriptions of public rights in private goods and private rights in 
public or commons goods, just as confusions between owners and rights have 
sometimes led to conclusions that private entities hold private rights and public entities 
hold public rights, “when in fact public rights (rights to access and use that do not 
include the right to exclude others from such use) are generally held by private entities 
because public bodies have created such rights for citizens” (McKean 2000: 31-34). 
McKean’s description of the relationship between goods, rights and owners of rights is 
valuable not only because it shows that any combination of goods, property rights and 
rights holders can exist, at least theoretically (McKean 2000: 33). McKean’s description 
is essential because it reinforces evidence about the complexity of property 
arrangements in the commons, which take the form of “mixed regimes including 
elements of individual and common property” (Pennington 2012: 30).  
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This complexity of ownership arrangements brings the discussion to the second 
limitation concerning the definition of property rights in common pool resources. 
According to Schlager and Ostrom (1992), property arrangements in common pool 
resources describe not only the property entitlement, but also the rules used to create 
and enforce those entitlements (1992: 249). Following this approach, property 
arrangements are bundles of rights that concern both operational entitlements of use and 
access to a resource as well as the collective choice actions that define and change these 
operational entitlements (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
Similarly, Buck (1998) explains that “the property right to a resource is not a single 
right but rather a bundle of rights, such as rights of access, exclusion, extraction or sale 
of the captured resource; the right to transfer one’s right to a second person; and the 
right of inheritance” (Buck 1998: 3).  
Table 1.2 Property Systems in Common Pool Resources 
Source: Based on Cole and Ostrom (2012), Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
Table 1.2 provides a description of property bundles in common pool resources 
following two categories of rights: a) operational rights concerning rights of access and 
rights of withdrawal; and b) collective choice rights concerning the management, 
exclusion and alienation17 of the resource (Cole and Ostrom 2012, Schlager and Ostrom 
1992). As Schlager and Ostrom (1992) noted, the distinction between rights at the 
                                                
17This thesis does not focus on the process by which rights of alienation are defined. 
This is because the right of alienation is defined by public actors at state level, rather 
than at transnational or international level.  
Property Right Description of Property Right 
Operational 
Rights 
Access The right to enter a resource, which can be achieved by 
permission from a recognised authority, by purchasing a 
right to enter or by inheriting a right to enter. 
Use The right to withdraw, to harvest or to extract units from 
the system resource, and to potentially use them as input 
for other production activities. 
Collective 
Choice Rights 
Management The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform 
the resource by making improvements or by developing 
a variety of infrastructures on it. 
Exclusion The right to determine who will have an access right to 
the resource. 
Alienation The right to sell or lease any of the rights above for a 
given period of time 
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operational level and rights at the collective choice level can also be explained as “the 
difference between exercising a right and participating in the definition of future rights 
to be exercised. The authority to devise future operational-level rights is what makes 
collective-choice rights so powerful” (Schlager and Ostrom 1992: 251). 
This categorisation of rights illustrates why labelling property arrangements in common 
pool resources as private, common or public can represent a barrier rather than an 
enabler for theory development. Considering the difference between goods, owners and 
rights described by McKean (2000), this categorisation of rights allows for a more 
suitable reclassification of rights holders as individuals, groups or governments (O 
Ostrom et al 1999: 279), bearing in mind that, at least theoretically, any of the specified 
rights holders can have any configuration of operational and/or collective choice 
entitlements. This approach helps understand why public entities can formulate rights of 
use or access to a common pool resource that lead to imperfections in the application, 
monitoring or enforcement of these rules by private groups of users (Feeny et al 1990: 
8). Similarly, this approach helps understand why parcelling rights to individual rights 
holders by a government – i.e. individual exclusive rights provided by a public entity – 
can lead to costly monitoring and enforcement that overlook the possibility that private 
groups or organisations of individuals can hold and share private rights without 
parcelling use exclusively on an individual basis (McKean 2000: 31). In this 
circumstance, individual private rights allow for resource unit maximisation, but do not 
and cannot ensure protection against resource crowding or overexploitation (Feeny et al 
1990: 6).  
This circumstance also reveals the main misconceptions regarding the privateness of 
individual and group property. As McKean noted (2000), the privateness of a right 
refers to “the clarity, security and especially the exclusivity of the right” or, to be more 
exact, to a clear specification of the entitlements of the rights holder, the protection of 
these entitlements and the exclusivity of the entitlements to the rights holder as opposed 
to non-holders (McKean 2000: 28). Nowhere does it state that the privateness of a 
property right refers exclusively to an individual rights holder. Thus, the privateness of 
a property right refers just as much to individual rights holders as to common or group 
rights holders, because common or group property designates property that is held by a 
finite number of people who manage those rights and exclude outsiders (Dagan and 
Heller 2001).  
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In this circumstance: 
“a group of individuals might be a private owner that can share property 
rights and thus create a regime of common property rights for managing 
common pool goods” (McKean 2000: 32).   
Then, resource user groups can define property systems that create common rights of 
use based on internally negotiated processes of withdrawal from the resource as well as 
private rights of access based on exclusion of outsiders. In addition, this property 
arrangement can be de jure ensured by the external authority of a public entity or de 
facto ensured by the internal authority of the private group entity. In short, this 
conceptualisation of the privateness and publicness of rights and rights holders allows 
for recognition of the complexity of governance in common pool resources that 
facilitates, rather than hinders, the study of the relationship between the common pool 
good, the bundle of property rights and the nature of property rights holders.  
To conclude, this conceptualisation of the relationship between goods, property 
arrangements and property holders is suited to the analysis of institutional arrangements 
in global commons for three reasons. First, it recognises that the physical properties of 
the resource – as natural properties of the common pool good – are relevant in the 
selection of institutional arrangements in the resource because they frame initial levels 
of rivalry and excludability in the consumption of the good. Second, this 
conceptualisation recognises that the bundle of rights that makes up property 
arrangements in common goods take the form of hybrid institutions or mixed regimes of 
governance. German and Keeler (2012) have defined hybrid institutions as “institutional 
arrangements governing the interdependencies among discrete property holders and 
regimes, whether defined by structure (linkage among entities with jurisdiction over 
discrete property regimes) or modes of governance (balance between self-organisation 
and formal regulation as complementary instruments of governance)” (2012: 571). 
Therefore, this conceptualisation frees scholars from the confines of social order 
heuristics that collapse rights and rights holders into analytical boxes labelled “the 
community”, “the market” or “the state” (Streeck and Schmitter 1985) and allows for 
more detailed investigation into the relationship between the bundle of rights and the 
publicness or privateness of these rights. Third, this conceptualisation recognises the 
diversity of rights holders that can define, monitor or enforce an institutional 
arrangement in the commons, which can lead to polycentric systems of governance that 
are both complex and sustainable in the long-term (recall Table 1.1
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definition of property arrangements in common pools as comprising a bundle of 
operational and collective choice rights (recall Table 1.2), then private and public rights 
holders can have different configurations of authority as makers and keepers of these 
rights, without associating authority in defining, monitoring or enforcing these rights 
with the publicness or privateness of the rights holder.  
Overall, rather than focusing on public entities that hold exclusive authority in 
negotiating institutional arrangements for the global commons, such as state actors, one 
should focus on diverse entities holding both individual and group interests that might 
not always coincide, that might lead to complex bundles of operational rights of use and 
access to the common pool and that might lead to complex bundles of collective choice 
rights, which involve both public and private actors sharing authority in the definition, 
monitoring and enforcement of these rights.  
Therefore, this thesis proposes to refocus our analytical lenses beyond the role of public 
actors in negotiating arrangements for governing transnational common pool resources. 
The diversity of operational and collective choice arrangements witnessed in local and 
global commons suggests that the rule-making, rule-monitoring and rule-enforcement 
go beyond explanations structured in public negotiations along national-international 
lines. The remainder of this chapter explores whether this diversity of operational and 
collective choice arrangements is indeed witnessed in the early governance of the 
electromagnetic radio spectrum as an example of a transnational common pool resource. 
Overall, the following sections find tensions between the publicness and privateness of 
these property arrangements in the early governance of the radio resource. Thus, the 
diversity of these property arrangements require a closer study of the role of individual 
private users and associations of private users in defining the bundle of rights that make 
up institutional arrangements in transnational commons.    
 
1.2 The Radio Spectrum as a Transnational Common Pool Resource 
The electromagnetic radio spectrum has been previously recognised as a transnational 
common pool resource (Herter 1985, Hess 2008, Soroos 1982, Wijkman 1982). 
Representing the totality of radio frequencies, the radio spectrum is exposed to 
problems of collective action resulting from the competitive withdrawal of resource 
units by users, which reduces resource availability for others (i.e. rivalry of 
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consumption), as well as from the difficulty of excluding beneficiaries that do not invest 
in costly cooperation for the provision of stable institutions of governance (i.e. non-
excludability).  
The sections below start by introducing the natural properties of the radio spectrum 
resource. As E. Ostrom noted, every common pool resource has different physical 
properties, which frame different incentive structures for actors drawing benefits from 
their use (Ostrom 1990, 2010). Thereafter, the sections outline three main problems of 
collective action in the radio spectrum resource: a) the problem of interference, as a type 
of negative externality or pollution resulting from the activity of providing wireless 
communications on the radio resource; b) the problem of private control over a common 
resource utilised to deliver a public good – i.e. communications - as a type of tension 
between the exclusive right to use the radio resource and the universal right to public 
correspondence; and c) the problem of non-interconnection between devices and non-
intercommunication between services operating in the radio resource, as a type of 
tension between exclusive and non-exclusive property on the resource. These tensions 
reveal the complexity of problems of collective action in transnational commons, which 
span from coordination problems in situations of externalities arising from the 
consumption of radio frequencies to distributional problems in situations of rival 
consumption of radio frequencies by public and private actors.  
Overall, the following sections reveal the presence of both public and private industry 
actors in defining and redefining operational and collective choice rights in the radio 
spectrum. This account of early coordination identifies the presence of private actors, 
sometimes grouped in strategic associations, in rule-making for managing radio 
frequencies as well as their position in relation to the public actors present in the 
process. The main evidence to support the central position of industrial actors in early 
rule-making is the decision to parcel out international radio frequencies by 
communications service rather than by sovereign state. This decision, in place to the 
present day, dates back to the early 1900s when the first institutional arrangements for 
governing the radio resource were established. This decision also reveals how 
distributional problems resulting from access to radio frequencies, externality problems 
resulting from use of radio frequencies as well as congestion problems resulting from 
difficulties of exclusion in the radio resource were framed by negotiations between 
private actors on the one hand and between private actors and public actors on the other 
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hand. Bringing these issues into contemporary debates about how the radio resource 
should be apportioned and should be allocated to a growing number of wireless 
communications services, the chapter concludes that the radio spectrum is a suitable 
case to test the relevance of private venues of collaboration and contestation in 
determining property arrangements in transnational common pools.  
 
1.2.1 The Three I’s –interference, intellectual property and interconnection 
Wireless communications via radio frequency waves were first discovered in the mid to 
late 19th century and gained immediate acceptance as alternative to wired telegraph 
communications due to their strategic value in commerce and defence. However, the 
borderless and open access nature of the radio spectrum resource raised questions about 
how wireless communications should be managed in a global system organised in 
empires. In this context, three main problems of collective action came to structure 
transnational negotiations over radio spectrum management. First, the issue of harmful 
interference as a negative externality produced by communication devices using this 
open access resource concomitantly. Second, the issue of establishing intellectual 
property rights on the first technology solutions for producing and delivering wireless 
communications as a form of exclusive use of this open access resource. Third, the issue 
of interconnection between proprietary communications systems competing for access 
on the radio waves, as a form of mitigating attempts to restrict access for private use. 
Since the Preliminary Conference on Wireless Telegraphy of 1903, these issues have 
been at the core of national, transnational and international negotiations. Their 
dynamics have framed positions of rivalry and excludability on the radio resource, not 
only between private actors as initial providers of the technology that facilitated the 
extraction of economic value from this resource, but also between private and public 
actors involved in defining property arrangements in the resource.  
Communications via electromagnetic radio frequencies came into application in the mid 
to late 19th century, against an international context dominated by Great Power politics. 
This was an age characterised by the globalisation of commerce via intensive maritime 
traffic, the globalisation of communications via widespread telegraph cables and, as a 
result, the emergence of commercial champions with international operations across 
political empires. Wireless communications are largely associated with Guglielmo 
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Marconi who invented, patented and commercialised the first devices to transmit 
information via electromagnetic waves using the internationally standardised Morse 
code18.  
Wireless communications developed against a background of established international 
cooperation over the communications system of cable telegraphy that stretched across 
the globe. On the one hand, the international system of cable telegraphy followed 
closely the organisation of empire and reflected investments made by the Great Powers 
in the telecommunications infrastructure that later consolidated the position of Post, 
Telegraph and Telephone authorities (PTTs) as well as the commercial capacity of 
national champions in manufacturing communications equipment (Headrick 1991, Hills 
2002, Hills 2007, Tomlinson 1945). On the other hand, the international system of cable 
telegraphy raised a number of coordination problems over the flow, pricing and 
operability of communication services in this complex network of cables, which led to 
the creation of the International Telegraph Union in 186519 (Codding 1995, Griset 1992, 
Headrick 1991, Hills 2002). The structure of coordination under the International 
Telegraph Union, the predecessor of the contemporary International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), maintained responsibility over the telegraph network 
in the hands of governments and established an international bureau with responsibility 
to centralise and monitor changes to national networks with potential technical and/or 
commercial impact on the wider international communications system20 (Cowhey 1990, 
Genschel and Werle 1993). Wireless communications using radio frequencies 
developed against this background of international coordination in cable 
telecommunications that, most importantly, established governments as central in 
                                                
18 Against popular belief, Guglielmo Marconi is not the inventor of radio. As Headrick 
noted, “his contribution consisted in putting together pieces attributed to other men – 
Hertz’s spark, Branly’s coherer, Popov’s antenna, Lodge’s tuning circuit […]” (1991: 
117). However, Alekdandr Popov called Marconi “the father of wireless” for 
developing the practical application of wireless using the standardised means of 
communications through Morse code, as used in cable telegraphy (Simons 1996: 37).  
19 The first International Telegraph Conference was called by the German Empire in 
1865 and was addressed to all interested parties across the European continent. The 
signatories of the convention were the representatives of: Austria, Hungary and 
Boehme, Bade, Bevier, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Hamburg, Hanover, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Algarve, Prussia, Russia, Saxony, Sweden and Norway, 
Swiss Confederation, Turkish and Wurttemberg (ITC 1865).  
20 It should be noted that, since its inception, the ITU and the ITU Conferences have 
been open to private companies and organisations, although these entities participate on 
a consultative basis and do not have the right to vote in Regulations or Treaties.    
 49 
delivering and administering telecommunications as a public good21, derived from “the 
right of all people to access correspondence by means of international telegraph” (ITC 
1865, Art 4). As outlined below, it is this approach to communications as a public 
service that came to challenge the first use of radio waves on an exclusive basis for the 
delivery of wireless communications by a private industrial actor.   
In this age of empire, wireless communications received immediate attention for their 
value in ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship communications in the context of the 
globalisation of commerce of the early 20th century. Increased mobility was thus a 
valuable attribute of communications using radio waves. However, compared with the 
wired network, wireless telegraphy raised a different coordination problem – that of 
managing interference between services operating internationally. Because radio 
frequencies travel across national borders, wireless communications cannot be 
controlled outside the territory they are emitted from and, as a result, are susceptible to 
interference from other communication services they meet along the way. As a type of 
electromagnetic disturbance, which occurs when the use of some electrical equipment 
obstructs or degrades the performance of another, interference is thus a type of pollution 
on the radio spectrum resource. As a result, the first aspect of international cooperation 
in wireless communications was the issue of interference between communication 
services delivered, largely, by private or public entities registered within the territory of 
the signatories of the International Telegraph Convention (1865). As a negative 
externality, interference affected the very quality and secrecy of wireless 
communications, reducing the utility derived from licensed services. Thus, the 
Preliminary Conference on Wireless Telegraphy in Berlin22 (1903) introduced the 
principle of non-interference, by which “the working of wireless telegraph stations must 
be organised, as far as possible, in such a manner as not to interfere with the working of 
other stations” (Art V). However, against the background of resolving the problem of 
interference, the first international negotiations in radiotelegraphy were framed by 
                                                
21 Art 4 of the International Telegraph Convention of 1865 stipulated that “the 
contracting parties recognised the right of all people to access correspondence by means 
of international telegraph” (ITC 1865).  
22 Once again, the German Empire made the call for this international conference. As it 
will be outlined below, one of the main reasons for calling an international conference 
in radiocommunications stemmed from the threat of exclusivity in the radio waves 
imposed by Marconi.  
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tensions, both at national and international level, between the private and public control 
of the radio spectrum. 
With virtual unanimity in the specialist literature, the rapid growth of wireless 
communications in various areas of economic activity is associated with the work of 
Guglielmo Marconi and, particularly, his attempt at the creation of a proprietary global 
standard for wireless telegraphy in the early 20th century (Headrick 1991, Hills 2002). 
Marconi achieved this position by establishing intellectual property rights on the first 
devices used for commercial wireless communications. The dynamics of contestation 
that resulted from Marconi’s attempt at a de facto monopoly over wireless 
communications is thus crucial for understanding the nature of collective action that has 
defined transnational radio spectrum management since its inception to the present day. 
Not only do these dynamics help us understand the relationship between private and 
public actors in managing global commons, but they also facilitate a closer look at the 
relationship between industry actors involved in technological innovation and 
knowledge exchanges in the sector of wireless communications.  
In 1896, Marconi filed a patent for his invention in Britain and, a year later, set up the 
Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company Ltd to take over all past, present and future 
patents developed under his name23 (Simons 1996: 44, Tomlinson 1945: 11). Registered 
as Patent 12039, the claim read: “I believe that I am the first to discover and use any 
practical means for effective telegraphic transmission and intelligible reception of 
signals produced by artificially-formed Hertz oscillations” (Simons 1996: 44). Soon, 
Marconi’s patent received the interest of the British Post Office. However, the 
relationship between Marconi and the Post Office reached an immediate standstill when 
Marconi rejected their offer to purchase his patents. Regarding the Post Office as direct 
competitor, Marconi leased equipment to ship owners and transmitted free of charge on 
claims of intercompany communications, which bypassed the monopoly service of the 
Post Office on all communications. Soon after, Marconi won several contracts with the 
                                                
23 G. Marconi moved to Britain in 1986, following a lack of interest in his equipment 
for wireless communications by the Italian Ministry of Posts and Telegraph (Headrick 
1991: 117, Hill 2002: 94, Simons 1996). At the time, the Italian government advised 
Marconi to make his invention available worldwide without a patent, since Marconi had 
not made a new discovery in telegraphic transmission via radio frequencies but, in 
reality, created a practical device for the stable transmission and reception of signals 
using previous scientific discoveries (Simons 1996: 44). However, Marconi proceeded 
to patent his invention in Britain.  
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British Admiralty and Lloyd’s of London, and introduced a policy of non-
intercommunication on all services provided for commercial maritime purposes.  
Marconi’s policy of non-interconnection/ non-intercommunication meant that any ship 
wanting to communicate with another one insured by Lloyd’s would have to purchase 
or rent Marconi equipment (Headrick 1991: 119). This position prompted Marconi to 
make new claims to change his company’s status from an international supplier of 
wireless communications equipment to an international operator for the general public, 
by setting interconnection at a surcharge between his service and domestic ones, such as 
those provided by the Post Office (Hills 2002: 97). As Jolly and Hills noted, Marconi’s 
argument in support of this de facto monopoly was based on the requirement to control 
interference in order to deliver quality of service in ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore 
transmissions (Hills 2002: 97, Jolly 1972: 137). In fact, throughout the first five years of 
existence, Marconi’s company made intellectual property claims on all improvements 
of the technology under Patent 12039, creating a considerable portfolio in short-range 
and long-range wireless communications and taking a consistent position in filing for 
patent infringements in most countries where Marconi subsidiaries were operating 
(Simons 1996). The production of proprietary equipment, coupled with the adoption of 
a policy of non-intercommunication in service delivery, indicates Marconi’s interest to 
establish exclusive use of international radio frequencies. As Headrick noted “Marconi, 
never modest in his ambitions, wished to claim the electromagnetic spectrum as his 
private domain and create, in radio communications, a company as powerful as the 
Eastern group in cables” (Headrick 1991: 119).  
Thus, Marconi’s attempt to establish a private monopoly on wireless communications 
came in direct contradiction with the role of governments to ensure “the right of all 
people to public correspondence”, as stipulated in the International Telegraph 
Convention (ITC 1865, Art 4). In addition, Marconi’s de facto monopoly on wireless 
communications had also reconfigured the interests of competitors affected by 
Marconi’s imposition of a surcharge for international communication services. For 
instance, in 1897, the German Emperor’s Scientific Advisor – A. Slaby – attempted to 
set up a commercial agreement between Marconi and AEG24 of Germany for the 
common provision of transnational wireless communication services. Failure to reach 
                                                
24 At the time, AEG was one of the most established manufacturers of telegraph systems 
in Germany, also benefiting from worldwide orders.  
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an agreement led to the creation of Telefunken in 1903, one of the main competitors to 
Marconi in the coming years25 (Simons 1996: 47).  
In 1903, the year of the creation of Telefunken, the German government proposed the 
first international conference for coordinating wireless communications. Commenting 
on the reasons behind this initiative, Tomlinson noted: 
 “It was perhaps more in view of the imminent stranglehold of the Marconi 
interests in wireless communications, than the actual need for international 
regulation of these communications, which inspired the German 
Government to take initiative in organising the first international 
conference on wireless telegraphy” (Tomlinson 1945: 13).  
Unsurprisingly, at the conference, the German delegation proposed free interconnection 
as a fundamental principle in international wireless communications. Hills noted that, 
put simply, the goal of the German manufacturer, backed by the state, was to compel 
Marconi to share his network with their equipment by enforcing free interconnection 
and global standardisation of devices by international treaty (Hills 2002: 101). Thus, 
compulsory interconnection was perceived, by a majority of conference participants, as 
a means to limit Marconi’s position in the market for wireless communications as 
derived from his first mover advantage in the radio resource. Because compulsory 
intercommunication did not receive the support of all members at the first wireless 
telegraph conference26, the issue was pursued at the International Radiotelegraph 
Conference of 1906.  
This time, the German delegation changed its approach. Citing interference between a 
growing number of services – a recognised problem at the time of the conference27 – the 
German delegation proposed the introduction of service regulations for all ship-to-shore 
transmission, whereby services delivered by public entities would be registered in 
                                                
25 The Telefunken system did not infringe on Marconi’s patents because both Siemens 
and AEG had strong patent portfolios in wired telegraphy and, with the help of A. 
Slaby, were able to branch into wireless telegraphy soon after Marconi’s inventions. 
26 The Italian and British delegations did not support the clause, citing contracts with 
Marconi (Hills 2002: 102).   
27 Commenting on the nature of international communications at the time, Tomlinson 
(1945) noted: “In spite of technical progress and the greater number of radio stations in 
operation, the air was still legally free. While the conditions of operation were 
established in certain countries by national legislation, the effective use of radio as a 
form of international communication, especially in the areas where maritime traffic was 
heavy, depended on the good will of neighbouring stations. All too frequently, good 
will was lacking” (Tomlinson 1945: 18). 
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different frequency blocks than those delivered by commercial entities. Thus, the 
proposed solution to avoid interference and crowding of certain frequency bands was to 
designate government services, including military services, to higher frequencies 
(600kc/s-1,600kc/s), while designating commercial services to lower frequencies 
(300kc/s-600kc/s)28.  
The effect of this measure was, essentially, the reconfiguration of rivalry and 
excludability in the radio spectrum. At the time, Marconi’s most successful ship-to-
shore communications service over long distances was operating in higher frequencies, 
above 600kc/s. Being a private and commercial service for the shipping industry, 
Marconi’s international operations were essentially squeezed out of the radio bands 
above 600kc/s, which became designated, exclusively, to government services. This 
favoured Telefunken, whose equipment was deployed on all state-owned German 
vessels, which essentially qualified them for access in the over 600kc/s frequency 
bands. By adopting this service-based regulation for international wireless 
communications, the private control established by Marconi in longwave 
communications was essentially eliminated. The allocation of radio frequencies by 
communications service, coupled with the principle of non-interference and the 
principle of interconnection, form the basic regulation of the transnational radio 
resource to the present day.  
These regulatory measures had a clear impact on changing the dynamics of rivalry in 
the radio spectrum. They altered the incentives structure for both public and private 
actors drawing economic benefits from the radio resource. For instance, relations 
between public and private actors at the national level had altered soon after the Berlin 
Conference of 1906, when the British Post Office signed a new licensing agreement 
with Marconi based on financial incentives, rather than punitive measures aimed at 
restricting his operations, in return for accessing frequency bands otherwise closed for 
commercial use (Headrick 1991: 125, Hills 2002: 131). Commercial relations between 
industrial actors had also changed, when Marconi and Telefunken agreed to form a 
patent pool in 1911, which gave the two companies access to highly proprietary 
knowledge in long distance broadcasting (i.e. long distance fixed point 
                                                
28 Kc/s stands for “kilo cycles per second”, a measure established by Hertz for recording 
the frequency of an electromagnetic wave. Later, the measure of “kilo cycles per 
second” was replaced by Hz, showing the importance of the discovery. 
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communications) and led the two companies to establish a new monopoly in frequency 
bands yet unregulated by international treaty.  
Overall, the early history of radio spectrum management reveals tensions between 
government and commercial control of the wireless resource. This early history shows 
the private origin of wireless communications as well as the clear reliance on 
technology for extracting value and for establishing property systems in a transnational 
resource (Ostrom in Buck 1998: xiii). This early history also reveals that both public 
and private actors have strong incentives to set preferable rules in the radio spectrum, 
rules that can alter the degree of rivalry and excludability in the radio pool, triggering a 
reorganisation of the resource and producing new incentives for contestation and 
coordination. Therefore, this early history reveals the centrality of distributional and 
coordination problems of collective action in the radio resource. On the one hand, 
distributional problems informed dynamics of contestation regarding rivalry and 
excludability between private and public users of the resource. On the other hand, 
coordination problems informed dynamics of coordination regarding the proprietary 
technologies used to extract economic value from the radio resource. The next section 
addresses how these dynamics of contestation and coordination inform positions of 
authority in setting property arrangements concerning rivalry and exclusion in the 
transnational radio spectrum pool. 
  
1.2.2 Who fixes problems of collective action in the radio spectrum 
Describing the governance of the radio spectrum, Buck noted that: 
“The radio spectrum is res communes [common property], rather than res 
nullius [open access] because allocation of the spectrum to various users is 
not permanent. Users receive usufructuary rights rather than a full bundle 
of proprietary rights” (Buck 1998: 154).  
This description of the property arrangements established on the radio resource, 
although conceptually misleading29, is relevant for two reasons. First, it informs about 
the nature of operational ownership on the radio resource. Second, and most 
importantly, it informs about the nature of collective choice rights on the radio resource 
                                                
29 Based on the categorisation of property rights presented in Table 1.2 above, 
usufructuary rights are, in fact, the essence of the bundle of property rights in a common 
pool resource, referring to both operational rights of use and collective choice rights to 
exclude users from accessing the resource.   
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– i.e. the rights of management and exclusion of property negotiated in the resource 
(revisit Table 1.2). Practically, what Buck is proposing is that property rights on the 
radio resource, as in most global commons, cannot and should not be interpreted in the 
categorical sense we interpret most individual ownership. Chaduc and Pogorel (2008) 
noted that the question “who owns the spectrum?” has “no answer and almost no sense” 
(2008: 71). When making this proposition, the authors were probably considering 
individual ownership. In fact, the Constitution of the International Telecommunications 
Union recognises “the sovereign right of each state to regulate its telecommunications” 
but does not make explicit reference to property rights in the radio resource (ITU 2011, 
Art 1). This entails that public actors such as governments have the right to regulate the 
output derived from the use of the radio resource – i.e. wireless communications – 
rather than an explicit and exclusive collective choice right to manage the radio 
resource. This approach sheds a different light on contemporary debates about 
individual and government property on the radio spectrum and shows the practical 
reality that property arrangements are best understood in relation to positions of 
authority in defining the degree of rivalry and excludability in the resource. Thus, the 
question of property is directly linked to the question of authority over who defines and 
redefines rivalry and excludability in the resource.   
E. Ostrom showed that the term common-pool resource “refers to a natural or man-
made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) 
to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom 1990: 
30). A closer look at the early history of radio spectrum reveals that, when Marconi 
developed the technology to appropriate radio waves for wireless communications, the 
spectrum was an open access resource with no established operational rights, similar to 
the earth’s oceans or atmosphere in a state of nature (Herter 1985). This made radio 
spectrum prone to increased rivalry of consumption as well as increased difficulty in 
excluding multiple users (Aral 2009: 687, Ostrom et al 1999: 278). Consumption in the 
radio spectrum is highly rivalrous because, when used for the production of wireless 
communications, radio frequencies are essentially removed from the available pool. 
When these frequencies are used intensively, overcrowding can occur, leading to 
frequency scarcity. As Wormbs noted, crowding in the radio spectrum “is peculiar since 
it takes place both in a geographical dimension with transmitters close in space, and in a 
frequency dimension with [services] on adjacent frequencies in the electromagnetic 
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spectrum” (Wormbs 2011: 93). Because of these two dimensions of geography and 
frequency, radio signals can spill over both into the “area dimension” – because they 
travel through space – and into the “frequency dimension” – because their emission can 
overflow out-of-band (Vany et al 1969: 1515).  These effects of rivalry in consumption 
were recognised in the early stage of wireless communications, as the number of service 
providers of wireless communications increased in different radio bands, highlighting 
the subtractive and finite nature of the resource in conditions of use30 (Wade 1987: 96). 
Similarly, the difficulty of excluding others from using the radio resource was also 
recognised early on, when Marconi’s attempt at establishing a private monopoly in 
certain frequency bands could not preclude both public and commercial entities from 
using the radio resource.  
This situation highlights the importance of property arrangements that order 
relationships of rivalry and excludability in the radio pool, so that stable economic value 
can be derived from the resource in the absence of pollution as a result of interference 
and in the absence of free-riding on the networks of others, which can lead to 
overcrowding31. In this context, basic coordination in defining a set of rules that prevent 
interference and encourage interconnection is desirable for both public and private 
actors extracting economic value from the radio resource. However, these basic rules 
that internalise negative externalities do not solve distributional problems of rivalry and 
excludability32. This places the question of authority in defining operational rights of 
                                                
30 However, in radio spectrum, rivalry of consumption and difficulty of exclusion do not 
lead to the permanent contamination or depletion of the resource (Wormbs 2011: 106). 
These properties entail that, compared with other natural resources such as the air, water 
or minerals, the radio spectrum returns to its original state, at no cost, once all users 
have been removed from it. However, radio spectrum is predisposed to congestion, 
which Friedman considered as having the same impact on the residual supply of the 
resource as depletion. Using the example of fish and petroleum as resources that can be 
affected by depletion of supply, and highways and radio waves as resources that can be 
affected by congestion of supply, Friedman argued that exhaustion of usable supply 
occurs in both types of resources and “therefore the resources are appropriately called 
‘exhaustible’” (Friedman 1970: 856-857). 
31 Blomquist and Ostrom showed that these characteristics do not always lead to 
dilemmas of the commons. A commons dilemma occurs only when overuse, erosion or 
deterioration of the resource prevents the ability to continue to provide the value ‘use-
units’ (1985: 383). 
32 Distributional problems of collective action occur because resource users can disagree 
with regard to which of the multiple efficient equilibria they prefer in order to define the 
degree of rivalry and excludability in the resource pool, see for instance Holzinger 
(2008) and Martin (1995).  
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access and use at the core of dynamics of contestation and coordination between 
resource users. The next section provides evidence of these dynamics of authority in 
setting operational rights in frequency bands designated for broadcasting services across 
Europe, as negotiated between private and public actors in the mid 1900s.  
 
1.2.3 Where to fix problems of collective action in the radio spectrum 
In the interwar period, a growing number of radiotelegraph services, using both short 
wave and long wave frequencies, started populating the international radio spectrum33. 
Some of these services such as ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications were 
regulated by international treaty, generally specifying the power levels they could 
operate at in order to prevent harmful interference within and between frequencies. 
Other services such fixed point communications – i.e. broadcasting – were not regulated 
by international treaty prior to World War I. These services were not regulated 
internationally because technological knowledge for long distance broadcasting was 
ring-fenced in patent pools established by Marconi and Telefunken since 1911 (Hugill 
1999: 100). However, amateur broadcasting services were also operating in shorter 
distances, increasingly overcrowding frequencies. This situation was dealt with 
differently in the United States and across the European continent, where a large 
proportion of broadcasting stations were registered. As opposed to the United States, 
European administrations established broadcasting as a public service and, essentially, 
created a public network of stations across each of their territories. Whereas this 
measure controlled overcrowding and facilitated content monitoring, it also led to 
increasing the transmission power of broadcasting stations, which were interfering 
across borders. The problem of broadcasting interference became most endemic on the 
European continent in the interwar period. The problem originated, at least in part, from 
the fact that transnational radio frequencies were “parcelled out” by communications 
service rather than by sovereign state (revisit Section 1.2.1).  
                                                
33 During this time, it was discovered that not only long waves could carry 
communications over long distances. Marconi experimented with short waves and, as 
Headrick noted, he made a second contribution to wireless communication by showing 
that short waves are as suitable to deliver long distance communications as long waves 
(Headrick 1991: 202-203). It should be noted that, due to the curvature of the earth, 
short waves have higher frequencies whereas long waves have lower frequencies. These 
physical properties make them more suitable for different types of communications.  
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As a result, public actors proposed to redesign the rule of international allocation of 
radio frequencies from service-based to state-based at the International Radiotelegraph 
Conference (IRC) of 1927 in Washington. Commenting on the proceedings of the 
Conference, Codding and Rutkowski (1982) noted: “the most thorny question then, as 
today, concerned the kind of administrative scheme that should be adopted for vesting 
rights in frequency usage” (1982: 15). However, the Radio Regulations of the IRC 
(1927) did not achieve a change in the allocation of international frequencies from 
service-based to state-based. Instead, the Radio Regulations (1927) maintained 
allocations by communications service and “parcelled out” the radio spectrum in two 
geographical regions across the world – the European region and the rest of the world 
(IRC 1927). Essentially, this confined the problem of interference in broadcasting to its 
original source – i.e. Europe – without altering the international rules of frequency 
allocation by communications service. 
The architects of this rule change were not the public signatories of regulations, but the 
private industrial actors present at the conference. Citing the US Assistant Secretary of 
State present at the IRC (1927), Hills shows that “the radio companies practically wrote 
it [the IRC Convention]” (Hills 2002: 202). These radio companies were the British 
Marconi Company, Telefunken, Companie Generale de T.S.F. and Radio Corporation 
of America. In 1922, following a rapid increase in their operations in the unregulated 
long wave bands for broadcasting, they set up an international wireless consortium 
known as the Commercial Radio International Committee (Headrick 1991: 185, Hills 
2002: 196, Tomlinson 1945: 57). This association was not only a patent pool but also a 
traffic agreement between the four companies, effective until 1945. The effect of this 
agreement was not only their “undisputed control […] of the production of wireless 
apparatus” (Tomlinson 1945: 57) or even the “cartelisation of the worldwide production 
of wireless equipment” (Hills 2002: 196). The most important aspect of the agreement 
was the traffic arrangement between them, which essentially led to their joint allocation 
of long wave frequencies for international broadcasting. This arrangement was, 
essentially, an exclusive private regime for the allocation of transnational radio 
frequencies for broadcasting services that ran in parallel to national services. In this 
context, the proposal to allocate international frequencies by state rather than by service 
was unacceptable for the ‘Big Four’ (Tomlinson 1945: 57). This rule change would 
have squeezed them out of the long distance broadcasting bands, similar to the way 
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Marconi was squeezed out of the over 600Kc/s bands in the early 1900s (revisit Section 
1.2.1). Thus, the position of the ‘Big Four’ explains why long distance broadcasting was 
not regulated by international treaty at the IRC (1917), maintaining their exclusive use 
of these bands. Their position also explains why the allocation of radio frequencies was 
maintained by communications service rather than by state and why geographic 
parcelisation was introduced in order to contain the problem of interference and 
overcrowding of public broadcasting services in Europe, without altering the service-
based regulation of international frequencies.  
As a result, the problem of interference and overcrowding continued across Europe until 
the late 1930s, following several frequency plans negotiated by public service operators 
organised in what is now the European Broadcasting Union (1950-present). Since then, 
the radio spectrum has been reorganised in three geographical regions34, each 
negotiating their own frequency plans. But the international allocation of radio 
frequencies is still achieved by communications service rather than by state. The 
example of the commercial agreement between the ‘Big Four’ reveals the authority 
private industrial actors have had in defining operational rights in transnational radio 
frequencies so as to reconfigure the rules of rivalry and exclusion among them as well 
as between them and public actors administering the radio waves. This also reveals that 
private international agreements concerning particular technology exchanges or 
technology pools are not only mechanisms of establishing positions of dominance in 
communications markets but also mechanisms of altering operational rights of use and 
access in the radio resource. As in the case of the ‘Big Four’, this is rarely achieved at 
national level where these actors are in fact licensed for operation, but at the 
transnational level where they can negotiate positions of rivalry in wider radio pool. In 
fact, the international parcelisation of radio frequencies by communications service, 
rather than by state, facilitates the formation of associations of private industrial actors 
for the extraction of economic benefit in wider than smaller radio pools. Hence the 
incentives to maintain the international regulation of radio frequencies by 
communications services. Before proceeding to explore similar dynamics in more depth 
in the case studies of this thesis, the next section outlines how the organisation of 
                                                
34 Art 43 of the ITU Constitution states that “Members States reserve the right to 
convene regional conferences, to make regional arrangements and to form regional 
organisations, for the purpose of settling telecommunication questions which are 
susceptible of being treated on a regional basis” (ITU 2011, Art 43).    
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property arrangements in radio frequencies has been conceptualised in contemporary 
debates about the most efficient levels of rivalry and excludability in radio spectrum 
policy. Nevertheless, the growing focus on spectrum policy can miss out on important 
dynamics of contestation and coordination at the transnational level and, as a result, can 
paint an incomplete picture of the relationship between authority and property 
arrangements in the global radio common.  
 
1.2.4 How to fix problems of collective action in the radio spectrum   
The position of public actors as managers of radio frequencies at national level has 
focused attention on the policy mechanisms they hold to administer this resource. There 
is little doubt that, in most situations, public administrations still provide initial access 
to the radio resource, following mechanisms that resemble regulation by “command and 
control” (Brito 2006, Ogus 2004: 245-246). There is also little doubt that, recently, 
public administrations have introduced more flexible mechanisms of allocation that 
facilitate “secondary markets” or “unlicensed access”, while maintaining different 
degrees of administrative control (Bauer 2002, Benkler 2002, Baumol and Robyn 2006, 
Faulhaber and Farber 2003, Huber 1998, Shelanski and Huber 1998). However, 
prescribing new mechanisms for spectrum policy can also be a limiting exercise 
because, in most cases, they concern only operational rules of access in the first instance 
and at state level. While relevant for understanding the rules-in-use at a given time, 
these approaches cannot fully capture rule change in the management of the spectrum 
resource and, particularly, change derived from elsewhere than the national level. Thus, 
the relationship between these mechanisms and the property arrangements they 
sometimes aim to create is not always straightforward.  
From an analytical perspective, these mechanisms have been categorised in three broad 
types of regulatory regimes – administrative, market, commons – which rarely capture 
the full bundle of operational and collective choice property rights witnessed in 
common pool resources (revisit Table 1.2). These typologies carry an important 
limitation: the artificial pairing of broad regulatory regimes with particular spectrum 
allocation mechanisms and, in turn, with particular types of property (Figure 1.1). The 
debate around these three typologies is briefly presented below. Although they carry 
important considerations about the governance of the radio spectrum, they rarely 
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consider the full bundle of property rights in common pool resources and, instead, focus 
mostly on the linkages between mechanism of allocating access and the derived rights 
of access.  
Figure 1.1 Common Assumptions of the Relationship between Public Methods of 
Allocating Radio Waves and the Property Systems They Produce 
 
 
Allocations by Command and Control Mechanisms. This procedure is recognised as the 
most widely used mechanism for allocating radio frequencies (Brito 2006). It has been 
promoted for simplifying the regulatory process and ensuring that wireless 
communications do not interfere with each other (Baldini 2013: 96). It has been largely 
associated with the issue of licenses by a communications authority charged with 
‘reducing chaos’ in the radio waves. It has been regarded as the preferred method of 
allocation for incumbents because it provides non-flexible, individual rights to property 
in the form of non-transferable licenses, which in turn, protect investments in large-
scale communications networks (Figure 1.1). However, this method has been criticised 
for leading to the politicisation, capture and, in the long term, inflexible distribution of 
the radio resource to users that might not always utilise it efficiently (Faulhaber and 
Farber 2003: 195-197). Thus, this method has been critiqued for being “vulnerable to 
influence costs” and leading to artificial scarcity by regulatory means (Coase 1959, 
Vany et al 1969, Lehr and Crowcroft 2005, Melody 1980). Faulhaber and Farber (2003) 
argue that the longevity of this regulatory regime, based upon non-flexible rights to 
property on the radio spectrum, is derived from the strong incentives incumbents have 
to keep the systems rather than to change it (2003: 195-197). The main limitation of this 
approach is that it suggests users of the radio spectrum will always have a preference 
for individual property rights when ‘harvesting’ the radio resource.   
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Allocations by Market Mechanisms. This approach, first introduced by economist R. 
Coase in relation with the administration of radio frequencies by the Federal 
Communications Commission in the United States, proposes replacing the allocation of 
radio waves by non-flexible individual property rights as established by the license 
system with flexible private property whereby owners could sell, subdivide and re-
aggregate spectrum parcels. Coase noted that “once the rights of potential users have 
been determined […], the rearrangement of rights could be left to the market” (Coase 
1959: 30). Coase suggested that, for spectrum allocations to be achieved efficiently, a 
regulatory regime for creating well-defined private property rights and the price 
mechanism would be sufficient to alleviate the spillovers of harmful interference and 
congestion. However, Coase’s initial argument has been reformulated in current debates 
about spectrum policy to refer to a licensing regime still based upon individual property 
rights with the flexibility of trading the license in secondary markets (Figure 1.1, Vany 
et al 1969, Faulhaber and Farber 2003). This mechanism of allocation would then 
benefit from flexibility in the choice of technology or the choice of service. In addition, 
this type of market exchange is recognised to encourage innovation and to facilitate 
spectrum refarming, as frequency bands would shift uses more quickly. The price 
mechanism would then be sufficient to capture all the information about supply and 
demand (Faulhaber and Farber 2003: 199). The limitation of this approach is that the 
radio spectrum is still allocated on an individual basis and that licenses generally carry 
provisions established under the administrative system that limit their tradability on 
other bases such as technology or service specifications (Hazlett and Spitzer 2006, Lehr 
and Crowcroft 2005: 422).  
Allocations by Commons Mechanisms. This approach is considered to have led to the 
establishment of spectrum commons. It has been largely attributed to unlicensed bands 
where devices have embedded ‘politeness protocols’ so that they don’t interfere with 
each other. The successful operation of these devices in certain frequency bands led to 
question the necessity of establishing exclusive rights through licenses, reshaping the 
current understanding of harmful interference and secure investment (Brito 2006, 
Benkler 1999, Benkler 2012). Allocations by unlicensed/commons mechanisms are 
sometimes falsely associated with open access systems where property arrangements 
are minimal. In reality, unlicensed allocations of radio frequencies are highly regulated 
because they carry technical specifications – established by public or private 
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administrators – regarding power levels and the general behaviour of unlicensed users 
in the band. In addition, the relationship between unlicensed/commons mechanisms and 
technological innovation or efficiency in the use of radio frequencies has been 
increasingly contested on grounds that innovation is rarely only the result of regulatory 
measures for providing open access onto the radio resource (Faulhaber and Farber 2003, 
Lehr and Crowcroft 2005: 422). As a result, property arrangements in 
unlicensed/commons bands are as complex as any other institutional arrangements that 
set specific levels of rivalry and excludability in a given frequency band.  
These three mechanisms of allocation reveal a number of important considerations 
about the current debate in radio spectrum policy, confirming some of the analytical 
limitations identified by scholars studying property arrangements in common pool 
goods (Bromley et al 1992, McKean 2000, Pennington 2012). First, there is still 
considerable confusion about the definition of property systems as individual or 
collective rights of access rather than as the more complex bundle of operational and 
collective choice rights witnessed in the ownership structures of common pool goods. 
Second, there is still considerable reliance on the role of external actors such as 
regulatory agencies or governments on defining and re-defining rules about the degree 
of rivalry and excludability among direct resource users of a given frequency band. 
Third, there is still considerable focus on spectrum policies at the state level, with a 
considerable attention being paid to the relationship between public policies of 
allocating access and the efficiency of those rights of access in extracting value from the 
radio resource. As a result, the debate is too often structured around ‘parcelling out’ 
versus ‘opening up’ the radio spectrum as main options for defining property 
arrangements in this resource. Lastly, these mechanisms tend to view private resource 
users – such as communications service and system providers – as receivers of flexible 
or non-flexible property rights in the radio resource. However, the early governance of 
the radio spectrum reveals that private resource users are considerably more active in 
defining and re-defining rule systems in the radio resource than the debates about public 
mechanisms of allocating access to this resource would allow. The case of the ‘Big 
Four’ in the early 1920s provides a powerful example of the extent to which private 
industrial actors can collectively define property arrangements that set the degree of 
rivalry and excludability in a frequency pool without relying on international 
coordination between public actors to set these rules.  
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Therefore, this thesis finds it useful to explore the relationship between industrial actors 
as direct resource users and the property arrangements established in radio frequency 
pools at transnational level. This approach does not sideline the role of public actors in 
administering the radio resource at national or international level. Instead, it recognises 
that actors can organise differently at national and international level, leading to 
variations in the bundle of property rights established to harvest the common resource. 
This makes the radio spectrum a good example to test the role of industrial actors in 
defining property arrangements in transnational common pool goods. Against this 
background, the next chapter outlines the analytical framework used in the thesis to test 
the relationship between the dynamics of contestation and collaboration among private 
industrial actors drawing economic benefit from the use of the radio resource and the 
property arrangements that emerge in this transnational resource.  
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Chapter 2.  Collective Action in Shared Resources: The Analytical 
Framework  
This thesis starts from the assumption that private parties who extract economic value 
from a common pool good can sometimes organise to define complex yet stable 
property systems, regardless of the presence or absence of an external public authority 
with responsibility to regulate the common pool. The early regulation of radio 
frequencies reveals the role of industrial actors in defining operational and collective 
choice rules in the radio resource across borders. It identifies that industrial actors can 
organise to define alternative rule systems to those proposed by public actors. Lastly, it 
identifies that these alternative rule systems can be monitored and enforced in private 
transnational regimes for specific bands35 or in public international regimes for the 
whole radio resource36. The thesis tests whether this evidence is replicated in the 
management of radio spectrum across time, focusing on the relationship between the 
organisation of private resource users and the structure of property arrangements in the 
transnational radio resource. Therefore, the thesis asks the following research question: 
What determines the specific configuration of rights of access and use (operational 
property rights) and rights of management and exclusion (collective choice property 
rights) in a transnational common pool resource such as the radio spectrum?  
The chapter presents the analytical framework used to answer this research question. 
The thesis adopts a variant of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework put forward by scholars of public choice institutionalism (Aligica and 
Boettke 2011, Blomquist and deLeon 2011, McGinnis 2011, Ostrom 2011). The IAD 
framework has been widely used in the analysis of institutional arrangements for a 
                                                
35 For instance, the Commercial Radio International Committee operated as an industry 
association of the ‘Big Four’ for the private transnational regulation of the longwave 
broadcasting band. However, elements of this regime were also transposed into the 
international regulation of the radio resource, such as the allocation of international 
frequencies to communication services rather than to states. This example, outlined in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, reveals why private actors sometimes benefit from formalising 
aspects of private transnational governance into public international law.  
36 Scott, Cafaggi and Senden (2011) explain the difference between a transnational and 
an international regime as “not being constituted through the cooperation of states as 
reflected in treaties (the latter being the principal territory of international law). They 
are non-state (or private […]) in the sense that key actors in such regimes include both 
civil society or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and firms (both individually 
and in associations)” (Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011: 3). 
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variety of policy questions including the governance of common pool goods (Ostrom 
2011). The IAD framework benefits the analysis of property arrangements in the radio 
resource because it recognises that the physical properties of the resource, the attributes 
of the resource user group and the rules in existence are significant explanatory 
variables that shape the strategies of individuals in situations of collective action 
(Blomquist and deLeon 2011, Ostrom 2011). Therefore, the framework helps 
distinguish three variables on which the thesis focuses in order to answer the research 
question of who defines complex property arrangements in transnational commons. The 
first variable concerns the extent to which a private association of industry actors 
precedes or succeeds the decision of public actors to (re)-set rules of rivalry and 
excludability in the radio resource. The second variable concerns the distribution of 
private actor interests for a particular configuration of rivalry and excludability, as an 
attribute that shapes individual strategies inside the private association of resource 
users. The third variable concerns the distribution of private actor resources, particularly 
of intellectual property used in the technology that harvests the radio resource, as an 
additional attribute that shapes individual strategies inside the private association of 
resource users.  
These three variables refer to the position of private actors in the organisation of 
collective action as well as to the attributes of private actors as a group that can 
determine a particular set of property arrangements to govern the common pool. 
Interestingly, these group attributes – i.e. diversity of actor interests and diversity of 
actor resources – are found to have different impact on achieving collective action in 
local and global situations of interdependence (Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 9). Several 
studies found that actor heterogeneity inhibits collective action in local common pool 
resources but facilitates it in the international arena (Holzinger 2008, Keohane and 
Ostrom 1995, Martin 1995, Libecap 1995). These findings make the study of property 
arrangements in the radio resource even more relevant, contributing to our 
understanding of the necessary attributes of private actors in organising stable and 
sustainable collective action at transnational level. These findings also inform the 
selection of case studies, which address the transnational regulation of five frequency 
bands in the European radio region across time. By tracing the formation of actor 
strategies in a given institutional setting, as well as the process of negotiating the degree 
of rivalry and excludability among private actors using the resource for the production 
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of communications goods and services, the thesis can infer on the determinants of 
operational and collective choice property arrangements in transnational common pools. 
The following sections describe the main components of the research design applied in 
the thesis: the parameters of the analytical framework, the selection of cases and the 
methods used to analyse cases in order to answer the research question.  
 
2.1 Parameters of the Analytical Framework 
Previous analyses of situations of interdependence in common pool resources revealed 
that “many factors affect the strategic structure of a particular appropriation and 
provision problem, including the physical structure of a particular CPR [common pool 
resource], the technology available to the appropriators, the economic environment, and 
the sets of rules that affect the incentives that appropriators face” (Ostrom 1990: 50). 
Scholars of public choice institutionalism have identified and classified these exogenous 
variables that are present in most situations of interdependence (Ostrom 2011: 9) and 
that affect the incentives to cooperate towards the provision of these institutional 
arrangements (Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 15). These variables are: a) the physical 
properties of the resource; b) the attributes of the resource user group and c) the existing 
institutional arrangements that govern operational and collective choice behaviour at a 
given time (Ostrom 2011: 10). These variables constitute the main structural elements 
that shape actors’ positions and interactions in an “action situation”37 where operational 
and collective choice rules are negotiated in order to form property arrangements for the 
administration of common goods (Figure 2.1). This framework is known as the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and, although it has been 
used in the analysis of social-ecological systems, it can have wider applicability in the 
analysis of complex social orders (Aligica and Boettke 2011, Blomquist and deLeon 
2011, Ostrom 2011). Thus, the framework is a heuristic for situations of 
interdependence, structured upon groups of exogenous variables, which define the 
behavioural boundaries of an action situation (Figure 2.1). By recognising the 
complexity of exogenous variables that shape positive or negative incentives to 
                                                
37 The action situation is a simplified concept that describes “the social space where 
individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one 
another or fight”, a type of decision-making arena where actors negotiate rule systems 
(Ostrom 2011: 11).  
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cooperate, the framework moves the analysis beyond short-term rationality in actor 
preferences. 
Figure 2.1 Variant of the IAD Framework for Analysis of Property Arrangements in the 
Radio Spectrum as a Transnational Common Pool Resource 
 
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2011: 10) 
Figure 2.1 describes the steps that will be followed in testing the relationship between 
the organisation of private resource users – i.e. industry actors – and the configuration 
of property arrangements in the transnational radio resource – i.e. operational rules and 
collective choice rules. Each case study starts with an investigation of the exogenous 
factors that could influence actor strategies for a particular configuration of rivalry and 
excludability in a shared resource. The variables considered for this analysis are: a) the 
presence of the public actor vis-à-vis industry actors in the wider governance of 
electronic communications, in order to assess whether industry action responds to a 
policy position of the public actor; b) the economic interests of industry actors for an 
outcome in the market for wireless communications, in order to assess whether 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of preferences results in different configurations of 
excludability in a radio frequency pool;  and c) the technology capabilities held by 
industry actors, in order to assess whether the homogenous or heterogeneous 
distribution of technology resource among private actors results in different 
configurations of rivalry in a radio frequency pool (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, Libecap 
1995, Martin 1995, Poteete and Ostrom 2004). The following sections discuss the main 
lines of debate around the distribution of economic interests and technology capabilities 
Physical Properties of 
the Radio Resource 
Distribution of 
Economic Interests 
and Technology 
Resources 
Existing Rules in the 
Wider Governance of 
Electronic 
Communications 
Exogenous Factors 
Actor Positions and 
Interactions 
(Re)-Setting 
Operational Rules 
Setting Collective 
Choice Rules 
Action Situation Property Outcomes 
Rights of Access 
Rights of Use 
Rights of Management 
Rights of Exclusion 
Rights of Alienation 
rights to enter a resource 
rights to withdraw units from a resource  
rights to regulate a resource 
rights to (re)-set rules of access  
rights to sell/lease rights of access or use 
 69 
among resource users of local and transnational common goods. The following sections 
show how expectations derived from these main lines of debate have informed the 
operationalisation of variables and the selection of cases used in this thesis in order to 
test the relationship between the organisation of resource users and the configuration of 
operational and collective choice rules in transnational common pools such as the radio 
spectrum.  
 
2.1.1 The Role of Public and Private Actors  
The first factor to be analysed concerns the position of the public actor in the wider 
governance of electronic communications. The question is whether the public actor – 
regulatory agency or government(s) – represents the principal authority that sets the 
configuration of property arrangements in a radio pool. National and international law 
recognise the role of public authorities to regulate radio frequencies on their territory. 
However, as identified in Chapter 1, too close a focus on national spectrum policy runs 
the risk of diverting attention from complex negotiations concerning the level of rivalry 
and excludability in transnational frequency bands regulated by communications service 
rather than by sovereign state.  
This question does not contest the analysis of spectrum policy as either inhibiting or 
enabling efficient resource use through a combination of exclusive licensing, licensing 
with secondary markets or conditioned open access (revisit Section 1.2.4). Instead, it 
questions that public regulation is the only instrument to ensure the stability of property 
arrangements in the radio resource, either by exclusive rights of use secured through 
licenses or by non-exclusive rights of use secured through conditioned access. 
Regardless of the specific configuration of property arrangements, the administrative 
presence of a public authority to create, monitor and enforce these rules is regarded as 
paramount in spectrum policy analysis.  
The role of a single public authority to define, monitor and enforce property 
arrangements is, however, difficult to identify in the administration of transnational 
common pool resources, such as the radio spectrum. An easily observable reason is the 
absence of hierarchical authority to define, monitor and enforce property arrangements 
at the global level (Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 2). A less easily observable reason is the 
absence of a single node of authority and a single level of decision-making for the 
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provision of a public good (Heritier 2002, Holzinger 2008). Considering the presence of 
polycentric systems of authority in the regulation of the climate, E. Ostrom (2010) 
noted that “the initial relevance of the polycentric approach is the parallel between the 
earlier theoretical presumption that only the largest scale was relevant for the provision 
and production of public goods […], and the contemporary presumption that only one 
scale is relevant for policies related to global public goods” (Ostrom 2010: 34). It is, 
thus, equally important to identify whether polycentric systems of authority are present 
in the regulation of the radio spectrum, since radio waves are inherently transnational 
and since the public good derived from them – i.e. wireless communications – is 
inherently mobile across national borders. In this context, too close a focus on a single 
public actor, or on negotiations among public actors at the international level, runs the 
risk of omitting important dynamics among private actors with different incentives to 
derive economic value from the common resource and with different strategies for 
setting rules of rivalry and excludability in the radio resource.  
In this context, it is essential to identify the position of public actors vis-à-vis private 
actors in the wider governance of the radio spectrum at international level. Previous 
research has demonstrated the importance of “the threat of national or international 
regulation to the decision by corporate leaders to choose a self-regulatory strategy” 
(Haufler 2001: 106). Consequently, this analysis identifies whether private actors 
organise to define property arrangements in transnational commons as a result of the 
(re)-distributive positions of public actors (Haufler 2001) or as a result of their 
collective self-interest38 (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Lastly, this analysis identifies the 
configuration of authority between public and private actors at different levels of rule-
making, monitoring and enforcement in the governance of transnational common pool 
resource (Black 2008, Cafaggi 2012a, Verbruggen 2013). Once it is identified whether 
the organisation of private actors precedes or succeeds the initial position of public 
actors to establish property arrangements in a radio frequency, the analysis can focus on 
the distribution of interests and capabilities among private actors as a form of mapping 
their rule preference for the degree of rivalry and excludability in the radio resource. 
                                                
38 Research on transnational private regulation has already identified “Ostrom’s 
paradox” when dealing with problems of collective action as a result of pollution or 
overcrowding of common resources, as these problems can be “effectively addressed 
through action by the very same market actors whose conduct caused the problem, but 
now acting collectively rather than individually” (Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011: 7).  
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2.1.2 The Diversity of Private Actor Interests 
The second factor to be analysed concerns the interest distribution of private industry 
actors for a preferred configuration of excludability in a frequency band, as an attribute 
that shapes individual strategies for the type of property arrangements to be deployed in 
the radio resource. The question is whether heterogeneity of economic interests for a 
particular distributive outcome of rivalry and excludability is more likely to result in 
minimal coordination over the institutional arrangement in a transnational resource 
pool. Heterogeneity of interests has been identified as having different impact on 
coordination outcomes in situations of interdependence at local and international level 
(Abbott and Snidal 2001, Keohane and Ostrom 1995, Poteete and Ostrom 2004). On the 
one hand, studies of local common goods reveal that asymmetric interests can reduce 
the opportunity private individuals have to design stable and sustainable institutional 
arrangements to utilise the common pool (Martin 1995: 73, Ostrom 1995). On the other 
hand, studies of international public goods reveal that asymmetric interests can create 
opportunities for the formation of interest associations and, as a result, for mobilisation 
towards the design of stable and sustainable institutional arrangements (Abbott and 
Snidal 2001, Buthe 2009, Martin 1995, Werle 1998).  
The definition of “interests” might explain variation in coordination outcomes at local 
and global level. Specifically, interest heterogeneity can refer to “evaluations of the 
individual benefits and costs of polices” (i.e. preferences over policies) and evaluations 
“of the outcomes themselves” (i.e. preferences over outcomes) (Keohane and Ostrom 
1995: 7). Accordingly, this thesis defines private interests as the distribution of 
economic interests for a particular outcome of rivalry and excludability in the radio 
resource. This definition is informed by considerations that economic interests in 
wireless communications markets, which develop from the utilisation of the radio 
resource, play a major role in the formation of rule preferences over the degree of 
rivalry and excludability in the resource.     
In this context, a group of private actors with diverse economic interests in 
communications markets might choose to cooperate in the design of operational rules in 
a given frequency band in order to reduce uncertainty over (re-)distributive measures 
put forward by a public actor or, in its absence, to reduce uncertainty over discovery 
and transaction costs in the market (Haufler 2001, Schmitter and Streeck 1999). 
Subsequently, complementary rather than fully aligned economic interests can achieve 
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collective provision of property arrangements in a particular common pool, regardless 
of whether the group is formed of concentrated symmetric interests or not (Olson 1965). 
As Schmitter and Streeck (1999) noted, “highly interdependent sets of firms may 
develop a common interest in some kind of self-organized (associational) adjudication 
of internal conflicts over terms of exchange; this interest may be more likely to give rise 
to associative action than other common interests” (Schmitter and Streeck 1999: 27). As 
interdependence of action is high in common pools, the central question would not 
concern the impact of interest heterogeneity on cooperation per se, but the impact of 
interest heterogeneity on “the amount and type of cooperation […] leading to 
outcomes” (Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 16). The amount and type of cooperation is 
given by the complexity of a property arrangement in a common pool. Because the 
costs of defining collective choice arrangements (i.e. rights of management and 
exclusion) increase as the diversity of economic interests within the pool increases, then 
private actors are expected to prefer less complex operational arrangements (i.e. rights 
of access) based on exclusive individual property in order to secure their position of 
rivalry. Not only does individual property provide certainty over the degree of 
excludability in the pool, it also provides greater reliance on external actors to monitor 
and enforce arrangements based on existing forms of individual private property. Thus, 
operational arrangements based on exclusive individual property allow for a reduction 
in the costs of collective choice arrangements for re-negotiating the degree of 
excludability within the pool. Once the heterogeneity of economic interests in a 
particular pool is identified, the analysis can focus on the heterogeneity of capabilities 
held by individual private actors as a form of mapping their rule preferences over the 
degree of rivalry or competition inside the pool.  
 
2.1.3 The Diversity of Private Actor Capabilities 
The third factor to be analysed concerns the resource distribution of private industry 
actors for a preferred configuration of rivalry in a frequency band, as an attribute that 
shapes individual strategies for the type of property arrangements to be deployed in the 
radio resource. The question is whether heterogeneity of resources for a particular 
distributive outcome of rivalry and excludability in a transnational resource pool is 
more likely to result in institutional arrangements based on exclusive individual 
property as opposed to exclusive common property. The difference between individual 
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private property and common private property rests in the willingness of private actors 
to invest in collective choice arrangements that privatise the rights to a pool without 
parcelling it into exclusive individual pieces39 (revisit Section 1.2.3, McKean 2000). 
Then, the distribution of individual capabilities among private actors is an essential 
determinant of the level of rivalry in the allocation of the resource and, subsequently, of 
the type of cooperation chosen to establish internal operational rules (i.e. rights of use) 
in the common pool. As outlined in Chapter 1, the most important capability for radio 
resource users is intellectual property in the technology used to harvest the radio 
resource in order to produce wireless communications and to develop wireless 
communications markets. As E. Ostrom (1998) showed, technology extracts value and 
establishes and sustains property rights in a common pool (in Buck 1998: xiii). Without 
it, the radio resource would not be harvested at all. 
A considerable number of studies has recognised the role of intellectual property40 as an 
essential capability in negotiating governance systems for electronic communications 
markets at transnational level (Bekkers et al 2014, Bekkers and Liotard 1999, Schmidt 
and Werle 1998, Werle 2001). These studies address the relationship between patents 
and voluntary standardisation of technology solutions in electronic communications. 
Because most of these standards are open compatibility or interoperability interfaces 
between proprietary components, they hold an inherent tension between “the private 
character of IPRs [intellectual property rights] and the public interest that a standard 
wants to foster” (Bekkers, Verspagen and Smith 2002: 1142). As Maskus and Merrill 
(2013) explain “incorporating patented or patent-pending technologies in standards is 
virtually inevitable and generally beneficial, but there is a tension between owners and 
users of a patented technology” (Maskus and Merrill 2013: 1). However, most of the 
studies that explore the relationship between intellectual property capabilities and the 
strategies of private actors in the process of standardisation of wireless communications 
                                                
39 A brief definition of common property regimes is provided by Dagan and Heller 
(2001): “common property designated resources that are owned or controlled by a finite 
number of people who manage the resource together and exclude others” (2001: 557). 
Or, as an adaptation of Rose’s definition, common property regimes designate common 
property on the inside and private property on the outside (Rose qtd in Dagan and 
Heller 2001: 557). Note that Rose’s initial definition was “commons on the inside, 
property on the outside”, which might be confusing as commons are a type of property.  
40 This thesis makes a clear difference between intellectual property as a capability of 
individual private actors and operational and collective choice arrangements as property 
institutions for governing common pool resources.  
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have linked these strategies to the development of property arrangements in electronic 
communications markets rather than property arrangements in the radio resource that 
allow these markets to form in the first place (Abbot and Snidal 2001, Krasner 1991, 
Schmidt and Werle 1998).  
Because technology is the only means to harvest the radio resource for the production of 
wireless communications, distributional conflicts in the arrangements of wireless 
communications markets41 should be mirrored, at least in part, by distributional 
conflicts in the arrangement of the wireless resource. Similar to asymmetries of 
interests, asymmetries of capabilities among private actors have led to different 
outcomes in local common goods and global public goods (Keohane and Ostrom 1995). 
The choice of a distributional equilibrium42, which sets individual rents among private 
actors using the common resource, depends on the individual actor’s ability to hold 
capabilities that translate into influence over property outcomes (Abbott and Snidal 
2001: 362, Martin 1995: 79, Libecap 1995: 165). In the radio spectrum, holders of 
essential technologies that harvest the resource are likely to use this capability as 
influence in the negotiation of internal operational rules (i.e. rights of use) in favour of 
their technology capabilities. However, in local commons, heterogeneity of capabilities 
among private actors is less likely to lead to changes in property arrangements due to 
undesired changes in the allocation of the resource under the status quo (Libecap 1995: 
165). In the provision of public goods at international level, heterogeneity of 
capabilities can lead to changes in property arrangements as long as some parties are 
willing to cover the cost of collective choice arrangements (i.e. management, exclusion, 
alienation) and as long as operational arrangements (i.e. allocation of use) reflect their 
technology capabilities (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 349, Martin 1995: 75). Nevertheless, 
both scenarios would indicate a preference for individual private property rather than 
common private property in order to reduce the costs of negotiating operational 
arrangements of resource allocation in the pool as well as in order to ensure certainty of 
resource rents based on the preferred technology capability. Under this circumstance, it 
                                                
41 Abbott and Snidal showed that the process of technology standard setting is rarely 
neutral (2001: 351). Krasner confirmed this finding, showing that cooperation in 
transnational telecommunications markets are “characterized not by Nash equlibria that 
are Pareto suboptimal but rather by disagreements over which point along the Pareto 
frontier should be chosen, that is, by distributional conflicts rather than by market 
failure” (Krasner 1991). 
42 Out of an infinite number of distributional equilibria in situations of cooperation.  
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is important to analyse whether private actors with asymmetric capabilities choose other 
types of property arrangements than individual private property to allocate use of the 
radio resource.    
The four case studies selected in this thesis will follow closely the analysis of these 
three variables: a) the presence of the public actor as a (re)-distributive authority of 
rivalry and excludability in a given frequency band; b) the diversity of economic 
interests among private actors as influencing a particular configuration of rivalry and 
excludability in a given frequency band, and c) the diversity of technology capabilities 
among private actors as influencing a particular configuration of rivalry and 
excludability in a given frequency band. As Keohane and Ostrom (1995) noted, 
heterogeneity in actor preferences and capabilities are treated as exogenous variables 
because “they are determined exogenously to the institutions designed to deal with 
specific collective action problems” (Keohane and Ostrom 1995: 10). Thus, economic 
preferences and technology capabilities inform the strategies of private actors in 
negotiating the distribution of operational (i.e. rights of use and access) and of 
collective choice arrangements (i.e. rights of management and exclusion) in a common 
pool. The following section provides the main criteria for the selection of cases that 
tests the relationship between the attributes of industry actors and the property 
arrangements selected for the governance of the radio resource as a transnational pool.  
 
2.2 Case Selection 
In order to test the relationship between the organisation of industry actors and the 
property arrangements that make up the governance of the radio spectrum, this thesis 
has selected four case studies that address the regulation of radio frequencies for 
wireless electronic communications in Europe, Radio Region 1 of the ITU: -­‐ The regulation of the 900 MHz band for second generation cellular digital mobile 
communications in the late 1980s (Case Study I) -­‐ The regulation of the 1.9 GHz and 2.1 GHz bands for third generation cellular digital 
mobile communications in the 1990s (Case Study II) -­‐ The regulation of the 800 MHz band for mobile broadband in the late 2000s (Case 
Study III) 
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-­‐ The regulation of the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands for wireless local area networks in 
the early 2000s  (Case Study IV). 
There are three broad considerations for the selection of these case studies. First, the 
thesis has selected a single natural resource – i.e. the radio spectrum – in order to 
explore changes in property rules in different frequency bands across time. Although 
frequency bands have different propagation characteristics, their main physical 
properties are largely the same across the commercial radio spectrum, allowing for good 
comparison across frequency pools and across time. The time element is particularly 
important, because it reflects different stages in the liberalisation of electronic 
communications and, as a result, different structural conditions for industry actors. 
Second, the thesis has selected commercial frequencies used to deploy a variety of 
electronic communications services such as mobile telecommunications, broadcasting 
and information technologies, allowing for comparison across industry sectors. Third, 
the thesis has selected a single geographic dimension of the radio spectrum, focusing 
exclusively on the regulation of radio frequencies in Europe, Radio Region I. As 
identified in Chapter 1, this geographic area is predisposed to problems of coordination 
and distribution due to the considerable number of industry actors operating in a high 
number of jurisdictions with developed electronic communications markets. In addition, 
this geographic area hosts the presence of a public transnational actor – in the form of 
the Commission of the European Union. Although radio frequencies in the region are 
regulated for a wider geographic area than the European Union, the presence of the 
European Commission is relevant in order to test the impact that a public actor might 
have on the organisation of private interests for the creation of property arrangements in 
a given band. Additionally, the presence of the European Commission can reveal more 
information about situations when industry actors rely on a public actor for monitoring 
and enforcing rule systems defined by private regimes.  
A map of the case studies is presented below, in relation with the selection criteria on 
the independent variable43: a) the variation in the presence of a public actor with 
authority to (re-)distribute rivalry and excludability in a given frequency band, and b) 
                                                
43 As Burnham et al noted, this selection criteria follows the recognised practice in 
small-n research, by which “cases are typically not randomly selected – and in fact 
doing so might not be at all appropriate – but are selected precisely because they belong 
to a particular classification category on the independent variable” (Burnham et al 
2008).  
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the variation in economic interests and technology capabilities among private actors 
negotiating operational and collective choice rules in a given frequency band.       
 
2.2.1 The Presence of a Public Actor 
The first consideration for the case selection is the presence of a public actor in a 
position to (re-)distribute rivalry and excludability in a given frequency band at 
transnational level. Having variability in the position of a public actor is important in 
order to test whether industry actors organise in response to the position of the public 
actor or in response to other considerations of collective self-interest. Table 2.1 gives 
the variability in the presence and preference of the public actor – in the form of the 
Commission of the European Union – for a particular configuration of rivalry and 
excludability in the radio resource across the four case studies. Whereas “presence” 
refers to the existence of a European Commission with formal competences in 
electronic communications policy, “preference” refers to the explicit identification of a 
technology or service to be deployed in a given frequency band.  
Table 2.1 Selection of Cases - The Presence of the Public Actor 
 
Table 2.1 reveals that there is considerable variation in the presence and preference of 
the public actor across the four case studies selected in this thesis. Case Study I and 
Case Study IV (concerning the 2.4 GHz band) exhibit no presence and, subsequently, no 
preference of the public actor for a configuration of rivalry and excludability in the 
radio spectrum. This indicates that industrial actors responded to their private interests 
to organise in order to define property arrangements in the given frequency bands. At 
the opposing pole, Case Study II exhibits the presence of a public actor with a declared 
preference for a particular technology and/or service that could impact rivalry and 
excludability in the frequency band. In this case, it is important to examine whether 
industrial actors aligned their preferences to those of the public actor or if they put 
No Early Preference of Public Actor Early Preference of Public Actor 
No Presence of Public Actor 900MHz Band        2.4GHz Band 
        (Case Study I)       (Case Study IV)  
__ 
Presence of Public Actor  800MHz Band          5MHz Band 
  (Case Study III)      (Case Study IV) 
1.9GHz-2.1GHz Band 
(Case Study II) 
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forward alternative arrangements that represented their economic interests and 
capabilities more closely.   
Table 2.1 shows how the four case studies fit within these two categories, representing 
the presence and preference of a political actor. On the issue of preference of a political 
actor, it is important to note that this refers, exclusively, to a technology or service 
preference. As explained above, the choice of technology used to withdraw value from 
a particular common pool resource is extremely important in guiding the degree of 
rivalry within a pool. If a political actor, as in Case Study II, expresses a preference for 
a given technology or service, this is expected to have a different impact on the 
organisation of private interests willing to derive economic value from a given band. 
Similarly, if a political actor does not express a preference but has a presence in early 
rule-making, as in Case Study III and Case Study IV (concerning the 5 GHz band), it is 
important to qualify whether private actors use the policy venues available with the 
public actor or whether they prefer to establish private venues for interest 
intermediation. 
 
2.2.2 The Diversity of Interests and Capabilities of Private Actors 
The second consideration for the case selection is the distribution of economic interests 
and technology capabilities among industry actors harvesting the radio resource for the 
delivery of mobile electronic communications. The distribution of these factors informs 
the strategies adopted by private actors in the negotiation of operational and collective 
choice rules as well as in the negotiation of the complexity of these rules.   
Table 2.2 Selection of Cases - Diversity of Interests and Capabilities Among Private 
Actors 
 
Table 2.2 shows how the four case studies fit within these two categories, representing 
the diversity of interests and capabilities among industry actors as they enter into 
negotiations about the level of rivalry and excludability in a given frequency band. 
Low Diversity of Capabilities High Diversity of Capabilities 
Low Diversity of Interests 900MHz Band         
   (Case Study I)       
1.9GHz-2.1GHz Band 
    (Case Study II)  
High Diversity of Interests 2.4GHz Band 
(Case Study IV) 
800MHz Band           5GHz Band 
    (Case Study III)        (Case Study IV) 
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Based on the theoretical expectations outlined in Section 2.1, Case Study I exhibits 
homogeneity of both interests and capabilities among private actors. This symmetry is 
expected to encourage self-organisation in the transnational resource, but to prevent the 
development of common property arrangements based on complex collective choice 
rules. Case Study II exhibits homogeneity of interests combined with heterogeneity of 
capabilities among industry actors. This situation is also expected to encourage self-
organisation in the transnational common, but to favour individual property 
arrangements that reflect the capabilities of actors with dominant technologies. Case 
Study III and Case Study IV (concerning the 5 GHz band) exhibit heterogeneity of both 
interests and capabilities among industry actors. These asymmetries are expected to 
discourage self-organisation in the transnational resource, because industry actors are 
less likely to be willing to invest in costly collective choice arrangements. In this 
situation, industry actors are expected to rely on individual property arrangements 
supplied by the market and enforced by external public actors.  
The validity of these expectations will be tested in the four case studies addressing the 
regulation of four frequency bands. The next section presents the methods used to test 
these assumptions about the relationship between the organisation of private actors and 
the property arrangements developed in each frequency band.  
 
2.3 Methods 
This thesis is structured as a theory testing exercise that follows the causal process by 
which an association of private actors can shape property arrangements in a 
transnational common pool such as the radio spectrum. In order to follow this causal 
process, the thesis relies on two complementary methods of analysis. The predominant 
method is process tracing in small-n comparative cases, which is used in order to 
identify the process of negotiating operational and collective choice rules in different 
frequency pools. The systematic use of process tracing across the different case studies 
is reinforced by the use of network analysis of technology exchanges among industry 
actors in communications technologies, in order to provide a visualisation of the 
relationship between industry users of the radio resource across time.   
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2.3.1 Process Tracing  
There is a growing recognition in the literature that systematic process tracing of small-
n cases has considerable value for developing theory-oriented explanations due to its 
attention to the most important elements in the causal mechanism generating a 
particular outcome or class of outcomes (Hall 2008: 304, 306). As a method, “process 
tracing rests upon the discovery of a chain of events, rather than a distribution of values 
of variables, that leads to certain outcomes“ (Caporaso 2009: 70). Thus, the method of 
process tracing is best suited for the analysis put forward in this thesis, because it helps 
identify the causal relationship between the independent variable (i.e. public or private 
actors) and the dependent variable (i.e. property arrangements in the common pool). 
Specifically, the method of process tracing allows considerable scrutiny of the position 
of public actors, the configuration of interests and capabilities of private actors as well 
as their progressive interactions and negotiations, in order to identify the causal 
mechanisms between these configurations of interests and capabilities, and the property 
outcomes established in the radio resource.  
Each case study relies on the systematic examination of the position of the public actor 
as well as the negotiation between private actors within interest associations that 
provide the organisational framework to negotiate technology systems requiring a 
particular configuration of operational rules (rules of access and rules of use) and 
collective choice rules (rules of management and rules of exclusion) for managing the 
transnational radio resource. This internal account is sustained by a close examination 
of primary and secondary sources, which record and analyse the negotiations that took 
place in industry associations during the development of each case study. Primary 
sources cover minutes of meetings and official reports of negotiations regarding the 
technical specifications of electronic communications systems to be deployed in the 
frequency bands investigated in each case study, most notably the European Conference 
of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)44, the European 
                                                
44 CEPT Reports and ECC Decisions, Recommendations and Reports are publically 
available at http://www.erodocdb.dk. GSM Plenary Meeting Reports (1982-1991) and 
GSM-CEPT Documents (1982-1988) referenced in this thesis are available at 
www.gsm-history.org, permission to reproduce granted by Hillebrand & Partners. Rare 
GSM Documents (i.e. Digital Cellular Cooperation Agreement and Annexes on IPR 
Policy (1985), Quadripartite Agreement (1986), GSM MoU (1987)) are available at 
www.gsmhistory.com, permission to reproduce granted by Stephen Temple. A selection 
of these primary sources is also archived in the CD ROM attached to F. Hillebrand 
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Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)45, the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE)46, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)47, 
the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP)48, the Next Generation Mobile Networks Alliance 
(NGMN)49 and the Wi-Fi Alliance50. Secondary sources cover personal accounts of 
radio spectrum policy experts and industry experts51 who were present at the meetings. 
Secondary sources also include specialist reports and news reports52 about the main 
events. In order to limit bias in the account of these events, triangulation of these three 
types of sources is used in each of the cases analysed in this thesis.  
The method of process tracing is applied in a systematic manner across the four case 
studies through the consistent operationalisation of the key independent and dependant 
variables identified in the IAD framework adopted in this thesis (Figure 2.1). Thus, 
each case study applies the method of process tracing to the same observables using 
operational definitions that have been employed in the specialist literature analysing 
                                                                                                                                          
(2002) GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile Communication, John Wiley & 
Sons, copyright clearance granted by John Wiley and Sons.    
45 ETSI SMG Plenary Meeting Reports (1992-1999) and Selected ETSI SMG 
Documents (1993-1999) are archived in CD ROM attached to F. Hillebrand (2002) 
GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile Communication, John Wiley & Sons, 
copyright clearance granted by John Wiley and Sons. The complete set of 
specifications, reports and documents for GSM and SMG are archived by ETSI at 
www.etsi.org (members access).  
46 IEEE 802.11 Documents (2000-2015) of the IEEE Standards Association are 
publically available at https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/documents.  
47 The complete list of ITU Conferences, Assemblies and Events is publically available 
at the History of ITU Portal, http://www.itu.int. Permission to reproduce ITU 
Conference Documents and ITU-R Recommendations referenced in this thesis has been 
granted by the Legal Affairs Unit of the ITU.   
48 Selected 3GPP Documents referenced in this thesis are archived in CD ROM attached 
to F. Hillebrand (2002) GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile 
Communication, John Wiley & Sons, copyright clearance granted by John Wiley and 
Sons.  
49 Selected NGMN White Papers referenced in this thesis are publically available at 
www.ngmn.org/uploads/media.  
50 Selected Wi-Fi Alliance Press Releases referenced in this thesis are publically 
available at http://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/press-releases.  
51 Personal accounts of key policy and industry experts present at negotiations in GSM 
and SMG are available at www.gsm-history.org, www.gsmhistory.com, as well as in 
the collection by F. Hillebrand (2002) GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile 
Communication, John Wiley & Sons.   
52 Selected from media articles collected from Business Wire, Electronic Engineering 
Times and The Financial Times as well as from IEEE Journals and Proceedings of the 
IEEE.   
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management regimes in common pool resources and extending their application to the 
field of wireless communications (Bromley et al 1992, Libecap 1995, Martin 1995, 
Ostrom 1990). Based on the discussion in the previous sections, a summary of 
observables that will be consistently analysed across the four case studies, together with 
their operational definition, is introduced in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 List of Observables (Independent and Dependant Variables) with their 
Operational Definition 
 
Source: Based on Bromley et al (1992) and Ostrom (1990) 
 
2.3.2 Network Analysis 
Although this thesis relies on process tracing in order to identify the strategies of actors 
involved in the negotiation of property arrangements, it uses network analysis of 
Variables Concept Operational Definition 
Independent Initial Position of Public 
Actor 
European Commission as transnational public actor with: 
a)  variable position of authority/ competence in defining, 
monitoring and enforcing property arrangements in radio 
spectrum (e.g. corporate actor) 
b)  variable preference for communications systems or 
communications services (e.g. agenda setter) 
Initial Distribution of 
Economic Interests among 
Private Actor 
Economic interests as actor preferences for a specific 
economic outcome of rivalry and excludability in a frequency 
pool (e,g. technology coexistence, technology exclusion, 
service sharing) 
Initial Distribution of 
Technology Capabilities 
among Private Actor 
Technology capabilities as distribution of power or leverage 
in negotiations (e.g. dominance of a technology as 
mechanism for extracting value from a frequency pool) 
Dependent Rules of Access Access as permission to enter a frequency pool based upon: 
- geography (e.g. CEPT) 
- technology specification (e.g. GSM, cdma2000) 
- service specification (e.g. broadcasting, mobile cellular 
telecommunications) 
Rules of Use  Use as rate of withdrawal of resource units from a frequency 
pool based upon:  
-type of use (e.g. technology or service) 
-relationship between users (e.g. compatible as systems 
coexistence, conflicting as systems interference) 
Rules of Management Management as ability of negotiating actors to define 
conditions of participation in decision-making, to define 
conditions of monitoring and to define and change conditions 
of operation (access and use) in a frequency pool  
Rules of Exclusion Exclusion as ability of negotiating actors to define and 
change rules of access 
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technology transfers in the electronic communications sector in order to provide 
additional evidence on the pattern of coordination among industry actors negotiating 
property arrangements. Based on graph theory, network analysis provides descriptive 
statistics on the position of influential actors in the electronic communications sector 
and the relationship between actors in clusters of influence. Because technology 
determines and sustains property on the radio resource (Ostrom in Buck 1998: xiii), 
network analysis is conducted to identify relations of strategic association based on 
technology transfers. In order to measure these relationships, this thesis uses network 
analysis of publically reported strategic alliances that took place from 1990 to 2010, 
covering the time span of three out of the four case studies53 (Case Study I to Case 
Study III).  
Alliance data is gathered using the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Database. The 
information on strategic alliances in this database has been previously used in empirical 
studies exploring the network structure created by publically reported alliances in the 
industry (Bekkers and Martinelli 2012, Sampson 2004, Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
Alliance data has been aggregated based on the membership of actors in two industry 
classification groups, as indicated by the primary Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC): Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus (3661 SIC Primary) and Radiotelephone 
Communications (4812). In order to show changes in network structure across case 
studies, alliances are measured over five-year time frames, from 1990 to 201054.  
Network analysis contributes to the main argument of the thesis in two ways. First, it 
offers a visualisation of the structure of the alliance network over a five-year period55, 
as a proxy of the nature of associability among industry actors. Second, it calculates and 
                                                
53 Case Study IV concerns the information technology and computing industry. 
Strategic alliances in these sectors are not fully disaggregated in order to allow for 
reliable descriptive statistics of technology transfers between actors in these sectors.  
54 The life of strategic alliances is not reported in the SDC Platinum Database. The 
network analysis assumes that the typical duration of a strategic alliance varies from 
three to five years, which is in line with previous research (Schilling and Phelps 2007).  
55 All alliance types are included in the analysis. This includes joint ventures, research 
and testing collaborations and joint service deployments. However, it excludes all joint 
ventures that are reported as individual entities. Alliances where subsidiaries of parent 
companies were reported have been recoded to reflect the position of the parent 
company. This is because the transfer of knowledge in the form of R&D, testing or 
patents is easily diffused from parents to subsidiaries. See Schilling and Phelps (2007) 
for a similar approach. Alliances with more than two partners, which correspond to the 
dyadic coding for analysing networks, have been regrouped in dyadic form. 
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visualises network metrics that allow us to identify key firms, key clusters and their 
relationship in the transfer of knowledge within the network, as a proxy of the extent of 
associability among industry actors. It refers to firms as nodes and to relationships 
between firms as edges. This thesis uses three network metrics to analyse strategic 
relations in the industry. First, degree centrality shows how connected an individual 
entity is to other members in the network. It represents a count of the total number of 
edges that are connected to a node and is a measure that reflects a position of advantage 
in exchanges with other members. The graphs in this thesis visualise degree centrality 
by the size of the node and provide the exact measure in a detailed table. Second, 
eigenvector centrality measures the influence that a node has in the overall network. 
The graphs in this thesis visualise eigenvector centrality by variation in the shade of the 
nodes, from grey (small eigenvector centrality) to black (high eigenvector centrality). 
Lastly, the Newman clustering algorithm is applied to visualise groups of industry 
actors that form clusters of technology transfers in the wider network. The graphs in this 
thesis visualise clustering analysis by marking edges between nodes in different colours.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
The following chapters will address negotiations about operational and collective choice 
rule systems that govern the radio frequency bands that make up the totality of case 
studies analysed in this thesis. Each case study will follow closely the Institutional 
Analysis and Development conceptual framework adopted in this thesis (Figure 2.1), 
which focuses on the relationship between a number of independent variables (i.e. the 
position of the public actor, most notably the European Commission; the configuration 
of economic interests and technology capabilities of private actors organised in formal 
and informal industry associations) and the dependent variables (i.e. the resulting 
operational and collective choice property arrangements in each of the designated 
frequency bands). The use of process tracing, combined with network analysis, offers 
the possibility to follow this causal relationship closely, in order to shed light on 
theoretical considerations about the role of public versus private actors in the rule 
making, monitoring and enforcement of regimes governing transnational common 
goods as well as on theoretical considerations about the configuration of actor attributes 
most likely to result in stable and comprehensive property systems in transnational 
common pools such as the radio spectrum.      
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Chapter 3.  Regulating the 900 MHz Band: Devising Operational 
Rules in Regional Pools           
This chapter traces the creation of property arrangements in the 900 MHz frequency 
band for the deployment of digital mobile cellular communication services, as initiated 
across Western Europe in the early 1980s. In this case, industry actors coordinated to 
define operational rules of access and operational rules of use in order to extract 
economic value from the 900 MHz band, in the absence of a transnational public actor 
with authority to manage telecommunications markets or the regional radio resource – 
i.e. the European Commission. In contrast, industry actors – particularly 
telecommunications operators (PTTs56) – had considerable authority in organising both 
telecommunications markets and the radio resource at the national level, but with 
limited coordination at the regional level. In this case, the initial distribution of interests 
and capabilities among industry actors reveals a situation of symmetric interests for 
extracting economic value from the 900 MHz band, with the aim to create new mobile 
communications markets, combined with a situation of relatively equal distribution of 
technology capabilities among the negotiating actors.  
The case of the 900 MHz frequency band in the 1980s is, thus, useful in order to test the 
relationship between the organisation of industry actors and the configuration of 
property arrangements resulting from negotiations among these actors, in conditions of 
homogenous interests in the economic outcome derived from harvesting the band and 
homogenous distribution of capabilities in developing technology solutions to extract 
economic value from the band. Theoretical expectations based on the study of property 
arrangements in common pool resources would indicate that this situation of 
homogenous interests and homogenous capabilities is most likely to result in well 
defined collective choice rules of management and exclusion by a group of private users 
(Ostrom 1995). Moreover, this configuration of interests and capabilities is most likely 
                                                
56 Regarding the private character of these industry actors, it should be noted that, 
although some telecommunications operators were also public administrators (PTTs), 
their activity in devising the regulatory rules for the 900 MHz frequency band (in GSM-
CEPT) focused on the definition of property arrangements for commercial purposes, i.e. 
the creation of a new market in mobile communications. Pelkmans (2001) adopted a 
similar approach, describing negotiations for the GSM standard as “actions of private 
governance by the European telecoms operators” (2001: 433).  
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to result in collective choice arrangements that sustain operational arrangements based 
on common rules of use and exclusive rules of access – i.e. common exclusive property.  
Therefore, this chapter traces the negotiation process among industry actors involved in 
the regulation of the 900 MHz frequency band at transnational level, in order to 
investigate whether the theoretical expectations presented above are met. These 
negotiations lasted over a decade, so a timeline of main events is introduced to guide the 
reader through the development of this bargaining process (Figure 3.1). Over this 
timeline, the case study follows the analytical framework introduced in the previous 
chapter, which looks first at the position of the public actor and second at the 
distribution of interests and technology capabilities among private actors (Section 3.1), 
in order to then trace the bargaining process that results in a given configuration of 
operational and collective choice rules in the transnational radio resource at 900 MHz 
across Western Europe (Section 3.2).  
Figure 3.1 Timeline of Main Events in the Regulation of the 900 MHz Band for GSM 
Mobile Communications Systems in the 1980s 
 
The chapter finds that industry actors were able to establish private cooperation in order 
to extract economic value from the collective use of the 900 MHz band by developing a 
new mobile communication system for harvesting the resource called Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM). However, although industry actors were able to agree 
common rules of access and use of the radio resource based on favourable technology 
exchanges among members, which would lower their internal rivalry, they did not 
devise rules of management and rules of exclusion that would successfully control entry 
by new actors. Thus, the theoretical expectations put forward by studies of common 
pool resources are only partially met. The resulting industry association took the form 
of a Memorandum of Understanding (GSM MoU) with limited capacity to monitor 
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commitments to internal rules of use and internal rules of access, which destabilised the 
initial levels of rivalry and excludability agreed collectively.  
This case reveals a scenario whereby private actors agree operational rules of access and 
use in the absence of a public actor, but they do not devise collective choice rules of 
management and exclusion in order to strengthen the operational rules collectively 
agreed upon. This scenario results in limited mutual monitoring, which requires the 
intervention of the public actor to stabilise property arrangements initially agreed by 
industry actors. Due to limited mutual monitoring among industry actors, internal 
rivalry among members increased and the preferred property arrangements in the 
transnational frequency pool at 900 MHz, in Western Europe, relied on principles of 
individual exclusive property rather than on principles of common exclusive property.  
 
3.1 The Formation of Actor Strategies in the Wider Governance of 
Telecommunications 
This section traces the origins of strategies adopted by industrial actors, which informed 
their positions in the negotiation of rules for the collective use of the 900 MHz band. It 
looks at the formation of actor strategies – both public and private – in the wider context 
for governing telecommunications, in order to identify the origin of their interests and 
capabilities. In the late 1970s, in Western Europe, the first systems of wireless 
telecommunications – also known as analog cellular communications – were being 
deployed by Postal Telegraph and Telephone Agencies (PTTs) acting in their dual 
capacity as operators and public administrators. These analog networks had local or 
national coverage and were based on proprietary standards developed according to 
vertical relations between national operators and manufacturers. Coordination between 
these networks was minimal and, if necessary, was achieved in the European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) – a voluntary 
association of telecommunications operators. The Commission of the European 
Community (EC), of then nine members57, had limited powers to harmonise 
telecommunications policy in the union. However, in 1982, PTTs in Western and 
                                                
57 The founding six – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands (1957) – followed by Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973).  
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Northern Europe58 agreed to jointly regulate the 900 MHz band in order to provide a 
cross-border public network for mobile communications. This turn of events can be 
explained by two factors. First, changes in the global market structure as a result of 
growing international trade in telematics and telecommunications, which questioned the 
inward looking, fragmented nature of telecommunications networks across Western 
Europe. Second, changes in the European market structure as a result of competitive 
pressures from PTTs in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, who collectively 
developed an international network for mobile communications in a single, harmonised 
frequency band.  
 
3.1.1 The Structure of the System of Governance in Telecommunications 
Mobile cellular communication systems across the world developed in an institutional 
setting characterised by minimal coordination among telecommunications systems 
interconnected at national borders (Genschel and Werle 1993). Although the radio 
spectrum continued to be allocated by communications service at international level – in 
the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) – national 
spectrum policy continued to be inward looking, based on market dynamics within the 
territory of each ITU member (revisit Section 1.2). In Europe59, the regional allocation 
of spectrum confirmed this practice of parcelling wavelengths to service operators with 
national coverage in conditions of service monopolies60 (Wormbs 2011: 99). Across 
Europe, the first systems of wireless telecommunications – also known as analog 
cellular communications – were being provided by Postal Telegraph and Telephone 
Agencies (PTTs) acting in their dual capacity as operators and public administrators61. 
Often, the PTTs would procure these systems from national manufacturers, following 
vertically integrated relations of production whereby the PTT would control research, 
                                                
58 Both members and non-members of the EC.  
59 As explained above, this thesis treats the boundaries of “Europe” as limited to 
member states of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations. See the List of Acronyms for details of individual member states in 
CEPT. 
60 Although Wormbs’ (2011) study looks at the allocation of broadcasting services, the 
same principles applied to allocations of analogue services, as it will be discussed 
below.   
61 By comparison, in the United States, Bell Systems and subsequently AT&T were 
running a regulated private monopoly.  
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development and design, directly or indirectly (Genschel and Werle 1993: 206). 
However, even within national borders, these analog networks were limited in space 
and scope compared with contemporary mobile communications networks. Their 
capacity was limited to small areas of coverage and small numbers of customers, while 
bulky devices were generally mounted on transport systems such as busses or trains 
(Farley 2005). Therefore, at the time, cross-border coordination in wireless 
communications was minimal and concerned only established mechanisms for ensuring 
non-interference and overcrowding.  
In Europe, the regional association concerned with coordination in wired and wireless 
communications was the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations (CEPT). Established in 1959, the CEPT was a voluntary organisation 
whose membership comprised of representatives of national PTTs across the European 
continent. Decision-making within the CEPT was achieved through consensus and, as 
Reid noted, it mostly concerned policy issues regarding the interconnection of wired 
telecommunications networks62 (Reid 1977: 308). Thus, distributional problems of 
collective action in wireless communications across borders did not make the agenda of 
the CEPT. 
This mode of governance, characterised by Genschel and Werle (1993) as hierarchically 
structured with minimal coordination across borders63, came under structural pressure in 
the 1980s. The strongest was the competitive pressure of the electronics and 
communications industries in the United States (Table 3.1). Following World War II, 
the US government made considerable investment in research and development (R&D) 
in these industries, which led to the development of the low cost transistor, the silicon 
microprocessor, the integrated electrical circuit as well as the cellular system of wireless 
communications64 (Farley 2005). These developments were deemed revolutionary 
                                                
62 For instance, a frequent policy issue was setting international tariffs for 
telecommunications. In the age of monopolies, long-distance lines would subsidize 
local loops and, as a result, they were attractive business segments in the natural 
monopoly model.  
63 Genschel and Werle (1993) highlight that hierarchies rely on authority whereas 
regimes use regulations (1993: 207).  The authors explain that minimal coordination 
occurred largely because technical specification for interconnection emerged ex post the 
adoption of incompatible national systems.  
64 The cellular system was invented by Bell Laboratories in the late 1960s and increased 
the attractiveness of investments in wireless telecommunications. Cellular systems 
operate by dividing a geographical area into multiple cells and placing a base station in 
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because they facilitated more reliable automated services in telecommunications and 
telematics (Dalum et al 1999).  
In turn, these developments strengthened the position of the telematics and 
telecommunications industry of the US vis-à-vis its main competitors in Europe and 
South East Asia (Table 3.1). At the time, the OECD published several studies on the 
evolution of these industries in the global market, reporting a “technology gap” between 
the two sides of the Atlantic (OECD 1968, 1970). This position was confirmed by 
political leaders of the European Communities (EC), reporting that few European firms 
were large enough to compete with “technology giants” such as AT&T, Motorola or 
IBM, which were becoming increasingly visible in the European market (Davies and 
Brady 1998, EC 1980, EC 1983, Pollack 1994, Sullivan 1984, Woolcock 1984).  
Table 3.1 Export Market Shares (%) in Electronic Communications, 1981 and 1991 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators  
These market changes had also manifested in increased pressures for standardisation of 
products in the telecommunications and telematics industries. The European market was 
very attractive for US firms operating in this sector and, as a result, the United States 
pressed for an increase in global technology trade in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATTs). Although the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) did not discuss the 
                                                                                                                                          
each of the cells. The geographical area is also equipped with a central switch, able to 
process and send information about the user to the base stations. Cellular technology 
remains, to date, the basis of mobile telecommunications systems. 
  Electronics  
(%) 
Office Machinery & Computers 
(%) 
1981 1991 1981 1991 
France 5.0 5.2 7.3 5.7 
Germany 11.7 10.6 12.3 9.0 
Italy 2.6 2.7 4.8 3.9 
United Kingdom 5.5 5.6 8.6 9.9 
Japan 41.0 37.8 11.0 24.7 
United States 16.2 21.4 38.6 26.9 
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liberalisation of telecommunications markets65, it established international codes for the 
elimination of technical barriers to trade and promoted international standardisation of 
technical systems in these sectors (Alabau and Guijarro 2011: 41).  
However, an increase in the production of voluntary international standards in 
telecommunications had put pressures on decision-making within the ITU. At the time, 
the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) of the ITU 
was the main standardisation organisation in telecommunications. An increase in the 
number of participants, while maintaining the established practice of decision-making 
by consensus, was becoming costly for telecommunications companies participating in 
the CCITT. Besides, the voluntary nature of international standards increased the 
possibility of non-compliance while maintaining the high costs of collective 
development (Genschel and Werle 1993: 217).  
In this context, the increased costs of standardisation at international level pointed at 
regional organisations as a more suitable level for coordination (Besen and Farrell 1991: 
311, Reid 1977: 305). In Europe, the CEPT provided this institutional structure but had 
limited organisational capacity for tackling distributional issues of standardisation. As 
outlined above, the CEPT was largely an association for telecommunications policy 
coordination, rather than for technical standardisation (Reid 1977). Simultaneously, 
changes in the institutional structure of the EC were opening up alternative mechanisms 
for coordination in telecommunications markets. However, as the next section reveals, 
this decision-making venue was not sufficiently developed at the time, because PTTs 
were unwilling to cede control over telecommunications policy to the Commission of 
the European Communities and, as a result, preferred standardisation in the voluntary 
CEPT. 
 
3.1.2 The Initial Position of the Public Actor  
Within the EC, the effects of increased competition and liberalisation of international 
technology markets translated into an internal industrial crisis associated with the 
institutional weakness of the European project (Pollack 1994, Sullivan 1984). As early 
as 1972, the EEC Heads of State/Government recognised this relative weakness and 
                                                
65 Telecommunications services were first discussed in the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations, which took place from 1986 to 1994.  
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proposed “a single industrial base for the Community as a whole” (EC 1972)66. By the 
early 1980s, the European Commission was also questioning the ability of individual 
Members to effectively compete on their own in international markets for 
telecommunications and telematics:  
“One example […] is the development of a new family of time division 
switches: their development cost varies between $700 million and $1,300 
million according to the manufacturer. Knowing that to provide a 
reasonable return on development costs of $1,000 million, sales of $14,000 
million are necessary, one wonders how such a return could be obtained on 
a telephone switch of this sort given that the British market is worth $7,200 
million, the French market $10,900 million and the German market 
$11,700 million?” (EC 1983c) 
In the early 1980s, at the start of the liberalisation process, the European Commission 
was itself trying to tip the balance of competences in its favour. Hence, between 1980 
and 1985, the Commission’s main objective was the liberalisation and harmonisation of 
telecommunications equipment markets, rather than the liberalisation of 
telecommunications services run by the PTTs. This is an important distinction that 
clarifies the position of the European Commission in the coordination of 
telecommunications markets. It shows that the Commission had limited powers of rule 
making in telecommunications policy in the EC.  
Between 1980 and 1985, the Commission made several Recommendations in the field 
of telecommunications, focusing primarily on the equipment market. Following the 
Declaration on the European Union at the Stuttgart European Council (1983) it 
proposed the creation of a single market for telecommunications network components 
and terminals, in order to facilitate a single industrial policy as flagged by the European 
Council (EC 1983a, 1983b). The proposal was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 
1984. However, the Commission also proposed the creation of a Telecommunications 
Body to be placed under its authority, in order to facilitate harmonisation of 
telecommunications policy (EC 1983b). This proposal, which would have removed 
authority over telecommunications services from the PTTs, was rejected by the Council 
of Ministers. Instead, the Council set up the Senior Officials Group in 
                                                
66 At the 1972 Paris Summit, the EEC Heads of State or Government outlined the 
objectives and the policies to be pursued with a view to achieving a European Union. At 
the Summit, the Heads of State or Government agreed that “it is necessary to seek to 
establish a single industrial base for the Community as a whole”. For the full 
declaration, see EC (1972) Statement from the Paris Summit, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Oct 1972, Vol 10, Luxembourg, pp. 14-26. 
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Telecommunications (SOG-T), which was exclusively formed of representatives of the 
PTTs and did not respond directly to the Commission.  
This clarifies the position of the public actor vis-à-vis industrial actors in 
telecommunication policy in the EC at the time. First, the European Commission had 
limited authority in telecommunications policy in the early 1980s. Prior to the Single 
Act (1987), the PTTs were de jure excluded from the liberalisation of public 
procurement (Hulsink 1999: 75-108, Sauter 1995: 96). Second, the Commission did not 
question the jurisdiction of PTTs over telecommunications policy or over the delivery 
of telecommunications services. In fact, some authors have pointed out that, during this 
time, the Commission’s position responded to international pressures for liberalisation 
of the telecommunications equipment markets, as stipulated in the 1979 GATT 
Agreement, rather than to its internal agenda to acquire formal competences in the 
sector (Alabau and Guijarro 2011: 41). Third, and of most relevance, the PTTs had 
already established coordination mechanisms within the CEPT, following a logic of 
minimum harmonisation of telecommunications policy across a geographic area greater 
than the EC. This coordination mechanism was preferred by the PTTs because it 
concerned the wider geographic area of Europe, rather than exclusively the EC, and 
because it followed the preferred consensus decision-making to arrive at voluntary 
policies. As Pollack (1994) noted, the Commission had to effectively compete with an 
already established association where a preferred policy coordination mechanism was 
already in place (1994: 99).  
In fact, in 1984, the Council clearly stated that telecommunications administrations 
should “consult each other, preferably in the framework of CEPT, before they introduce 
any new service, notably between Member States with a view to establishing common 
guidelines so that the necessary innovation takes place under conditions compatible 
with harmonization” (Art 1, EC 1984). Even the European Commission clearly 
specified that, in telecommunications services, the Community was “to support the 
telecommunications administrations in programmes of harmonisation established in 
CEPT and CCITT” (COM(80) 422 final). Thus, at the time, the EC was not a preferred 
decision venue for the PTTs. In contrast, the CEPT provided a decision framework that 
gave each PTT sufficient weight to influence the final outcome regarding the 
harmonisation of telecommunications policies. The next section clarifies the distribution 
of economic interests and technology capabilities that determined these industrial actors 
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to enter negotiations for the deployment of wireless communications services in the 
CEPT.  
 
3.1.3 The Initial Distribution of Private Interests and Private Capabilities 
In the early 1980s, the European PTTs continued the established practice of building 
incompatible wireless telecommunications services for their respective markets. 
Although the PTTs agreed on minimum levels of cross-border and cross-frequency 
interference, they did not harmonise these networks. On the contrary, PTTs with the 
largest telecommunications markets adopted incompatible standards for their analog 
cellular networks. The majority of these networks were still organised following the 
vertical relationship between national operators and manufacturers. Hence, the German 
Bundespost (DBP) opted for the C-Netz standard developed by Siemens, the French 
Direction Générale des Télécommunications (DGT) opted for the Radiocom 2000 
standard developed by Matra and Alcatel, the Italian Società Finanziaria Telefonica 
(STET) opted for the RTMI/RTMT standard, while British Telecom and Racal 
Electronics – the two licensed operators in the United Kingdom67 – opted for the AMPS 
standard developed by AT&T and Motorola from the United States (Ibrahim 2006: 
140).  
This situation reveals the economic interests of industrial actors – both service operators 
and manufacturers – in wireless communications. In the early 1980s, analog networks 
were providing limited coverage with highly variable numbers of customers. Generally, 
these numbers varied form 1,000 customers to 30,000 customers, mostly businesses 
(WCIS Database). Depending on its scope, a network of approximately 30,000 
customers would have essentially populated an entire frequency band using the analog 
                                                
67 Similar to the divestiture of AT&T and Bell Systems in the United States, the United 
Kingdom adopted the Telecommunications Bill of 1981, which kick started the 
privatization process of British Telecommunications and the creation of a number of 
subsidiaries. In 1983, licenses for radio cellular networks were granted to Cellnet (BT 
and Securicor) and Racal Vodafone (Milicom, Comvik of Sweden and Hambros Hank). 
See, OFCOM (2013) A Brief History of Recent UK Telecoms and Oftel. However, the 
two licensees were required to develop a single radio interface for their respective 
networks, so that customers could interconnect and roam between the two. A common 
interface is important for automatic roaming, which lies at the core of cellular networks, 
allowing subscribers to automatically switch from the base station of a network when 
moving from cell to cell, even if they don’t belong to operator whose infrastructure it is. 
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technology of the time. However, analog networks across Western Europe rarely 
reached maximum capacity in the late 1970s and, as a result, most operators focused on 
network development within their territory. Even if networks reached full capacity, then 
more allocations would be made in adjacent radio frequencies, mostly below 470 MHz 
(Haug 2007). Thus, for operators, such as the Bundespost (DBP) or Direction Générale 
des Télécommunications (DGT), the potential to grow markets offered an incentive to 
invest in R&D for new analog standards developed at home. For manufacturers, such as 
Siemens or Alcatel, the development of mostly proprietary and incompatible standards 
for these growing networks offered an incentive to lock-in home markets and to export 
to friendly markets. This situation reveals that, in Western Europe, both operators and 
manufacturers had similar economic interests with regard to the development of 
wireless technologies, which was mostly inward looking and maintained the vertical 
relationship between operators and manufacturers. 
However, the situation was different across the Scandinavian states – Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden – where a combination of both network coordination and 
frequency harmonisation across borders was taking place in the early 1980s. In fact, 
since the early 1970s, the Nordic PTTs68 met in the Nordic Mobile Telephone Group 
(NMT Group), an association of PTT representatives from the four countries, in order to 
discuss “issues of a commercial or operative nature” (Haug 2002a: 101). The initial aim 
of the association was not coordinating telecommunications networks and, most 
certainly not coordinating standardisation of telecommunications systems. As T. Haug, 
Secretary of the NMT Group, recalls “the committee’s mandate was extremely vague 
because most of the PTT heads themselves did not understand much about mobile 
communication technology or uses” (Haug 2002a: 102). As Haug recalls, the main aim 
was to “obtain common system solutions”, which essentially translated into a number of 
properties that national cellular networks should have in order to sustain other 
commercial relations between the four members states of the NMT Group (Haug 2002a: 
102). Fulfilling these commercial relations was central to the particular development of 
                                                
68 This chapter will use the term PTT to refer to telecommunications operators in the 
Nordic countries. It should be noted, however, that the term PTT is a misnomer for 
some of the Nordic telecommunications operators/administrations, such as Norway and 
Sweden, where postal and telecommunications authorities were never connected. 
However, for the purpose of being succinct in the description of events, the term PTT 
will be used to refer to all telecommunications operators/administrations. A similar 
approach was used by Haug (2002). 
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wireless communications in the NMT Group. The dispersed nature of settlements and 
the strong economic ties across the Scandinavian region made cross border mobility an 
essential component of stable commercial relations. The four PTTs had previously 
deployed wireless systems, most of which were mobile terminals placed on commercial 
vehicles. These systems used incompatible technologies and were assigned to different 
radio frequencies, so signals were lost when commercial vehicles travelled across 
borders. Cross-border roaming was thus a desirable feature of any coordination 
agreement in the NMT Group (Haug 2002a: 102, Manninen 2002).  
Subsequently, the focus of the NMT Group switched to frequency harmonisation. If 
cross-border frequency harmonisation could be agreed, then an international rather than 
a national cellular system could be built “in keeping with the usual policy of the PTTs, 
[…] to define interfaces between building blocks in the system and between the system 
and the [fixed] telephone network” (Haug 2002a: 102). Essentially, this meant that 
instead of designing a network for a national frequency one would design a network for 
a regional frequency – i.e. a larger frequency pool with a single system rather than a 
system of multiple parts coordinated, if at all, at national borders.  
Frequency harmonisation in the NMT Group was achieved successfully in the 1970s. 
The small number of PTTs, as well as their homogenous economic interests in 
facilitating cross-border communications to fulfil wider commercial ties, led to 
spectrum harmonisation in the 450 MHz band. This aligned the preferences of the 
Scandinavian PTTs for a single wireless cellular network to be deployed across borders. 
Undoubtedly, however, a single international network was not the preferred option for 
at least some equipment and infrastructure manufacturers, who would have to compete 
across borders for the production of network components, rather than to secure national 
contracts for the production of entire networks at home. Three strategies were adopted 
in the NMT Group to mitigate positions between operators and manufacturers in order 
to create a single network in the harmonised 450 MHz band. First, the NMT Committee 
established a procedure by which each operator was allowed to suggest a number of 
manufacturers with whom to deliberate system specifications and, later, tenders 
(Lehenkari and Miettinen 2002: 117, Manninen 2002: 111)69. Second, by enlarging the 
                                                
69 Initially, the NMT Group convened all interested manufacturers. However, these 
were not willing to share R&D collectively, so the Group conducted individual hearings 
from representatives of six manufacturers selected to provide consultation on the 
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frequency pool across borders, manufacturers of specific network components would 
benefit from a wider market albeit in conditions of increased competition. Third, in 
order to prevent intellectual property disputes and, indirectly, to limit the immediate 
effect of increased competition, the network would use established technologies and 
techniques that would maintain position in the market (Haug 2002a: 103).  
This configuration realigned the economic interests of manufacturers in favour of 
creating a single network in a harmonised frequency band, which ultimately led to the 
development of the NMT standard70 for analog mobile communications – one of the 
most successful “first generation” standards of radio communications in the world. In 
addition, it led to the creation of the first network to have international roaming and to 
occupy a harmonised frequency band, which put forward an alternative institutional 
arrangement for the governance of radio frequencies across borders.  
Therefore, compared with the situation in Western Europe, where radio frequencies 
were fragmented in incompatible networks along national border, the NMT Group 
created a common frequency pool in the 450 MHz band as well as a common set of 
operational rules to harvest the pool, based on the NMT standard. This point requires 
further analysis as to the distribution of rivalry and excludability in the 450 MHz band. 
The NMT project has been previously described as “operator-driven cooperation” 
because it challenged conventional production relations based on lock-in effects 
(Lehenkari and Miettinen 2002). Instead, the argument goes, the NMT system instilled 
competition between equipment manufacturers at every component level of the 
network. While this last point is undoubtedly true, the description of the relationship 
between operators and manufacturers in this case is possibly less accurate. As Berggren 
and Laestedius (2003) noted, this relationship did not follow “the user-producer 
constellation in the conventional sense”, but the logic of a “development pair” (2003: 
97). The most iconic development pair at the time was Ericsson (manufacturer) and 
Televerket (public operator in Sweden), who formed a joint venture called Ellemtel in 
order to develop fixed telecommunications systems. The AXE digital switch, developed 
                                                                                                                                          
practical system, both technically and economically. The selected manufacturers were 
Ericsson, AP, Sonab, STK, Storno and Tekade, originating from the Scandinavian 
countries and Germany (GFR). 
70 Note that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, wireless communications standards are 
compatibility standards that clarify relationships (or interfaces) between network 
components, rather than product standards per se.  
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jointly and produced by Ericsson, was essential to create a single NMT network in a 
harmonised band. Without the digital circuit switch, the initial idea to project the NMT 
network in a similar fashion to a fixed telecommunications network could not have been 
achieved, increasing fragmentation and making the system less desirable. The example 
of the Ericsson-Televerket development pair is important because it shows the 
dynamics of coordination – albeit not without its tensions71 – between industry 
segments described in conflict due to vertical and/or lock-in relations. Moreover, the 
example of this development pair indicates that NMT, as a project, relied on an aligned 
relationship between operators and manufacturers, which would facilitate the creation 
of common rules for harvesting the 450 MHz frequency band for wireless 
communications.  
In fact, by 1983, the NMT system had the largest share in the global market for mobile 
cellular systems (Funk and Methe 2001: 598). Not only did NMT networks increase 
capacity to approximately 100,000 subscribers by mid 1980s, but also the system was 
easily exported in other parts of the world. In fact, by the mid 1980s, the Austrian, 
Benelux and Irish PTTs had all chosen NMT systems for their analog networks, which 
opened up the possibility of band harmonisation and international roaming among them. 
This situation put pressures on the German, French and Italian telecommunications 
industries, which were developing home markets at a slower rate than the Nordic 
counterparts, while also loosing established markets for their exports abroad. In this 
context, competition between the two approaches of ‘frequency coordination’ versus 
‘frequency fragmentation’, with different results to extracting economic value from the 
radio resource, led to the creation of Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) in CEPT in 1982. 
As it will be outlined below, the two approaches continued to inform preferences in 
GSM-CEPT, which affected the choice of operational rules – i.e. rules of use and rules 
of access – on the radio spectrum. Before proceeding with the next section, it is 
important to highlight that coordination in GSM-CEPT, similar to coordination in the 
NMT Group described above, did not concern a tragedy of use, misuse or overuse in the 
spectrum common. Instead, it concerned distributional conflicts over rights of use and 
                                                
71 It should be noted that, at the start, Ericsson was not willing to deploy the AXE 
switch on the NMT system. This is because, as Karlsson noted, AXE was considered 
“too complex for such a peripheral thing as mobile telephony” (Karlsson and Lung, 
www.ericssonhistory.com). Televerket convinced Ericsson to use AXE, by warning 
that, otherwise, it would place the order with Ericsson’s competitors (Hagstrom qtd in 
Karlsson, www.teliasonerahistory.com). 
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rights of access onto a newly created regional pool in the 900 MHz frequency band in 
Western Europe.  
 
3.2 The Process of Private Rule-Making in the 900 MHz Band 
This section follows the process of negotiating a set of operational rules – rules of 
access and rules of use – to be used in the 900 MHz band for the production of mobile 
cellular telecommunications. In 1982, the Dutch PTT, with the backing of the Nordic 
PTTs, proposed the creation of a mobile cellular network to run across Western and 
Northern Europe and to resemble the NMT network in both operation and function. The 
proposal was put forward in the CEPT, which, as indicated above, was the preferred 
setting for voluntary coordination in radio spectrum and telecommunications policy 
across Europe. This first move by the Dutch and Nordic PTTs triggered a response from 
their European counterparts, who agreed to set up a group of expert representatives 
from the eleven PTTs interested in coordinating – albeit at varying degrees – mobile 
telecommunication networks across Europe72. The group – named Groupe Spécial 
Mobile (GSM) – was to follow the established consensus rules of decision making in 
the CEPT. Hence, at its origin, GSM-CEPT was designed to replicate the NMT Group, 
and to allow for negotiations regarding different levels of harmonisation of mobile 
telecommunications services. These levels of harmonisation were not pre-determined. 
The following sub-sections explore this process of bargaining in GSM-CEPT for 
defining different levels of harmonisation and network development in the 900 MHz 
band. A close analysis of the economic interests and capabilities of members reveals 
that GSM-CEPT was an association of members with similar interests and relatively 
equal technology resources, which slowed negotiations based on consensus decision-
making. This section concludes that GSM-CEPT was a club of equal members, whose 
operation relied on exclusive access based on the geographic representation of its 
members and on the proportional contribution of these members to the technology 
system used to harvest the common 900 MHz pool.  
 
                                                
72 GSM-CEPT was constituted of PTT members from the following eleven countries: 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (FRG), Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.   
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3.2.1 Negotiating Rules of Access 
In 1979, the World Administrative Radio Conference of the ITU (WARC 79) 
designated a part of the 900 MHz band for land mobile communications in Region 1 of 
the Radio Regulation – the radio region that also includes Europe. Recalling that the 
radio spectrum is allocated at international level by communications service, rather than 
by sovereign state (revisit Chapter 1), this allocation was made primarily because the 
band was unused at the time (Haug 2004: 155). However, in the established practice of 
the ITU Radio Regulations at the time, this allocation did not make reference to a 
particular technology configuration or telecommunication system to be deployed in the 
900 MHz band. More so, the allocation did not specify any level of coordination at 
regional level other than respect for the principle of basic interconnection and non-
interference.   
T. Haug, representing Televerket, recalls that PTT representatives discussed this 
allocation at the CEPT Telecommunication Meeting of June 1982 (Haug 2004: 155). 
European PTTs already using NMT73 in the 450 MHz band had a clear economic 
interest in utilising the 900 MHz band to extend the current system and to harmonise it 
across borders, which would have eliminated costs of interconnection with other 
incompatible systems. However, geography stood in the way. The French and German 
markets, operating incompatible systems other than NMT, were limiting the potential 
for international roaming in Western Europe. As a result, at the Plenary Assembly of 
CEPT in Vienna, June 1982, the Dutch PTT made a proposal for: 
“the creation of some kind of harmonised public automatic mobile service 
in Europe, operating in the 900 MHz band and which would have to be 
operational in the 1990s” (GSM Doc 3/82: para 5).   
The reasons behind the proposal evoked the fragmentation of analog mobile networks in 
Western Europe (GSM Doc 3/81: para 3). The proposal, which came from the Dutch 
PTT, should not be surprising. In 1982, the Dutch and Danish PTTs were the first 
telecommunications operators in the EC to adopt NMT. The proposal received 
immediate backing by the four Nordic PTTs, recommending that the task of organising 
“some kind of harmonised public automatic mobile service” should be entrusted to a 
                                                
73 Recall that, in addition to four Nordic PTTs, the Austrian, Benelux and Spanish PTTs 
had also purchased and deployed NMT.    
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new study group – Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM-CEPT74) – within the Harmonisation 
Committee of the CEPT (GSM Doc 4/82). T. Haug, former secretary of the NMT 
Group, was soon proposed and appointed Chairman of the GSM Group.   
Having both non-EC and EC members supporting the proposal put pressure on the 
French and German PTTs to consider participating in the GSM Group. In addition, as 
long as the mandate of the group did not make reference to a specific technology 
configuration to be deployed in the 900 MHz band, the group could work as a 
mechanism for monitoring research and development undergone by competitors. T. 
Haug, newly invested Chairman of GSM-CEPT, recalls that: 
“The decision only mentioned “harmonisation” which indicates that the 
compatibility aspect was the dominant factor behind the decision, and few 
delegates […] sincerely believed that free circulation of radio users across 
international borders could be achieved” (Haug 2004: 155). 
Although informed by competition, the decision to participate in a process of 
harmonisation established some ground rules for the collective operation of the 
frequency pool at 900 MHz. The most important was defining the boundaries of the 
frequency that would motivate group members to invest in further rules of use.  
As Table 3.2 outlines, negotiations about frequency capacity limits and preferred 
systems to harvest the 900 MHz band were discussed as early as December 1982, a few 
months after the creation of GSM-CEPT.  
These negotiations revealed that interconnecting incompatible telecommunications 
networks in a harmonised frequency would be too costly for members to establish and 
maintain. As Haug noted: 
“It soon became obvious, however, that a very wide range of parameters 
would have to be identical in all participating networks if the system were 
to be successful” (Haug 1988: 455).  
 
                                                
74 Note that GSM is used to refer to both Groupe Special Mobile (the expert group) and 
Global System for Mobile Communication (the standard that emerged from the expert 
group). In order to distinguish between the two, the group will be referred to as GSM-
CEPT, while the standard will be referred to as GSM.  
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Table 3.2 Review of Official Position on Assignment of Mobile Cellular Systems, 
Selected GSM-CEPT Members, Dec 1982 
Source: Based on Report from Meeting 1 (1983), CEPT-CCH-GSM, GSM 52/83 
As a result, the Dutch and Nordic PTTs proposed a number of broad system 
specifications to be discussed in GSM-CEPT (GSM Doc 3/82). In fact, these 
specifications indicated the technology to be adopted for harvesting the 900 MHz band 
for the production of cellular communications. The proposed rules were (GSM Doc 
3/82, Haug 2002c):   
- fully automatic system 
- roaming capacity 
- switching call-in-progress 
- high degree of frequency efficiency 
- small cell structure (where necessary) 
- digital speech transmission 
- data transmission 
- facilities comparable to the Public Switched Telephone Network 
If adopted by all members, the rules would have limited access onto the 900 MHz 
resource to those following these specifications. Thus, every member of GSM-CEPT 
had a clear economic interest in defining system specifications that reflected their 
PTT Members 
GSM-CEPT 
Official Position on Assignment of Mobile Cellular Telephony in the 450MHz 
and 900MHZ bands  
Belgium Sufficient spectrum capacity in 450MHz band for a modified NMT system until the 
mid 1990s 
Denmark Insufficient capacity in 450MHz band for NMT system, plans for expansion of 
system in the 900MHz band from mid to late 1980s 
Finland Sufficient capacity in 450MHz band for NMT system to suffice until early 1990s 
France Need for new system deployed in 900MHz band as only possible solution from mid 
1980s 
Germany Sufficient capacity in 450MHz band for System C by the mid 1990s  
Italy Sufficient capacity in 450MHz band for RMTS system until the mid 1990s 
Netherlands Sufficient capacity in 450MHz band for a modified NMT system until the mid 
1990s 
Spain  Sufficient capacity in 450MHz band for NMT system 
Sweden Insufficient capacity in 450MHz band for NMT system, plans for expansion of 
system in the 900MHz band from mid to late 1980s 
UK Need for interim system deployed in the 900MHz band, subject to mutual 
agreement between two service providers in competition 
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investments in wireless telecommunications technology. Without a doubt, these system 
specifications were patterned on the NMT standard (Haug 2002a, Haug 2004). Because 
of NMT’s success, the broad system properties did not raise major distributional 
concerns among GSM-CEPT members. In fact, there was only one item – the digital 
speech transmission – that raised distributional concerns, particularly with the French 
and German PTTs. At that time, all cellular communications using radio frequencies, 
including the NMT network, used analog speech transmission. Introducing digital 
speech transmission into the broad network specifications put technical development 
into system specifications for the network to be deployed in the 900 MHz band. This 
meant that, rather than defining rules of access for a wider resource pool, the activity in 
GSM-CEPT would involve redefining rules of use inside to the pool, a situation that 
caused concern for some GSM-CEPT members. This item would upset the level of 
rivalry among GSM-CEPT members, by altering the proportional use of technology 
capabilities for wireless networks to be deployed inside the regional pool. The next 
section explores in more detail how negotiations among members with relatively equal 
technology capabilities led to the creation of weak rules of managing use for extracting 
economic value from the 900 MHz frequency band across Western Europe.  
 
3.2.2 Negotiating Rules of Use 
The proposal to include technical development into system specifications changed the 
nature of activity in GSM-CEPT, making it resemble a standardisation association75 
(Bach 2000). Whereas competition between members drove them to agree on the 
creation of a regional frequency pool, it prevented them from agreeing on joint technical 
development for system specifications in the 900 MHz band. As a result, and following 
consensus decision-making in the CEPT, the members removed “the digital speech 
transmission” requirement from the system specifications and kept it only as a working 
assumption, on the basis that digital speech would use spectrum more efficiently than 
analog speech (GSM Doc 53/83). The removal of this specification reflects the 
competitive position and equal weight of each member in GSM-CEPT. Besides, it 
                                                
75 As mentioned in Section 3.1, the main task of the CEPT was the harmonisation of 
existing networks and, if necessary, of radio frequencies, rather than the development of 
standards.  
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shows how competitive considerations between members informed the choice of 
operational rules in the 900 MHz band.  
As early as 1981, the Nordic PTTs announced work on the development of a “digital 
speech solution” for the NMT network. The project, entitled FMK76, had roots in 
previous research run by Televerket and Ericsson (Bekkers 2001: 277, Manninen 2002: 
101). The same year, delegates of the French DGT visited Televerket to test the NMT 
system and were informed of its work on a fully digital system for mobile 
communications using TDMA access technology for the speech transmission77 (Dupuis 
2002a: 24). Undoubtedly, this development informed the choice of “digital speech 
transmission” in the initial system specifications for GSM (GSM Doc 3/82).  
This development also informed the decision of the French and German operators (DGT 
and DBP) to sign a cooperation agreement, in July 1983, to coordinate research and 
development for a new system to be deployed in the 900 MHz band (Dupuis 2002a: 24). 
The cooperation agreement would forward development for an alternative to the system 
designed by the Nordic PTTs. It would also ensure that the technology to be jointly 
developed would be channelled through GSM-CEPT in order to receive early 
acceptance by all members (Bekkers 2001: 277, Dupuis 2002a: 25). Lastly, contracted 
manufacturers would design both analog and digital speech systems in order to ensure 
that both working assumptions in GSM-CEPT would be covered.   
Against this background, the GSM-CEPT members agreed to open proposals for system 
development at the end of 1984 and test them, within the framework of GSM-CEPT, at 
the end of 1986. However, soon after, the French DGT and German DBP altered the 
cooperation agreement to refer exclusively to “joint experimental work in digital 
cellular technology” (GSM Doc 76/84). The Annex to the Agreement specified that “the 
German part has proposed to give up the idea of introducing one of the proposed analog 
                                                
76 In translation, the abbreviation stands for Mobile Communication of the Future. 
Originally, the research project was looking at digital FDMA transmission, but soon 
realized that TDMA technology was more effective. See footnote below for definition.  
77 There are three recognised technologies used in mobile communications for 
transmitting voice and data: FDMA (Frequency Division Multiple Access) which was 
used in analog speech and assigns each call to a frequency; TDMA (Time Division 
Multiple Access) which assigns each call a portion of time on a designated frequency 
and hops calls periodically; CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) which assigns a 
code to each call and spreads it over all available frequencies. TDMA and CDMA are 
used in digital transmission.  
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systems and to give preference to the development of proposed digital systems” (GSM 
Doc 76/84). The decision of the German operator reflected delays in development work 
on analog systems by the main contracted parties to the agreement – Alcatel and Philips 
– whose proposal, called MATS-E, was estimated for delivery only towards the end of 
1985 (Charlish 1982). Thus, the French and German operators abandoned the analog 
system solution and opened proposals for digital speech technologies covering all types 
of access techniques – TDMA, CDMA and FDMA – as well as narrowband and 
wideband channel systems78. In addition, the two operators agreed to provide the 
technology, free of charge, to any third party in GSM-CEPT: 
“If certain interfaces or transmission methods are chosen as standards by 
CEPT, and if elements concurring to the definition of those interfaces or 
transmission methods have been subject to an "essential patent", registered 
by the contractor during the contract or beforehand or afterwards, a non-
exclusive free of charge operating license from the contractor shall be 
granted to any competent third party of European countries being 
represented in CEPT that would wish either to produce equipment referring 
to these standards or to se1l them or also to use them” (Franco-German 
Experimental Program, Annex C, para 2) 
This provision was, in fact, an incentive put forward by the French and German 
operators for other members in GSM-CEPT to adopt their technology. Were the others 
to select one of their transmission methods as components for the future network, then 
the technology will be provided free of charge79. As a consequence, the development 
work undertaken under the Franco-German experimental programme attracted interest 
from operators in Italy and the United Kingdom, who offered to join the programme in 
exchange for access to their existing research (Quadripartite Agreement, Annex A and 
Annex C). Thus, in June 1985, the Italian telecommunications operator Società Italiana 
per L’Esercizio Telefonico (SIP) joined the Franco-German Programme, followed in 
April 1986 by Racal-Vodafone and Telecom Sucuricor – the two operators of mobile 
networks in the UK. The cooperation agreement, known as the Quadripartite 
Cooperation Agreement (1986), tied together the four operators of the largest 
telecommunications markets in Europe. The Agreement, based upon an exchange of all 
                                                
78 Narrowband and wideband communications refer to the frequency range (bandwidth) 
chosen to transfer voice and data. Narrowband is generally thought to have better noise 
levels. Wideband, however, is generally thought to support better data transfer and 
achieve higher economic performance.  
79 As will be discussed in Section 3.3, this provision was also the cause of major 
instability after GSM MoU (1987) was signed.  
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registered essential patents related to the technology to be used in the 900 MHz band 
(Annex C), represented a counterweight to the development activity of the Nordic 
operators.  
Consequently, eight competing proposals were put forward for trial in GSM-CEPT in 
December 1986 (Table 3.3). Four of these proposals were funded by members of the 
Quadripartite Cooperation Agreement and offered a wide range of access techniques for 
digital speech transmission, including narrow and wideband solutions. The other four 
proposals were funded, directly or indirectly, by members of the NMT Group and 
offered a single access technique for the digital speech transmission – TDMA – as well 
as a single channel solution – narrowband. Each of the four systems was tested against 
the original system specifications agreed within GSM-CEPT (GSM Doc 52/83, GSM 
Doc 73/85).  
Table 3.3 Competitive Proposals for GSM Trials in 1986 
 
Source: Based on Arnold et al (2008), Bekkers (2001: 288), Dupuis (2002a: 27) 
The results of the Paris trials revealed that ADPM scored the highest against the initial 
system requirements, especially against the spectrum efficiency requirement (GSM Doc 
23/86, Table 3.3). T. Haug explains that ADPM – the system proposed by the 
Norwegian research centre Elab – was chosen because it offered the most affordable 
interface solution to the established telecommunications infrastructure available in each 
member of GSM-CEPT (Haug 2002c: 21, Bekkers 2001: 290).  Although ADPM was 
System Developers Main Access Technique Key partnerships 
CD-900 Alcatel/SEL/AEG/SAT/
Italtel 
Wideband TD/CDMA SEL (former ITT subsidiary) sold to 
CGE/Alcatel in 1986 & SAT part of 
Alcatel group 
MATS-D Phillips Hybrid narrow/wideband  FD/
TM/CDMA 
Phillips through TeKaDe/TRT 
subsidiaries 
S 900-D ANT/Bosch Narrowband TDMA ANT acquired by Bosch in 1992 
SFH 900 LCT Narrow/Wideband CD/TDMA 
with frequency hopping 
 Lab Central de Telecommunications 
France, subsidiary of Matra 
DMS-90 Ericsson Narrowband TDMA Ericsson acquired Marconi share of 
SRA (radio systems) and Magnetic 
(base stations) in 1983  
MAX Televerket Narrowband TDMA In partnership with ERA labs 
- Nokia Narrowband TDMA 
ADPM Elab TDMA Project sponsored through FMK 
project 
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the technology that scored the highest against commonly agreed system specifications, 
the French and German operators blocked its adoption for the 900 MHz band. Not only 
was ADPM a technology developed outside the Quadripartite Agreement and the EC, 
but the research centre Elab also carried a close history of cooperation with the Swedish 
operator Televerket80. However, T. Maseng (2004), the project director at Elab, noted 
that narrowband TDMA was selected because it proposed the most cost effective speech 
solution for both densely and sparsely populated areas in each country represented in 
GSM-CEPT (2004: 163). P. Dupuis (2002a) recalls that there was considerable 
agreement in GSM-CEPT over narrowband TDMA as the preferred speech transmission 
for less costly networks (2001). In fact, the German operator expressed support for the 
technology (Dupuis 2002a). According to Maseng (2004), the most attractive aspect of 
the technology was its “adaptive digital phase modulation”, a technique that would 
require the least alterations and, implicitly, reduced costs to adapt the existing 
telecommunications infrastructure in both rural areas and large cities81 (2004: 163).  
The situation reached a deadlock in February 1987 at the Madeira Conference of GSM-
CEPT. Then, all members, bar the French and German operators, declared “narrowband 
TDMA had substantial advantages over wideband TDMA” and invited their French and 
German counterparts to reconsider their position by May 1987 (GSM Doc 46/87, para 
5). In the meantime, they also adopted the technology as a working assumption for the 
system to be commonly deployed in the 900 MHz band (GSM Doc 46/87, para 6). The 
deadlock was broken in May 1987 with the Bonn Declaration of the Quadripartite 
Cooperation (1987). The Declaration stated that narrowband TDMA was to be adopted 
as the standard for speech transmission in the 900 MHz band, if enhanced with a delay 
equalisation modulation technique developed by the CD-900 consortium funded by the 
French and German operators (Table 3.3):  
“Europe must have a single standard supported throughout the CEPT. This 
should be based on the narrowband TDMA concept defined by CEPT at its 
Madeira meeting in February 1987, enhanced in the area of modulation and 
coding to provide the greatest flexibility in receiving equipment 
implementation” (Bonn Declaration, 1987) 
                                                
80 In fact, Elabs development work on the digital speech system was commissioned 
through the FMK project developed by Televerket and other in the NMT group in 1981 
(Manninn 2004:192).  
81 In contrast, CDMA was best suited for densely populated areas.  
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The Bonn Declaration reflects the trade-offs between industrial actors, with relatively 
equal technology capabilities, represented in GSM-CEPT. On the one hand, the system 
to be used in the 900 MHz band was to reflect the equal contribution of those that 
invested in research and development towards the standard. As T. Haug noted, “even 
those who were in favour of ADPM found that the change to GMSK [the original 
modulation technique in ADPM] was a small price to pay for European unity” (Haug 
2002c: 22). On the other hand, the Bonn Declaration requested that the agreement were 
“formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding open to all authorised operators in 
CEPT” (Art 4), but modelled on the shared intellectual property agreement of the 
Quadripartite Cooperation (Art 9). Effectively, this ensured that intellectual property 
would be shared on favourable terms in the GSM MoU (1987) or, more specifically, 
that “the signatories shall coordinate their policies on intellectual property rights as far 
as possible” (Art 9, GSM MoU 1987). Fifteen mobile operators, all members of GSM-
CEPT, signed the GSM Memorandum of Understanding on September 1987. The GSM 
MoU (1987) stated: 
“The signatories shall support the open (non-proprietary) definition of at 
least the following interfaces in the form of CEPT recommendations: 
Mobile/Base Station (air interface) based on the narrowband TDMA 
concept defined by CEPT […] enhanced in the areas of modulation and 
coding […] as agreed by CEPT GSM at its Brussels meeting June 1987 
Base Station/Mobile Switching Centre 
Mobile Switching Centre/Mobile Switching Centre/Location Register” 
(GSM MoU 1987, Art 5) 
Essentially, the agreement reconfigured network specifications so that the technology 
deployed in the 900 MHz band would reflect, at least in part, the capabilities of all 
actors who invested in technical development for GSM. In addition, agreeing to tender 
on “coordinated intellectual property rights” (Art 9, MoU 1987) was aimed at lowering 
rivalry between members of GSM-CEPT, while sharing the economic benefits derived 
from using a single technology system to harvest the 900 MHz pool. These 
specifications turned GSM-CEPT into a club of industry actors that defined rules of use 
of the radio resource at 900 MHz based on the contribution of technology capabilities 
by most of its members, leading to a complex technical standard, while limiting access 
to this regional pool on technology as well as geographic considerations (GSM-CEPT). 
However, formalising these complex operational rules of use and access onto the 900 
MHz band in a voluntary Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) did not create strong 
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internal mechanisms for monitoring the license-free/patent exchange agreement on 
which rules of use in the 900 MHz band were based. Also, the MoU did not create 
strong exclusion mechanisms for controlling entry by new members with limited 
interest in maintaining the rules that GSM-CEPT members had invested in. The next 
section explores the impact of this type of interest association on the property 
arrangements that emerged from GSM MoU (1987).  
 
3.3 The Impact of Private Association on the Choice of Property Systems  
This section discusses the impact of the GSM MoU (1987) on the configuration of 
property arrangements in the 900 MHz band across Western Europe. As a voluntary 
agreement between fifteen telecommunications operators in Western Europe, the GSM 
MoU (1987) had limited authority to monitor and enforce commitment to procure 
digital mobile cellular networks for the 900 MHz band as specified in GSM-CEPT. In 
1988, the GSM MoU signatories issued a set of specifications for tendering to 
manufacturers with the requirement that their essential patents will be provided on a 
free license to GSM MoU signatories inside or outside of Europe (Art 9). This 
requirement mirrored the intellectual property agreement of the Quadripartite 
Cooperation (1986) and represented the trade off put to the French DGT and German 
DBP in exchange for support of the system specifications agreed upon in GSM-CEPT. 
Whereas this procurement procedure had the effect of limiting rivalry between 
operators, with equal technology capabilities and with equal investments in the 
development of new harvesting technologies for the 900 MHz band, it also had the 
effect of increasing rivalry between operators and manufacturers as equal beneficiaries 
of mobile communications derived from the use of the band. This situation destabilised 
the GSM MoU (1987) and resulted in the elimination of the clause for the provision of 
free licenses for essential patents. The elimination of the clause followed from signing a 
cross-licensing scheme between the main manufacturers that participated in the GSM 
trials (1986). This approach led to a realignment of positions in favour of the GSM 
system to be deployed in the harmonised frequency pool at 900 MHz, reducing 
uncertainty over resource rents for both operators and manufacturers and allowing the 
GSM project to be implemented. However, with the cross-licensing agreements in 
place, operational rules of use in the frequency pool had changed because the value of 
the patents held by different members was no longer equal. This situation revealed the 
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weakness of collective choice rules of management and exclusion for the deployment of 
GSM in the 900 MHz band, as stipulated in the GSM MoU (1987).  As a result, the 
European Commission, as a transnational public actor, intervened to stabilise the system 
in two ways. First, it proposed the GSM Directive (87/372/EEC), which offered 
certainty to manufacturers by reserving the frequency bands at 900 MHz for digital 
mobile communications, albeit without specifying technology requirements for them. 
Second, it backed up the creation of consortia between operators and manufacturers to 
jointly develop and distribute the GSM system. The result of these interest realignments 
in the GSM MoU (1987) led to the creation of property arrangements based on 
exclusive individual property inside the 900 MHz pool, in order to counterweight the 
limited authority of the GSM MoU (1987). Thus, although industry actors were the first 
to define operational rules of access and use of the 900 MHz band at transnational level, 
these operational rules were not reinforced by collective choice rules of internal 
management and exclusion, which destabilised the original GSM-CEPT system. In this 
context, the regulation of the 900 MHz frequency pool in Western Europe was defined 
by private actors in negotiations of technical systems, but the monitoring and 
enforcement of the property rules resulting from these negotiations did not rest with the 
private actors but with the public actor.  
 
3.3.1 The Nature of Private Association  
The GSM MoU (1987) committed its signatories to provide public commercial services 
for digital mobile communications in the 900 MHz band by 1991, based on the 
assumption that intellectual property rights essential to the GSM system would be 
provided on a free license to all signatories of the agreement. T. Haug confirmed that 
standardisation work in GSM-CEPT was premised on the assumption of developing an 
open standard, whereby the use of patented technologies was avoided unless they were 
provided royalty-free to all members (Haug 2004: 157)82. Temple (2002) explains that 
“coordination on intellectual property rights” was kept in the original MoU (1987) 
because the Quadripartite signatories had shared intellectual property from the start of 
                                                
82 The Quadripartite Agreement (1986), partly mirrored in the initial GSM MoU (1987) 
at the request of the Quadripartite Agreement signatories, took this clause further by 
requesting that essential patents chosen as standards be made available free of charge, 
on a non-exclusive basis, to third parties of European operators (Annex C, Quadripartite 
Agreement). 
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the GSM programme and, under different circumstances, would run the risk of sharing 
their patents royalty-free without a reciprocated commitment from other GSM MoU 
signatories (Temple 2002: 45). Bekkers, Verspagen and Smith (2002) explain that this 
approach was common practice when monopolist network operators – i.e. the PTTs – 
determined and funded the development work of manufacturers in exchange for long-
term contracts, which sometimes included “licensing patents to other suppliers at no 
costs by operators with multi-supplier policies” (Bekkers et al 2002: 1144).  
Originally, this situation was not contested by the main manufacturers that participated 
in the GSM Paris trial (revisit Table 3.3), because the GSM MoU (1987) opened the 
possibility of a considerably larger market as a result of the harmonisation of the 900 
MHz frequency pool. Indirect commitment to the GSM MoU (1987) was also secured 
by the intervention of the European Commission, which proposed the GSM Directive 
(87/372/EEC) that reserved and harmonised the frequency pool at 900 MHz for the 
“introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile 
communications in the European Community”. Although Council Directive 
87/372/EEC did not specify the technical parameters of the system to be deployed in the 
900 MHz band83, it referred to the work carried out by GSM-CEPT. Thus, Council 
Directive 87/372/EEC acted as a stabiliser to the creation of the regional frequency pool 
in the 900 MHz band for those willing to adopt the technical specifications of the GSM 
MoU (1987). This interest alignment between EU and non-EU operators was also 
achieved because Finland and Sweden were preparing their accession to the European 
Union in the enlargement of 1995. The joint commitment to the GSM MoU (1987) and 
Council Directive 87/372/EEC achieved the lowering of rivalry between operators in 
the 900 MHz band, allowing unanimous support for the GSM system specifications.   
However, the frequency pool created by the GSM MoU (1987) was still susceptible to 
new entry by outsiders. The main destabiliser was Motorola, acting as a free-rider on 
the open standardisation process that occurred in GSM-CEPT. A US manufacturer with 
                                                
83 The GSM Directive 87/372/EEC stipulates that “for the purpose of this Directive, a 
public pan-European cellular digital land-based mobile communications service shall 
mean a public cellular radio service provided in each of the Member States to a 
common specification [common standard], which includes the feature that all voice 
signals are encoded into binary digits prior to radio transmission [radio speech 
transmission], and where users provided with a service in one Member State can also 
gain access to the service in any other Member States [transnational roaming]” (text in 
brackets not in the original).  
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European base, Motorola established several research and development subsidiaries 
across Europe through the 1980s, due to the strong competition it faced from the private 
monopoly Bell-AT&T in the US market. However, instead of placing bids for 
development contract with the GSM-CEPT operators in preparation of the GSM Paris 
trials (revisit Table 3.3), Motorola continued research and development in digital speech 
transmission for mobile terminals outside the GSM-CEPT framework. This meant that 
Motorola was not tied into the intellectual property clause of the GSM MoU (1987) and, 
throughout the late 1980s, patented some of the digital radio technology standardised in 
CEPT84. This technology turned out to be essential to the GSM standard, which 
determined Motorola to refuse to license it under the royalty-free conditions of the 
initial GSM MoU (1987).  
Faced with this stalemate, operators removed the free intellectual property clause from 
the GSM MoU procurement procedure, but required manufacturers to supply the market 
covered under the GSM MoU Agreement (1991) on “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions” (Bekkers, Verspagen and Smith 2002: 1147). Once again, 
Motorola refused this clause on the premise that it was willing to enter cross-licensing 
agreements only with manufacturers of complementary products to its terminals 
(Bekkers et al 2002: 1151). Indirectly, this meant that Motorola was signalling cross-
licensing agreements with the main manufacturers of base stations and switches 
contracted for system development in GSM-CEPT (revisit Table 3.3).  
This position reflects Motorola’s strategies to use its technology capabilities to tip the 
degree of rivalry inside the 900 MHz frequency pool in its favour. As a result, from 
1990 to 1993, Motorola signed cross-licensing agreements with Alcatel (1990), Siemens 
(1990), Matra (1991), Philips (1992), Ericsson (1992) and Nokia (1993) (Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 provides a visual representation of global technology transfers in radio 
communications from January 1990 to December 199485. It applies a cluster analysis, 
represented by vertices in different colours. From a visual standpoint, the network 
                                                
84 A study conducted by Bekkers et al (2002) confirms that Motorola filed for the 
largest number of essential patents in January 1987, only a few months prior to the 
signing of the GSM MoU (1987) and once narrowband TDMA was agreed unanimously 
as the technology to be used for the radio speech transmission of GSM.   
85 This visual representation applied a filter of the eigenvector centrality at 0.0025, 
which eliminates one-off transfers of outliers. However, Table 3.4 gives the main 
network metrics prior to the application of any visual filters.  
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representation confirms that Motorola interacted in the same cluster with Ericsson, 
Alcatel and Siemens (green cluster).  
Figure 3.2 Network Visualisation of Technology Transfers, Global Strategic Alliances, 
Jan 1990 - Dec 1994 
 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
Figure 3.2 also provides the visual representation of the network metrics in Table 3.4. 
Motorola scores one of the highest degree centralities in a network of approximately 
2,700 technology transfer, at DC=30 (Table 3.4).  
As a representation of the number of exchanges in the network, the high degree 
centrality logged by Motorola reveals its considerable portfolio in radio 
communications from 1990 to 1995. As a measure of influence in the network, 
Siemens, Ericsson and Motorola score high levels of eigenvector centrality at over 
EC=0.01 (Table 3.4), which confirms their position in the global market for mobile 
communications following the new GSM MoU Agreement (1991), which removed the 
royalty free license clause and brought in new GSM MoU signatories. 
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Table 3.4 Network Analysis Metrics, Global Strategic Alliances, Jan 1990 - Dec 1994 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
In order to stabilise these new conditions of rivalry and excludability in the 900 MHz 
frequency pool for the deployment of GSM systems, the European Commission 
intervened to confirm the legality of the manufacturing consortia that followed from the 
new procurement procedures, which eliminated the original intellectual property clause 
from the GSM MoU (1987). In COM Decision 90/446/EEC, the European Commission 
decided that these consortia “do not have as its object or effect the restriction of 
competition within the common market”, because “the development and manufacture of 
the GSM system is so great that realistically there is no scope for companies to act 
individually” (COM Decision 90/446/EEC, para 2). This last step confirmed the new 
operational arrangements in the 900 MHz band, based on limited rivalry among 
manufacturers but increased rivalry between manufacturers and operators of GSM 
systems. This last step also confirmed the necessity of an external public actor to 
intervene in order to stabilise new operational arrangements in the absence of internal 
mechanisms of mutual monitoring and exclusion inside the GSM MoU. The next 
section summarises the configuration of property arrangements in the 900 MHz 
frequency pool across the CEPT in the late 1980s and early 1990s, discussing the 
relationship between the distribution of interests and capabilities among members of 
GSM-CEPT, later GSM MoU, and the resulting operational and collective choice rules 
established to extract value from the band.  
Measures Network Analysis of Strategic Partnerships 
Global Telecommunications Sector 
Jan 1990 – Dec 1994 
No log entries 2,718 
No nodes 1,125 
Mean degree centrality 2.3 
Mean eigenvector centrality 0.001 
Mean betweenness centrality 760 
Max degree centrality AT&T (78), Siemens (37), Northern Telecom (30), Motorola (30), 
IBM (24) 
Max eigenvector centrality AT&T (0.45), IBM (0.016), NEC (0.014), Pacific Telesis (0.014), 
Siemens (0.013) 
Max betweenness centrality AT&T (95,927), Siemens (29,285), Northern Telecom (27,773), 
Pacific Telesis (24,584), NEC (23,776) 
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3.3.2 The Nature of Property Arrangements in the 900 MHz Frequency Pool  
The negotiation and renegotiation process of the GSM MoU (1987) reveals important 
considerations about the relationship between the configuration of industry actors and 
the property arrangements that result from their organisation, with the aim to withdraw 
economic benefit from the 900 MHz frequency band at transnational level. Table 3.5 
provides a summary of the configuration of property arrangements that resulted in the 
900 MHz band for the deployment of GSM across Western Europe in the late 1980s.  
Table 3.5 The Configuration of Property Arrangements in the 900 MHz Regional 
Frequency Pool for the Deployment of GSM Systems in the late 1980s  
 
First of all, the organisation of GSM-CEPT, in the wider context of consensus oriented 
decision making in CEPT, shows that industry actors entered GSM-CEPT with 
homogenous interests in the economic outcome resulting from harvesting the 900 MHz 
band. The main economic interest was to harvest the resource for a new and wider 
market for digital mobile cellular communications. The organisation of system 
development work in GSM-CEPT also shows that industry actors entered it with 
relatively homogenous capabilities in order to create technology solutions to harvest the 
resource independently. This relatively equal distribution of capabilities among 
members of GSM-CEPT kept internal rivalry high, until the free royalty agreement was 
Property Right Property Arrangements in the 900MHz Frequency Band based on GSM 
Operational 
Rights 
Access The right to enter the radio resource is granted based on membership in a 
geographic club (CEPT) and on membership in a technology club (GSM).  
Use The rate of use of the radio resource by each member is given by the extent to 
which their technology capability enters into the standard. Initially, in GSM-
CEPT, the value of each technology capability represented in the standard was 
equal. Later, in GSM MoU, the value of each technology capability represented 
in the standard is given by a cross licensing agreement, arranged outside the 
authority of the GSM MoU. 
Collective 
Choice Rights 
Management Consensus decision-making inside GSM-CEPT provides basis for agreement of 
operational patterns of use in the 900 MHz band, based on either equal 
representation of technology capabilities in the standard or based on royalty free 
access to technology specifications in the standard. However, rights to manage 
internal use patterns are limited in GSM-CEPT. There are no internal 
mechanisms for mutual monitoring of rights of use based on fair representation 
of technology capabilities of members in the GSM standard.  
Cross licensing of technology for harvesting 900 MHz takes place outside GSM 
MoU. Industry actors require the authority of a public actor to legitimise and to 
monitor these arrangements, based on market considerations.  
Exclusion The right to determine who has access to the 900 MHz band is limited in GSM-
CEPT. External entrants, such as Motorola, need to be internalised if 
investments in the initial operational arrangements are to be protected.  
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introduced, which lowered internal competition between members by attributing the 
same value to all technology specifications that made it into the standard.  
This initial distribution of economic preferences and technology resources led to the 
establishment of a particular configuration of rules of access and rules of use of the 900 
MHz frequency band by GSM-CEPT members. On the one hand, rights of access to the 
900 MHz band were given by membership in the CEPT as a geographic interest 
association and by membership in GSM-CEPT as a technology association that 
developed a particular technical specification for harvesting the radio resource. On the 
other hand, agreeing on a particular rate of use of the 900 MHz band was difficult to 
achieve due to the competing relationship between resource users with equal 
capabilities to develop technology systems, which would achieve their economic 
interest of harvesting the frequency pool. The rate of use of the 900 MHz band, as 
embedded in the technology specifications of the GSM standard, was only settled in 
GSM-CEPT when intellectual property cooperation mechanism was formalised in the 
Quadripartite Agreement (1986) and Bonn Agreement (1987). This royalty free 
licensing agreement gave the same value to each technology capability represented in 
the GSM standard, if adopted to harvest the 900 MHz frequency band (Table 3.5).       
However, the homogenous distribution of economic interests and technology 
capabilities among members in GSM-CEPT also revealed problems with the 
establishment of collective choice rules to safeguard the operational rules of access and 
use explained above. In particular, the symmetric technology interests of service 
operators prevented them from establishing an internal mechanism for mutual 
monitoring, which would ensure commitment to intellectual property coordination, as 
agreed upon in the original GSM MoU (1987). Also, the interest of members to have 
their technology capabilities represented in the GSM standard used to harvest the radio 
resource prevented them from establishing exclusion mechanisms that would protect the 
association and, implicitly, the resource from entry by non-members, who had not 
invested in developing common operational rules of access and use to the 900 MHz 
band (Table 3.5).  
Subsequently, under the GSM MoU (1987), signatories established limited collective 
choice rules to monitor the implementation of operational rights agreed in GSM-CEPT. 
Their limited authority to manage the internal commitments of system manufacturers, 
and to exclude new entrants, triggered changes to the initial operational rules agreed in 
 117 
GSM-CEPT. Thus, the intellectual property coordination mechanism – which set an 
equal value for technology contributions to the GSM standard – was removed from the 
GSM MoU (1987) and cross-licensing agreements among manufacturers were 
formalised, outside the GSM MoU. This required the intervention of the European 
Commission, as a public actor to legitimise the creation of several industry consortia 
and to monitor their use and access onto the 900 MHz frequency pool, from a 
competition policy perspective based on communications markets. However, under 
these new conditions of internal rivalry inside the GSM MoU(1987), the property 
arrangement in the 900 MHz frequency pool in the CEPT was based on principles of 
individual exclusive property that would secure individual rights to patented technology 
for manufacturers and individual rights to the exclusive use of GSM in the 900 MHz 
frequency pool by operators.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This case has traced the initiation and definition of operational rules for the 900 MHz 
frequency band by industry actors in GSM-CEPT and, later, in GSM MoU (1987). The 
case suggests that industry actors with symmetric economic preferences and equal 
technology capabilities, such as the PTTs in Western Europe in the late 1980s, can 
organise to produce operational rules to govern a frequency pool collective, with the 
aim to extract economic value from its use. The case is relevant because it reveals that 
industry actors could achieve this initial coordination in the absence of a transnational 
public actor with established competences in the telecommunications sector, such as the 
Commission of the European Community. As it is revealed, at the time, the centripetal 
force of policy making in the European Community, particularly in the field of 
telecommunications, was limited.  
The evidence of coordination among industry actors with relatively homogenous 
interests and capabilities confirms, thus, theoretical assumptions in the study of 
common pool resource governance. In this case, PTTs solve the problem of organisation 
and engage in technology system design in order to define a common set of operational 
rules for the 900 MHz band. However, in this case, they do not reinforce operational 
rules for the collective use of the 900 MHz band with stable collective choice rules – i.e. 
rules of internal management and rules of exclusion. This finding contradicts theoretical 
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expectations of stable collective choice rules in conditions of homogeneity of interests 
(Agrawal 2003: 249). In our case, PPTs maintain a high degree of internal rivalry over 
the technology specifications that would be used to harvest the radio resource and do 
not invest in new mechanisms of internal management, relying on the decision-making 
structure established in CEPT. This collective choice is particularly problematic 
because, as discussed in the chapter, GSM was an ad hoc standardisation unit, whereas 
CEPT was an intergovernmental organisation tasked with policy harmonisation in 
telecommunications. The limits of internal management are also revealed when the 
intellectual property coordination mechanism – which established a particular set of 
rules of use for the 900 MHz frequency pool – is broken following entry by a free rider 
and the establishment of cross licensing agreements outside the context of the GSM 
MoU (1987).  
Thus, operational rules of use for the 900 MHz band – as established in the GSM MoU 
(1987) – were challenged, from within, by manufacturers who worked in the 
development process with the PTTs. Similarly, operational rules of access onto the 900 
MHz band were challenged, from without, by manufacturers who developed similar 
systems privately and were now trying to gain entry. Due to this contestation, internal 
rivalry among developers and operators of GSM remained high, revealing an actor 
preference for individual rights of use of the frequency band, coupled with technology 
and service exclusion, in order to secure investments in the creation of the original pool. 
Due to these high levels of rivalry and excludability, industry actors relied on the public 
actor to formalise these property arrangements in Directive 87/372/EEC.  
This case contributes to our understanding of dynamics of coordination inside a 
transnational common pool resource, revealing that homogeneity of interests and 
capabilities might be sufficient to solve first level problems of organisation and, not 
always, second level problems of mutual monitoring and enforcement (revisit Section 
1.1.2). Broadly, it contributes to our understanding of the relationship between authority 
and rights in transnational common pool resources. While authority for defining 
operational rules rests with industry actors, monitoring and enforcement rests with the 
public actor. As long as rules of access and use are contested internally, industry actors 
will prefer individual exclusive rights to the common pool, legitimised by a public 
actor.     
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Chapter 4.  Regulating the 1.9-2.1 GHz Band: Devising Collective 
Choice Rules in Regional Pools 
This chapter follows the process of defining property arrangements in the blocks of 
frequencies between 1,980-2,010 MHz and 2,170-2,220 MHz (hereafter 1.9-2.1 GHz), 
used for the deployment of third generation mobile cellular communications systems 
across Europe86 in the late 1990s. Similar to the previous case study, this chapter reveals 
that industry actors played an active role in negotiating and defining operational rules of 
access and use of the 1.9-2.1 GHz frequency bands for terrestrial mobile 
communications services at regional level. However, the case on the regulation of the 
1.9-2.1 GHz bands has two points of difference with the previous case study on the 
regulation of the 900 MHz band in the same geographic area.  
First, this case study reveals a stronger presence of a transnational public actor in the 
form of the European Commission, who acquired formal authority in 
telecommunications in the early 1990s. Moreover, this case study reveals that the 
transnational public actor had a strong technology preference for the evolution of 
mobile cellular communications in a particular direction, which differed from the 
technology preference of industry actors. This difference in the position and the 
technology preference of the transnational public actor is useful in order to test whether, 
in the presence of a public actor with established policy venues, industry actors will 
conduct negotiations within these established policy venues or will choose to negotiate 
in private venues of decision-making. To this end, the chapter reveals that, even in the 
presence of a transnational public actor with established policy venues and known 
technology preferences, industry actors choose to negotiate technology configurations 
that define operational rules for radio frequencies in autonomous and private industry 
associations, such as European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI SMG).    
Second, this case study reveals a different distribution of economic interests and 
technology capabilities among industry actors interested in extracting economic value 
from the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands. Whereas, similar to the first case study, both service 
                                                
86 Note that, whereas in Case Study I, the geographic boundaries of the 900MHz 
frequency pool are limited to CEPT Member States situated in Western Europe, this 
case study looks at a wider frequency pool from a geographic point of view, following 
the admission of new members from Central and Eastern Europe in the CEPT in the 
1990s.  
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operators and system developers have symmetric interests in the economic output 
derived from harvesting these bands, for the purpose of providing evolved technology 
systems based on GSM, they have more heterogeneous technology capabilities than in 
the previous case study, due to the centrality of manufacturers with essential patents in 
the development of GSM systems. This difference between the first and the second case 
study is useful in order to test theoretical expectations regarding homogeneity in 
economic interests combined with heterogeneity in technology capabilities among 
private actors and the configuration of property arrangements resulting from the 
negotiations of these private actors. As such, theoretical expectations based on the study 
of common pool resources would indicate that this combination of interests and 
capabilities is more likely to impede private cooperation, because of considerable 
differences in use preferences. Theoretical expectations based on the study of 
transnational common goods, however, would indicate that this combination of interests 
and capabilities can lead to private cooperation if those actors with vested interests in a 
given technology configuration, and with considerable capabilities, are willing to invest 
in the creation and maintenance of operational rules, which support that technology 
solution. To this end, the chapter confirms that, rather than impeding private 
cooperation, this distribution of interests and capabilities can result in the creation of 
common operational rules of access and use for a new frequency pool around the 
capabilities of a few developers with considerable technology resources. However, the 
chapter also reveals the weakness of these collective choice rules when they do not 
ensure the participation of an important resource user group in system development (i.e. 
service operators). The chapter also reveals the weakness of commitments to newly 
defined operational rules, if industry actors do not exchange information about their 
technology preferences prior to decision-making on the technology configurations that 
define rights of use in the frequency pool at 1.9-2.1 GHz. In this circumstance, levels of 
internal rivalry remained high among members of ETSI SMG, even when rules of 
exclusion were strict, resulting in a property arrangement based on principles of 
individual exclusive property, similar to the first case study in this thesis.  
The chapter is organised in a similar manner to the previous case study, following the 
process of negotiating technology specifications for deploying third generation mobile 
communication systems called Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
in the regional frequency pool at 1.9-2.1 GHz band (Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1 Timeline of Main Events in the Regulation of the 1.9-2.1 GHz Bands for 
UMTS Mobile Communications Systems in the 1990s 
 
Similar to the previous case study, the bargaining process between industry actors lasted 
over a decade. A timeline of main events is introduced to guide the reader through the 
focal points in the negotiation process, noting that the same analytical framework is 
applied, which looks first at the position and technology preference of the public actor 
and, second, at the distribution of interests and technology capabilities among private 
actors (Section 4.1), in order to then trace the bargaining process for deciding 
operational and collective choice rules in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands (Section 4.2). 
 
4.1 The Formation of Actor Strategies in the Wider Governance of 
Telecommunications 
This section follows the formation of economic interests and technology preferences 
that informed the strategies of public as well as private actors in the negotiation of 
operational rules of access and use, as well as collective rules of management and 
exclusion in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band across the CEPT. In contrast with the case of the 
regulation of the 900 MHz band in the same radio region (Chapter 3), this case reveals 
a transnational public actor – in the form of the European Commission – with a clear 
position in the management of telecommunications markets across the European Union, 
whose geographic reach juxtaposed, in considerable proportion, that of the CEPT. This 
section also reveals that, beyond exhibiting clear competences in telecommunications 
policy in the EU, the Commission had a clear technology preference for mobile 
communications, which was considered revolutionary because it tried to achieve the 
integration of fixed and mobile communications systems in a single infrastructure and, 
subsequently, to gradually phase out second generation mobile communications systems 
based on GSM. However, industry actors deriving considerable economic value from 
harvesting the 900 MHz band using the GSM system did not share this technology 
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preference. Instead, both operators and manufacturers that deployed GSM across the 
CEPT, as well as outside the CEPT, were interested in extending and, if necessary, 
evolving GSM networks to new frequency bands in order to improve the return on 
investment in these networks following the implementation of the GSM MoU (1991). 
This section concludes by showing that private industry actors, particularly 
manufacturers, responded to the revolutionary vision for telecommunications put 
forward by the European Commission by strengthening private mechanisms of 
decision-making inside the newly created standardisation body called the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which took over and formalised the 
standards development process established, ad hoc87, in GSM-CEPT. Overall, the next 
section reveals the centrality of a small number of key manufacturers, with essential 
technology capabilities for the development of second generation (GSM) and third 
generation (UMTS) mobile communication systems as well as the uncertainty regarding 
the configuration of UMTS as either an evolution from the GSM core network, which 
would maintain the existing distribution of rivalry and excludability in the radio 
resource as envisioned by system developers, or the configuration of UMTS as a new 
radio component to a core public network, as envisioned by the European Commission.  
 
4.1.1 The Structure of the System of Governance in Telecommunications 
The first GSM networks were deployed across Western Europe in 199288, following the 
opening of the GSM Memorandum of Understanding (1991) to operators outside the 
geographic boundaries of the CEPT. As discussed in Chapter 3, the opening up of the 
GSM MoU (1991) followed from changes in the licensing of intellectual property for 
the technology essential to the GSM standard89. In short, the strategy of 
                                                
87 It is important to remember that Groupe Special Mobile (GSM) was not part of the 
permanent structure of the CEPT. Being a standards development group, it stood apart 
from the overall scope of the CEPT, which focused on telecommunications policy 
harmonisation at the time (revisit Chapter 3).  
88 Although the GSM MoU stipulated that “the purpose of the MoU is primarily 
focusing on opening a pan European public service in 1991” (Preamble, GSM MoU 
1991), the first GSM networks opened in mid 1992, due to delays in the type approval 
of mobile terminals used for this service.  
89 The Addendum to the GSM MoU (1991) noted that “in addition to those that meet the 
requirements of Art 2 of the MoU, the MoU together with this Addendum can also be 
signed by a telecommunication administration from outside the CEPT member states, or 
an operator which is authorized in such a country to provide public digital cellular 
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telecommunications manufacturers to impose fees on proprietary technologies90 
essential to the deployment of digital cellular networks led to a change in the strategy of 
GSM MoU signatories, who opened the agreement to operators outside the CEPT in 
order to benefit from greater economies of scale derived from network harmonisation 
and international roaming (Dupuis 2007).  
The effect of the opening up of the GSM MoU (1991) was the creation of transnational 
economies of scale for network operators willing to commit to the adoption of the 
technology in their home markets. In addition, the opening up of membership to 
operators around the world led to the creation of a permanent decision-making structure 
within the GSM MoU (1991), which became the GSM Association in 1995, totalling 
over 100 member operators and over 10 million subscribers around the world91. The 
exponential growth of this association of operators translated into a dominant position 
of the GSM standard in the global mobile telecommunications market throughout the 
1990s (Figure 4.2).  Figure 4.2 provides the market shares of the main compatibility 
standards for mobile telecommunications at global level from the mid 1990s to the mid 
2000s. The chart compares the market shares of first generation (analogue), second 
generation (GSM, TDMA, PDC, CDMA) and third generation (W-CDMA) 
compatibility standards in mobile telecommunications at global level. The chart reveals 
that, within a decade, the GSM standard gained considerable lead in the market for 
mobile telecommunications, increasing its global market share fivefold from 
approximately 15% in 1995 to over 75% in 2005 (Figure 4.2).  
                                                                                                                                          
mobile telecommunications services at 900 MHz” (Art 2, Addendum to GSM MoU 
1991).  
90 Chapter 3 shows that, following from the Quadripartite Agreement (1986), the 
original GSM MoU (1987) stipulated that essential patents chosen for the standard be 
made available free of charge to other operators members of CEPT as well as to their 
partners, if outside the CEPT. See Section 3.3.1, Chapter 3.  
91 The main events in the transition from the GSM MoU (1987) to the GSMA are 
available at http://www.gsma.com/aboutus/history. The GSMA is one of the largest 
international associations representing the interests of mobile operators in the world. By 
2010, the GSMA represented the interests of operators with over 3 billions connections 
on GSM networks (GSM History, Accessed 15 January 2014).   
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Figure 4.2 Market Shares of the Main Mobile Telecommunications Standards at Global 
Level, 1992-2005 
 
Source: Based on Informa WCIS, Accessed Dec 2012 
Inside the European Union92, mobile telecommunications markets were also growing 
exponentially and the number of subscribers of second generation mobile 
telecommunication networks (GSM) increased from just under 10 million subscribers in 
1995 to over 180 million subscribers in 200093 (Figure 4.3).  The growth of the mobile 
telecommunications market provided incentives for both public and private actors 
interested in harvesting the radio resource for mobile communications products and 
services. Its most immediate manifestation was a growing demand for space in the radio 
spectrum to accommodate new subscribers beyond the 900 MHz frequency band 
reserved for second generation mobile communications in the early 1990s. On the one 
hand, industry actors were interested in extending GSM networks to new frequency 
bands in order to improve the return on investment in GSM networks94. On this aspect, 
                                                
92 Figure 4.3 provides estimates of the total number of subscribers of first generation 
(analog) and second generation (GSM) cellular telecommunications networks in the 
EU15 comprising Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.  
93 The GSMA estimated that, by the end of 2000, GSM network operators had over 400 
million subscribers at global level. See Selian (2003: 17).  
94 In 1995, CEPT passed Decision ERC/DEC/(95)03 on the Frequency Bands 
Designated for the Introduction of DCS-1800, which was later renamed GSM-1800, due 
to the similarity between the standards. As Selian (2003) noted, GSM specification were 
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both operators and manufacturers had aligned their economic preferences for populating 
new frequency bands with existing second generation cellular services (GSM) in order 
to benefit from the considerable growth potential of the mobile telecommunications 
markets95 (Figure 4.3).  
Figure 4.3 Comparative Growth of Analog and Digital Cellular Mobile 
Communications Networks in EU15, 1990-2000 
 
Source: Based on Informa WCIS, Accessed Dec 2012 
On the other hand, public actors were interested in forwarding the agenda for 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector following from, albeit not exclusively, 
the post-Uruguay round of negotiations on basic telecommunications services of the 
World Trade Organisation (1994-1997)96. For public administrators, the growth of 
                                                                                                                                          
slightly modified for the higher frequency and, as a result were renamed as DCS. 
However, in 1997, DCS-1800 was renamed GSM-1800, reflecting the deployment of 
the GSM system in this higher frequency (Selian 2003: 15).  
95 In 1995, the penetration rate for mobile communications services – analog and digital 
(GSM) – stood at approximately 5% of the population across members of CEPT 
situated in Western and Central Europe (Informa WCIS Database, Accessed 15 
December 2013). Thus, the market for mobile communications was still at an early 
stage in its development.   
96 The negotiations, which took place from 1994 to 1997, resulted in a Reference Paper 
on the main commitments for liberalising telecommunications, adopted by over 50 
WTO members, comprising the members of the European Union and wider European 
Free Trade Association. The main commitments of the WTO Reference Paper on Basic 
Telecommunications (1997) cover the creation of an independent regulatory body 
separate from suppliers of basic telecommunications services designated to ensure the 
transparent and universal provision of services and the prevention of anti-competitive 
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mobile telecommunications gave the opportunity to apply international commitments of 
sector liberalisation in the newer mobile communications segment of the market, rather 
than the traditional fixed telecommunications segment of the market, still dominated by 
monopoly providers. This position is reflected in the divergent regulatory approaches to 
second generation mobile communications services across developed 
telecommunications markets in the world. In Japan, as in Western Europe, public 
administrators supported aligned industry positions on the development and deployment 
of a single standard – PDC in Japan and GSM in Western Europe97 – in a harmonised 
frequency band, encouraging the creation of economies of scale. By contrast, in the 
United States, the public administrator supported competition between standards98 in 
non-harmonised frequency bands99, encouraging innovation in systems and networks. 
These approaches resulted in different growth paths for mobile telecommunications 
standards at global level (Figure 4.2) and, inherently, to tensions between regulating 
frequency bands for replication or for innovation, with different implications on the 
dynamics of rivalry and excludability in bands designated for mobile 
telecommunications services. Thus, underpinning the position of both public and private 
actors interested in the development of mobile communications markets were 
                                                                                                                                          
practices in the sector. Also, the Reference Paper stipulated the procedures for the 
allocation and use of scarce resource such as radio frequencies on an “objective, timely, 
transparent and non-discriminatory manner” (Para 6, Reference Paper on Basic 
Telecommunications). See WTO Telecommunications Services, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.htm  
97 Recall that, throughout the development of these standards, public operators had the 
dual role of administrators and providers of telecommunications services (revisit 
Chapter 3). In this case, an alignment between the public position of 
telecommunications administrators and industry actors was possible. Thus, similar to 
how GSM was the single standard adopted across CEPT member states, PDC (Personal 
Digital Cellular) was the single standard adopted across Japan at the proposal of the 
NTT public operator in cooperation with Japanese manufacturers. For a detailed 
account, see Kano (2000).  
98 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved both TDMA and CDMA-
based standards for the deployment of second generation mobile systems. For personal 
communications systems, a variant of second generation mobile systems, there were as 
many as seven standards available, including CDMA, TDMA and DECT-based 
standards. For a full list, see Kano (2000).   
99 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) did not specify a timeline for the 
rollout of second generation mobile telecommunications networks, meaning that service 
providers were able to choose the standard and the time when to refarm their licensed 
spectrum from first generation (analog) networks to second generation (digital) 
networks.   
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considerations of growth based on replication of existing services or innovation of new 
services to be deployed in new frequency bands.  
These divergent positions towards radio resource allocation for market growth in 
mobile telecommunications consolidated two distinct technology preferences for the 
main public actor and the main industry actors interested in harvesting additional radio 
frequencies for mobile communications services. The next two sections address the 
formation of these technology preferences for the Commission of the European Union 
(European Commission) as a transnational public actor whose jurisdiction overlapped 
that of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 
(CEPT) as well as the formation of technology preferences for the main manufacturers 
of equipment and infrastructure in mobile telecommunications at transnational level 
across Western and Central Europe100.  
 
4.1.2 The Initial Position of the Public Actor 
The position of the European Commission as a public actor in the telecommunications 
sector of the European Union was formalised in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The 
Treaty clarifies the role of the Commission in defining guidelines “covering the 
objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of trans-
European networks” (Art 129c, para 1). In particular, the European Commission 
becomes an agenda-setter for “the establishment and development of trans-European 
networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures” 
(129b, para 1), in accordance with the liberalisation and interconnection of national 
infrastructures:  
“Within the framework of a system of open and competitive markets, 
action by the Community shall aim at promoting the interconnection and 
interoperability of national network as well as access to such networks” 
(Art 129b, para 2, Treaty of Maastricht 1992).   
From this viewpoint, it could be argued that the growing role of the European 
Commission as a public actor in the telecommunications sector has its origin in the 
                                                
100 In the early 1990s, membership of CEPT was opened to new states in Central 
Europe. A full list of members and their respective years of joining the CEPT is 
available at http://www.cept.org/cept/about-cept/member-countries-and-year-of-
admission 
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entry into force of the Single European Act (1986), with its objective to establish a 
single market by the end of 1992, although the telecommunications sector did not make 
the direct object of this original project. Of interest here, however, is the process by 
which the European Commission arrived to have a particular position in relation to the 
development of the telecommunications sector in the European Union, as understood in 
Art 129b and Art 129c of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). There are three directions 
that informed the position and preference of the European Commission as a public actor 
with a specific agenda for market development and, implicitly, for the allocation of the 
radio resource in the 1990s. These three directions follow a particular logic for the 
development of the telecommunications sector based upon: a) a competitive market, b) 
an integrated market and c) a co-regulated market. Their origin and development 
formed the preference of the European Commission for an implicit redistribution of the 
radio resource for mobile communications services and, subsequently, informed the 
preference of the industry in response to the position of the Commission.  
The preference for a more competitive market had its origin and development in the 
GATS negotiations starting in 1986 and concluding in 1997101, which followed the 
progressive opening up of the telecommunications equipment market in the first round 
of the negotiations as well as the opening up of the telecommunications services market 
in the latter round of negotiations. As R. Niepold (2002), the former head of the Radio 
Spectrum Policy Unit of the European Commission noted, the liberalisation process in 
the European Community coincided with the international obligations of the GATS 
agreement, which set conditions between the trading partners regarding the relationship 
between the opening up of the mobile communications market and the allocation of the 
radio resource:  
“Since frequencies are an indispensible condition for access to a mobile 
market, disciplines have been laid down. GATS allows some freedom to 
allocate and assign frequencies subject to the obligation to do so in a 
reasonable, objective and impartial manner; restrictions may not be more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the services and cannot 
be used as a disguised barrier to trade” (Niepold 2002: 132).  
Thus, Niepold (2002) unveils the relationship between the project of liberalisation and 
harmonisation of telecommunications markets within the European Community and its 
                                                
101 These are the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) on the opening up of the equipment 
market in telecommunications and the post-Uruguay Round on the opening up of the 
services market in telecommunications (1994-1997).  
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wider context of trade liberalisation in the sector. In addition, Niepold stresses the 
relationship between a liberalised and harmonised market for mobile communications in 
the Community (EC 1987) and the implicit requirement for “the allocation and use of 
scarce resources […] in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner”, as stipulated in the GATS Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications 
(1996, Art 6). Against this background, the European Commission expressed a clear 
position that mobile communications markets offered an opportunity to further 
liberalisation in the sector: 
“Mobile communications thus is seen by a number of Member States as a 
major candidate for competitive supply. Exclusive provision of the main 
network infrastructure must not hinder the use of new technological 
opportunities by private systems” (EC 1987: 88).    
This early position of the European Commission, formalised in the Green Paper on the 
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment 
(EC 1987), confirms that the entry of the European Commission in the regulation of 
telecommunications was incremental (Thatcher 2001), achieved through small steps that 
shifted, progressively, the line between traditional telecommunications services as 
“reserved services” and new communications services as “liberalised services”, starting 
with the liberalisation of mobile and satellite networks, followed by cable networks and, 
ultimately, fixed telecommunications networks (Hancher and Larouche 2011: 746). 
This incremental position is confirmed by the first legislative package for the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in the European Community – the Open 
Network Provision Directive 90/387/EEC and the Services Directive 90/388/EEC – 
which adopted competition in telecommunications networks and services other than 
“public voice telephony” (Art 1.2, Commission Directive 90/388/EEC). As Hacher and 
Larouche (2011) noted, “even if public voice telephony might sound restrictively 
defined, in fact more than 80 per cent of the sector as it existed at the time was left in 
the reserved services category” (Hacher and Larouche 2011: 746). This situation 
confirms that the European Commission responded to international pressures for 
institutional reform in the telecommunications sector (EC 1987: 155), but adopted an 
incremental approach that balanced the interests of telecommunications operators in 
new markets such as mobile communications with their interests in traditional markets 
such as fixed telecommunications.   
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This approach is furthered by the preference of the European Commission for a more 
integrated market in telecommunications across the European Community. Prior to the 
explicit formulation of its competences in telecommunications in the Maastricht Treaty 
(Art 129b-d), the European Commission established a functional relationship between 
the opening up of communications markets and their integration across Member States. 
The Green Paper (1987) voiced the position of the European Commission in relation to 
the development of open but integrated infrastructures for network industries, such as 
the Integrated Services Digital Networks102 (ISDN): 
“By adapting the increasingly available digital narrowband infrastructure, 
ISDN will allow voice, data, text and simple video communication on the 
existing network. At the same time, ISDN allows the creation of a single 
market for advanced terminals, and lays the basis for the Community-wide 
introduction of new services. […] ISDN should become the Community’s 
future-oriented open network infrastructure on which services can develop” 
(EC 1987: 117-118).  
As Fuchs (1994) noted, the position of the European Commission for the development 
of integrated networks reconciled the gradual liberalisation of infrastructures and 
services with a guarantee of temporary survival of telecommunications monopolies in 
traditional fixed line services (Fuchs 1994: 183). This gave the European Commission a 
framework in which to maintain a balance between international commitments for the 
liberalisation of telecommunications markets and national commitments for the special, 
yet temporary, treatment of voice telephony services provided by monopoly operators. 
In addition, the European Commission promoted its preference for the development of 
integrated and interconnected telecommunications networks in European Research 
Programmes such as the Research into Advanced Communications in Europe (RACE) 
Programme (1988-1992).  
The RACE Programme (1988-1992) is particularly relevant because it defined the 
political vision of the European Commission regarding the integration of mobile and 
fixed communications services in a single network deployed across the European 
Community:  
“The objectives of RACE are ambitious. It aims at the introduction of 
Integrated Broadband Communications (IBC) taking into account the 
                                                
102 The Council Recommendation on the Coordinated Introduction of the Integrated 
Services Digital Network (ISDN) in the European Community (86/659/EEC) had only 
been issued in December 1986, a few months prior to the publication of the Green Paper 
(EC 1987).   
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evolving ISDN and national infrastructure strategies, progressing to 
Community-wide services by 1995” (EC 1987: 116).  
The vision of the European Commission for the Integrated Broadband Communications 
Network – also known as Broadband-ISDN or B-ISDN – followed the logic that new 
broadband networks would “be able to carry a broad range of services independent of 
network operation” (EC 1987: 33). The mobile component of this “monolithic” 
broadband network was the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS), 
which would allow the deployment of mobile telephony and mobile data services on the 
network (Huber et al 2000: 130). However, as the former director of DG Information 
Society, J. da Silva103 (2002) noted “such a new generation was seen as comprising not 
only novel radio techniques [i.e. not GSM], but also an open and flexible fixed 
infrastructure based on state-of-the-art technology” (2001: 116). Essentially, this vision 
for the mobile component of the B-ISDN network would replace existing mobile 
networks including the GSM digital network, which would upset newly established 
positions in this growing mobile communications market. However, in the view of the 
European Commission, this vision reconciled the interests of monopoly operators by 
maintaining their position in voice services with the interests of established 
manufacturers by sponsoring technology development at the pre-competitive phase in 
European Research Programmes, without upsetting international commitments to 
gradual liberalisation of networks and services.    
Nevertheless, in the view of the European Commission, this balance of interests 
between operators and manufacturers could be maintained if both parties had an equal 
representation in decision-making processes regarding the choice of standards in future 
telecommunications networks. Historically, this balance could not be achieved in the 
CEPT, where telecommunications operators with administrative responsibilities (PTTs) 
were the only members given the vote on the harmonisation of telecommunications 
policy104. In addition, CEPT was not envisioned as a standardisation body, but as a 
policy harmonisation body for telecommunications operators across Europe (Revisit 
Chapter 3.1). This informed the decision of CEPT members to propose the creation of a 
                                                
103 J. da Silva is former director of DG INFSO.D “Converged Networks and Services” 
European Commission, EC Directorate General for the Information Society.  
104 As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to stress that delegations of PTTs in CEPT 
would include both representatives of the operators with voting rights and 
representatives of their manufacturing partners (national based), with consultative 
rights.   
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standardisation body in telecommunications, which would provide an opportunity for 
both operators and manufacturers to continue and broaden the standardisation process 
commenced in GSM-CEPT. This standardisation body was the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), set up in 1988, with representation in 
decision-making from all industry members based in CEPT Member States. In line with 
its vision, the European Commission supported the decision to transfer all 
standardisation responsibilities from CEPT to ETSI:  
“Jointly finance, the institute, based on a small core team of permanent 
staff and independently managed according to best business practice, 
should draw flexibly on experts from both the telecommunications 
administrations and industry, in order to substantially accelerate the 
elaboration of standards and technical specifications, indispensible for an 
open competitive market environment and the development of Europe-
wide services” (EC 1987: 22).      
The European Commission’s support for the creation of ETSI is also a manifestation of 
the public actor’s preference for co-regulation in the development of the 
telecommunications market. From this point of view, co-regulation did not only 
maintain the balance of interests between operators and manufacturers in support of the 
European Commission’s vision for integrated networks of gradually liberalised services 
such as ISDN or B-ISDN. As Chalmers (2006) noted, co-regulation was instrumental to 
the realisation of collective problem-solving as a political good (2006: 21). In this 
context, co-regulation would facilitate the standardisation of new equipment and 
infrastructure in order to achieve the political goal of interoperable services deployed on 
integrated telecommunications networks across borders in the Union. For some, this 
position is an indication of the Commission’s development as a corporate actor, with 
growing powers and resources, and with an interest to extend its prerogatives “by 
constructing Euro-centric networks”105 (Schneider and Werle 1990). However, the view 
of the European Commission as a corporate actor, managing established networks of 
interests, does not seem to fully fit the account presented above (Fuchs 1995). Instead, 
in the early 1990s, the position of the European Commission is more likely to have been 
informed by the need to reconcile the interests of monopoly operators and the interests 
of manufacturers or, as Esser and Noppe (1996) described it, to “enable the muddling 
through by private actors” (1996: 548). The political vision of the European 
                                                
105 Note that this construction of Euro-centric networks refers to networks of interests 
rather than networks in telecommunications.  
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Commission for the creation of a monolithic infrastructure with flexible components 
and multiple services appeared to achieve this reconciliation of interests in light of the 
liberalisation of the sector.    
Overall, the political vision of the European Commission is important to analyse for two 
reasons. First, and in contrast with the previous case study (revisit Chapter 3.1.2), the 
European Commission is a public actor with a clear position regarding the development 
of the mobile communications market, in the wider reform of the telecommunications 
sector, along the three lines identified above, i.e. a more competitive, integrated and co-
regulated sector. Second, and again in contrast with the previous case study, the 
European Commission is a public actor with a clear preference for the development of a 
single, integrated infrastructure to support a variety of services across border, including 
mobile communications services replacing GSM. This position of the European 
Commission as a public actor with a clear preference for market growth based on 
innovation in cellular services, rather than replication of existing services, would have 
redistributive effects on mobile communications markets based on GSM and, 
subsequently, on positions of rivalry and excludability established on the radio resource 
that facilitated the growth of these markets. The next section discusses how the 
preference of the European Commission for the development of mobile communication 
services – as a flexible component to a single fixed infrastructure – conflicted with the 
position of private actors in digital cellular networks based on the GSM systems 
deployed in the 900 MHz band. The next section ends by showing that industry actors 
responded to the technology preference of the European Commission by strengthening 
private mechanisms of standards development in the newly created European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which took over and formalised the 
standardisation process established, ad hoc, in GSM-CEPT. 
 
4.1.3 The Initial Distribution of Private Interests and Private Resources 
The response of the industry to the position of the European Commission reveals the 
overall strategies of private actors interested in the development of mobile 
communications services based on replication and evolution of existing systems (GSM), 
rather than based on innovation of new systems (UMTS as part of B-ISDN). In the early 
1990s, this position was informed by considerations of return on investment in GSM 
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networks as well as by the unprecedented growth potential of mobile communications 
markets based on the GSM system. These considerations aligned the strategies of both 
operators and manufacturers in favour of the replication of existing services in new 
frequency bands, coupled with the gradual evolution of the radio component of the 
GSM core network. In short, this gradual evolution would consolidate the market 
presence of both developers and operators deploying second generation mobile 
communications systems based on the configurations of rivalry and excludability set in 
the GSM MoU (1991).  
For operators, the growth of the mobile communications market represented a clear 
incentive to improve their return on investment in GSM systems. This strategy was also 
justified by pressures of liberalisation, which was largely achieved through the remedy 
of a newcomer being awarded a second radio frequency license to balance the position 
of the incumbent (Larouche 2003: 11-13). However, the presence of new entrants in the 
mid 1990s did not reduce the overall market presence of mobile operator units of 
traditional fixed line providers106. On the one hand, the deployment of GSM systems in 
the harmonised 900 MHz band led to the gradual consolidation of the mobile operator 
units of traditional fixed line providers across the CEPT107. On the other hand, growing 
demand for mobile communications services translated into growing demand for space 
in the radio spectrum, which led to the licensing of new frequency bands for GSM 
systems in the 1,800 MHz band, turning GSM into a multiband standard. Overall, this 
consolidated the position of the initial operators of mobile communications services 
                                                
106 Although, by the mid 1990s, the administrative and operational responsibilities of 
PTTs were broken up to give rise to regulatory agencies, the operational branches of the 
PTTs continued to hold a dominant position in the market for both fixed and mobile 
communications.      
107 By the late 1990s, the most established pan-European service providers were 
Orange, O2, T-Mobile and Vodafone. Orange was owned by the Microtel Consortium 
and, in the early 1990s, was sold to Hutchinson Whampoa, to be later acquired by 
Mannesmann and sold to Telecom France in 2000. O2 was owned by BT Cellnet and 
acquired by Telefonica in 2005. T-Mobile was owned by Deutsche Telekom and 
merged with France Telecom’s Orange in 2010 to form EE in the United Kingdom. 
Vodafone was owned by Racal Electronics and renamed Vodafone Group when it 
acquired Mannesmann and Orange in 1999. It later divested and sold Orange to France 
Telecom in 2000. 
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across the CEPT, who collectively provided over 70% of these services in the mid 
1990s108 (Informa WCIS Database, Fuentelsaz et al 2008: 441-442).  
For manufacturers, demand for mobile communications services based on the GSM 
system represented a clear incentive to improve their return on investment in the 
development of the system rather than to invest in the development of a new 
infrastructure along the vision of the European Commission. On the one hand, patent 
holders of GSM systems were drawing considerable benefit from the opening up of the 
GSM MoU (1991) to operators outside the CEPT. On the other hand, these developers 
were maintaining a dominant position across the CEPT, where GSM was exclusively 
deployed. According to Bekkers (2001), these manufacturers used their patent portfolios 
in GSM to apply a practice of “restrictive licensing”, combining cross-licensing 
agreements among initial patent holders with a high license fee for non-patent holders, 
having the effect of slowing down market entry for non-European manufacturers and, 
essentially, reinforcing positions of rivalry and excludability in the market as well as in 
the radio resource (Bekkers 2001: 336).   
Overall, both operators and manufacturers in the CEPT had strong incentives to grow 
their portfolios in GSM in order to recover their initial investment in developing and 
deploying the system, as well as to increase their profits in the young market for mobile 
communications. This is revealed by the strategies of established operators and 
manufacturers in European Research Programmes (RACE and ACTS) as well as in the 
newly created European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). These early 
strategies conflicted with the vision of the European Commission for an integrated 
infrastructure for all communications services and informed decisions about the 
technology for third generation mobile communications systems (UMTS) to be later 
deployed in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands.     
The RACE and ACTS European Research Programmes109 followed the political vision 
of the European Commission for the creation of a single pan-European network entitled 
B-ISDN, which would “bring together the whole spectrum of the then conceivable 
telecommunications services”, including mobile services (Fuchs 1994: 180). In the 
                                                
108 At the time, pan-European service providers would hold several licenses across the 
CEPT market. For instance, Vodafone held seven licenses, whereas Orange and T-
Mobile held two licenses each (WCIS Database, Accessed 15 December 2012).  
109 Research into Advanced Communications in Europe (RACE); Advanced 
Telecommunications Technologies and Services (ACTS).  
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context of these research programmes, the Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) was envisioned as the new mobile component of the B-ISDN network, 
with capacity to deliver low and medium speed data services in addition to mobile 
telephony. Table 4.1 gives the participants in these development programmes, revealing 
that the majority of manufacturers with patent portfolios in GSM took part in RACE 
and ACTS projects.  
Table 4.1 Selected Projects in Telecommunications and their Composition in European 
Framework Programmes, 1988-1998 
Source: Based on EC (1989), EC (2000) and EC (2004b) 
At first, this level of participation appears paradoxical, since each project focused on the 
development of new technologies to replace both the GSM radio access network and the 
GSM core network (da Silva 2002: 116). However, a closer analysis reveals the 
strategic behaviour of system developers in these programmes. On the one hand, 
developers used the research programmes to diversify their portfolios in radio access 
networks, by signing up to projects that researched technologies they did not hold a 
strong patent portfolio in. For instance, in RACE Phase II (1990-1994)110, developers 
                                                
110 It should be noted that RACE Phase II (1990-1994) continued to focus on the 
development of radio access technologies to the B-ISDN core networks. As a result, it 
focused on testing the two competing technologies which made the debate in GSM-
European Framework 
Programme 
Project Participants 
RACE I 
(1988-1992) 
Mobile  Alcatel, Bosch, Ericsson, GEC-Marconi, Plessey 
RACE II 
(1990-1994) 
CODIT Philips, Matra, CSELT, Italtel, Ericsson, Telia 
ATDMA DeTeMobile (Deutsche Telekom), Alcatel, 
Fondazione Ugo Bordoni, Roke Manor Research 
Ltd 
MONET Alcatel-SEL, Philips, Nokia, Ericsson, Telefonica, 
Post and Telecom of Finland, CNET, OTE, 
CSELT, Fondazione Ugo Bordoni, University 
Limerick, AT&T Network Systems, Royal PTT 
Nederland, University Twente, VTT Technical 
Research Centre Finland, Roke Manor Research 
ACTS  
(1994-1998) 
FRAMES Siemens, Nokia, Ericsson, CSEM, CNET, Instituto 
Superior Tecnico, University of Kaiserslautern, 
Delft University of Technology, University of 
Oulu, The Royal Institute of Technology, 
Chalmers University of Technology, Roke Manor 
Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 
Integracion y Sistemas 
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holding extensive patent portfolios in TDMA radio access technology (e.g. Ericsson, 
Telia) took part in the CODIT Project, which tested CDMA-based radio technology. 
Similarly, developers holding extensive patent portfolios in CDMA radio access 
technology (e.g. Alcatel) took part in the ATDMA Project, which tested TDMA-based 
radio technology (Table 4.1). On the other hand, developers did not engage in 
registering any specific patents to the concluding FRAMES Project and, subsequently, 
the technology that made the object of this research remained in the portfolios of their 
initial owners once the project ended111 (ACTS 2000). These findings are confirmed by 
studies looking at the behaviour of participants in early European Research 
Programmes, when industry members were not willing to produce collective results 
“beyond an increase in the competence of the participating unit” (Laredo 1998: 592). 
Thus, the assimilation of technology outputs resulting from European Research 
Programmes remained relatively low, unless otherwise desired by the private owners of 
these technologies.  
These findings are also confirmed by the strategies of industry representatives, 
predominantly manufacturers, in the competing development group established in the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Following the creation of 
ETSI, the standardisation responsibilities for GSM systems were transferred from the 
CEPT to ETSI in 1988. The Group was renamed ETSI Special Mobile Group (ETSI 
SMG) and, at the beginning, it dealt exclusively with the standardisation of the GSM 
system. Most importantly, industry representatives in ETSI SMG invested in the 
development of an evolutionary path to providing data services using the GSM core 
network. This “evolutionary” path, known as GSM Phase 2 and Phase 2+, was a 
competitor to the “revolutionary” path proposed by the European Commission (Dupuis 
2000). Instead of developing a new component to the B-ISDN network, ETSI SMG 
proposed to evolve the radio interface of the GSM system while maintaining its core 
network for delivering mobile communications. The situation in ETSI SMG explains 
why, in the early 1990s, manufacturers with portfolios in GSM were interested in 
                                                                                                                                          
CEPT regarding the radio interface, i.e. TDMA or CDMA, this time for the transfer of 
data services as well voice telephony.  
111 In contrast, all other ACTS Projects produced a total of 145 registered patents, see 
ACTS 2000.  
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developing evolved radio interfaces for its core network – such as GPRS or EDGE112 – 
rather than investing in a new radio interface for a new core network, as envisioned in 
European Research Programmes (Dupuis 2000). This position reflected a clear 
preference for protecting investments in the GSM system as opposed to making new 
investments in the UMTS system as a mobile component of an integrated public 
network. For manufacturers, evolving GSM systems would protect the value of their 
patent portfolios. For operators, it would protect their investments in GSM networks, by 
making changes only to the periphery of these networks, in new terminals and base 
station software (Bekkers 2001: 344).  
But, most importantly, evolving the GSM network would protect positions of rivalry 
and excludability established in the radio resource that facilitated the delivery of these 
mobile communication services. Investing in the vision of the European Commission 
for a new mobile component to a revolutionary public network would have had 
redistributive effects on these positions in the radio resource, a situation that was not 
desirable for either operators and manufacturers drawing increasing benefits from the 
deployment of GSM networks in Europe and worldwide.  In comparison, by deploying 
existing systems in new radio frequency bands, these positions of rivalry and 
excludability would remain largely unchallenged. By the mid 1990s, these industry 
considerations had refocused the development work in European Research Programmes 
(ACTS) as well as the political vision of the European Commission. In the ACTS 
Research Programme (1994-1998), UMTS was envisioned in a more flexible manner, 
interworking with both GSM and ISDN networks, and relying on the evolution of 
second generation mobile networks as much as on the future fixed broadband network 
(da Silva 2002: 123). Similarly, the European Commission was increasingly supporting 
a flexible approach to UMTS as a third generation mobile communications systems that 
would evolve from the second generation GSM system: 
“Ultimately, personal communications services are likely to be carried 
most economically via a single integrated technology concept – the so-
called UMTS (the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System). The 
                                                
112 Two evolutionary solutions to data services for GSM were reached in ETSI SMG in 
the mid 1990s: a) GPRS, a packet-switched service that would require changes to 
several GSM network components and a change in the business model of charging, 
from time-based charging to volume-based charging; c) EDGE, a faster packet switched 
service that would allow similar connectivity to GPRS (Bekkers 2001: 344, Selian 
2003: 45). 
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strong European position in digital mobile communications has made the 
Union a major actor in the work towards this future “third generation” 
system, building on the strengths of the current second generation digital 
mobile system” (EC 1994: 16).   
By the mid 1990s, these changes in the vision for UMTS as third generation mobile 
communication services interworking with both second generation mobile 
communication systems (GSM) and the fixed public infrastructure (ISDN) led to a 
considerable duplication of research activity in European Research Programmes and in 
ETSI along parallel visions of the radio technology and network architecture for these 
future services113 (Dupuis 2007). However, as indicated above, the strategies adopted by 
private actors, particularly manufacturers involved in this development work, differed 
between the European Research Programmes and ETSI. In short, developers used 
European Research Programmes to substantiate their portfolios with new technologies 
for UMTS, while using ETSI SMG to forward their system development work for 
GSM. At the same time, as Bekkers (2001) reveals, operators showed little interest in 
the development of UMTS, concerned mostly with increasing their GSM subscriber 
base (Bekkers 2001: 460). This picture reveals the centrality of manufacturers in the 
development of GSM and UMTS systems as well as the uncertainty regarding the 
configuration of UMTS as either an evolution from the GSM core network or a new 
radio component of the core public network. The remainder of this chapter follows the 
process by which manufacturers refocused the development and standardisation work 
on UMTS along an evolution of the GSM core network, by setting new operational 
rules for system development in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band in ETSI SMG. Before exploring 
this relationship between the development of the UMTS system and the configuration of 
rights of use in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands, the next section discusses how international 
rights of access in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands came to be interpreted in relation with a third 
generation mobile communication system with a mobile and fixed layer, resembling the 
vision of the UMTS taking shape in Europe (Callendar 1994).  
 
                                                
113 Confirming these parallel visions, P. Dupuis (2007) noted that “it is not exaggerated 
to say that, around 1990, there was a certain competition between the GSM group and 
RACE 1043” (Dupuis 2007). Race 1043 was the research project aimed at the 
introduction of B-ISDN.  
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4.2 The Process of Private Rule-Making in the 1.9-2.1 GHz Band 
This section follows the process of negotiating operational and collective choice rules 
for the deployment of third generation mobile communications based on UMTS as an 
evolved system specification from GSM, as preferred by a number of key 
manufacturers holding essential intellectual property in these systems. The section 
reveals that this situation of increased heterogeneity in the distribution of technology 
capabilities among a few industry actors, holding considerable essential intellectual 
property, permitted the creation of new rules of management and new rules of exclusion 
for systems to be deployed in the 1.9-2.1 GHz frequency bands. This situation stands in 
contrast with the previous case study where industry actors were not willing to invest in 
decision-making procedures other than those already established in CEPT. In contrast, 
decision rules and procedures in ETSI were negotiated and renegotiated in order to 
reflect the large manufacturing base represented in this interest association, as well as 
their technology preferences regarding the exclusion, rather than inclusion, of 
competing systems. Although these collective choice arrangements allowed industry 
actors to adopt a set of operational rules for systems to be deployed in the 1.9-2.1 GHz 
band, they did not ensure internal monitoring of technology preferences by different 
manufacturing groups and they did not ensure the equal representation of operators in 
the standards development process that defined operational rules of access and use onto 
the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands. As a result, operational arrangements for UMTS were contested 
both from within by manufacturers and operators from the CEPT as well as from 
without by manufacturers from other radio regions, particularly the United States.  
 
4.2.1 Negotiating Rules of Access 
In 1992, the World Administrative Radio Conference of the ITU (WARC 92) identified 
a block of frequencies between 1,885-2,025 MHz and 2,110-2,200 MHz (i.e. 1.9-2.1 
GHz) for use by Future Public Land Mobile Systems (FPLMTS). This allocation was 
surprising in both substance and procedure. On the one hand, it allocated frequencies in 
the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands to mobile communications services of a particular technology 
specification (FPLMTS), which broke with the tradition of allocating international 
frequency bands to broad families of services. On the other hand, it made this allocation 
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in a footnote of the WARC 92 Radio Regulations, which broke with the tradition of 
stipulating it in the Table of Allocations or in a Resolution. The footnote read: 
“The frequency bands 1,885-2,025 MHz and 2,110-2,200 MHz are 
intended for use, on a worldwide basis, by administrations [governments] 
wishing to implement the future public land mobile systems (FPLMTS). 
Such use does not preclude the use of these bands by other services to 
which these bands are allocated” (ITU 1992: ADD 746A).  
In short, this footnote proposed limiting access onto the 1.9-2.1 GHz frequency bands to 
providers of terrestrial mobile communications114 that met specifications for future 
public land mobile systems (FPLMTS), which at the time were developed in the 
international standardisation body of the ITU (CCIR115) with considerable input from 
CEPT members (Adams and Frank 1992: 45). The flexible allocation provided in the 
footnote – i.e. “such use does not preclude the use of these bands by other services” – 
responded to the position of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the 
United States, who opposed the position of CEPT members to make additional 
allocations for mobile communications services at that time. The remained of this 
section follows how the vision for third generation communications networks put 
forward in Europe came to inform the configuration for future public land mobile 
systems (FPLMTS) at international level, how it came to be opposed by the FCC and, 
ultimately, how it came to define flexible rules of access onto the global 1.9-2.1 GHz 
band, which contributed to increased contestation of technical specifications for the use 
of this band at international level.   
The project for Future Public Land Mobile Systems (FPLMTS) had its origin in the 
work of the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) of the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). The project started in 1985 and was developed by 
Task Group 8/1 of the CCIR with the view to make recommendations on spectrum 
requirements for future mobile communications at WARC 92. Overall, it is recognised 
that early work in Task Group 8/1 reflected uncertainty about technology capabilities 
for future mobile systems as well as uncertainty about harmonising such systems at 
international level (Bekkers 2001: 481, Searle 1991: 1788). This situation translated into 
                                                
114 Within this range, bands 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz were identified for 
the satellite component of these mobile communications services. However, for reasons 
of brevity, this chapter will refer to those frequencies in the 1.9-2.1GHz band 
designated exclusively for terrestrial, rather than satellite, communications services.  
115 The International Radio Consultative Committee of the International 
Telecommunications Union, currently ITU-R.  
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uncertainty about radio spectrum requirements for future mobile communication 
systems in international allocations. In preparation for WARC 92, CEPT provided Task 
Group 8/1 with its own considerations for spectrum requirements based upon the vision 
of future public land mobile systems “as a third generation personal communication 
system [UMTS], in the context of second generation mobile and cordless systems” 
(Searle 1991: 1787, text in parenthesis added). In preparation for WARC 92, the CEPT 
concluded a requirement of “a minimum bandwidth of approximately 230 MHz” for a 
vision of future public land mobile systems that combined the vision of RACE (1990-
1994) and ETSI for UMTS as a third generation mobile communication system, which 
would be deployed in the early 2000s, allowing for the gradual phasing out of GSM 
networks. For this gradual process to take place, without upsetting radio allocations for 
GSM networks in Europe, new frequency bands were proposed for UMTS as FPLMTS 
around the 2 GHz frequency band. This position was embraced by the Task Group 8/1 
in CCIR Recommendation 687, which identified a bandwidth requirement of 230 MHz 
for FPLMTS. As Searle (1991) noted, this represented a departure from the established 
practice at ITU World Radio Conferences: 
“The identification of FPLMTS as a specific WARC 92 agenda item is 
somewhat unusual in that it seeks to define spectrum use at a more detailed 
level than the generic service e.g. Mobile, Fixed, Fixed Satellite” (Searle 
1991: 1790).  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United States contested this 
proposal at WARC 92. There were two interdependent reasons for the position of the 
FCC. First, it opposed allocating additional radio resource to terrestrial mobile 
communication systems that, in the view of the FCC, could have been flexibly allocated 
by operators in the 900 MHz or 1,800 MHz bands reserved for technology neutral 
mobile communications services in the US. This position of the FCC to allow operators 
to upgrade to third generation services at their own will came in stark contradiction with 
the position of CEPT Members, which conditioned access onto the 900 MHz band and 
1,800 MHz band to second generation GSM systems (revisit Chapter 3). Thus, the FCC 
found that its regulatory approach to bands previously designated for mobile 
communications systems gave enough flexibility to phase out services for next 
generation systems without the requirement for additional bands. Instead, the FCC was 
more interested in the deployment of satellite mobile communications in the 2 GHz 
band. Second, the FCC opposed conditioning access to the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands to 
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terrestrial mobile communications services whose technology specifications were being 
defined by European interests: 
“FPLMTS refers to a concept being developed in the CCIR primarily by 
European radiocommunications interests for delivering mobile 
telecommunications services in the 21st century. […] The European view 
FPLMTS as the successor to the Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) – a pan-European digital cellular system that is 
currently being deployed across Europe. […] The United States made no 
specific allocation proposal for FPLMTS, citing the extensive existing 
allocations available for mobile services, uncertainty over just what 
FPLMTS is, and the possibility of making FPLMTS-like services available 
through standards-setting and common (global) interoperability 
requirements rather than through a new frequency allocation” (US 
Congress 1993: 78).  
This excerpt reveals the basis for the compromise reached at WARC 92. On the one 
hand, rules of access onto the 1.9-2.1 MHz bands were not defined in relation to 
FPLMTS systems in the Table of Frequency Allocations of the Radio Regulations. On 
the other hand, the footnote to the Table of Allocations gave a green light to European 
administrations to implement FPLMTS if they so wished, as long as “such use does not 
preclude the use of these bands by other services to which these bands are allocated [on 
a primary basis]” (ITU 1992: ADD 746A). In addition, Resolution 212 of WARC 92 
regarding the “Implementation of Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunications 
Systems” noted that CCIR was invited to “continue its studies with a view to 
developing suitable and acceptable technical characteristics for FPLMTS that will 
facilitate worldwide use and roaming […]” (ITU 1992: RES212). This recommendation 
reflected the position of the United States regarding the “uncertainty over just what 
FPLMTS is” (US Congress 1993: 78) and pointed at the lack of consensus for the vision 
of UMTS as third generation mobile communication systems put forwards by European 
Research Programmes and ETSI, as discussed in the previous section. In this light, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the process by which manufacturers took an active 
role in defining the standard for third generation mobile communications services away 
from the revolutionary conception envisioned by the European Commission and toward 
the evolutionary conception based on the core GSM network, designed to replicate 
position of rivalry and excludability already achieved in frequency bands where GSM 
networks were deployed. The development of the standard was achieved away from the 
venue already established by the European Commission, such as the European Research 
Programmes, and into the private venue of the European Telecommunications Standards 
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Institute (ETSI), set up with particularistic rules of representation and decision-making 
that favoured system developers with considerable operations across the CEPT.  
 
4.2.2 Negotiating Rules of Management and Exclusion 
The uncertainty regarding the basic technology specifications and the radio resource 
requirements for the UMTS system were negotiated and resolved in ETSI SMG from 
1996 to 1998. This situation followed from considerable changes in the decision-
making rules, the voting procedures and the intellectual property policy of ETSI in the 
first half of the 1990s. As a newly created not-for-profit standardisation organisation, 
with a more diversified membership basis than the CEPT but with the same geographic 
reach, ETSI spent its first years creating rules regarding the procedures for defining 
telecommunications standards. This section examines the steps adopted in ETSI and 
ETSI SMG to define collective choice rules of management (decision-making, voting) 
and collective choice rules of exclusion (membership, intellectual property policy) in 
order to maintain positions of rivalry and excludability established in the mobile 
communications market following the deployment of GSM networks. The section 
concludes that these rules facilitated the re-definition of UMTS as third generation 
mobile communication services deployed on the same network infrastructure as GSM, 
offering – at least in the initial stage – a duplication of services with GSM Phase 2+ 
and, subsequently, leading to an overestimated allocation of radio frequencies for these 
services in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands across Europe. The redefinition of UMTS as a third 
generation mobile communication service deployed on the core GSM network was 
proposed and supported by manufacturers represented in ETSI SMG.  
As discussed above, ETSI was established in March 1988 in order to further the 
development of European standards in telecommunications and to ensure that both 
operators and developers are equally represented in decision-making during the 
standardisation process (revisit Section 4.1.2). However, from the start, rules of 
membership and participation in ETSI set it apart from other international 
standardisation bodies (Besen 1990: 522). There are three overarching policies that 
define the boundaries of collective choice rules in the specification of 
telecommunications standards in ETSI and, as a result, have a direct impact on 
configurations of rivalry and excludability in the radio resource that deploys these 
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systems. These overarching policies with direct impact on collective choice rules of 
management and exclusion in radio systems are: a) the rules of membership; b) the rules 
of decision-making; and c) the rules defining the relationship between the intellectual 
property of members and the standards produced by ETSI. As it will be discussed 
below, it was only after these collective rules of management and exclusion were 
defined that system developers agreed to consolidate and fast-forward the 
standardisation of UMTS in ETSI SMG.  
First, rules of membership in ETSI are defined in relation with two principles of 
inclusion-exclusion. On the one hand, membership in ETSI is open to wider categories 
of interests than the CEPT, including telecommunications administrations, network 
operators, manufacturers, research bodies and user organisations (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 ETSI Membership by Category (5), 1992 and 1997 
Source: Based on Bekkers (2001), Fuchs (1994), Hillebrand (2002) 
On the other hand, full membership with voting rights in ETSI is restricted to CEPT 
Members116, applying the same principles of exclusion based on geographic 
representation as in the previous case study discussed in this thesis. Table 4.2 provides 
figures for the composition of ETSI by membership category in 1992 and 1997. The 
figures show that manufacturers based in CEPT had the consistently widest 
representation in ETSI, at over 50% of all members throughout the 1990s. Interestingly, 
                                                
116 Besen (1990) noted that, in the early 1990s, ETSI members were drawn from 21 
countries represented in CEPT: “In addition to members from countries that belong to 
the EC, there are members from Austrial, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Malta, Norway, 
Sweden, Swithzerland and Turkey” (Besen 1990: 522).  
Membership Category % Total Full Members 
1992 
% Total Full Members 
1997 
Manufacturers 61.5% 53% 
Public network operators 14% 16% 
Administrations, national standards 
bodies, other administrative bodies 
10% 10% 
User organisations 8% 6% 
Service providers, consultancy 
partners, research bodies 
6.5% 15% 
Total  309 (100%) 457 (100%) 
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public network operators maintained representation around 15% of all members in ETSI 
in the 1990s, although the process of liberalising network services was underway across 
the CEPT. These figures speak for the relative lack of participation of mobile operators 
in the standardisation process in ETSI SMG, which can be explained by their more 
active participation in the GSM MoU  - the operators’ association concerned with the 
deployment, extension and harmonisation of GSM networks.  
Second, rules of decision-making concern both the voting procedure and the overall 
organisation of ETSI. The rules of decision-making in ETSI, as well as their reform in 
the mid 1990s, are essential in defining collective choice rights of management in 
mobile communication systems and in the radio resource used for their deployment. As 
Besen (1990) noted, one of the decision rules that sets ETSI apart from other 
international standardisation associations is its use of weighted voting rather than 
consensus voting (Besen 1990: 523). This meant that telecommunications standards 
could be adopted if they received a 71% weighted majority (Besen 1990: 523, Bekkers 
2001: 152). This measure is thought to have been created in order to respond to 
deadlock situations similar to the one described in the previous case study, when 
consensus voting on technical specifications for the GSM standard blocked its initial 
adoption in GSM-CEPT as a result of the opposing vote of the French and German 
operators (revisit Chapter 3.2). In addition, this measure was adopted in order to 
provide incentives for system developers to forward the process of standardisation at the 
lowest level of Technical Committees and Project Teams, which were operating by 
informal consensus and would, subsequently, avoid deadlock by putting standards 
through a majority vote in the Technical Assembly.  
An equally important consideration of the voting procedure is the use of turnover and/or 
GDP weighted voting117, which has the effect of differentiating among voting members, 
giving more weight to insiders with the largest contribution in telecommunications 
markets across the CEPT. This form of market proportionality in the weight of the vote 
in ETSI sits in stark contrast with the one-member-one-vote principle in the 
standardisation process established in other standardisation associations. In short, this 
                                                
117 As Bekkers (2001) explains, depending on the object of the vote, voting is cast either 
by national delegations or by individual members (Bekkers 2001: 153). On most issues, 
including ETSI standards, individual voting – rather than national voting – applies. 
Individual voting is weighted on the annual turnover of the member and, in the case of 
administrations, on their GDP.  
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method gives considerable weight to the market interests of companies with the largest 
turnover in the telecommunications sector. And, combined with the representation of 
the different interests, this method has been regarded as favouring incumbents over new 
entrants as well as, in case of an alignment between the technology preference of 
operators and manufacturers with the highest turnover, a bypass of a minority vote on 
the configuration of a given standard in ETSI118 (Bekkers 2001, Besen 1990, Cowhey et 
al 2008). As the first Director of ETSI, D. Gagliardi (1988) noted, the structure of 
weighted majority voting, combined with the proportion of interests represented in 
ETSI, meant that technology preferences were no longer defined along country lines but 
along membership category lines, giving considerable weight to the vote of 
manufacturers with the highest turnover (Gagliardi qtd in Freeman 1988: 91, Gagliardi 
qtd in Dodsowrth 1988). Overall, the combined effect of weighted majority voting and 
the representation of telecommunications actors gave considerable weight to the 
economic interests of established developers in CEPT and facilitated changes to the 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy in ETSI (1994) as well as its organisational reform 
in 1996. These two issues are brought to closer analysis because they inform the 
definition of rights of exclusion and rights of access to the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands via the 
negotiation of technology specifications of the UMTS system to be deployed in these 
bands.  
The relationship between the intellectual property of members and the specification of 
standards with essential configurations based on their intellectual property can have the 
effect of destabilising positions of rivalry established in communication markets. The 
previous chapter provides an example of this case, when rules for patent exchanges in 
the GSM MoU (1987) had to be altered in order to reflect the position of manufacturers, 
such as Motorola, who at an initial stage refused to make essential patents available to 
members of the GSM MoU on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (revisit 
Chapter 3.3). M. Johnson, Director of the ITU Telecommunications Standardisation 
                                                
118 Similarly, the ETSI budget was drawn from the contributions of its individual 
members and was also tied to their market revenues. As it is expected, the costs of 
standards-making were covered by individual members based on their turnover, while 
optional standards making was covered solely by the specific members willing to 
produce the standard (Gagliardi qtd in Freeman 1988: 31). European Standards (for EC 
members) fall within this latter category and, as a result, the European Commission can 
sponsor some of the standardisation activity for these standards. Note that European 
Standards (EN series) differ from the general ETSI Standards (ES series).  
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Bureau, explains the issue at stake in the relationship between intellectual property and 
standardisation in the electronic communications sector:  
“IPR holders need an assurance of reasonable compensation for the 
adoption of their IPR-protected innovations to motivate their contribution 
of such innovations to standards development processes. Potential 
standards implementers similarly require the security of a reasonable IPR 
licensing fee to motivate their conformance with standards” (Johnson 2014: 
3).   
These two facets were at the core of negotiations regarding the IPR Policy on ETSI in 
the early 1990s. In fact, the transfer of standardisation responsibilities from GSM-CEPT 
to ETSI SMG also transferred the problem of disclosure and availability of essential 
patents confronted by members of GSM-CEPT in the early 1990s. The main negotiation 
concerned the establishment of an IPR pool or an IPR Policy with a 
disclosure/withholding period prior to the adoption of a standard – a proposal supported 
by network operators – and the establishment of an IPR Policy based on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) – a proposal supported by system developers 
and similar to most standardisation associations (Bekkers and West 2009, Iversen 
1999). Between 1993 and 1994, ETSI proposed, voted and passed two IPR Policies. 
The first IPR Policy (1993) followed the proposal backed by network operators for 
FRAND licensing with a disclosure/withdrawal period. The second and final IPR Policy 
(1994) followed the proposal backed by manufacturers for FRAND licensing with the 
elimination of a disclosure period. The voting procedure and composition of ETSI 
facilitated this swift change and the final IPR Policy (1994) was adopted with 87.2% 
majority vote in individual weighted voting and 90.3% in national weighted voting 
(Communications Standards News 1995). Most importantly, the IPR Policy (1994) 
formalised situations when ETSI members can choose not to license an IPR internally 
but to license it externally, with the effect of blocking the development of the standard, 
leading to a reconfiguring of position of rivalry and excludability in the association.  
Similarly, the voting procedure and composition of ETSI facilitated its organisational 
reform in the mid 1990s. Upon its creation, ETSI followed an organisational structure 
comprising a General Assembly, a Technical Assembly, Technical Committees and 
Project Team. As Bekkers (2001) and Besen (1990) show, the Technical Assembly 
represented the highest authority for the production and approval of standards, which 
were developed in Project Teams and Technical Committees. However, by the mid 
1990s, standardisation in ETSI was considered costly and lengthy (Communications 
 149 
Daily 1995). In the early 1990s, communication between project teams was considered 
problematic even inside ETSI SMG. For instance, P. Dupuis recalls that, although ETSI 
SMG had a subcommittee charged with the development of UMTS following the 
integrated vision put forward in European Research Programmes, it had limited scope 
for how to implement this vision due to reduced communication with the 
subcommittees concerned with the development and implementation of GSM and 
evolutionary GSM Phase 2+ networks (Dupuis 2002c: 181).   
Between 1995 and 1996, ETSI undergoes a major reform that removes the Technical 
Assembly – the ultimate decision-making forum on draft standards – from its 
organisational structure. The reform was introduced in order to reflect a paradigm shift 
in ETSI towards market-driven standardisation, based on existing demand for mobile 
communications such as GSM. In short, this paradigm shift to market-driven 
standardisation removed the vision of UMTS as a revolutionary mobile communication 
component of the B-ISDN network and brought it closer to the standardisation of 
evolutionary services of the GSM core network (Dupuis 2000). In addition, by 
removing the authority of the Technical Assembly from standardisation decisions, 
Technical Committees such as ETSI SMG would gain autonomous status to adopt draft 
standards prior to a vote in the General Assembly. As the former Chairman of ETSI 
SMG, F. Hillebrand (2002) noted:  
“A far reaching autonomy was agreed for Technical Committees on all 
technical matters. The concept of ETSI Partnership Project was created. 
This was an activity when there is a need to co-operate with an external 
body and where such co-operation cannot be accommodated within an 
ETSI Project or Technical Committee. This model had been designed 
within ETSI with the GSM and UMTS work in mind” (Hillebrand 2002: 
95-96).  
This model of standardisation was fundamentally different from the one established in 
GSM-CEPT. First, it departed from the equal representation of the technology 
preference of each member in the development of a communications system – as in the 
case of GSM for the 900 MHz band – to a majority representation of the technology 
preference of each member. Second, and of most importance, it departed from 
commercial considerations of frequency harmonisation at regional level to commercial 
considerations of market efficiency and market standardisation at global level. This shift 
to market-driven standardisation informed considerations to maintain the vision of 
UMTS as a voice and added data service, similar to the revolutionary conception of the 
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system, and to link it to the GSM core network, similar to the evolutionary conception 
of the system. The effect was that UMTS would require a similar radio resource 
allocation to the one put forward by CEPT at the international conference WARC 92 – 
i.e. 1.9-2.1 GHz – in order to deliver services similar to the evolved GSM systems 
deployed in the 900 MHz and 1,800 MHz bands.  
 
4.2.3 Negotiating Rules of Use 
In 1996, a group of experts, headed by Alcatel and comprising the main 
telecommunications manufacturers in Europe119, produced the Global Multimedia 
Mobility Report concluding that UMTS would require a new access network, a radio 
interface and new terminals and could be associated in a flexible manner to any core 
networks including GSM, ISDN, B-ISDN (TDoc SMG 194/96, Dupuis 2002c: 183, 
Samukic 1998: 1101). This report put forward a flexible approach that would gain the 
support of the UMTS Task Force, the advisory group proposed by the European 
Commission to deliver a common strategy for third generation mobile systems. F. 
Hillebrand120, the Chairman of ETSI SMG at the time, noted that the report produced a 
controversial debate in ETSI about how best to reorganise UMTS work and what 
Technical Committee this work should go to, which resulted in little consensus within 
the Assembly (Hillebrand 2002: 185). However, the Report received a proposal from 
ETSI SMG, which endorsed the recommendations and offered to take responsibility for 
specifying the UMTS radio access network, the interface and the added multimedia 
services (SMG#19 Plenary, Hillebrand 2002: 185, Huber et al 2000: 130).  
The position adopted by ETSI SMG in relation with the recommendations of the Global 
Multimedia Mobility Report was the crucial step towards the reconfiguration of UMTS 
as an evolutionary radio access network based on core network of GSM. There are two 
main reasons why this is important for the reconfiguration of UMTS as an evolutionary 
system. First, ETSI SMG had its roots in the former GSM-CEPT group, which, 
throughout the early stages of ETSI, maintained a degree of autonomy, compared with 
other Technical Committees, by keeping an exclusive focus on the development of a 
single standard – GSM. Second, ETSI SMG was already working on added services to 
                                                
119 A full list of participants is available in ETSI TDOC SMG 194/96, Annex 3.  
120 F. Hillebrand has been actively involved in the standardisation process for both GSM 
and UMTS.   
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GSM networks, such as GPRS and EDGE, as part of the GSM Phase 2+ programme. In 
this context, UMTS could be developed in a similar fashion to GPRS and EDGE, by 
developing a new radio access network to be linked to the existing GSM core network. 
This scenario was perceived as offering the middle ground for both manufacturers and 
operators with interests in GSM. For manufacturers, it would reduce the costs of 
developing new system that would allow for the integration of mobile services into the 
public network, as proposed by the European Commission. For operators, it would 
reduce the costs of investing in new core networks too soon after the considerable 
investments achieved for GSM.   
Soon after the restructuring of the decision-making process in ETSI, SMG signed a 
cooperation agreement with the Japanese Association of Radio Industries and 
Businesses (ARIB) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI T1P1). This 
agreement followed from the decision to align ETSI with partner SDOs for the creation 
of market-based global standards. Both organisations had strong ties with GSM system 
providers and operators, which was perceived as strengthening external support for the 
evolutionary vision of UMTS. Whereas ANSI T1P1 established ties with manufacturers 
to deploy GSM networks in parts of the technology-neutral 1,900MHz band designated 
for Personal Communication Services (PCSs) in the United States, the 
Telecommunication Technology Committee – the standardisation organisation in Japan 
– nominated ARIB to study third generation mobile services (Bekkers 2001: 328, 463). 
The European-Japanese cooperation agreement is significant for the future development 
of UMTS as an evolutionary standard.  
In 1997, NTT DoCoMo, the privatised Japanese telecommunications incumbent, 
opened bids for third generation networks based on W-CDMA radio technology121, 
which were won by Ericsson for the network infrastructure and by Nokia for terminals 
deployment (Bekkers 2001: 464, Clarke and Lammers 1997). As indicated in the 
previous section, both Ericsson and Nokia were involved in the RACE Phase II and 
ACTS research programmes and were focused on developing and testing CDMA-based 
radio access technologies to diversify their companies’ portfolios, which at the time 
were largely TDMA-based – i.e. the radio access method for second generation GSM 
networks (revisit Table 4.1). Essentially, winning these bids allowed Ericsson and 
Nokia to perform test trials as well as to deploy this new technology for next generation 
                                                
121 This radio access technology stands for wideband code division multiple access.  
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mobile services outside the policy venues established by the European Commission in 
the RACE Programmes and thus, without the requirement to register patents in the 
programmes. In addition, both Ericsson and Nokia supported W-CDMA as the global 
alternative to cdma2000, a competing third generation standard, which was being 
developed in North America by a consortium led by Lucent, Motorola, Nortel and 
Qualcomm (Bekkers 2001: 467). These circumstances gave Ericsson representatives 
momentum to propose a cooperation agreement between ETSI SMG, ARIB and ANSI 
T1P1 in order to support the evolutionary pathway to UMTS based on W-CDMA. 
The proposal was voted at the SMG#21 Plenary in February 1997 (Hillebrand 2002: 
196). Soon after, Ericsson, Nokia, Alcatel and Siemens expressed their joint 
commitment to deploy future third generation mobile systems – UMTS – based on an 
evolution pathway from the GSM core network in the 1.9 -2.1 GHz band (BusinessWire 
1997, McIvor 1997). Thus, the position of the four largest telecommunications 
equipment suppliers in Europe, coupled with the international backing of external 
industry associations, speeded the standardisation process for third generation mobile 
systems in ETSI. In addition, the key position of the four largest telecommunications 
equipment suppliers in ETSI SMG gave weight to the conception of UMTS as an 
evolutionary path from the GSM core network as well as its backward compatibility 
with the GSM standard.  
The position of these four manufacturers in ETSI SMG was very important to 
promoting the technical specifications of the third generation system to be deployed in 
the 1.9-2.1 GHz band as evolving from GSM and, subsequently, to maintain the 
position of rivalry and excludability already achieved by the GSM system in other 
bands such as the 900 MHz band. In addition, the autonomy of ETSI SMG with regard 
to the standardisation process allowed the transition from the revolutionary to the 
evolutionary vision of UMTS to be easily introduced on the agenda of the group 
(Dupuis 2000). Thus, in the span of just over a year – i.e. from 1997 when the four 
manufacturers expressed their joint commitment to support UMTS as evolving from 
GSM to 1998 when competing technology specifications for UMTS were put through 
the vote in ETSI SMG – industry actors were able to completely change the vision of 
UMTS.  
However, although majority voting rules were in place and decision making in ETSI 
SMG was autonomous from the rest of the organisation, the industry actors sharing the 
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core technology capabilities – i.e. Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Alcatel, Motorola – could 
not agree on a single radio access technology for UMTS to be integrated in the evolved 
GSM core network. As a result, in June 1997, at the ETSI SMG#22 Plenary, group 
members agreed to bring forward five competing technology solutions122 based on the 
validation tests that took place in the FRAMES Project123 (revisit Table 4.1). However, 
because most of the manufacturers represented in ETSI SMG had developed radio 
access technologies for third generation systems outside the FRAMES Project and prior 
to the decision by ETSI SMG to evolve UMTS from GSM, there was limited internal 
monitoring of the patents held by the participating actors as well as limited knowledge 
of their preferences. This situation determined F. Hillbrand, the Chairman of ETSI 
SMG, to propose more flexible voting arrangements in the Committee, by which two 
rounds of votes were introduced – an “indicative round” and a “decisive round” (SMG 
TDoc 858/97, Hillebrand 2002: 199). This voting procedure, designed to steer the 
decision-making rules to flexible consensus between the two voting rounds, led to the 
elimination of three of the five technology proposals but maintained the split between 
equipment manufacturers with the largest technology capabilities in Europe (Table 4.3).  
 Table 4.3 Main UMTS Radio Access Interface Alternatives (UTRA), Proponents and % 
Votes in ETSI SMG 
Source: ETSI SMG Report of Meetings SMG#24 (1997) and SMG#24bis (1998) 
Following this procedural change, the first “indicative” vote in ETSI SMG#24 revealed 
that no technology option had reached the 71% majority vote needed under majority 
rules. Subsequently, a repeat vote was scheduled for SMG#24bis in January 1998. Thus, 
between the votes, industry representatives were given an opportunity to renegotiate 
                                                
122 The five concepts were registered as follows, with the proposed technologies in 
parenthesis: Alpha (WCDMA – Wideband Code Division Multiple Access), Beta 
(OFDMA – Orthogonal Frequency Division), Gamma (WTDMA – Wideband Time 
Division), Delta (Wideband TD/CDMA), Epsilon (ODMA – Opportunity Driven). 
123 As indicated in Section 4.2.3 of this chapter, industry actors chose not to register 
patents for UMTS in the FRAMES Project and, as a result, all these technologies 
remained part of individual portfolios and proprietary.  
Proposal Main 
Proponents 
% Votes 
 SMG#24 
% Votes  
SMG24#bis 
Alpha 
(WCDMA) 
Ericsson, Nokia, NEC, NTT DoCoMo, 
Telecom Italia, Telecom Finland 
58% 61% 
Delta 
(TD-CDMA) 
Siemens, Alcatel, Bosch, Motorola, 
Italtel, Nortel 
41.55% 38.7% 
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technology preferences with fellow manufacturers as well as with operators of mobile 
communications networks. For the latter group – i.e. mobile operators – the two 
technologies offered different incentives. On the one hand, promoters of TD-CDMA 
were arguing that their solution offered the smoothest transition from the GSM air 
interface, which was TDMA-based, and would require the least changes in software and 
infrastructure. In fact, the main promoters of TD-CDMA had proposed this air interface 
to the GSM MoU Association as the most acceptable standard for operators around the 
world, due to its protection of previous infrastructure investments in second generation 
networks (Meredith 1997). On the other hand, promoters of W-CDMA were arguing 
that their technological solution would offer the most competitive position in the global 
market for third generation mobile services and, although more expensive to implement, 
would constitute a long term competitor to cdma2000 – the third generation radio 
standard proposed by the North American consortium led by Qualcomm, Motorola, 
Nortel and Lucent (ETSI SMG(97)5, Part B). These considerations split the votes of 
operators as well as manufacturers that had not been directly involved in the 
development of one of the two proposals.  
In addition, although the main service operators with deployed GSM networks in the 
900 and 1,800 MHz bands were present at the meetings, they had little representation in 
the development process of these systems – unlike the development pairs established for 
GSM – and did not take part in system trials – unlike the Paris Trials for GSM (1986) – 
where the quality, spectrum efficiency and cost efficiency of these network were tested. 
This explains why, at the vote in ETSI SMG#24 Plenary, the Chairman of the 
Committee, F. Hillebrand, noted: 
“It is remarkable that, except for France Telecom, no GSM operator 
presented a contribution or declared a position at SMG#24. […] No 
technical, operational or planning aspects were addressed by operators 
other than France Telecom. This was a complete change compared to the 
situation in the GSM radio decision in 1987” (Hillebrand 2002: 205).  
The “decisive” vote, held in SMG#24bis led, once again, to no majority option for the 
UMTS air interface (Table 4.3). Subsequently, Ericsson, Nokia and Siemens brokered a 
deal outside the formal procedures established in ETSI SMG (Hillebrand 2002: 203), so 
that the UMTS radio access interface would contain both technology solutions, 
harmonised at the interface level as follows (ETSI SMG(81)1 Annex 5):  
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- W-CDMA would be used in paired spectrum bands for UMTS (1,920-1,980MHz in 
the uplink, from terminals to base station; 2,110-2,170 in the downlink, from base 
station to terminals) 
- TD-CDMA would be used in unpaired spectrum bands for UMTS 
In order to secure the agreement, and benefiting from its considerable autonomy, ETSI 
SMG did not hold another vote in the General Assembly. F. Hillebrand, the Committee 
Chairman, noted that this decision was taken on grounds that ETSI SMG had a 
considerable industry representation:  
“[I]n terms of the number of delegates, but also the number of weighted 
votes represented, this [the SMG#24bis Plenary] was equal to a well 
attended General Assembly of ETSI” (Hillebrand 2002: 202) 
Thus, the autonomous status of ETSI SMG facilitated the establishment of flexible 
decision-making rules concerning the technologies that would frame rules of access and 
rules of use in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band for the deployment of UMTS as based on an 
evolved GSM core network. However, the limited rules for monitoring internal 
technology capabilities and technology preferences among manufacturers, combined 
with the limited participation of service operators in the early development stages of 
these technology systems or in system trials, exposed the weakness of collective choice 
rules for spectrum management in ETSI SMG.   
 
4.3 The Impact of Private Association on the Choice of Property System 
This section shows that the organisation of industry actors in ETSI SMG differed from 
that in GSM-CEPT, as presented in the previous case study. The main element of 
difference stems from the larger number of participants in ETSI SMG, combined with 
their more diversified technology capabilities. However, because both operators and 
manufacturers had similar economic interests to replicate operational rules for the 900 
MHz band in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands, they were willing to invest in coordinating 
standardisation activity for third generation systems in ETSI. In particular, 
manufacturers with interests in maintaining their positions of rivalry and excludability 
derived from GSM were active in devising decision-making procedures to support the 
quicker adoption of standards in ETSI. These decision rules allowed established 
manufacturers, such as Ericsson, Siemens, Nokia and Alcatel, to gain support from 
service operators to change the development direction preferred, initially, by the public 
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actor for “revolutionary” third generation systems based on integrated public networks, 
to “evolutionary” third generation system based on evolved GSM networks (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 "Revolutionary" versus "Evolutionary" Conceptions of UMTS 
Source: Based on Dupuis (2000), Hillebrand (2002) and Huber et al (2000) 
Whereas the shift from “revolutionary” to “evolutionary” systems clarified the main 
rules of access onto the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands, as based on technology and service 
exclusivity evolving from GSM, industry actors had difficulty maintaining 
commitments to these operational rules in the aftermaths of the agreement in ETSI 
SMG#24bis. As it will be discussed below, ETSI SMG did not develop the internal 
mechanisms to monitor the technology preferences of its different participants and to 
ensure commitment to the operational rules agreed upon in ETSI SMG#24bis for the 
technical specifications of the radio access interface in UMTS. This exposed the 
fragility of operational rules for the deployment of UMTS in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands 
based on the technology specifications agreed in ETSI SMG. As a result, operational 
rules of access and use of UMTS in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands were soon contested inside 
and outside ETSI SMG. This high level of rivalry, similar to the high level of rivalry 
established after the collapse of the intellectual property coordination mechanism of the 
GSM MoU (1987), shaped preferences for individual exclusive forms of property based 
on UMTS in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band.  
 
4.3.1 The Nature of Private Association 
The agreement arrived at in ETSI SMG#24bis was contested, following a number of 
intellectual property disputes during 1998 and 1999. These disputes revealed the 
fragility of operational agreements for the 1.9-2.1 GHz band in the absence of strong 
Pre 1998 Post 1998 
Access Network UMTS UMTS 
Interface Multiple WCDMA  
Core network (B)-ISDN GSM  
Architecture Single network Horizontal network 
Frequency Allocations 2GHz band 2GHz band 
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collective choice rules to safeguard them. Two problems affected the nature of 
collective choice agreements in ETSI SMG in the aftermath of the agreement on the 
interface for UMTS. First, the decision-making procedures in ETSI SMG did not give 
participants enough time to exchange information about their technology preferences, 
between manufacturers and between manufacturers and operators. Second, and similar 
to the GSM MoU (1987), the agreement in ETSI SMG did not make any commitment to 
coordinating intellectual property, leading to internal disputes, especially between 
Ericsson and Qualcomm. The agreement for the deployment of UMTS in the 1.9-2.1 
GHz band was reached only after an informal industry association – the 3G Partnership 
Project (3GPP) – was set up, in conjunction with a 3G Patent Platform Partnership that 
established principles of minimum cooperation on the essential technology capabilities 
of members. However, because the 3GPP was set up only after the formal adoption of 
operational rules based on UMTS in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band, rules of access and use on 
the bands remained structured on individual exclusive property.        
Although agreement on the UMTS air interface was eventually reached, the standard 
development process in ETSI SMG carried a central dispute over essential IPRs in the 
specifications of the standard. This occurred because, under ETSI IPR Policy (1994), 
ETSI members had no responsibility to declare essential patents within a set time from 
the start of the standardisation process, as originally negotiated, and were only required 
to make them available, in bona fide, on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” 
grounds (revisit Section 4.2.2). Under this policy, information exchanges about the 
technology preferences and technology capabilities of participants was minimal. 
Subsequently, during SMG#24 and SMG#24bis, when voting for the UMTS air 
interface was taking place, members did not declare any essential IPRs and, instead, 
opted for making broad IPR statements (ETSI/SMG(97)5 Part A)124. In addition, at 
SMG#24bis, promoters of either W-CDMA or TD-CDMA declared that the IPR 
                                                
124 At the meeting, the ETSI legal adviser compiled a list of companies that could hold 
UMTS radio interface patents relevant to the standardisation process, which was sent to 
the ETSI Secretariat in confidential form. Also, three German operators – T-Mobil, E-
Plus Mobilfunk and Mannesmann Mobilfunk – put forward a position paper that 
expressed their “serious concern that patent issues, if at all, are not resolved in a 
satisfactory manner” (TDoc SMG 1061/97). 
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environment was strongly in favour of their respective solutions125. One of the most 
controversial position papers on IPRs in ETSI SMG was Qualcomm’s – the US-based 
manufacturer that developed cdmaOne/cdma2000 – and who was claiming to hold a 
considerable portfolio in essential CDMA radio technologies (ETSI SMG(98)1 Part A). 
Although several proposals were made to license IPRs on fair and reasonable grounds, 
Qualcomm maintained its position on the premise that a single CDMA-based standard 
should be developed globally and that the standard should include its essential property. 
If Qualcomm did not agree to license its patents on fair and reasonable grounds, then, 
according to ETSI IPR Policy (1994), the standardisation process would have to start 
again based on alternative technology specifications. This situation reveals the fragility 
of operational rules of access and use of the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands based on UMTS. It also 
reveals that limited rules for exchanging information about technology capabilities and 
monitoring technology preferences were agreed in ETSI SMG. As the ETSI SMG 
Chairman, F. Hillebrand (2002) noted: 
“An ETSI Technical Committee has no leverage to resolve IPR issues. It 
can contribute to ease a solution by organising an open system 
specification process, where every interested company can register IPR so 
that they get negotiation power in licensing negotiations. This has been 
done by the whole UMTS specification process” (Hillebrand 2002: 212).  
The fragility of the agreement was further exposed when the Commission of the 
European Union passed Decision No 128/1999/EC on the Coordinated Introduction of a 
Third Generation Mobile and Wireless Communications System (UMTS) in the 
Community of December 1998. Similar to the GSM Directive 87/372/EEC in the 
previous case study, the Decision would formalise operational rules of access and use 
agreed upon in ETSI SMG by adopting the technology specifications for UMTS, on an 
exclusive basis: 
““[…] in line with the efficient use of radio frequencies […] Members 
States shall coordinate their approach with a view to authorising 
compatible types of UMTS systems in the Community” (Art 4, Decision 
No 128/1999/EC) 
However, in the context of the dispute over essential intellectual property in ETSI as 
well as in the context of the liberalisation of telecommunications markets, the 
government of the United States interpreted Art. 4 of Decision No 128/1999/EC as a 
                                                
125 For instance, TDoc SMG 23/98 on Motorola’s support of TD-CDMA and TDoc 
SMG 7/98 on IPR Licensing Policy Statement on behalf of the main W-CDMA 
promoters.   
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breach of the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services, by way of giving 
preference to UMTS systems as developed by ETSI. In response, in January 1999, the 
Commission published a letter to the US government, offering a clarification of the 
rules of exclusion stipulated in Decision No 128/1999/EC: 
“The UMTS Decision foresees the issuing of at least one UMTS license in 
each Member State to ensure the availability of an interoperable service 
and facilitate pan-European roaming for the benefit of consumers. The 
concept for UMTS and its eventual standard will be decided by industry 
with full participation from non-European industry. The UMTS Decision 
does not limit other 3G technologies in the European market as Member 
States, in accordance with their national licensing schemes, are free to 
authorise them next to UMTS if economic operators would propose this” 
(EC 1999).  
Nevertheless, the commitment of industry actors to UMTS was, once again, achieved 
outside the formal parameters of decision-making in ETSI and the wider policy context 
of the European Union. First, in order to avoid continued deadlocks, F. Hillebrand 
(2002), the Chairman of ETSI SMG, proposed the creation of the 3G Partnership 
Project as an industry association of standardisation bodies promoting UMTS based on 
GSM from around the world  (Hillebrand 2002: 215). Within this informal industry 
association, members could set up minimum mechanisms for coordinating their 
intellectual property, as initially discussed but not arrived at in ETSI SMG. The idea 
came from members of ETSI SMG and had a stronger representation and position from 
the GSM MoU Association126. The group stated that their rationale was “to limit the 
liability of the proposed standard to excessive IPR demands” (SMG TDoc 241/98). The 
group proposed the creation of the 3GPP Patent Platform as a middle ground between a 
patent pool and the existing IPR Policy in ETSI (SMG TDoc 608/98).  
Essentially, the patent platform broke the deadlock regarding the technology systems 
structuring rights of use on the 1.9-2.1 GHz band127. It allowed for a non-exclusive 
partnership where both licensors and licensees could become members, but where no 
                                                
126 The participating companies were: Alcatel, Analog Devices, Bosch, Cegetel, 
CSEM/Pro Telecom, Ericsson, France Telecom, Fujitsu, Lucent Technologies, 
Mannesmann, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Motorola, NEC, Nokia, Nortel, NTT DoCoMo, 
Siemens, Sony, T-Mobil, Telecom Finland, Telecom Italia, Texas Instruments. At the 
meetings, representatives from ETSI, ETNO and the GSM MoU Association were 
present.  
127 The idea of the patent platform was considered in line with competition law within 
the EU, as well as in other jurisdictions, since its members were not bound to create 
exclusive patent pools that could lead to dominant positions (Choumelova 2003). 
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bundling or pooling of patents would take place and where licensors were given the 
freedom to license outside the partnership (3GPP 1999, Choumelova 2003). More 
importantly, the 3G Patent Platform would act as a voluntary evaluation and 
certification body for essential patents in third generation mobile communications. 
However, the project was agreed in 3GPP only after Ericsson and Qualcomm entered 
into a cross license agreements for their CDMA-based portfolios, abandoning the 
litigation and supporting the creation of a global family of standards – IMT-2000128 – 
ensuring minimum harmonisation of third generation systems but maintaining three 
CDMA-based modes of operation: cdma2000, W-CDMA and TD-CDMA129.  
The establishment of the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP) and the 3G Patent Platform 
reveals two important aspects about the strategies of industry actors for the coordination 
of economic activity in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band. First, the strategy of the main developers 
in ETSI SMG was to consolidate their presence in the mobile communications market 
by replicating positions of rivalry and excludability created with the deployment of 
GSM in the 900 MHz band. Figure 4.4 provides a visual representation of global 
technology transfers in radio communications services and equipment from January 
1995 to December 1999130. From a visual standpoint, the network representation 
confirms the nodal role of manufacturers with essential intellectual property in GSM 
and UMTS in the transfer of technology capabilities from a global core to the periphery. 
The network metrics are provided in Table 4.5 and confirm that positions of rivalry and 
excludability in the delivery of mobile communications at the global level were 
maintained since the deployment of GSM. As a representation of the number of 
exchanges in the network, the high degree centrality logged by Motorola, Siemens and 
Ericsson reveals their key positions in the transfer of intellectual property. Similarly, as 
a measure of influence in the networks, Motorola, NTT – which collaborated closely 
with Ericsson to operate the first networks for third generation mobile communications 
                                                
128 Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunication Systems (FPLMTS) was renamed 
IMT-2000 by the ITU (revisit Section 4.2.1).  
129 This family of standards, which is perceived as a global compromise, resulted 
largely from consideration of technology path from second generation mobile 
communications around the world, particularly from the operators’ point of view, rather 
than a reflection on the patent disputes. For more information on the harmonizing 
efforts of operators, see K. Zsigo (1999).  
130 This visual representation applied a filter of the eigenvector centrality at 0.0025, 
which eliminates one-off transfers of outliers. However, Table 4.5 gives the main 
network metrics prior to the application of any visual filters. 
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systems based on the W-CDMA radio network and the evolved GSM core network – 
and Ericsson score some of the highest levels of eigenvector centrality.        
Figure 4.4 Network Visualisation of Technology Transfers, Global Strategic Alliances, 
Jan 1995 - Dec 1999 
 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters, SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
 
Table 4.5 Network Analysis Metrics, Global Strategic Alliances, Jan 1995 - Dec 1999 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters, SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
Measures Network Analysis of Strategic Partnerships 
Global Telecommunications Sector 
Jan 1995 – Dec 1999 
No log entries 3,250 
No nodes 1,505 
Mean degree centrality 2.1 
Mean eigenvector centrality 0.001 
Mean betweenness centrality 837 
Max degree centrality AT&T (59), Motorola (55), NTT (35), Siemens (30), Ericsson (29) 
Max eigenvector centrality AT&T (0.035), Motorola (0.026), NTT (0.020), Ericsson (0.016), 
Lucent Technologies (0.016) 
Max betweenness centrality AT&T (90,954), Motorola (77,530), NTT (49,299), Northern 
Telecom (33,174), Lucent Technologies (30,863).   
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The second aspect that the organisation of industry activity in ETSI SMG reveals is the 
fragility of operational rules based on technology exclusion and service exclusion in 
conditions when collective choice rules do not reflect the participation of all resource 
users (i.e. service operators) and do not ensure basic mechanisms of information 
exchange about technology preferences or technology capabilities. The next section 
looks at the impact of this rule configuration in ETSI SMG on the property 
arrangements established in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands, upon the deployment of third 
generation mobile communications systems based on UMTS.  
 
4.3.2 The Nature of Property Arrangements in the 1.9-2.1 GHz Frequency Pool 
The negotiations that took place in ETSI SMG reveal important considerations about 
the relationship between the configuration of industry actors and the property 
arrangements that resulted from the deployment of technology systems based on UMTS 
in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band across Europe in the late 1990s. Table 4.6 provides a summary 
of the configuration of rights at operational and at collective choice level that formed 
the bundle of property arrangements in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band.  
Table 4.6 The Configuration of Property Arrangements in the 1.9-2.1 GHz Frequency 
Bands for the Deployment of UMTS Systems in the late 1990s 
 
Property Right Property Arrangements in the 1.9-2.1 GHz Frequency Band based on UMTS 
Operational 
Rights 
Access The right to enter the radio resource is granted based on membership in a geographic 
club (CEPT) and on membership in a technology club (ETSI SMG).  
Use The rate of withdrawal from the radio is embedded in the technical specifications of 
the standard (UMTS). Members with technology capabilities in the core network of 
GSM will maintain the same rate of withdrawal in the new resource, because UMTS 
is based on an evolved core network for GSM. The new radio access technology for 
UMTS does not change withdrawal rate among members either, because both W-
CDMA and TDMA are included in the final specification. 
Collective 
Choice Rights 
Management Majority voting inside ETSI SMG provides some basis for agreement in conditions 
of increased heterogeneity of capabilities. It contributes to the quick adoption of 
operational rules of use based on the same withdrawal pattern as in GSM, by passing 
the technology preference for “evolutionary” UMTS as desired by industry rather 
than the technology preference for “revolutionary” UMTS as desired by the public 
actor. 
However, the equal representation of resource users, particularly service operators, 
in developing operational rules is more limited in ETSI SMG than in GSM-CEPT. 
Internal monitoring of technology preferences of voting members is also limited in 
ETSI SMG. Credible commitments to accessing technology capabilities of other 
members on fair and reasonable grounds, as a way of sharing withdrawal rights from 
the 1.9-2.1 GHz band, is also limited. 
Exclusion The right to determine who has access to the 1.9-2.1 GHz band is well defined in 
ETSI SMG, based on geographic representation in CEPT and adoption of technology 
specifications devised in ETSI SMG (UMTS and GSM). Internalisation of outsiders 
is minimal.  
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At the operational level, it reveals that the rights resulting from agreements on the main 
network architecture for UMTS systems was based on principles of exclusion. On the 
one hand, exclusion of use as derived from those technology specifications that were 
not based on the core GSM network, which UMTS systems were also based on. In 
addition, because the new radio access interface for UMTS systems included both TD-
CDMA and W-CDMA, its adoption did not challenge the configuration of rivalry and 
excludability achieved in the 900 MHz band, as reported in the previous case study. On 
the contrary, it replicated it in another frequency band – i.e. 1.9-2.1 GHz band – 
particularly as the two technology solutions, supported by the most established 
developers across the CEPT, made it into the final radio access interface. On the other 
hand, exclusion of access was achieved on a geographic basis – i.e. only companies 
located in the CEPT could vote in ETSI Technical Committees – and the technical 
specifications arrived at in ETSI SMG were based on the exclusive deployment of third 
generation mobile communications services in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands.  
However, at the collective choice level, there was less coordination between members, 
which weakened the operational arrangement arrived at in ETSI SMG. Although 
operators and manufacturers had equal rights of participation in ETSI SMG, operators 
did not take part in system specification design as in the previous case study (GSM-
CEPT). In addition, mechanisms for exchanging information about technology 
preferences for the radio interface as well as mechanisms for ensuring commitments to 
the technology specifications arrived at in the radio interface, as exemplified by the 
position of Qualcomm, were limited in ETSI SMG. Established in 1999, the 3G 
Partnership Project and the 3G Patent Platform occurred only after operational rules of 
use of the UMTS systems in the 1.9-2.1 GHz band were challenged, internally, by 
Qualcomm and after those operational rules – based on technology and service 
exclusivity – were legitimated in EU legislation. Thus, although industry actors 
approved operational rules in ETSI SMG, internal contestation of the configuration of 
those rules remained high – unless until the establishment of the 3G Patent Platform – 
and, subsequently, informed preferences for individual exclusive rights in the 1.9-2.1 
GHz band, based on technology exclusivity and service exclusivity.  
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4.4 Conclusions 
This case has traced the definition of operational rules for the 1.9-2.1 GHz frequency 
band for the deployment of third generation mobile cellular communications systems by 
industry actors organised in ETSI. The case makes three contributions to the specialist 
literature looking at the organisation of authority in transnational commons on the one 
hand, and at the attributes of groups most likely to facilitate cooperation on the other 
hand. First, the case suggests that industry actors with symmetric economic preferences 
and asymmetric technology capabilities can solve first level problems of organisation 
for devising operational rules in a transnational common pool. In our case, they do so in 
ETSI, which was established in order to represent, in its decision-making, the 
diversified distribution of capabilities among industry actors in the CEPT – i.e. turnover 
weighted decision making. This evidence confirms theoretical assumptions in the study 
of transnational common goods, which propose that heterogeneity of capabilities – 
particularly if these are distributed across a small number of private actors – can 
facilitate private coordination. In our case, the centrality of developers with 
considerable technology capabilities in GSM systems, contributed to the development 
of technology solutions for harvesting the 1.9-2.1 GHz band that would replicate the 
situation of rivalry and excludability in the 900 MHz band (revisit Chapter 3). This 
aspect is linked to the second contribution of this case to the specialist literature on the 
distribution of authority in transnational commons. In contrast with the previous case, 
the Commission of the European Union exhibits clear competences in regulating 
telecommunications markets as well as a clearly defined preference for 
“revolutionising” the third generation of mobile communications, rather than evolving it 
from GSM. Because this “revolutionary” approach would change positions of rivalry 
and excludability in the radio spectrum, private actors initiate the definition of an 
“evolutionary” system from GSM in ETSI.  
The third contribution of this case is to our understanding of the ability of private actors 
– already organised in ETSI in order to define a replica of operational rules in the 900 
MHz band for GSM – to sustain commitments to these operational rules. Surprisingly, 
levels of internal rivalry in ETSI stayed high and, subsequently, industry actors did not 
communicate their technology preferences, or information about their technology 
capabilities (e.g. essential patents), prior to the voting on the standard. As in the 
previous case study (Chapter 3), the result was a deadlock, which was solved by cross 
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licensing agreements after operational rules embedded in the standard were put to the 
vote. Due to these weak levels of commitments, operational rules were, once again, 
legitimised by the public actor in Commission Decision 128/1999/EC.  
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Chapter 5.  Regulating the 800 MHz Bands: Devising Collective 
Choice Rules in Global Pools  
This chapter traces the process of redefining property arrangements in the 800 MHz 
band in Europe in the late 2000s, from an original allocation at regional level to 
broadcasting services to a reallocation at the global level to broadcasting and mobile 
communications services on a co-primary basis. The case of the regulation of the 800 
MHz band in the late 2000s puts forward a new distribution of preferences among 
public and private actors.  
On the one hand, this case reveals a transnational public actor, in the form of the 
Commission of the European Union, with clear authority in regulating 
communications markets and new competence in harmonising spectrum policies 
across Member States. The authority of the European Commission is exemplified by 
its active role in driving the digitisation process of broadcasting services, which were 
occupying a portion of the radio spectrum that included the 800 MHz band. In the 
switchover process from analog to digital broadcasting services, part of the radio 
frequencies occupied by analog transmissions could be released, producing a “digital 
dividend”. However, in contrast with the previous case study, the public actor did not 
express a preference for the reallocation of this “digital dividend” to a communication 
service or to a technology configuration. In this circumstance, industry actors 
negotiated operational rules for the 800 MHz band outside the policy venues 
established around this public actor. 
On the other hand, this case reveals a new distribution of economic interests and 
technology capabilities among industry actors interested in the reallocation of the 
digital dividend bands. The case shows considerable heterogeneity in the economic 
interests of the broadcasting industry on the one hand, and the mobile 
communications industry on the other hand, as well as differences in the economic 
interests of operators and developers within the mobile communications industry after 
the telecommunications “market crash” of the early 2000s. This heterogeneity of 
economic interests is reinforced by considerable heterogeneity of technology 
capabilities among developers and operators in the mobile communications industry, 
following the diversification of technology standards used to harvest the radio 
resource. Theoretical expectations based on the study of local common pool resources 
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would indicate that this distribution of diverse interests and diverse capabilities is one 
of the most unlikely configurations to result in private cooperation without the 
intervention of a public actor.  
However, this case study reveals that industry actors are able to coordinate in order to 
reallocate access and use of the 800 MHz band even in conditions of diversity of 
economic interests and technology capabilities. Specifically, the case shows that 
industry actors in the mobile communications industry organised in order to overturn, 
at the global level (WRC-07), an allocation of the 800 MHz band made in favour of 
the broadcasting industry, at the region level (RRC-06), within the span of just over 
one year. The case traces the process by which actors in the mobile communications 
industry achieved the reallocation of the 800 MHz band under new property 
arrangements. Figure 5.1 indicates the main events in this process, which, once again, 
span over a decade of negotiations.  
Figure 5.1 Timeline of Main Events in the Regulation of the 800 MHz Band in the 2000s 
 
The chapter shows that there are two important steps taken by industry actors in the 
mobile communications sector in order to accommodate and manage their 
heterogeneity of interests and capabilities. First, rules of collective management for 
technology systems in the 800 MHz band were negotiated based on the early 
participation of both operators and developers in the decision-making process as well 
as based on mutual monitoring of system development across the two industry groups. 
Second, rules of operation in the 800 MHz band were negotiated under flexible 
consensus between operators and manufacturers, whereby rules of use were not 
defined in relation with the adoption of a strict set of technology specifications (i.e. 
technology exclusivity), as preferred by operators. Similarly, rules of access were 
defined in relation with service primacy in the band as preferred by both operators and 
manufacturers. In this case, operators had the flexibility to independently define the 
rate of use of the radio resource, by selecting from a number of mobile 
communications systems (or “generations”) based on considerations of market 
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demand. Similarly, in this case, manufacturers had the assurance that at least one of 
the their technology capabilities would be selected for deployment by operators, as 
long as the communication systems was based on technology inclusion (co-existence) 
rather than technology exclusion. Because such a technology configuration would 
reduced levels of rivalry among members of the same industry association (Wireless 
World Research Forum), it allowed for the definition of flexible rules of use inside the 
frequency pool at 800 MHz, while ensuring that mobile communications services 
benefited from primacy of access at the global level. Because primary status is the 
highest level of protection against non-interference in radio communications, the 
property arrangements that resulted from this configuration of rules resembled 
principles of common (flexible use) and exclusive (primary access) property. This 
configuration of property rights differs from the previous case studies, where property 
arrangements are based on individual, technology exclusive and service exclusive 
property.   
 
5.1 The Formation of Actor Strategies in the Wider Governance of 
Electronic Communications  
This section follows the formation of actor strategies prior to the negotiation of 
operational and collective choice rules in the 800 MHz frequency band in the late 
2000s. It argues that both public and private actors had to reconsider their position 
regarding the configuration of property arrangements in the radio resource as a result of 
two factors: a) the process of digitisation of communications services, which pushed 
forward an agenda for convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and 
information technology services and b) the financial instability of the 
telecommunications industry, which resulted in the “telecoms crash” of the early 2000s. 
For transnational public actors, such as the European Commission, these structural 
factors opened an opportunity to renew the agenda for liberalisation of electronic 
communications away from the “managed competition” approach of the 1990s and 
towards an “integrated approach” for converged services in the 2000s (Hancher and 
Larouche 2011). Because the agenda for convergence was associated with the 
digitisation process of electronic communications services, it raised questions about its 
distributive and re-distributive effects on the allocation of the radio resource in 
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spectrum bands where analog broadcasting services were considered for digitisation, 
such as in the 800 MHz band. For industry actors in the broadcasting sector, the process 
of digitisation and convergence threatened positions of reduced rivalry and uncontested 
excludability in the 470-862 MHz band (i.e. the UHF band), established since the 1961 
Stockholm Agreement on the transnational allocation of colour television broadcasting 
services in Europe. For industry actors in the mobile cellular communications sector, 
which had digitalised since the introduction of second generation systems such as GSM, 
the process of convergence occurred simultaneously with the financial collapse of the 
telecommunications sector and, subsequently, challenged business models based on the 
purchase of individual and exclusive rights in new spectrum bands. Overall, the 
financial instability of the telecommunications market, which challenged the position of 
the established mobile cellular communications industry, coupled with the convergence 
of electronic communications systems, which challenged the position of the established 
broadcasting industry, triggered a shift in strategies away from an interest in purchasing 
exclusive rights in new spectrum and towards the reorganisation (i.e. refarming) of 
already acquired spectrum along more flexible rules of access and use of the radio 
resource.   
 
5.1.1 The Structure of the System of Governance in Electronic Communications 
In the early 2000s, the system of governance for electronic communications – i.e. 
broadcasting, telecommunications and information technology – had a different 
structure than the hierarchical, minimally coordinated order of the 1980s131 (Genschel 
and Werle 1993). There are two explanations for this change in the governance structure 
of electronic communications in developed markets. First, the process of digitisation, by 
which content of any type – voice, image, data – is packaged and delivered via the same 
system, challenged hierarchical forms of organising broadcasting and 
telecommunications industrial relations. The process of digitisation is thus associated 
with the convergence of distinct services in broadcasting, telecommunications and 
information technology, which traditionally developed in hierarchical relations of 
                                                
131 Revisit Section 3.1 for a discussion on the hierarchical structure of the 
telecommunications sector in Europe in the 1980s, coupled with minimal coordination 
across borders.  
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production and distribution and were now challenged by a blurring of boundaries 
between them and by their reconfiguration into “bits” and “transport”132: 
“[…] from the standpoint of firms, they used to be in silos, with a 
telephone firm and various TV channels, but now the same delivery system 
can deliver bits, which could be a voice call or it could be broadband or it 
could be video or it could be almost anything” (Cave 2012: 210).         
Second, with digitisation, electronic communication systems are developed and 
deployed differently than traditionally separate systems such as telephone lines and 
television aerials, leading to an intensification of standardisation at transnational and 
international level and challenging the traditionally minimal coordination of the 
industry across borders (Schmidt and Werle 1998). An example of this intensification of 
transnational and international standardisation is the IMT-2000 family of global 
standards133 for third generation mobile cellular communications, which coordinated 
competing technology specifications produced by different transnational standardisation 
bodies under a single definition of services provided by the ITU  (revisit Chapter 4).  
However, the process of digitisation did not and does not produce the same degree of 
convergence as well as the same level of transnational coordination across the different 
industries that make up the wider electronic communications sector. In addition, there 
are different causes for the uneven coordination and convergence of industries in the 
wider electronic communications sector. In fact, in the early 2000s, the process of 
digitisation, convergence and transnational coordination differed considerably between 
the broadcasting industry, the mobile cellular communications industry and the 
information technology industry.  
                                                
132 Asked by the Select Committee on Communications in the House of Lords whether 
convergence of electronic communications could mean the bundling of any type of 
communication services, M. Cave responded: “Yes, in a sense ultimately it is bits and it 
is transport” (Cave 2012: 221). As it will be discussed below, this is also the approach 
adopted by the European Commission in the 2002 Electronic Communications 
regulatory framework.  
133 Although it is generally referred to as an international family of standards, IMT-2000 
is a set of technical recommendations for the delivery of global third generation mobile 
communication systems, agreed at the level of the ITU. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, IMT-2000 had three member standards: UMTS/W-CDMA, CDMA2000, 
UMTS/TDMA. Following a number of revisions on the specifications throughout the 
2000s, four other members were added. From the 2G+ family, the EDGE and DECT 
standards were added. From the 3G+ family, mobile WiMAX and HPSA were later 
added. 
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The limitations of convergence are evident in the process of digitisation of the 
broadcasting industry in Europe in the early 2000s. At community level in the European 
Union, the broadcasting industry adopted a single standard for digital television (DVB) 
in the late 1990s134. However, the development of the digital television standard did not 
lead to an inevitable deployment of digital television services or an inevitable creation 
of a single market for digital broadcasting in the community.  
Table 5.1 The Digital Television Market in the EU, 2002 
 
Source: EC (2003), Annex I 
                                                
134 The digital transmission of television signal via different communications 
infrastructures – terrestrial, satellite and cable – was regulated under Directive 
95/47/EC, which stipulated that, in fully digital, television services should “use a 
transmission system which has been standardised by a recognised standardisation body” 
(Art 2c, Directive 95/47/EC). In this case, the delegated body was the Digital Video 
Broadcasting (DVB) Consortium that produced, in the late 1990s, three digital 
television standards for the respective transport networks: DVB-T (terrestrial), DVB-S 
(satellite) and DVB-C (cable). Levy (1997) and Michalis (1999) analyse the decision-
making process that led to the adoption of Directive 95/47/EC as well as the reasons 
that contributed to the low rate of adoption and deployment of digital broadcasting 
services in Europe. For instance, Levy (1997) argues that national institutional 
structures, underpinned by the traditional politicisation of the broadcasting sector in 
Europe, contributed to the unwillingness of broadcasting operators to upgrade to digital 
systems of signal transmission.    
Total HH  Total Digital TV HH  TV HH          %  
Cable DTV  
TV HH           %  
Satellite DTV  
TV HH          %  
Terrestrial DTV  
TV HH       %  
Austria 3.3  0.36  10.7%  0.07  2.1%  0.29  8.7%  0.00  0.0%  
Belgium 4.3  0.23  5.2%  0.22  5.0%  0.01  0.2%  0.00  0.0%  
Denmark 2.4  0.92  38.9%  0.55  23.6%  0.36  15.3%  0.00  0.0%  
Finland 2.3  0.22  9.4%  0.04  1.6%  0.17  7.3%  0.01  0.5%  
France 25.1  4.97  19.8%  0.95  3.8%  4.02  16.0%  0.01  0.0%  
Germany 37.9  4.14  10.9%  1.94  5.1%  2.21  5.8%  0.00  0.0%  
Greece 3.6  0.22  6.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.22  6.0%  0.00  0.0%  
Ireland 1.3  0.32  24.4%  0.06  4.4%  0.26  20.0%  0.00  0.0%  
Italy 20.1  3.13  15.6%  0.02  0.1%  3.11  15.4%  0.00  0.0%  
Luxembourg 0.2  0.01  5.3%  0.00  1.0%  0.01  4.2%  0.00  0.0%  
Netherlands 7.1  1.16  16.5%  0.45  6.4%  0.69  9.8%  0.02  0.3%  
Portugal 3.6  0.34  9.6%  0.04  1.1%  0.29  8.0%  0.02  0.5%  
Spain 12.8  3.21  25.1%  0.05  0.4%  2.78  21.8%  0.38  3.0%  
Sweden 4.6  1.44  31.6%  0.46  10.0%  0.84  18.4%  0.15  3.2%  
UK 26.3  11.51  43.8%  3.23  12.3%  6.22  23.7%  2.06  7.8%  
TOTAL EU 154.73  32.2  20.8%  8.1  5.2%  21.5  13.9%  2.6  1.7%  
US 118  44.95  38.1%  21.8  18.5%  22.55  19.1%  0.6  0.5%  
Japan 41.9  6.7  16.0%  0  0.0%  6.7  16.0%  0  0.0%  
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On the contrary, Table 5.1 reveals that, in the early 2000s, the digital television market 
was fragmented across different transport networks – terrestrial, cable or satellite – as 
well as across different member states of the European Union. In this case, the uneven 
digitisation of broadcasting services across networks was not triggered by coordination 
problems in the development of a digital standard per se, but by limited agreement over 
the implementation of conditional access systems and gateway systems, coupled with 
limited willingness to invest in the reorganisation of the radio resource and the physical 
infrastructure (Levy 1997).  
Thus, in the case of the broadcasting sector, the process of digitisation would require 
fundamental changes to their business model. On the one hand the switchover from 
analog to digital transmission would have considerable redistributive effects in the radio 
resource because, with digitisation, “five to eight digital channels can be fitted in the 
same space occupied by one analogue channel” (EC 2003: 6). On the other hand, the 
switchover from analog to digital transmission would have considerable redistributive 
effects in the broadcasting market because, with digitisation, the broadcasting value 
chain would be open to new entrants and new services (EC 2003: 7).  
Similarly, the intensification of transnational and international standardisation in mobile 
telecommunications did not produce an immediate deployment or take up of third 
generation mobile communication services in the IMT-2000 family of standards. Figure 
5.2 reveals that, instead of replicating the growth patterns of second generation mobile 
communications around the world, third generation systems in the IMT-2000 family of 
standards – CDMA and W-CDMA135 – had a total share of less than 15% of the global 
market for mobile communications in the mid 2000s. In fact, in mid 2000s, the GSM 
second generation standard had the largest share of the global market for mobile 
telecommunications, at over 70% of the market.  
 
                                                
135 As described in the previous chapter, Chapter 4, W-CDMA is the radio specification 
of the UMTS standard developed by 3GPP, whereas CDMA – or cdma2000 – is the 
radio specification developed by 3GPP2 for third generation mobile communications 
systems. Whereas W-CDMA was developed and deployed in Europe and Japan, 
cdma2000 was developed and deployed primarily in North America.  
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Figure 5.2 Global Market Shares of Major Mobile Communications Standards 
  
Source: Based on WCIS Database, Informa, Accessed Dec 2012 
As in the case of the broadcasting industry, coordination over the development of the 
IMT family of standard did not trigger immediate implementation, deployment or take 
up of third generation mobile communications services. Several market considerations 
have impacted this process. First, setting up interconnection and roaming agreements 
between operators of third generation mobile communications systems belonging to the 
same family of standards – i.e. IMT-2000 – was more costly than envisioned by 
international standardisation organisations such as ITU-R136 (Bohlin et al 2007: 241). 
Second, reduced cooperation over the development of multimedia content to be 
delivered over third generation mobile communication services, coupled with reduced 
interoperability of mobile data services delivered across third generation networks in 
different countries, limited the added services offer of third generation networks 
compared with established second generation (i.e. 2G and 2.5G) networks (Weber et al 
2004: 383-387). Bohlin et al (2007) argue that this situation perpetuated “a vicious 
cycle in which the lack of content and infrastructure mutually reinforce one another, 
heightened by the absence of a clear idea about the kind of content that customers might 
                                                
136 One of the central considerations for increased costs of interconnection was the 
requirement to produce multi-band mobile devices that would pick up signals emitted 
from third generation systems operating in different frequency bands around the world. 
Thus, the global roaming requirement for membership of the IMT-2000 family of 
standards imposed additional costs of development and interconnection (Feldman 2005: 
69, Rosenbrock 2002: 239).   
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want” (Bohlin et al 2007: 239). K. H. Rosenbrock, Director General of ETSI in the 
early 2000s, confirmed that uncertainty over the type of multimedia content to be 
delivered on third generation networks led to over 5,700 change requests being 
proposed to the UMTS standard after the specifications were frozen by 3GPP in 1999 
(Rosenbrock 2002: 245). Lastly, the costs of purchasing access to new spectrum and the 
costs of investing in new network infrastructure for third generation systems 
outweighed the marginal improvements on added data services already provided by 
2.5G networks. These discrepancies resulted in considerable variation in the cost of 
licensing radio spectrum in the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands for third generation mobile 
communications systems in Europe137 and contributed to the accumulation of debt by 
telecommunications operators, leading to the telecommunications market crash of 2001 
(Gruber 2001, Klemperer 2001, The Economist 2002). However, although the design 
and inconsistent application of the auctioning process across developed 
telecommunications markets in Europe slowed down the migration from second 
generation to third generation mobile communications systems, it was by no means a 
sufficient factor for restricted investment in third generation communications networks 
in Europe. Instead, the significant duplication in communication services between 2.5G 
networks and 3G networks, coupled with the lack of multimedia content to be delivered 
as added services on 3G networks, contributed significantly to the slow migration from 
second generation to third generation mobile communications systems (revisit Chapter 
4). This slow migration from second to third generation mobile communications 
systems raised questions about the extent of reorganisation or redistribution of the radio 
resource prescribed for third generation networks in conditions of low occupancy rates.  
Overall, digitisation created the possibility for convergence of services and networks as 
well as for intensification of transnational standardisation of systems in electronic 
                                                
137 Although the pricing of the radio resource for the deployment of third generation 
mobile communications systems is regarded, in the specialist literature, as one of the 
necessary conditions for the telecoms crash of 2002, it is by no means a sufficient 
condition for the telecom crash. Discrepancies between the pricing of radio spectrum 
across EU Member States have been identified as an important factor. Klemperer 
(2002) note that revenues from licensing spectrum in the 1.9-2.1 GHz frequency bands 
varied from €45 per capita in Belgium or Greece to over €600 per capita in Germany or 
the United Kingdom. Similarly, Cowhey et al (2008) and Gruber (2001) noted that the 
design of the auctioning processes could also distort valuations of the radio resource, 
causing telecommunications operators to overbid for access, with intensions to hoard 
the radio resource rather than invest in immediate network development.  
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communications but it did not and could not ensure their consistent implementation 
across different industries or across different states. The case of the broadcasting and 
the mobile communications industry in the early 2000s reveals that the two sectors were 
in different stages of the digitisation process and responded with different market 
dynamics to this process. Most importantly, the case of the broadcasting and mobile 
communication industry in the early 2000s reveals that changes in technology – i.e. 
digitisation – cannot inevitably lead to market efficiency or market growth and, as a 
result, can challenge established positions of rivalry and excludability in the radio 
resource that facilitates these markets. In the case of the broadcasting sector, the 
migration from analog to digital transmission would bring a radio spectrum “gain” – i.e. 
five to eight times more resource made available – that would challenge positions of 
exclusivity in bands traditionally allocated to broadcasting services. In the case of the 
mobile communications sector, the migration from second to third generation systems 
challenged established positions of rivalry derived from the prescription of technology 
specifications – i.e. GSM or UMTS – in bands with low utilisation rates. The next 
sections discuss the extent to which public and industry actors responded to these 
pressures by reformulating their strategies for the configuration of access and use of the 
800MHz frequency band populated by terrestrial broadcasting services and considered 
for digitisation in the mid 2000s in Europe. The next sections show that, although the 
European Commission utilised the agenda for digitisation to renew the regulation of 
electronic communications markets in Europe, it took a reserved approach to specifying 
technology or service preferences for the redistribution of the radio resource considered 
for digital switchover. In contrast, the broadcasting and mobile communications 
industry expressed clear yet diverging preferences for a particular configuration of 
recipients and rules in the radio resource considered for digital switchover.   
 
5.1.2 The Initial Position of the Public Actor 
In the early 2000s, the European Commission was an established public actor with 
unambiguous competences in regulating electronic communications markets in the 
European Union. Deriving these competences directly from treaty changes as well as 
from the application of the Open Network Provision Framework (ONP) of the 1990s, 
the European Commission articulated its competences with reference to the process of 
liberalisation of networks and services (revisit Chapter 4). However, as Hancher and 
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Larouche (2011) noted electronic communications law evolved from a “formalistic 
model” for ensuring market access in the ONP to an “integrative model” for ensuring 
competition in a new regulatory framework for electronic communications adopted in 
the early 2000s (2011: 747). Although this new framework rested on principles of 
competition (“effective competition”) and proportionate regulation (“technology 
neutrality”)138, its core was the convergence of electronic communications derived from 
the process of digitisation: 
“The convergence of the telecommunications, media and information 
technology sectors means all transmission networks and services should be 
covered by a single regulatory framework. […] It is necessary to separate 
the regulation of transmission from the regulation of content” (para 5, 
Directive 2002/21/EC).  
In this context, there is little doubt that the European Commission pursued the agenda 
for convergence of electronic communications networks and services by direct 
reference to the process of digitisation of these sectors and, particularly, by direct 
reference to the broadcasting sector as requiring aligning, through digitisation, with the 
rest of electronic communications industries that had already been through the process, 
such as the mobile communications industry (EC 1999, EC 2003). In fact, Directive 
2002/21/EC resolved any tensions between digitisation – as a redistributive process 
requiring some level of re-regulation of the radio resource/market – and technology 
neutrality139 – as a non-discriminatory principle that requires the removal of regulation 
distorting market forces – in favour of the digitisation agenda:  
“The requirement for Member States to ensure that national regulatory 
authorities take the utmost account of the desirability of making regulation 
technology neutral […] does not preclude the taking of proportionate steps 
to promote certain specific services where this is justified, for example 
digital television as a means for increasing spectrum efficiency” (para 18, 
Directive 2002/21/EC).   
                                                
138 The European Commission identified five principles for regulatory action for 
converged electronic communications: a) the promotion of competition in the European 
market for communications services to benefit the European citizens and to consolidate 
the internal market in a converging environment; b) minimum harmonization and the 
reduction of regulation where policy objectives are achieved through competition; c) 
legal certainty; d) technology neutrality; e) enforced as closely as possible to the 
regulated activities at global, regional and national level (COM(1999) 539). 
139 Directive 2002/21/EC provided the first formal definition of the principle of 
“technology neutrality” in electronic communications law in the EU. Technology 
neutrality was defined as a responsibility to “neither impose nor discriminate in favour 
of the use of a particular type of technology” (para 18, Directive 2002/21/EC).  
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However, this approach to the regulation of the electronic communications sector 
required two types of competences that the European Commission did not equally 
possess at the time. On the one hand, it required competences in redistributing the 
market for electronic communications, which the European Commission already had 
and which were used to re-regulate the sector in electronic communications networks140 
and electronic communications services141, similar to the “transport” and “bits” 
approach explained by Cave (2012) (Art 2, Directive 2002/21/EC). On the other hand, it 
required competences in redistributing the radio resource harvested by industry for the 
delivery of electronic communications, which the European Commission did not have 
and which remained in the competence of Member States. In fact, Decision 
676/2002/EC, which was aimed at establishing a regulatory framework for radio 
spectrum policy together with the legislative package on industry convergence, 
maintained the same jurisdictional boundaries between Member States and the 
Commission (Art 5), recognised the remit of the CEPT in harmonising radio frequency 
allocations (Art 4) and formalised practices of coordinating policy approaches142 at EU 
level (Art 1) similar to the case of the 900 MHz band for the delivery of GSM or the 
1.9-2.1 GHz band for the delivery of UMTS.  
In this case, the European Commission had a strong position in favour of the 
digitisation of terrestrial broadcasting services but, due to this division of competences, 
did not express a definite preference for the redistribution of the radio resource to be 
released after the switchover from analog to digital broadcasting. This position of the 
European Commission is particularly relevant because the “digital dividend” – i.e. the 
radio resource released after the switchover from analog to digital broadcasting – was 
                                                
140 ‘Electronic communications networks’ are defined as “transmission systems and, 
where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the 
conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means 
[…] to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks 
used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of 
the type of information conveyed” (Art 2a, Directive 2002/21/EC). 
141 ‘Electronic communications services’ are defined as “a service normally provided 
for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and 
transmission services in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, 
or exercising, editorial control over content transmitted using electronic 
commuunications networks and services” (Art 2b, Directive 2002/21/EC). 
142 Decision 676/2002/EC established a Radio Spectrum Policy Group that would assist 
the Commission for coordinating these policy approaches (Art 3). 
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situated in a “prime” portion of the radio resource below 1 GHz (400 MHz to 800 MHz) 
where electronic communications benefit from stable penetration rates and long ranges 
(i.e. less physical infrastructure). In fact, throughout the 2000s, when the Radio 
Spectrum Policy Group of the European Commission conducted several rounds of 
industry consultations, the Commission maintained a reserved position regarding the 
reorganisation of this prime radio resource:  
“A major allocation issue for all Member States is how to reallocate the 
“digital dividend”: that is the spectrum released when analogue 
broadcasting is finally closed down. […] So far, the momentum is towards 
keeping the spectrum within broadcasting, though the potential alternative 
use of the spectrum by other services is being developed in various fora” 
(EC 2003: 21-22). 
Even after the industry consultation process on the implications of the switchover, 
conducted by the Radio Spectrum Policy Group from 2004 to 2006, the European 
Commission did not make a clear recommendation for the amount of radio resource to 
be reorganised143, the industry recipients of this reorganisation144 or the configuration of 
operational property arrangements (rights of access and rights of use) in this resource 
(EC 2007: 9). Instead, the Commission opted for the identification of three main 
“application clusters” – broadcasting networks, mobile cellular networks and broadband 
local area networks – with potential to be deployed in the “digital dividend” bands in 
configurations of access and use that, however, remained unspecified.  
This reserved approach on behalf of the European Commission can be justified on two 
grounds. First, the Commission itself chose to adopt a strategy focused on redistributing 
the market for electronic communications rather than redistributing the radio resource, 
in the aftermaths of applying prescriptive radio spectrum allocations for third generation 
mobile communications networks that did not replicate the market growth of GSM 
networks. This could explain why the European Commission advocated a high degree 
of flexibility in defining operational rights for specific applications or services. Second, 
the industry itself chose to formalise and negotiate its strategies outside the policy 
                                                
143 The Commission indicated that the UHF band (470 MHz to 862 MHz) without 
specifying how much of this band is considered for reorganisation or refarming (EC 
2007: 9). 
144 The Commission suggested three types of networks for the UHF sub-bands: high 
power networks (broadcasting), medium power networks (mobile cellular) and low 
power networks (fixed and mobile local area networks). The Commission referred to 
these types of networks as “application clusters” (EC 2007: 9).  
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framework established around the European Commission in the EU, particularly 
because the digitisation and convergence agenda were deemed disruptive to established 
positions of rivalry and excludability in the radio resource. This could explain why the 
industry preferred other transnational venues such as the regional CEPT or the global 
ITU to negotiate the allocation of the digital dividend. The next section looks at the 
distribution of interest and capabilities among the established industry – broadcasting 
and mobile telecommunications industry – in order to explain their preference for 
negotiating property arrangements for the digital dividend band – particularly the 800 
MHz band – outside the policy framework of the European Union.    
 
5.1.3 The Initial Distribution of Private Interests and Private Resources 
The established electronic communications industry in Europe responded differently to 
the potential reorganisation of the digital dividend bands, particularly the 470-862 MHz 
band (i.e. the UHF band). On the one hand, the broadcasting industry had an established 
position of reduced rivalry and effective exclusivity in the UHF band (470-862 MHz) 
since the Stockholm Regional Agreement on the allocation of broadcasting services in 
1961. Under these conditions, the broadcasting industry supported safeguarding the 
radio resource for continued broadcasting services as well as maintaining traditional 
allocation mechanisms based on individual, exclusive use of the radio resource. On the 
other hand, the mobile communications industry was also in a position of reduced 
rivalry and effective exclusivity as a result of the creation of regional frequency pools at 
900 MHz and 1.9-2.1 GHz, but were faced with two diverging market outcomes from 
that the same configuration of property arrangements. In the case of the 900 MHz pool 
for the deployment of GSM this configuration of individual exclusive rights led to high 
spectrum occupancy levels and successful markets whereas, in the case of the 1.9-2.1 
GHz pool for the deployment of UMTS, this configuration led to low spectrum 
occupancy levels and slow market development. Under these conditions, the mobile 
communications industry proposed redistributing the radio resource between 
broadcasting and mobile communications networks as well as applying a more flexible 
approach to property arrangements in the radio resource. This section details the 
formation of these preferences as well as their distribution based on the technology 
capabilities available to the broadcasting and mobile communications industry. This 
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distribution of interests and technology capabilities informed industry actor strategies in 
negotiating regional and global arrangements for the refarmed 800 MHz band.     
The broadcasting industry responded with considerable reservation to the process of 
digitisation and, more broadly, to the convergence of the electronic communications 
industry. There are two explanations for this reserved approach. First, convergence was 
perceived as extending principles of network design in information technology and 
telecommunications to broadcasting services that operated under different regulatory 
conditions for content and services (Cullell and March 2011, Michalis 1999). In the 
framework for convergence, a broadcasting network would, in fact, become an access 
system for all digital applications and services and could potentially reduce the 
transmission of broadcasting content in favour of other applications.  
This position explains why the broadcasting industry, and particularly the terrestrial 
broadcasting industry in Europe, did not kick-start the switchover soon after the 
adoption of the DVB standard in the mid/late 1990s145. Second, the broadcasting 
industry was aware that the switchover from analog to digital broadcasting would 
produce residual radio resource in their allocated frequency bands, whose keeping 
would have to be justified on the basis of projected demand. This reorganisation would 
challenge an established and exclusive industry position since the early 1960s, when the 
ITU Regional Radio Conference (RRC 1961) agreed a primary allocation for 
broadcasting services in the 47-68 MHz (Band I), 174-230 MHz (Band III - VHF) and 
470-862 MHz (Band IV/V – UHF).  
Consequently, the broadcasting industry across Europe preferred the venue of the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU)146 to organise a position against any immediate 
                                                
145 The DVB Consortium that promoted the DVB family of standards was formed by 
both established broadcasters and telecommunications manufacturers in Europe and, in 
fact, created the DVB standard not as a broadcasting standard (such as PAL or 
SECAM) but as a transport standard, as one “used generically to describe the transport 
of media content from one point of origin to multiple receivers – irrespective of the 
physical network used for this transport” (Reimers 2006: 173).  
146  The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was founded in 1950, having as 
predecessor the International Broadcasting Union (1925) that set up the first regional 
allocations for the “European area” (revisit Chapter 1). EBU has a wider membership 
than the EU, largely mapped on the CEPT, and is a formal industry association that 
coordinates frequency planning and some aspects of standardisation of broadcasting 
services. R. Gressmann (2000), former Director of the EBU Technical Centre, noted 
that, whereas the international frequency plan did not always reflect the de facto reality 
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redistribution of the digital dividend to other electronic communications services and 
under more flexible property arrangements. In fact, public broadcasting operators in 
EBU held homogenous preferences against the redistribution of the digital dividend and 
delivered this position, via EBU, to the European Commission as well as to the CEPT. 
The latter was the preferred venue for coordination for broadcasting representatives in 
EBU, who chose the CEPT for its wider membership than the EU, its “proven 
infrastructure to arrange coordination” as well as its capability “to broker compromises 
needed for international planning” (EBU 2004): 
“[C]urrent EBU studies show that in the European environment, with its 
high population density, achieving universal national coverage with even 
the six multiplexes sought by most nations will require virtually the 
complete broadcast bands to be used solely for broadcasting. […] 
Providing ‘universal’ coverage is part of the public service mission and 
doing so will require adequate spectrum. […] Flexible allocations may be 
efficient for point to point services, but they are counterproductive for free 
to air broadcasting services, where receivers need to reliably and rapidly 
find broadcast stations” (EBU 2004).  
On closer analysis, this position of the broadcasting industry in Europe reveals its initial 
strategy in negotiations about the digital dividend. First, the broadcasting industry did 
not commit to an exact residual of radio resource after the switchover147 compared, for 
instance, with the public actor that estimated it to at least double the available space 
(EBU 2004, EC 2003). Second, the broadcasting industry justified keeping the existing 
radio spectrum allocations – even after the switchover – based on public service 
considerations of “universal coverage” rather than on considerations of existing or 
projected demand for two-way (i.e. interactive) multimedia services. Lastly, the 
industry opposed the application of flexible allocations for broadcasting services in the 
radio resource and advocated for “traditional allocation mechanisms” based on 
individual and exclusive use of frequency bands on considerations that broadcasting 
services require powerful stations and stable emissions (EBU 2004).  
                                                                                                                                          
in the different spectrum regions, “the EBU lists were generally recognised as reliable 
and unbiased unbiased reports of the de facto situations in the frequency bands allocated 
to broadcasting” in Europe (Gressmann 2000: 18).  
147 The exact position of the broadcasting industry states: “it is too early in the planning 
process to know what residual frequencies may or may not be available after the 
switchover, and hence this question cannot be answered completely at the moment” 
(EBU 2004).  
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In contrast, the mobile communications industry in Europe adopted a less homogenous 
but different position than the one adopted by the broadcasting industry. Overall, the 
mobile communications industry advocated for the redistribution of some residual radio 
resource to two-way electronic communications services, particularly mobile data 
services. However, established operators and established manufacturers in the mobile 
communications industry adopted relatively different positions on the exact frequency 
bands of the digital dividend to be redistributed for broadband services as well as on the 
flexibility of the property arrangements to be adopted in these bands.  
First, the mobile communications industry was in overall agreement over the residual 
radio resource to be “free” after the digital dividend: “Digital television is 
approximately four times more efficient than analogue television in the broadcasting 
service” (ITU-R SG1 qtd in UMTS Forum 2004). Second, the mobile communications 
industry was in overall agreement that “it should be considered whether this spectrum 
[digital dividend] could be allocated to mobile services” (UMTS Forum 2004). 
However, whereas manufacturers seemed to be interested in the lower parts of the 
digital dividend (i.e below 600 MHz), operators were interested in the upper parts of the 
digital dividend (i.e. the 800 MHz band). The positions of established manufacturers 
and an established operator are provided to exemplify these differences: 
“[W]e recommend to think about identification of this spectrum for 
interactive services like interactive broadcast for stationary and mobile use 
and other individual bidirectional media communications, where spectrum 
will be used in two directions such as mobile telephony including high 
bandwidth […] interfaces, wireless LAN etc” (Siemens 2004).  
“An example of such a separate service would be low-cost wide area 
coverage fixed or mobile communications for rural area, facilitated by the 
better propagation characteristics of the frequencies constituting the 
broadcasting bands, compared to current commercial mobile 
communications frequency bands” (Ericsson 2004).  
Established manufacturers were thus motivated to set in motion the interactive media 
market for mobile cellular communications, which had a slow start with the 
introduction of third generation mobile communications networks in the early 2000s. 
This is certified by the low penetration rate of third generation mobile communication 
systems (UMTS/W-CDMA) across Western Europe in the mid 2000s, compared with 
still dominant second generation systems (GSM)  (Figure 5.3). Thus, the slow 
deployment of third generation systems in the higher 2GHz bands (1.9-2.1 GHz) 
determined manufacturers to press for deployment of these interactive systems in 
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frequencies below 600MHz where, as Ericsson noted, the costs of setting up the 
physical infrastructure for these services would be lower due to the more stable 
penetration rate and wider coverage areas of these bands (Ericsson 2004, UMTS Forum 
2004). In addition, data services – including interactive services – via mobile cellular 
communications networks (i.e. wide area networks) were challenged by a “newcomer” 
technology in the form of WLANs (i.e. local area networks such as Wi-Fi).  
In fact, in the early 2000s the mobile communications industry was unsure whether 
WLANs providing local broadband services would become “disruptive technologies” to 
wide area cellular mobile networks providing lower data service rates (Weber et al 
2004: 385, also see Chapter 6). Hence, in the mid 2000s, established manufacturers in 
mobile communications were looking at ways to integrate and interwork the two 
technologies without disrupting each other’s markets148 (Ahmavaara et al 2003). This 
meant that manufacturers were supporting a more “scattered” or “spread” approach to 
overlaying mobile communications services – such as broadband services provided by 
WLANs – on spectrum primarily allocated to broadcasting or mobile communications.  
However, mobile communications operators took a different approach to the 
redistribution of the digital dividend, supporting more flexible operational rules in the 
radio resource while discouraging the application of a “scattered” approach to deploying 
wireless communications: 
“Technology and technology neutrality is in general good. However, it is 
important that the spectrum for certain services will not become too 
scattered. This is especially important for mobile services where the mobile 
terminals must be able to travel worldwide. […] It is important that 
spectrum is allocated to the market in the same way as spectrum for other 
public telecom services. […] If the same technology could be used for 
                                                
148 The formation of these strategies is discussed in more depth in the next case study, 
which looks at the creation of property arrangements in the 2.4GHz and the 5GHz 
frequency bands for WLANs (see Chapter 6). At this point, it is only important to know 
that the two technologies 3G cellular and WLANs were initially perceived and 
competing technologies for wireless access to broadband data services and that in 2003 
the mobile cellular communications industry and the information technology industry 
aligned their technology preferences to interwork the two systems. The result was that 
3GPP, the industry association that developed and maintained the GSM and the UMTS 
standards, took the initiative to develop a cellular-WLAN interworking architecture “as 
an add-on to the existing 3GPP cellular system specifications” (Ahmavaara et al 2003). 
Note that Ahmavaara et al (2003) contributed to this work on behalf of Nokia, who was 
one of the main promoters of this initiative and one of the founding members of the Wi-
Fi Alliance that rebranded WLANs into the Wi-Fi product.  
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different purposes, that will be more efficient for both operators and 
customers. However, it still should be needed to gather common types of 
technology in the same or adjacent frequency bands to avoid interference 
problems and fragmentation” (TeliaSonera 2004).   
Mobile communications operators were most affected by the telecom crash in the early 
2000s and, subsequently, were not interested in new technologies – such as WLANs – 
that would disrupt cellular communications networks. For this reason, they were mostly 
interested in the upper parts of the digital dividend – i.e. around the 800 MHz band – 
because this part of the dividend was directly adjacent to the 900 MHz band where 
GSM services were deployed and, subsequently, represented a way of enlarging the 
frequency pool for mobile cellular communications services without incurring 
additional costs from pairing fragmented allocations in the lower bands.   
Overall, this configuration of economic interests and technology preferences regarding 
the redistribution of the digital dividend reveals the strategies of the three main 
interested parties in the wider electronic communications sector. First, the broadcasting 
industry had relatively homogenous preferences for maintaining the radio resource in 
their operation and for applying property arrangements based on individual and 
exclusive licensing. Second, the mobile communications industry had more diverse 
economic interests, with manufacturers supporting a greater variety of technology 
options (e.g. WLANs) to be deployed in a wider frequency range (e.g. lower than 600 
MHz) and following more flexible allocations (e.g. overlaying WLANs on 
broadcasting/ telecom spectrum) than the operators who were supporting less 
technology variability (e.g. mostly cellular) in a lower frequency range (e.g. mostly 
upper dividend in 800 MHz) and with less flexibility in allocations in order to reduce 
fragmentation and maintain service exclusivity (e.g. no overlays). The next sections 
reveal the distributional effects of these conflicting interests on the creation of property 
arrangements in the 800 MHz frequency pool at global level. The next sections show 
that, by setting up voluntary collective arrangements for negotiating operational rules 
for future mobile communications systems, manufacturers and operators in Europe were 
not only able to align their preferences but also to put forward a new property 
arrangement in the 800 MHz band based on common exclusive property rather than 
individual exclusive property.   
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5.2 The Process of Private Rule-Making in the 800 MHz Band 
The next sections follow the negotiation of new operational rules of access and use of 
the 800 MHz frequency band in the lead up to the digital switchover that commenced in 
the late 2000s in Europe (2009-2013). First, they trace negotiations in the broadcasting 
industry for defining operational rules for the 800 MHz frequency band, which finalised 
with an ITU Radio Regional Conference (RRC-06) that maintained the digital dividend 
bands in the operation of the broadcasting sector in Europe. Then, they trace 
negotiations between mobile communications operators and manufacturers, which 
focused on the design of a new technology system – called IMT-Advanced – which 
would create a flat architecture for the integration, rather than the exclusion, of 
previously competing technologies in mobile communications. Referred to as the fourth 
generation of mobile communications149 (4G), the new IMT-Advanced system aligned 
the economic and technology preferences of both operators and manufacturers by 
proposing specifications that would maintain service exclusivity, as preferred by 
operators, coupled with technology flexibility, as preferred by manufacturers. This 
industry alignment was achieved by setting up collective arrangements in informal 
industry associations based on equitable participation of the two industry parties in 
system design, flexible consensus building on system specifications and cross-
monitoring in systems development. This alignment gave the mobile communications 
industry considerable weight to overturn the initial assignment of the 800 MHz band to 
broadcasting services and to re-assign it to mobile communications systems based on 
IMT at the World Radiocommunication Conference of the ITU in 2007 (WRC-07).  
The decision taken at WRC-07 for the 800 MHz band was novel in two ways. First, it 
created a global frequency pool for system specific (IMT) mobile communication 
services, which included the 800 MHz band as well as previous regional pools such as 
the 900 MHz band, essentially enlarging the global frequency pool for IMT systems. 
Second, by assigning this global frequency pool to IMT systems, it formalised property 
arrangements embedded in technical specifications for this system. Thus, rights of 
access to the global frequency pool were assigned exclusively to mobile communication 
systems. However, rights of use were not defined in relation with the adoption of a 
                                                
149 Although IMT-Advanced systems, including the most widespread specification of 
the systems called Long Term Evolution (LTE), are referred to as fourth generation 
(4G) mobile communications technology, they are not evolutionary technologies from 
second generation or third generation systems.   
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given set of technology specifications – as in the case of GSM or UMTS. Instead, 
operators had the flexibility to independently define the rate of use of the radio 
resource, by selecting from a number of mobile communication systems (or 
“generations”) based on considerations of market demand or need. This flexibility in the 
use of the radio resource suited manufacturers and operators alike and led to the 
creation of property arrangements based on the common use of complementary systems 
rather than the individual use of competing systems, setting a new property regime in 
the 800 MHz band based on common exclusive property.   
 
5.2.1 Negotiating Rules of Management and Exclusion  
The first formal negotiations concerning the redistribution of the digital dividend bands 
in Europe took place, in two rounds in 2004 and, respectively, in 2006, in the ITU 
Regional Radiocommunication Conference for Planning of the Digital Terrestrial 
Broadcasting Service in Parts of Regions 1 and 3, in the Frequency Bands 174-230 
MHz and 470-862 MHz (RRC-04 and RRC-06)150. The planning area of the conference 
was, thus, considerably larger than the European area (i.e. Regions 1 and 3 of the radio 
spectrum151) and, subsequently, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) – as the 
interest association for public broadcasting operators in Europe – coordinated with the 
CEPT in order to represent the interests of the European broadcasting industry. As 
expected, the conference discussed the digital plan for the implementation of terrestrial 
digital broadcasting in the two bands. Concerning the redistribution of the bands during 
and following the digitisation process, two issues were considered. First, the adoption of 
the exact parameters for the digital television standard to be adopted and the exact 
channel assignments for digital broadcasting stations in the area covering Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East and the northern half of Asia (i.e. “parts of Regions 1 and 3). 
Second, the distribution between broadcasting services as primary services on the band 
and “other primary services” that could share these bands. On the first item, the 
                                                
150 In 2000, the administrations members of CEPT requested the ITU to convene a 
Regional Radiocommunication Conference in order to revisit the Stockholm Agreement 
1961 in light of the introduction of digital broadcasting in the European Broadcasting 
Area, proposal accepted by the ITU in 2002. See Puigrefagut and O’Leary (2004). 
151 Region 1 and Region 3 cover over half of the global radio resource. See Annex 1 of 
this thesis on the division of the world in three radio spectrum regions. Also, see T. 
O’Leary, E. Puigrefagut and W. Sami (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the results of 
the RRC-06, including a map of the planning area (2006: 21).  
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conference adopted the position of the broadcasting industry in Europe – EBU via 
CEPT – that proposed to maintain the radio spectrum allocations for primary 
broadcasting services and to adopt assignment parameters based on the DVB-T 
standard. In line with this position, the new digital plan that resulted from RRC-06 
assigned over 90% of frequencies in use in Band III (174-230 MHz) to T-DAB digital 
radio broadcasting services and over 98% of frequencies in use in Band IV (470-862 
MHz) to DBV-T television digital broadcasting services (O’Leary et al 2006: 6-9). In 
fact, the Vice-Chair of the CEPT WG RRC-06 Working Group, F. Rancy (2005) argued 
in favour of keeping the allocations for broadcasting services on the basis that it was 
“premature to make a decisions regarding IMT-2000 in Band IV/V until the outcome of 
RRC-06 is known” (Rancy 2005).  
The second item – i.e. the co-existence of broadcasting with other primary services – 
was more controversial. As discussed above, historically, broadcasting services had de 
facto exclusivity in Bands IV and V, although, de jure, their primary status did not 
determine their exclusive use of the band. In this circumstance, digital broadcasting 
services could share the resource with other primary services as long as they were 
granted access and as long as they were not interfering with existing broadcasting 
services. On this item, CEPT administrations took a middle ground approach between 
the broadcasting industry and the mobile communications industry in Europe. On the 
one hand, the RRC-06 Plan would not redistribute any original allocations to other 
services, as preferred by the broadcasting industry. On the other hand, the RRC-06 Plan 
would allow other terrestrial applications to share the two bands as long as “such use 
does not cause more interference than would be caused by the digital entry in the Plan”, 
as preferred by some of the mobile communications industry, particularly 
manufacturers (O’Leary et al 2006: 15). As EBU members O’Leary, Puigrefagut and 
Sami (2006) noted, this so-called “envelope concept” was not preferred by broadcasters, 
particularly non-European broadcasters present at the conference, because it would 
essentially “open the plan to non-broadcasting services” (O’Leary et al 2006: 16). In 
reality, mobile communications operators did not prefer this type of flexible sharing 
either because it had the potential to change what was, de facto, exclusive use of the 
radio resource on principles of non-interference with the primary service. The position 
of the telecommunications operator TeliaSonera, in the context of the digital dividend, 
is a good example to confirm this expectation: 
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“If a certain part of the spectrum is reserved to broadcasting only and 
assigned according to broadcasting regulation (as opposed to telecom 
regulation) that part should not be able to use for telecom purposes” 
(TeliaSonera 2004).      
In this circumstance, RRC-06 arrived to what O’Leary, Puigrefagut and Sami (2006) 
call “a compromise package”, by which other digital services could be added to the 
RRC-06 Plan even if they did not have the technical characteristics of those specified in 
the Plan but as long as they had primary status in conformity with the ITU Radio 
Regulations (Art 5.1.3 RRC-06). EBU members O’Leary, Puigrefagut and Sami (2006) 
break down the essence of this “compromise”: 
“Broadcasters were less unhappy with that text [Art 5.1.3 RRC-06] as it is 
more restrictive than the initial proposal from CEPT. Before using a digital 
entry in the Plan for a non-broadcasting terrestrial application, the 
corresponding service must be allocated as a primary service in the relevant 
frequency band in the ITU Radio Regulations (RR). The frequency 
allocations can only be modified by an ITU World Radiocommunications 
Conference (WRC)” (O’Leary et al 2006: 16).   
There is no doubt that this compromise was most favourable for the broadcasting 
industry because it maintained de facto exclusivity for digital services in the exact 
frequency pool used for analogue broadcasting services. The results of the RRC-06 
were, however, least favourable for the mobile communications industry, manufacturers 
and operators alike. For mobile communications manufacturers, the RRC-06 would 
remove the flexibility to overlay non-primary services to the broadcasting bands unless 
those services gained primary status at the global level – i.e. in WRC – where economic 
interests and the distribution of technology capabilities would be considerably more 
diversified than at regional level. For mobile communications operators, the RRC-06 
would remove the certainty of de facto service exclusivity associated with the primary 
status granted, traditionally, to operators of public services in telecommunications and 
broadcasting. In this context, a middle ground option for the industry was to develop a 
mobile communications system that would provide the technological flexibility 
preferred by manufacturers together with the service exclusivity preferred by operators 
and to promote it for primary status in the digital dividend bands at international level, 
prior to the World Radiocommunications Conference scheduled for 2007 (WRC-07). 
The mobile communications industry achieved this collective arrangement in three 
stages that took place from 2004, when negotiations started in RRC-04/06, to 2007, 
when negotiations started in WRC-07. The three stages correspond to the establishment 
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of rules of equitable participation of competitors in system design, rules of flexible 
consensus building in informal industry associations and rules of cross-monitoring in 
system development achieved between informal industry associations. This type of 
collective choice arrangement mitigated the effects of heterogeneity of interests and 
technology capabilities in the industry and led to the collective promotion of the IMT-
Advanced mobile communications systems – based on technological flexibility 
combined with service exclusivity – for allocation in the 800 MHz digital dividend band 
at WRC-07.   
The first step in the establishment of collective choice arrangements towards IMT-
Advanced was made by mobile communications manufacturers, which set up an 
informal industry association – in the form of the Wireless World Research Forum 
(WWRF)  - in August 2001 in order to develop a flexible core network that would 
integrate, rather than exclude, existing second and third generation systems. There are 
two main economic considerations for the decision of the manufacturing industry to set 
up the research forum. 
 First, and as described in the previous sections, the market for mobile cellular 
communications was slowing down due to limited deployment of third generation 
mobile communications systems as well as to potential competition from local area 
networks (WLANs) for wireless data services.  
Second, the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP) was slowly changing status from an 
informal strategic partnership into a formal standards development and standards 
maintenance association, following the transfer of second generation (GSM, EDGE) 
and third generation (UMTS) standardisation responsibilities from ETSI. In fact, in the 
early 2000s, the 3GPP became a meta-standardisation body comprising the majority of 
regional standardisation institutes (e.g. ETSI, ARIB, TTC) and industry associations 
(GSMA, UMTS Forum) that adopted second or third generation systems based on the 
GSM core network (Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2 3GPP Membership by No of Individual Members and Respective 
Organisational Partners 
Source: Based on 3GPP (www.3gpp.com) and Rosenbrock (2002: 241) 
The state of the mobile cellular communications market, coupled with the formalisation 
of decision-making in 3GPP, determined leading manufacturers in Europe – Alcatel, 
Ericsson, Motorola and Siemens152 – to set up an industry association that would 
coordinate research for a new core network, which would integrate existing second and 
third generation mobile communications systems, as well as research for a new radio 
access network that would provide increased data transfer rates. Thus, the Wireless 
World Research Forum (WWRF) was set up in 2001 with the aim to coordinate early 
research for complementary radio access networks integrated into a horizontal core 
network that would operate on principles of technology inclusion rather than technology 
exclusion of proprietary and competing systems. W. Mohr, the Chairman of the 
Wireless World Initiative (WWI), noted that the aim of the forum was to identify and 
develop global mobile communications systems beyond the IMT-2000 family of 
standards for third generation mobile communications, to integrate them in a flexible 
core infrastructure and to feed them through further development and standardisation 
                                                
152 As of January 2014, the WWRF has a membership of approximately one hundred 
members, comprising of manufacturers and specialist research centers.    
Organisational Partner No of Individual Members 
2000 
No of Individual Members 
2013 
ETSI 173 (61%) 291 (76%) 
ARIB 37 (13%) 25 (6.5%) 
TTC 18 (6%) 9 (2%) 
T1 (later the entire ATIS) 22 (8%) 30 (8%) 
TTA 25 (9%) 13 (3.5%) 
CWTS/CCSA 9 (3%) 23 (6%) 
Total 284 381 
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channels such as European Research Programmes (WINNER), ETSI, 3GPP and the 
ITU (Mohr 2003, Mohr 2006)153.  
There are two fundamental differences between this approach and previous 
collaborative approaches conducted by the mobile communications industry for second 
and third generation communications systems. First, principles of collaboration – rather 
than competition – are moved from late stages in the system development process (i.e. 
standardisation as seen in ETSI) to the very early stages in the development process (i.e. 
research design and research principles). This is a clear departure from previous cases, 
such as GSM or UMTS, when the manufacturing industry developed proprietary 
technologies independently in the first instance and collaborated in the later stages, 
during the standardisation process, in order to ensure that property arrangements in the 
radio resource and in the communications market are structured around their proprietary 
technologies. Second, competition between proprietary technologies for the same 
“generation” of communications system was replaced with co-existence of the different 
standards corresponding to a single generation. Figure 5.3 illustrates the “vision” of 
mobile communications manufacturers for the integration of mobile cellular 
communications and wireless communications technologies providing different data 
transfer rates (horizontal axis) with different levels of mobility (vertical axis). 
Nonetheless, this collaborative approach based on the participation of competing 
technologies in all stages of the development process is grounded in market growth 
considerations (short and long-term) as well as in redistributive resource considerations. 
On the one hand, integrating competing standards of radio access networks (e.g. GSM, 
UMTS, cdma2000) on a single core network would allow flexibility to deploy a 
particular generation of communication systems (i.e. second, third, fourth) based on 
demand for added value services, without having to invest in core network evolution for 
a particular variant of radio access network.  
 
 
 
                                                
153 In a presentation to the ITU, W. Mohr noted that “due to long cycles for research, 
standardisation and frequency assignment, research on systems beyond IMT-2000 has 
to start now” (Mohr 2002).  
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Figure 5.3 Illustration of Capabilities of IMT-2000 and Systems Beyond IMT-2000 
Source: ITU-R (2003: 9), Permission to reproduce granted by ITU Legal Affairs Unit 
This was perceived as reverting the market trend following the introduction of third 
generation mobile communications systems across Europe and worldwide. It is 
exemplified by the case of W-CDMA (UMTS) and cdma2000, which were competing 
standards for radio access networks of third generation mobile communications 
systems154 and were integrated in the new horizontal architecture of the core network 
for “systems beyond ITM-2000” (i.e. IMT-Advanced), soon after Qualcomm joined the 
WWRF (Beming et al 2007). Most importantly, this integrated network would kick-start 
the market by giving operators the flexibility to maintain services for as long as markets 
were profitable (as in the case of second generation GSM) and to gradually phase them 
                                                
154 Revisit the previous chapter (Chapter 4) for a discussion on the competition between 
W-CDMA, promoted by established manufacturers in Europe and Japan, and 
cdma2000, promoted by established manufacturers in the United States.   
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out without having to purchase duplicate rights of access and use in new frequency 
bands (as in the case of third generation UMTS or cdma2000). On the other hand, the 
choice of core network – an “all IP-based” core network – would allow the co-existence 
of wide area networks (i.e. cellular mobile networks) with competing local area 
networks (i.e. LANs) that were providing high speed data rates with relatively lower 
mobility (Mohr 2002, Abramowicz et al 2004).  
This decision to integrate the two technologies was informed by considerations that the 
mobile cellular communications market was slowing down compared with IP-based 
services provided by wired and wireless local area network155. In fact, by maintaining 
its status as an informal research association of mobile communications developers, the 
WWRF provided considerably more flexibility in consensus building than formal 
standardisation associations such as ETSI or 3GPP. This constitutes the second step in 
the development of collective choice arrangements for managing future technology 
systems based on the radio resource. Once developers with considerable patent 
portfolios in competing technologies – i.e. W-CDMA (e.g. Ericsson, Siemens) and 
CDMA (e.g. Qualcomm) – joined the WWRF, they agreed to put forward a new “all IP 
based” core network that would support any of these competing radio access systems. 
Thus, the “all IP based” network could equally support evolutions from operators that 
deployed W-CDMA access network (as promoted by 3GPP) or CDMA access network 
(as promoted by 3GPP2), without having to tie their infrastructure investments in 
prescriptive radio access systems (revisit Chapter 4). This early informal alignment 
paved the way for the two formal associations 3GPP and 3GPP2 to agree, in 2007, 
network optimisation paths for GSM/W-CDMA and CDMA to evolve towards a fourth 
generation radio access technology called Long Term Evolution (LTE) and a new core 
network named System Architecture Evolution (SAE) developed by 3GPP but based on 
the all-IP system designed collectively in the WWRF. 
In this context, between 2001 and 2003, WWRF members made several proposals to the 
ITU for “systems beyond IMT-2000” based on the specifications listed in Figure 5.4. 
Because the ITU Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) was the “keeper” of the IMT-
2000 family of standards for third generation mobile communications systems, the 
                                                
155 The next chapter (Chapter 6) looks at the development of WLANs. It shows that, in 
2003, 3GPP took an initiative to “develop a cellular-WLAN interworking architecture 
as an add-on to the existing 3GPP cellular system specification” (Ahmavaara et al 2003: 
74).  
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mobile communications industry used this international venue to put forward evolutions 
to IMT-2000 systems. Although the ITU-R did not have authority to produce technical 
specifications, it did have authority to produce recommendations for future systems, 
bringing considerations of radio spectrum need derived from new technological 
development directly at the international level, where the status of communications 
services – i.e. primary, secondary, etc – was negotiated. Subsequently, in 2003, ITU-R 
published Recommendation M1645 for the Future Development of IMT-2000 and 
Systems Beyond IMT-2000, making clear reference to the flat, integrated architecture of 
mobile communications systems developed in the WWRF: 
“Systems beyond IMT-2000 will be realised by functional fusion of 
existing, enhanced and newly developed elements of IMT-2000, nomadic 
wireless access systems and other wireless systems with high commonality 
and seamless interworking” (ITU-R 2003).   
Thus, the approach put forward by the WWRF differed from previous industry 
coordination strategies. Instead of coordinating standards based on competing patented 
technologies in formal industry associations, established developers engaged in early 
research coordination based on flexible network architecture, aimed at kick-starting the 
cellular mobile communications market after the telecommunications crash in the early 
2000s. However, the technological flexibility proposed by the WWRF differed from 
previous methods of prescribing access to the radio resource based on technological 
excludability (i.e. GSM or UMTS). As such, the technological configuration of this new 
system would fundamentally challenge established rules of access and use of the radio 
resource for mobile communications. In addition, by channelling it through to the 
international level in the ITU, mobile communications developers made a direct case 
for the redistribution of services in the global radio resource where primary service 
allocations were considered.  
This flexible approach to designing the system architecture in WWRF received a more 
defined response from established communications operators than the previous case 
studies, which look at the standardisation of GSM for the 900 MHz band and UMT for 
the 1.9-2.1 GHz bands. This makes the third and final stage in the creation of collective 
choice arrangements for managing systems to be potentially deployed in the digital 
dividend bands. Similar to the initial strategy adopted by manufacturers, mobile 
communications operators with established markets at international level agreed to set 
up the Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN), in March 2006, in order to 
 195 
provide network requirements against the specifications agreed upon by developers. 
Similar to the WWRF, the NGMN was an informal industry association representing 
operators with appropriation interests in global frequency pools where IMT-2000 
systems were already deployed: China Mobile, France Telecom (Orange), T-Mobile, 
Vodafone, Sprint, NTT DoCoMo and KPN.  
As ENP Newswire (2008) noted, members of the NGMN Alliance156 “represented more 
than half of all mobile phone users worldwide”, confirming the economic interests of 
these operators in the development and allocation of evolved mobile communications 
systems. Thus, in a first White Paper produced in 2006, the NGMN Alliance sets out a 
procedure for evaluating system parameters that developers had to follow in order 
receive contracts for evolved networks (NGMN 2006). This level of cross-monitoring in 
system development had not been reached in previous negotiations over technology 
specifications – GSM or UMTS – where operators had relatively weak positions 
throughout the development process. Accordingly, the NGMN specified that flexibility 
over the choice of technology to be adopted for next generation networks had to rest 
with operators rather than with manufacturers. Implicitly, all IP based next generation 
networks had to provide the flexibility to phase in and out of different radio access 
network – i.e. GSM, W-CDMA, CDMA – without having to reinvest in infrastructure 
developments: 
“The not so distant future is a multi-modal one, in which users are agnostic 
to access and expect ubiquity of service coverage, security and immediate 
satisfaction. […] The generic NGMN systems [is expected to] co-exist with 
the classical circuit-switched segment of today’s mobile networks such as 
2G/3G solutions, which in time will phase out, as packet-switched [IP 
based] systems pick up legacy roamers into NGMN networks 
transparently” (NGMN 2006: 13, 22).    
Thus, the strategy of the NGMN Alliance differed substantially from previous 
development cycles, where rules of access and use of the radio resource were 
determined by technology excludability in negotiations among established 
manufacturers (revisit Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Following these requirements for 
technology flexibility of co-existing systems, the NGMN Alliance proposed the 
international allocation – on a primary or co-primary basis – of additional space in the 
upper limit of the digital dividend bands – otherwise allocated to broadcasting services 
                                                
156 By 2008, the NGMN Alliance had over 50 member operators, deploying different 
generation systems with competing technology specifications.  
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– to IMT-Advanced Systems. This position, expressed in an NGMN White Paper 
(2007), was put forward only a few months prior to the World Radiocommunications 
Conference of 2007 (WRC-07), opening the possibility to change the regional allocation 
of the digital dividend bands, made for primary broadcasting services in the RRC-06 
Plan, to global allocation for primary mobile communications services: 
“The most suitable spectrum for wide-area coverage of the next generation 
of mobile networks is within the UHF band (i.e. 470-806-862 MHz) which 
is currently used for terrestrial broadcasting in many countries. With the 
introduction of more spectrally efficient digital terrestrial TV, parts of this 
band will become available for alternative use (“digital dividend”). As 
claimed previously, the NGMN alliance feels that the most benefits in 
terms of economy and society in usage of spectrum are derived by making 
a significant portion of the UHF band between 470 and 806/862 MHz 
available to mobile broadband communications as soon as such spectrum 
can be made available (in some countries already by 2010) […]” (NGMN 
2007: 17).   
Thus, the NGMN Alliance put forward a proposal for setting rules of access for the 
digital dividend bands – comprising the 800 MHz band – based on principles of service 
exclusivity at international level. The position of the NGMN Alliance represented a 
considerable counterweight to the broadcasting industry that had just secured de facto 
service exclusivity in the RRC-06. In addition, the position of the NGMN Alliance was 
in line with Recommendations M1645 (2003) and M2078 (2006) of the ITU-R, which, 
based on industry estimates, proposed the total spectrum bandwidth requirements for 
IMT-2000 and IMT-Advanced systems to be 1,280 MHz to the year 2020. Also, the 
position of the NGMN Alliance confirmed a preference for setting rules of use of digital 
dividend bands based on principles of technology flexibility – rather than technology 
exclusivity – in line with the preference of developers in the WWRF.  
In fact, in 2007, only a few months prior to the WRC-07, a group of key manufacturers 
in the WWRF – Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Nokia and Nokia Siemens Networks – 
together with a group of key operators in the NGMN Alliance – Orange (France 
Telecom), T-Mobile, Vodafone and Nortel – set up the Long Term Evolution/ System 
Architecture Evolution Alliance (LTE/SAE Alliance) in order to conduct a trial 
initiative of the new network for IMT-Advanced following specifications agreed by the 
WWRF, developed jointly by 3GPP and 3GPP2 and expected to be tried against the 
network requirements established by the NGMN. The design of the network put 
forward by the LTE/SAE Trial Initiative represented the alignment of the otherwise 
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diverse preferences of the mobile communications industry for a system requiring 
common rules of use of the radio resource based on technology flexibility combined 
with exclusive rules of access of the radio resource based on primary service allocations 
to mobile communications systems in global radio frequency pools. The next sections 
show how the mobile communications industry negotiated their preference for the 
configuration of rules of access and rules of use of the digital dividend bands – 
particularly the 800 MHz band – at the WRC-07, following the stages by which this 
configuration of property arrangements was pushed through the policy process of the 
ITU.    
 
5.2.2 Negotiating Rules of Access 
The WRC-07 took place from October to November 2007. The few months prior to the 
conference were essential in changing the rules of access for the 800 MHz band, which 
forms the upper part of the UHF band considered for the digital dividend. Prior to the 
conference, the broadcasting industry and the mobile communications industry had 
different positions regarding the redistribution of the digital dividend bands and 
organised differently to achieve their preferred configuration of rivalry and 
excludability in the bands. On the one hand, the broadcasting industry organised in the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU), a formal interest association with established 
cooperation mechanisms with the CEPT, which helped achieve the result of the RRC-06 
in favour of maintaining individual rights of use and exclusive rights of access for the 
broadcasting industry in the VHF (174-230 MHz) and UHF (470-862 MHz) bands. 
Because regional allocation agreements for the broadcasting industry – the first 
commercial industry to utilise radio waves for wireless communications – were rarely 
overturned at the international level, and because the new Regional 
Radiocommunication Conference for digital broadcasting (RRC-06) had been approved 
only one year prior to the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-07), the 
broadcasting industry did not redefine their position and did not organise outside the 
established route of the broadcasting union (EBU) and the regional administrative group 
(CEPT). In this context, the official position of EBU prior to the WRC-07 remained that 
any primary or co-primary allocations to the digital dividend bands should be postponed 
for a later international conference: 
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“From a technical point of view, the propagation characteristics of the UHF 
band […] can be best exploited when a large area is covered with high 
power signals (typically used by broadcasting and broadcasting-like 
applications, one-to-many). If the same is done by cellular networks 
(typically one-to-one) to cover a reduced number of users this could result 
in a less efficient use of spectrum. […] The introduction of other services 
in the broadcasting bands should be done in such a way that no interference 
is caused to broadcasting services which already exist or which were 
planned at RRC-06”  (EBU 2006).  
In contrast, the mobile communications industry represented in the WWRF and the 
NGMN set up a new and informal industry group with the purpose to deliver the 
position of the industry on Agenda Item 1.4 in preparation of the WRC-07, which asked 
delegates “to consider frequency-related matters for the future development of IMT-
2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000” (Agenda Item 1.4, WRC-03). The new industry 
group, called Mobile Industry Backing Terrestrial Spectrum for IMT (MIB) was set up 
in January 2007, only a few months prior to the WRC-07. It had a small membership of 
operators and developers - Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Fujitsu, Huawei, Motorola, NEC, 
Nokia, Nortel, Panasonic, Qualcomm, Samsung, Siemens and ZTE - with presence in 
international markets and with an economic interest in the harmonised allocation of 
additional frequencies for IMT systems in bands adjacent or complementary to existing 
IMT allocations (i.e. 900MHz for GSM, 1.9-2.1 for UMTS). In addition, MIB 
recognised collaborations with formal industry associations such as the UMTS Forum 
backing GSM/UMTS networks and the CDMA Development Group backing CDMA 
networks, which indicates developers’ alignment on technology flexibility, rather than 
exclusivity, as a guiding rule for using the radio resource. As J. Costa (2007), the MIB 
Coordinator, noted, the purpose of MIB was to deliver a detailed position of the mobile 
communications industry on the need for IMT systems (IMT 2000 or Advanced) in line 
with measurements conducted, negotiated and proposed by the industry in ITU-R, i.e. 
approximately 1,280 MHz additional spectrum for IMT systems by 2020157 (ITU-R 
M2078). For the most part of 2007, and in preparation for the WRC-07, MIB organised 
                                                
157 As detailed above, considerations of spectrum need for IMT systems had been 
negotiated between WRC-03, when no new allocations to mobile communications 
services were made, and WRC-07, especially in ITU-R. The figure of 1,280 MHz 
additional spectrum for IMT systems by 2020 was derived from industry specifications 
that the new fourth generation radio access network would provide: a) up to 100Mb/s in 
full mobility in the wide area (cellular) and b) up to 1GB/s in low mobility in the local 
area (WLANs) (ITU-R M1645). In this context, spectrum allocations for IMT had to 
allow considerable flexibility for data application with higher transfer rates to operate, 
keeping the expected quality of service.   
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several seminars and presentations to the regional radio spectrum coordination bodies, 
such as CEPT in Europe and CITEL in the Americas, whose responsibility was to 
coordinate the positions of national administrations on the final distribution of the radio 
resource. Table 5.3 reveals a region-by-region proposal on additional spectrum need for 
mobile communication systems put forward by MIB prior to the WRC-07. 
Most importantly, these spectrum estimates were based on market forecasts for IMT-
2000 and IMT-Advanced systems, rather than for mobile communications systems in 
general. This strategy meant that, rather than proposing primary allocations to generic 
services such as mobile, broadcasting or aeronautical, MIB proposed that any 
international allocations would be made specifically to IMT system rather than, broadly, 
to mobile communications services. This proposal would alter the fundamental 
principles of defining access onto global frequency pools, by limiting the principles for 
granting de facto exclusivity in the designated radio resource: 
“A MIB objective for WRC-07 is that, not only should sufficient spectrum 
be allocated to the mobile radiocommunication service, but also that it be 
identified for IMT in order to facilitate economies of scale and global 
roaming of mobile stations” (Costa 2007: 10).       
Table 5.3 MIB Estimates of Additional Spectrum by Selected ITU Radio Sub-Regions, 
2007 
Source: MIB (2007)  
Based on the distribution of the radio resource showed in Table 5.3, MIB estimated that 
“existing spectrum bands will not be sufficient to carry the predicted traffic for IMT 
ITU 
Region 
Regional Coordinating Body Additional 
IMT 
Spectrum 
Existing 
IMT-2000 
Spectrum 
Region 1 European Conference of 
Postal and 
Telecommunications 
Administrations (CEPT) 
695MHz – low market 
1135MHz – high market 
585MHz 
Region 2 Inter-American 
Telecommunications 
Commission (CITEL) 
721MHz – low market 
1161MHz – high market 
559MHz 
Region 3 Asia-Pacific 
Telecommunications (APT) 
531MHz  - low market 
971MHz – high market 
749MHz 
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services after the year 2015”158 (MIB 2007: 14) and recommended seven candidate 
bands for additional allocations of IMT at WRC-07, which were included for 
consideration at the WRC-07 Conference Preparatory Meetings (ITU 2007).  
Table 5.4 gives a summary of the advantages and disadvantages for each of the seven 
candidate bands, as presented in the WRC-07 Conference Preparatory Meetings (ITU-R 
2007: 33-37).     
Table 5.4 List of Additional Candidate Bands for IMT Systems, Main Advantages and 
Disadvantages 
Source: ITU-R (2007) 
Of all the candidate bands, the most controversial at the time was the digital switchover 
bands between 470 MHz and 862 MHz. As identified in Table 5.3, their upper limit was 
adjacent to a band already identified for IMT (i.e. 900 MHz band), which, if extended in 
the lower 800 MHz band, would enlarge the operating frequency pool while minimising 
investments in interoperable equipment and infrastructure. In addition, the upper limit 
of the digital switchover band in Region 1 (Europe and Africa) and Region 3 (Asia) was 
already utilised for mobile communication services in Region 2 (Americas), giving the 
opportunity to harmonise a considerable portion of high value radio spectrum across the 
world. 
                                                
158 On the issue of timing, J. Costa (2007) added “from the time spectrum is allocated or 
identified at a conference, it may take up to 10 years to make it available to users. For 
that reason, it is important that spectrum be allocated or identified well in advance of 
when it will be needed” (Costa 2007: 10).  
Candidate Bands for 
IMT Systems 
Advantages Disadvantages 
410-430 MHz  
450-470 MHz 
Better propagation characteristics than higher 
bands 
Very good for low population density areas 
Heavily used for public safety and disaster 
relief 
470-806/862 MHz Better propagation characteristics than higher 
bands  
Close to other bands identified for IMT-2000, 
may result in reduced complexity of equipment  
Co-existence of cellular stations with high 
power/high site broadcasting stations may 
result in interference 
2,300-2,400 MHz Near already identified IMT-2000 bands In use for aeronautical, satellite and non-
mobile broadband in some regions 
2,700-2,900 Near already identified IMT-2000 bands Allocated on a primary basis for 
aeronautical services, a safety of life service 
3,400-4,200 Good for IMT-Advanced systems requiring 
wideband services, convergence of cellular and 
broadband wireless access systems 
Allocated to fixed and fixed satellite 
services 
4,400-4,990 Good for IMT-Advanced system  Intended to preserve orbit/spectrum 
resource for future use, on an equitable 
basis 
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However, an allocation of the entire UHF band (470-862 MHz) to mobile 
communications on a primary or co-primary basis was unacceptable for the 
broadcasting industry at WRC-07. Thus, the issue of timing was raised, with the mobile 
communications industry pressing for immediate allocations and the broadcasting 
industry advocating a progressive approach to redistributions in the UHF bands. The 
CEPT took, once again, a middle ground approach by expressing agreement with the 
spectrum need estimates put forward by the mobile communications industry, as per 
MIB and ITU-R M2078, yet proposing that a decision for their allocation be postponed 
to WRC-11 (OFCOM 2007: para 1.6).   
A final compromise between the two industries was reached at WRC-07. The UHF 
band (470-862 MHz) in Region 1 (Europe) was to be divided in several sub-bands, 
whose allocation would be discussed, progressively, at WRCs. Thus, at WRC-07, the 
upper limit of the 800 MHz band – which is now known as the first digital dividend – 
would be allocated on a co-primary basis159 to IMT mobile communications systems. 
The allocation was made in Resolution 224 (WRC-07), which, in effect, created a 
global frequency pool for IMT systems at 800 MHz, overturning the regional 
allocations in favour of broadcasting services achieved at RRC-07: 
“Administrations which are implementing, or planning to implement IMT, 
should consider the use of bands identified for IMT below 1GHz and the 
possibility of cellular-based mobile networks’ evolution to IMT, in the 
frequency bands identified in Nos 5.286AA [450-470MHz] and 5.317A 
[698-960MHz in Region 2 and 790-960MHz in Regions 1 and 3] based on 
user demand and other considerations” (para 1, Resolution 224, ITU 2007).  
The WRC-07 concluded with several other allocations for IMT systems in globally 
harmonised frequency pools at 450 MHz, 2.3-2.4 GHz and 3.4-3.6 GHz (Table 5.3). 
However, the 800 MHz band is a strong example of the impact of industry associations 
on the redistribution of rights of access and use in a frequency pool already populated 
                                                
159 There is an obvious debate about the level of de facto exclusivity granted by an 
international allocation on a co-primary basis. Services allocated on a primary basis 
have high emissions and, at least at the current level of technology advancement, do not 
always co-exist well. In the case of the 800 MHz band, the allocation on a co-primary 
basis for mobile communications services carried high levels of de facto service 
exclusivity. This is reflected in Resolution 226 of the WRC-07 (ITU 2007), which 
recognised that “after analogue to digital television switchover, some administrators 
may decide to use all or parts of the band 698-806/862 MHz for other services to which 
the band is allocated on a primary basis, in particular the mobile service for the 
implementation of IMT, while in other countries the broadcasting service will continue 
to operate in that band” (para j, Resolution 226, WRC-07).   
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by other interests. Of crucial importance here is the way that, by creating several layers 
of representation, the mobile communications industry was able to ensure primary 
allocation of their services on a band that had just been reallocated for other uses. It also 
shows that rules of access were fundamentally informed by the IMT, creating 
exclusivity by specific service at the ITU level.   
 
5.2.3  Negotiating Rules of Use 
The main rules of use to the radio spectrum resource were negotiated, through system 
development and specifications, between the NGMN Alliance and the LTE/SAE 
Alliance from 2006 to 2008. The position of the NGMN Alliances is essential in this 
process because, in contrast with the previous case studies, it allowed operators of 
mobile communications the ability to be represented in system development from an 
early stage. This was achieved through the creation of system guidelines and trials 
against which candidate technologies were measured. Entitled “Proof of Concept”, 
these guidelines represented measures against which manufacturers designed and 
updated their core and radio access networks (NGMN 2007). As Robson noted, these 
“proof points” acted as “an industry-wide check” to ensure that the new systems met 
the NGMT Alliance requirements, 
“[…] particularly that the system has to be at least as good as the previous 
generation, but at significant lower cost per bit and with higher data rates 
and lower latency that would give consumers an experience similar to fixed 
broadband” (Robson 2009: 83).  
In June 2008, the LTE/SAE system was selected as the winning candidate160 for next 
generation networks backed by NGMN. The main consideration for choosing 
LTE/SAE was its flat network architecture, which resulted in a common core for all 
access technologies developed by 3GPP and by 3GPP2, including the LTE access 
technology designed the meet the system recommendations of ITU-R M.1654. This 
was particularly important for mobile operators because integration of LTE with 
GSM, WCDMA, cdma2000 and HSPA meant that operators could phasing in and out 
                                                
160 The other two candidate systems were UMB produced by Sprint, and WiMAX 
produced by the IEEE, but they were technologies for local wireless communications 
rather than for wide area communications put forward by the telecommunications 
industry. However, the main reason for selecting LTE/SAE was that it had a new radio 
access system (LTE) backed by an evolved core network, which essentially integrated, 
rather than excluded, previous technology generations.  
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of generations of mobile communications services without disrupting economies of 
scale already created by these technologies by the intervention of a new technology. 
As Robson (2009) noted, this type of integrated network configuration maintained 
“national coverage and global roaming from day one”, a feature that was specifically 
attractive for mobile operators (Robson 2009: 83). Thus, this approach to network 
design relied on the flexible allocation of the radio resource used for IMT systems, so 
that operators could phase in and out of mobile communication services of different 
generations without having to duplicate services, invest in new physical infrastructure 
or to purchase licenses in new spectrum allocations. Having outlined this new 
configuration of operational rules in the 800 MHz band, the next section discusses the 
relationship between the organisation of industry actors presented above and property 
arrangements that resulted from this organisation of private actors.  
 
5.3 The Impact of Private Association on the Choice of Property System 
This section highlights some of the differences in the organisation of the broadcasting 
and the mobile communications industry for the definition of collective arrangements in 
the 800 MHz band, paying particular attention to their strategies aimed at 
accommodating diversity of interests and diversity of technology capabilities. The 
section shows that, in contrast with the formal organisation of broadcasting services 
around established policy venues – i.e. EBU-CEPT, the mobile communications 
industry organised in information venues – i.e. WWRF, NGMN Alliance – from an 
early stage into the development process. As the previous sections reveal, this type of 
organisation allowed for informal consensus building between system developers on the 
one hand, and between system developers and manufacturers on the other hand, arriving 
at a gradual alignment of preferences between the two industry groups in the mobile 
communications industry. This gradual alignment gave the communications industry 
considerable weight to overturn the allocation of the 800 MHz band from broadcasting 
services at regional level to mobile communications based on IMT systems at global 
level. Also, this gradual alignment facilitated the creation of different operational rules 
than witnessed in the previous two case studies. On the one hand, rules of use were no 
longer defined in relation with the adoption of a single set of technical specifications 
giving more flexibility of use to operators. On the other hand, rules of access were 
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strictly defined in relation with exclusivity – i.e. mobile communication services, giving 
certainty to both mobile operators and system developers.  
 
5.3.1 The Nature of Private Association  
At the start of the 2000s, when policies for the digitisation of broadcasting services 
were being considered across developed broadcasting and telecommunications markets, 
the broadcasting industry made use of its traditional channels and policy venues to 
maintain the allocation of the VHF (174-230 MHz) and UHF (470-862 MHz) in use for 
broadcasting services. Because their allocation and technology preferences were 
relatively homogenous across the CEPT area, they negotiated a common position via 
EBU and the CEPT, leading to the reallocation of digital broadcasting services to the 
same frequency bands at the ITU Regional Conference RRC-06. However, the 
broadcasting industry did not clearly specify the need basis for this reallocation, in 
conditions when, throughout digitisation, the radio resource is used more efficiently 
and, subsequently, more emissions can be fitted, without interference, in a given band.  
The mobile communications industry, however, took a different approach to their 
organisation. The slow development of the mobile communications market for third 
generation systems pushed industry manufacturers to a common understanding of 
interests prior to investments in developing and testing competing technologies. This 
was the aim of the Wireless World Research Forum (WWRF), an informal industry 
association established with the aim to align the diverse preferences of manufacturers 
prior to the development of competing technology systems and prior to decision-making 
on standards in formal industry associations such as ETSI. As discussed in the previous 
sections, the aim of established developers in the electronic communications market 
was to put forward an integrated mobile communications system that would provide 
flexibility for phasing out of existing services and into new services, without asking 
mobile communications operators to invest in new or evolved infrastructures for every 
change in system generation.  
This position is certified by the intensity of strategic partnerships in the mobile 
communications industry prior and post WRC-07. Taken comparatively, Figure 5.4 and 
Figure 5.5 reveal important considerations about the global dynamics in the mobile 
communications industry. On the one hand, Figure 5.4 presents a very dynamic market 
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in terms of industry activity in strategic alliances based on technology transfers before 
2005. The network representation confirms the continued nodal role of manufacturers 
such as Motorola, Ericsson and Nokia, in terms of the number of exchanges in the 
network (i.e. degree centrality and n terms of the influence in the network (i.e. 
eigenvector centrality) (Table 5.5). The comparative networks metrics in Table 5.5 
confirm the central position of developers in the first half of the 2000s, followed by the 
central position of operators in the second half of the 2000s. 
 
Figure 5.4 Network Visualisation of Technology Transfers, Global Strategic Alliances, 
Jan 2000 - Dec 2004 
 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters, SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
The visual representation in Figure 5.5 also confirms the centrality of mobile 
communications operators and founders of the NGMN Alliance in the second half of 
the 2000s. 
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Figure 5.5 Network Visualisation of Technology Transfers, Global Strategic Alliances, 
Jan 2005 - Dec 2009 
 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters, SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
Table 5.5 Network Analysis Metrics, Global Strategic Alliances 
Source: Based on Thompson Reuters, SDC Platinum Database, Accessed Dec 2013 
Overall, these metric and visual representations confirm the active role of mobile 
communications operators in the latter part of the 2000s, when the system specifications 
for IMT Advanced were approved in ITU-R and when mobile operators started 
conducting validation tests for the new core network and integrated mobile services of 
different generations attached to it. This change in the relationship between system 
developers and system operators in mobile communications represents a departure from 
the previous case studies. Rather than relying on technology exclusivity as a mechanism 
Measures Network Analysis of Strategic Partnerships 
Global Telecommunications Sector 
Jan 2000 – Dec 2004 
Network Analysis of Strategic Partnerships 
Global Telecommunications Sector 
Jan 2005 – Dec 2009 
No log entries 1,550 580 
No nodes 912 432 
Mean degree 
centrality 
1.6 1.3 
Mean eigenvector 
centrality 
0.001 0.002 
Mean betweenness 
centrality 
154 9.7 
Max degree 
centrality 
Motorola (25), Ericsson (19), AT&T (19), NTT 
(18), Nokia (15) 
Nokia (12), Vodafone (11), Hutchison (8), 
Buongiorno SpA (5), China Unicom (5) 
Max eigenvector 
centrality 
Motorola (0.049), Ericsson (0.046), China 
Mobile (0.039), Nokia (0.037), China Unicom 
(0.026) 
Hutchison (0.081), Vodafone (0.081), Nokia 
(0.080), Orange (0.034), Deutsche Telekom 
(0.031) 
Max betweenness 
centrality 
China Mobile (12,544), Ericsson (10,829), 
Motorola (8,900), AT&T (7,844), Alcatel 
(4,999) 
Nokia (897), Hutchison (842), Vodafone (627), 
Google (368), Buongiorno SpA (244).   
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for securing rights of use in a given frequency band, the manufacturing industry opted 
for technology inclusivity of the main competing technologies and for reconfiguring the 
system to benefit both developers and operators. This flexibility, however, required a 
larger frequency pool, which the 800 MHz band offered due to its valuable propagation 
characteristics, which reduced investment in physical infrastructure, and, most 
importantly, due to its adjacency to an existing frequency pool for IMT systems, already 
established at the global level. The next section discusses how the organisation of the 
mobile communications industry in informal industry associations such as the WWRF, 
the NGMN Alliance and MIB increased communication between developers and 
manufacturers and informed preferences for more flexible operational rules in the 800 
MHz band.   
 
5.3.2 The Nature of Property Arrangements in the 800 MHz Frequency Pool 
The informal negotiations that took place between mobile communications developers 
and mobile communications operators are central to the definition of more flexible 
operational rules for the 800 MHz band. It is important to note that, compared with the 
broadcasting industry, which did not specify reallocation to the 800 MHz band based on 
need for specific (added value) communication services, the mobile communications 
industry, represented by MIB at the WRC-07, made a specific link between the flexible 
evolution of these systems and their technology co-existence, as well as their integration 
with wireless local area networks, in order to justify need for the reallocation of the 800 
MHz band to communication services. 
Table 5.6 provides a summary of the configuration of rights at operational and 
collective choice level, which formed the bundle of property arrangements in the 800 
MHz band. Table 5.6 reveals that, at the operational level, the right to enter the radio 
resource is maintained on service excludability but, this time, at the global level. The 
conflict between the primary allocation of the band to the broadcasting services on the 
one hand and the mobile communications services on the other hand reveals the 
importance of maintaining some aspects of excludability – in this case service 
exclusivity – when managing common pool resources. As long as mobile 
communications are allocated on a primary basis to the band – i.e. excludability based 
on de facto service exclusivity, rights of use inside the band are more flexibly defined 
than in the previous cases discussed in this thesis. Thus, rather than relying on 
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principles of technology exclusivity to define the rate of use in a given frequency band, 
mobile operators are given the flexibility to choose among a range of radio access 
technologies, as long as one of those technologies belongs to the IMT family of 
services.  
Table 5.6 The Configuration of Property Arrangements in the 800 MHz Global 
Frequency Pool for the Deployment of IMT Systems 
 
So, what changed to allow this flexibility of use? The answer rests with the organisation 
of the mobile communications industry, particularly with the establishment of three 
mechanisms to ensure commitments to the operational rules described above. First, both 
operators and developers participated in the design of the new system for IMT-
Advanced, which communicated the technology preferences of both parties. 
Technology flexibility, which was desired by mobile communications operators, was 
negotiated in exchange for service exclusivity at the global level, which was desired by 
mobile communications developers, as well as operators, in order to secure investments 
in research and development and in network deployment. Second, information 
exchanges on technology preferences and complementary technology capabilities 
Property Right Property Arrangements in the 800 MHz Band based on IMT 
Operational 
Rights 
Access The right to enter the resource is given by membership in a geographic area (CEPT) 
and in a communications service club (EBU, IMT).  
The right of primary access can be de facto service exclusivity, because it grants the 
communications service the highest protection from non-interference by other 
secondary, tertiary users.  
Use Broadcasting operators maintained rights of use of the 800 MHz frequency at 
RRC-06. Technology excludability was based on DVB-T for digital television 
broadcasting.  
After the reallocation at WRC-07, mobile operators gained rights to use the 800 
MHz band, with greater technology flexibility, as part of a wider frequency pool for 
IMT mobile communications systems.  
Collective 
Choice Rights 
Management Equal participation of both mobile operators and system developers in system design 
based on technology inclusion, rather than technology exclusion. Technology 
flexibility is ensured as long as one of the systems is from the IMT family of mobile 
communications.  
Information exchange as commitment to flexible operational rules is ensured from 
research and design phase in WWRF. WWRF founding members represented in MIB 
at WRC-07.  
Mutual monitoring is achieved, informally, between operators (NGMN Alliance) and 
developers (LTE/SAE Alliance) based on system validation tests, in order to achieve 
compliance with operational rules based on flexible access.  
Exclusion The de facto right to exclude is granted, first, solely to broadcasting services 
(RRC-06).  
Afterwards, the de facto right to exclude is grated, on a co-primary basis, to mobile 
and broadcasting services (WRC-07), overturning single service primacy to 
broadcasting at RRC-06. In CEPT, led to a release of whole 800 MHz band in favour 
of mobile communications services based on IMT.  
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occurred from the early stage of research and development, in informal organisations 
such as the WWRF, rather than at the stage of decision-making in formal 
standardisation associations such as ETSI or 3GPP. Third, mutual monitoring was 
achieved, informally, between an operators’ alliance (NGMN Alliance) and developers’ 
alliance (LTE/SAE Alliance) in order to establish system requirements and conduct 
system validation tests prior to the formal adoption of operational rules based on 
flexible use and de facto service exclusive access for mobile communications at 
national and regional level.  
 
5.4 Conclusions  
This case has traced the process of redefining operational rules in the 800 MHz band in 
the late 2000s, during the process of digitisation of broadcasting services. The case 
makes three interesting findings about the organisation of authority in transnational 
resources as well as about group attributes most likely to produce transnational common 
goods.  
The first interesting finding is that, in the presence of a public actor with established 
policy venues and no technology preference for the allocation of the 800 MHz band, 
private actors still choose private venues to negotiate and define system specifications 
for new operational rules in the 800 MHz band. This is surprising because the 
Commission of the European Union has been depicted as a corporate actor with an 
established network of interests (Schneider et al 1994). Findings from the previous case, 
coupled with findings from the current case regarding the reasons why private actors do 
not initiate negotiations about operational rules for specific frequencies via public 
policy venues, would indicate that the public processes might pick technology 
“winners” and “losers” too early, inhibiting rather than facilitating, consensus over 
standards and, implicitly, over rules in the resource.  
The evidence of private actor cooperation in the current case could fit this argument. To 
start, increased heterogeneity of interests and capabilities in the mobile communications 
industry did not inhibit cooperation. On the contrary, it facilitated communication in 
order to reach an early alignment between mobile operators and developers regarding 
the specifications of the system to be deployed in the 800 MHz band. This alignment 
was achieved by establishing equitable participation in system design and by engaging 
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in early information exchange about technology preferences. This is the second 
interesting finding of the chapter, since the literature on the regulation of common 
resources predicts little private cooperation in conditions of increased heterogeneity 
(Agrawal 2003: 249).  The third interesting finding is how private actors go about 
accommodating this heterogeneity, particularly heterogeneity of technology 
capabilities. Instead of relying on technology exclusion mechanisms, which might be 
higher if the process was taking place in public venues of decision-making, private 
actors cooperate on the development of a technology inclusive standard, which would 
give flexibility of use inside a given frequency allocation, as long as this allocation was 
protected by access exclusivity (i.e. primary service status at WRC). In order to ensure 
commitment to this flexible rate of use, industry actors engage in mutual monitoring 
and system compatibility testing (NGMN Alliance). This form of collective 
management of a common resource, based on flexible use and primary access 
resembles, more closely, principles of common exclusive property, rather than 
individual exclusive property, where the internal rate of use is not fixed to a given 
specification (IMT Advanced). The decision, taken by the mobile communications 
industry, to request a change of allocation in the 800 MHz to systems based on flexible 
use and primary access (IMT Advanced), reflects how property arrangements agreed 
privately, at transnational level, can co-exist with property arrangement originating 
from other levels of decision making, i.e. state or regional (RRC).  
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Chapter 6.  Regulating the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Bands: From Devising 
Operational Rules to Devising Collective Choice Rules in Global Pools 
This chapter follows the process of defining property arrangements in the 2.4 GHz band 
and 5 GHz band for use, on an unlicensed basis, by wireless local area networks 
(WLANs). The case analyses how different configurations of economic interests and 
technology capabilities among private actors had an impact on the creation of different 
property arrangements for the 2.4 GHz band and the 5 GHz band although, in principle, 
the two bands operate under similar rules based on unlicensed access and emission 
conditioned use. The case bears several similarities with the previous case studies 
discussed in this thesis and, as a result, provides useful cross-case comparisons. Figure 
6.1 offers the timeline of main events during the definition of operational rules for the 
2.4 GHz band and the 5 GHz band. These events span over two decades of negotiations 
among industry actors in the information technology and mobile communications 
industry and, based on the origin of industry actors in these two sectors, link the 
regulation of the two bands in the United States161 and the CEPT162. 
Figure 6.1 Timeline of Main Events in the Regulation of the 2.4 GHz Band and the 5 
GHz Band 
 
The case starts by analysing the distribution of economic interests and technology 
capabilities among industry actors in the information technology sector, following the 
opening of the 2.4 GHz band for unlicensed use by communication equipment based on 
spread spectrum technology in the United States (Section 6.2). In contrast with the 
established competence of the public actor in the United States, the authority of the 
Commission of the European Union was limited at the time, similar to the first case 
                                                
161 Situated in Region 2 of the radio spectrum.  
162 Situated in Region 1 of the radio spectrum. 
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study presented in this thesis. However, in contrast with all previous cases, this chapter 
reveals a situation of asymmetric economic interests in extracting economic value from 
different frequency bands, rather than solely from the 2.4 GHz band, combined with a 
relatively equal distribution of technology capabilities among a small number of 
industry actors. The case reveals that this initial distribution of interests and capabilities 
in the information technology industry163 led to limited cooperation by private actors, 
regardless of the presence (US) or absence (CEPT) of a public actor. Specifically, out of 
the four cases put forward in this thesis, the initial distribution of heterogeneous 
economic interests and homogenous technology capabilities appears to be the least 
likely to result in private cooperation with the aim to provide wireless communications 
even if, as in the case of the 2.4 GHz band, the public actor had already defined open 
rules of access and emissions conditioned rules of use, establishing what can be referred 
to as a public common.       
However, the second part of the case (Section 6.3) reveals how the intervention of the 
mobile telecommunications industry, interested in delivering data services similar to the 
information technology industry, changed this initial distribution among private actors 
by diversifying the technology capabilities available in order to deploy wireless local 
area networks (WLANs). The case shows that the intervention of the 
telecommunications industry in the technology development process increased the 
diversity of economic interests and technology capabilities among industry actors 
involved in the negotiation of technology specifications to be deployed in the 5 GHz 
band. This new situation of diversified interests and diversified capabilities raised the 
question whether the wireless technologies developed by the computing industry and 
the mobile technologies developed by the telecommunications industry should compete 
or co-exist.  
Similar to the previous case study, the chapter shows that industry actors with 
established technology capabilities in the computing and telecommunications industry 
were able to change allocations in the 5 GHz band, based on flexible rules of use and 
                                                
163 The chapter shows that, in the case of the 2.4 GHz band, we are looking at the same 
industry actors in the information technology sector in the United States and in Europe. 
As it will be explained, this is because the information technology market was not as 
developed in Europe as in the United States in the early 1990s, and information 
technology companies originated in the United States were already present in the 
European market.  
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exclusive rules of access at the international level (WRC-03). This situation changed the 
regulation of frequencies for WLANs from a public common in the 2.4 GHz band 
(conditioned common use and open access) to a private common in the 5 GHz band 
(conditioned common use and primary access). Similar to the previous case study, the 
chapter reveals that this was achieved by increasing information exchanges between 
industry actors (IEEE 802.11 and ETSI BRAN), by establishing a private certification 
mechanism with responsibility to monitor and approve interoperability of equipment 
(Wi-Fi Alliance) and by integrating, rather than excluding, mobile telecommunications 
and wireless communications systems (3GPP and Wi-Fi).  
 
6.1 The Formation of Actor Strategies in the Wider Governance of 
Electronic Communications  
This section traces the origin and distribution of private actor strategies during the 
opening of the 2.4GHz frequency band to equipment using spread spectrum 
technologies. It is revealed that the organisation of the 2.4 GHz band as a public 
common, characterised by conditioned yet unlicensed use, originates in the mid 1980s 
in the United States. This section starts by contextualising the origin of this regulatory 
regime and argues that it was informed by two interdependent factors. On the one hand, 
the liberalisation of telematics and telecommunications markets during the Tokyo 
(1973-1979) and Uruguay (1986-1994) Rounds of GATT negotiations. On the other 
hand, the increased global competitiveness of the information technology industry 
originating from the United States and the global competitiveness of the mobile 
communications industry originating from Europe. However, the increased 
competitiveness of these electronic communications sectors led to different approaches 
to liberalisation in the United States and in Europe. Whereas the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States adopted a deregulation 
agenda for some parts of the radio spectrum and the electronic communications market, 
the European Commission in the EC/CEPT had limited competences in this field and, as 
a result, put forward an agenda for re-regulation that packaged liberalisation with the 
convergence of infrastructures and services in the electronic communications sector. 
Thus, whereas the FCC followed the deregulatory agenda and allowed spread spectrum 
technologies to populate bands already open for industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) 
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use – such as the 2.4 GHz band – CEPT administrations focused on the harmonisation 
of frequency bands for the exclusive deployment of pan-European communications 
networks such as GSM. These approaches reflect the positions of the established 
industry in electronic communications at the time, which was structured in a small 
number of manufacturers with relatively equal technology capabilities, but with 
diverging economic interests for different parts of the radio resource. This distribution 
of equal technology capabilities and diversified economic interests in the radio resource 
prevented coordination for the development and use of spread spectrum technologies in 
the ISM bands in the 1990s and led to the fragmentation, rather than the convergence, 
of the electronic communications industry. Consequently, positions of rivalry and 
excludability in the wider radio spectrum were reinforced, rather than challenged, on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
6.1.1 The Structure of the System of Governance in Electronic Communications 
Wireless local area networks (WLANs)164 developed in an institutional setting 
characterised by minimal coordination between industries in the electronic 
communications sector as well as by minimal coordination in system standardisation 
and radio spectrum policy harmonisation across borders. However, similar to Case 
Study I (900 MHz band) and Case Study II (1.9-2.1 GHz band), the late 1980s and early 
1990s saw a gradual international commitment to the liberalisation of the electronic 
communications equipment and services market via the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT 1986-1994).  
However, as detailed in Case Study I (Chapter 3), the process of liberalisation and 
deregulation uncovered different levels of competition in the electronic communications 
industry, particularly between the United States and the European Union. Specifically, 
the telecommunications industry was growing at a faster rate across the European 
Union, due to projects such as GSM, whereas the information technology industry was 
growing at a faster rate in the United States. Table 6.1 compares the intensity in 
research and development of these two industries across a number of selected states in 
Europe and the United States. The figures confirm that the computing industry was 
                                                
164 Industry reports show that the first product to be certified as an early version of a 
WLAN corresponds to a device produced by Telesystem in 1988, whose dimensions 
were larger than a shoebox (Negus and Petrick 2009: 39, Marcus 2009: 31).  
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investing considerably more in research and development in the United States, whereas 
the telecommunications industry was more active in France, Germany and Sweden and, 
overall, across the EU-9 (Table 6.1).   
Table 6.1 R&D Intensity by Industry, Business Enterprise R&D as % of Value Added 
Source: OECD (1999)  
The figures in Table 6.1 reveal the basic difference in the configuration of interests in 
the electronic communications industry in Europe on the one hand and in the United 
States on the other hand. Moreover, as it will be shown in the next section, they also 
reveal how public actors situated in the United States and across the CEPT positioned 
themselves in relation with two major opportunities in the electronic communications 
sector. On the one hand, the growth of the computing industry following the 
introduction of personal computing (PC), the Internet and wired local area networks 
(wired-LANs) in the early 1980s (Lemstra and Hayes 2008: 4). On the other hand, the 
growth of mobile cellular communications following the introduction of second 
generation digital mobile telecommunications networks (GSM, PCS) in the late 1980s. 
Whereas across the CEPT, the vision for deregulation was associated with a re-
regulation process for the creation of pan-European networks (revisit Chapter 4), in the 
United States, the FCC interpreted deregulation as a process of eliminating 
anachronistic regulation and allowing technology to compete in the market.   
 
6.1.2 The Initial Position of the Public Actor 
In the early 1990s, public administrations across the EC and the CEPT were concerned 
with the adoption of a new model of managed competition that would balance the 
interests of monopoly operators in fixed line telecommunications with the interests of 
equipment manufacturers in the computing industry and the wireless communications 
industry (Hancher and Larouche 2011, Lando 1994). This tension manifested in two 
United States France  Germany Sweden  United 
Kingdom 
EU-9 
1990 1996 1990 1996 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1997 1990 1995 
Computers, Office 
Machinery 
46.7 43.1 10.0 9.7 14.5 27.0 39.0 51.9 19.1 4.8 16.0 14.9 
Communications 
Equipment & 
Semiconductors 
17.4 21.3 32.3 32.1 16.6 11.4 68.5 59.4 16.1 13.7 19.3 18.3 
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policy directions for the electronic communications sector in the European Community 
(EC). On the one hand, deregulation and the gradual opening up of infrastructures and 
services focused away from voice telephony over fixed line infrastructures, dominated 
by natural monopolies, and onto new segments of the electronic communications 
market, particularly mobile telephony and personal computing. On the other hand, re-
regulation of the electronic communications sector focused on the introduction of 
converged services on integrated infrastructures such as ISDN or B-ISDN165. Although 
the European Commission had limited competences in electronic communications in the 
early 1990s166, it positioned itself as a public actor by associating the wider agenda for 
sector liberalisation with the growth of the mobile communications and personal 
computing markets in Europe: 
 “[…] personal communications services are likely to be based initially on 
combinations of existing systems such as GSM, DCS-1800 and DECT, 
together with intelligent network functions in the fixed network providing 
for mobility via the fixed network, […]. This trend will be further 
reinforced by the move towards portability. After desktop work stations 
and PCs have shown strong growth rates, demand shifted to laptops, 
notebooks, and pen-books and now towards full-scale Personal Intelligent 
Communicators (PICs) or Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs)” (EC 1994: 
15).   
Thus, within the EC, the process of deregulation of electronic communications markets 
was associated with a project of re-regulation of converged infrastructures and services 
in order to maintain the “strong position” obtained by the European industry in the 
mobile communications sector167 (EC 1994: 14). By the mid 1990s, the policy direction 
for growth in electronic communications in the EC followed principles of managed 
competition based on the integration of pan-European infrastructures for the delivery of 
converged voice and data services that would maintain temporary positions of 
                                                
165 Revisit Chapter 4.1 for a discussion on the tensions between deregulation as part of 
the wider liberalisation process and reregulation as part of the single market project in 
the European Community.   
166 Revisit Section 3.1.2 and Section 4.1.2 of this thesis.   
167 The European Commission Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of 
Mobile and Personal Communication in the European Union (EC 1994) noted that 
“European industry has obtained a strong position in both network and terminal 
equipment markets in this area, and GSM is having a major impact on ensuring the 
world position of the global European telecommunications industry, with a resulting 
positive effect on its growth, competitiveness and employment” (EC 1994: 14). This 
approach confirms the policy direction for growth in electronic communications at the 
time, focusing on market integration and economies of scale within the EC/CEPT as 
well as on exports and competitive positioning abroad.  
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monopoly in fixed line telecommunications while opening up newer segments such as 
mobile and personal communications (Hancher and Larouche 2011:  746). Radio 
spectrum policy, which remained in the competence of member states, focused on the 
harmonisation of frequency bands in the CEPT with the end goal to replicate the 
creation of economies of scale in wireless equipment such as GSM.   
By contrast, in the United States, the process of deregulation of the electronic 
communications sector took a relatively different path to economic growth, aimed at 
improving competition within industry as a means for technology innovation. As M. 
Marcus (2009), former Assistant Chief for Technology for the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) recalls, this approach to deregulation, with political foundations in 
the Carter and Reagan administrations, is considered to have levelled the playing field 
for developers of communications technology without burdening the market with 
“prescriptive spectrum regulation”168 (Marcus 2009: 30).   
This policy approach contributed to the adoption of the Report and Order in the Matter 
of Authorisation of Spread Spectrum and other Wideband Emissions not Presently 
Provided for in the FCC Rules and Regulation (1985).  The FCC First Report and Order 
(1985) is widely considered “the formal starting gun for the WLAN industry” (Negus 
and Petrick 2009: 38). In short, the FCC First Report and Order (1985) authorised 
unlicensed access to low power and limited range devices using spread spectrum 
technology in the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) frequency bands at 900MHz, 
2.4 GHz and 5.8GHz in the United States, which were already operating a public 
                                                
168 M. Marcus (2009) noted that, at the time, some senior officials in the FCC were 
particularly motivated to “remove anachronistic barriers to technology and having faith 
in marketplace forces to use the newly available technology for its highest and best use. 
They were also “fail/safe” decision that obligated no one to use a specific technology 
and displaced no existing users” (Marcus 2009: 20). As discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis, the FCC applied this approach in mobile cellular communications in the early 
1990s, when it adopted more than one standard for second generation mobile 
communications systems. This reveals the difference in regulatory approach at the time, 
as well as the different considerations that linked radio spectrum policy to market 
growth on both sides of the Atlantic. To showcase this difference, the European 
Commission (1994) noted that “There has been concern in the US that delays in 
introducing digital technology are allowing the GSM standard an opportunity to 
dominate non-European markets […] on the other hand, the FCC decision to refrain 
from action to promote on a single second generation system standard has led to a 
considerable increase in the rate of experimentation and this may lead to rapid roll-out 
of innovative new mobile services in the US” (EC 1994: 142).  
 218 
commons regime based on unlicensed but conditioned access (i.e. interference 
conditioned access) for ISM applications:  
“Spread spectrum systems are also being authorised under Part 15 for 
general usage in the 902-928MHz, 2,400-2,483.5MHz and 5,725-
5,850MHz ISM bands. […] These systems may operate within these bands 
within a maximum output power of 1 watt. […] Spread spectrum systems 
are allowed to operate within the ISM bands only on a non-interference 
basis to other operations that have been authorised the use of these bands 
under other Parts of the Rules. They must not cause any harmful 
interference to these operations and must accept any interference which 
these systems may cause to their own operations” (FCC 1985: para 24).  
The scope of this authorisation requires further analysis in order to understand the 
response of industry actors to the decision of the FCC (1985). Two policy choices are 
important in this analysis: a) the choice of technology (i.e. spread spectrum) and b) the 
choice of radio resource (i.e. the ISM frequency bands). Their contextualisation 
provides evidence for the slow response of the industry to develop the WLAN market 
throughout the 1990s in the US as well as across the CEPT.  
The choice of spread spectrum systems169 was one of the technology options considered 
by the FCC in the 1980s in order to change the use of prescriptive regulation of 
spectrum “written to reflect the technologies available at the time and reasonably 
anticipated in the future” (Marcus 2009: 20). In his position as Associate Chief for 
Technology in the FCC, and with previous experience in the defence sector, M. Marcus 
proposed a “spread spectrum deregulation project” that would adapt this technology 
from military to civilian uses170 (2009: 20). However, Marcus clarifies that the choice of 
technology was not made in relation to a product or service range but to “promising 
technologies blocked by anachronistic regulations”171:  
                                                
169 Several types of spread spectrum technologies were defined: direct sequence 
systems, frequency hopping systems, time hopping systems, pulsed FM systems and 
hybrid spread spectrum systems (Appendix B, Report and Order, FCC 1985). Thus, the 
prescriptive regulation did not refer to a particular standardised technology but, in fact, 
to a broad family of methods for applying spread spectrum. 
170 Spread spectrum technology was extensively used in the military due to its resistance 
to jamming and intercepts.  
171 At the time, M. Marcus had identified three such promising technologies: spread 
spectrum, adaptive antennas and millimeter wave bands (>30GHz) (Marcus 2008).  In 
his account of the First Report and Order (FCC 1985), M. Marcus noted that “the FCC 
staff did not anticipate at the time that spread spectrum would be a possible technology 
for general land mobile applications, e.g. CDMA cellular, but rather that it could be 
valuable in at least niche applications” (Marcus 2009: 21-22).  
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“The spread spectrum goal at the time was not to introduce a specific class 
of products, such as wireless local area networks [WLANs], or even a 
specific band, but rather to create relatively clear opportunities for this 
technology to reach market in order to encourage investment in R&D” 
(Marcus 2009: 20).  
With spread spectrum as one of the technologies to be allowed in the radio resource, the 
question moved onto the frequency range to be considered for access and use. The 
choice of frequency range – i.e. 900MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8GHz (ISM bands) – 
showcases the importance of private actors in the population and regulation of radio 
waves. Three industry sectors in electronic communications opposed access of spread 
spectrum equipment on their allocated frequency bands or in the vicinity of their 
allocated frequency range: a) the military sector, b) the broadcasting sector and c) the 
mobile cellular communications sector. For the military sector, allowing spread 
spectrum equipment on the radio resource would encourage the development of civil 
applications with capacity to breach national security or to resist smart jamming based 
on the spread spectrum equipment of the time (Marcus 2009: 24). For the broadcasting 
sector – operators and manufacturers alike – allowing spread spectrum equipment on 
their licensed allocations would “seriously degrade” the quality of their television 
services by interfering with the picture quality (FCC 1985: para 6). Lastly, for the 
mobile cellular communications industry, allowing commercial spread spectrum 
equipment in licensed bands for mobile communications services would not only 
interfere with these services but, most importantly, would have the potential to compete 
with existing cellular systems using FDMA or TDMA access methods172 (FCC 1985: 
para 8, Marcus 2009: 25).  
The strong opposition of the broadcasting and mobile cellular industry to overlay spread 
spectrum systems on their licensed bands limited the choice of frequency ranges 
available for this technology. This focused the attention on the industrial, scientific and 
medical (ISM) frequency bands at 900MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8GHz for two reasons. 
First, the ISM radio spectrum was already populated by a variety of low power and 
                                                
172 As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2, FDMA, TDMA and CDMA are different 
channel access protocols used in terrestrial and satellite mobile communications. 
FDMA is a technology that divides the bandwidth into frequencies and assigns them for 
a communication. TDMA is a technology that assigns calls to different time divisions 
on the radio band. CDMA – which is used in third generation mobile communication as 
discussed in Chapter 4 – uses a spread spectrum technique that allocates a unique code 
to elements of a conversation and spreads it in different frequencies. In the early 1990s, 
the two established techniques in mobile communications were FDMA and TDMA.  
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limited range devices, including microwaves, microphones, remote controlled devices 
and cordless phones. Second, the ISM radio spectrum was already regulated to allow 
access to applications on an unlicensed and power conditioned basis that, similar to the 
regulation for spread spectrum equipment, is required to cause no harmful interference 
to other applications in the band and to accept their potential interference (FCC 1985: 
para 24). In this case, spread spectrum devices were permitted access to frequency 
bands already regulated as public commons – i.e. with no allocation for individual 
exclusive use but with conditioned access.  
The choice of ISM radio frequency bands for spread spectrum technologies reveals 
important considerations about the role of the public actor in determining operational 
rules of access and use in the radio resource. Far from creating open access regimes in 
the ISM radio frequency pool, the measures adopted in the First Report and Order (FCC 
1985) reveal some of the technology constraints imposed by industrial appropriators of 
the wider radio resource. The explanation comes from the regulators themselves. As one 
of the key contributors to the FCC Report and Order (1985), M. Marcus (2009) noted 
that the choice of maximum output power for spread spectrum devices at 1W (watt) was 
also informed by considerations that higher output powers “would be a threat to the land 
mobile establishment” by competing directly with cellular technologies of the day – i.e. 
FMDA and TDMA (Marcus 2009: 29). Similarly, the allocation of spread spectrum 
equipment in the ISM frequency bands reveals the more favourable position of the 
established industry – mobile cellular and broadcasting – for this assignment, given that 
devices in the ISM band were less likely to contest their co-existence with spread 
spectrum devices or, as Marcus put it, given that “microwave ovens do not protest” 
(Marcus qtd in Lemstra et al 2011: 47). Thus, allowing spread spectrum equipment to 
gain access to the ISM bands did not disrupt any configurations of rivalry and 
excludability in the ISM band itself as well as in other frequency bands where the 
broadcasting and mobile communications industry was benefiting from exclusive access 
and use.  
Overall, the choice of regulatory framework adopted by the FCC in the early 1990s 
focused on deregulating both the radio resource and the electronic communications 
market in order to provide the possibility for certain technologies – such as spread 
spectrum – to develop, while protecting the commercial interests of the established 
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communications industry173. By contrast, the choice of regulatory framework taking 
shape in the EC and, more widely, in the CEPT in the early 1990s focused on 
integrating infrastructures and converging services in order to replicate the creation of 
economies of scale similar to the deployment of GSM networks in mobile 
communications. However, most importantly, differences in the presence and regulatory 
preference of the public actor in the US and in the EC/CEPT did not disrupt 
configurations of rivalry and excludability in the radio resource for the established 
industry. On the contrary, similar to the previous case studies, the technology 
preferences of the established industry conditioned the configuration of rules of access 
(i.e. choice of frequency band) and rules of use (i.e. choice of equipment power limits) 
for spread spectrum technologies in the ISM bands so that the measure had minimum 
redistributive effects for established interests in the radio resource. The next section 
provides further evidence which explains the distribution of interests and capabilities 
among the established industry, showing that, at the time, the computing and mobile 
communications industry was consolidated in a small number of players with relatively 
similar technology capabilities but with diversified economic interests in their 
respective markets. This configuration of interests and capabilities contributed to the 
initial fragmentation of the wireless communications market, leading to reduced 
coordination in the development and standardisation of spread spectrum technologies 
and, subsequently, to reduced levels of use of the radio resource for low power and low 
range wireless services.    
 
6.1.3 The Initial Distribution of Private Interests and Private Resources 
The representation of private actors in the distribution of access and use of the radio 
spectrum in the decade from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s indicates their diversified 
interests in the growth of two distinct market segments – information technology and 
mobile cellular communications – in the United States and in CEPT Member States. 
The initial heterogeneity of private interests in the electronic communications market 
translated into limited investment in the development of low power and low range 
                                                
173 In fact, M. Marcus proposes that his attempts to promote similar technology and 
regulatory approaches in the FCC in the aftermaths of the First Report and Order (1985) 
led to the reorganization of his department, followed by his “internal exile” in the 
Enforcement Bureau of the FCC (Marcus 2009: 30).  
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devices using the ISM bands. This situation is confirmed by industry representatives 
who indicate that the wireless communications market did not experience the immediate 
growth that the cellular communications market did174. In fact, Negus and Petrick 
(2009) show that almost a decade after the adoption of the First Report and Order (FCC 
1985), there were approximately one hundred devices per year certified for the ISM 
frequency bands: 
 “The reaction to the FCC’s monumental allowance of unlicensed spread 
spectrum systems in 1985 was not an immediate flood of equipment 
authorisation applications. By today’s standards, it was not even a trickle” 
(Negus and Petrick 2009: 39).  
The remainder of this section explores the distribution of capabilities in the information 
technology and the mobile cellular communications markets in order to explain the 
limited interest of the established industry in populating the ISM bands with spread 
spectrum equipment in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s, the information technology 
industry in the United States was involved in the development of wired local area 
networks (wired LANs) that would facilitate access to newly commercialised Internet 
services. After the introduction of proprietary equipment, the main manufacturers in 
computing were concerned with the adoption of a wired LAN standard in order to 
develop the market (Lemstra and Hayes 2011: 35). Negotiations over the 
standardisation of wired LANs took place in the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE) – the most established association for electronic communications in 
the United States. Following a series of negotiations in the mid 1980s, the main industry 
actors could not agree on a single set of technical specifications, which led to the 
adoption of three standards for wired LANs by the IEEE: a) Ethernet (or IEEE 802.3 
promoted by XEROX, Intel and 3Com); b) Token Bus (or IEEE 802.4 promoted by 
General Motors) and c) Token Ring (or IEEE 802.5 promoted by IBM)175.  
In parallel, the wireless industry was looking at three different technologies that would 
replicate principles of local networking using electromagnetic technology176: a) 
                                                
174 However, from the mid 2000, wireless and mobile cellular communications had a 
relatively similar growth trajectory, becoming the two largest market segments in the 
world in electronic communications using the radio resource (Marcus and Neu 2013, 
Negus and Petrick 2009).  
175 Soon after, however, Ethernet established itself as the dominant standard (Valovic 
1990).  
176 The development of wireless LANs (WLANs) came from a requirement to enhance 
mobility in offices, campuses and warehouses, where wired networking was not 
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microwave technology; b) radio technology (where the mid range ISM bands would fit) 
and c) infrared technology (Computing 1993). Similar to the consolidation of the 
industry for wired LANs, these technologies were supported by established private 
actors in the United States. Motorola was backing microwave technology and was 
interested in deploying wireless LANs in the 18GHz frequency band – rather than in the 
lower ISM bands – in order to establish a form of exclusivity in this unlicensed band 
through an early market entry. The National Cash Register (NCR), acquired by AT&T 
in 1991, was backing radio technology and was interested in deploying wireless LANs 
in the 900MHz frequency band opened for spread spectrum equipment in the United 
States. In fact, by the mid 1990s, NCR was one of the four established industry actors – 
NCR, Proxim, Symbol and Aironet – developing spread spectrum wireless LANs for 
ISM frequency bands, particularly for the 900MHz band, in the United States (Negus 
and Petrick 2009: 37).  
However, the wired LAN and wireless LAN markets grew at different speeds in the 
early 1990s. Whereas the wired LAN market was growing at a considerable rate 
following the rising adoption of the Ethernet standard, the wireless LAN market was 
still fragmented, experimenting with three technologies – microwave, radio and infrared 
– in different frequency bands. In fact, in the early 1990s, NCR attempted to standardise 
wireless LAN as a variant to one of the wired LAN standards adopted in the IEEE. 
Representing NCR, and later becoming the central figure in the standardisation of 
wireless LANs, V. Hayes (2011) recalls that the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standards group 
voted against the development of a wireless extension to the standard and in favour of 
establishing a new standardisation group (Lemstra et al 2011: 63). This position reveals 
the heterogeneity of interests in the wired and wireless LAN market as well as the 
different stages in the development of these markets:  
“The development team [at NCR] recognised that having an already 
established group within IEEE 802 to sponsor a new physical layer was a 
much faster process than trying to start a new standard from scratch” 
(Lemstra and Hayes 2008: 9) 
In short, the diversity of economic interests in the three technologies for wireless LAN 
– i.e. microwave, spread spectrum and infrared – had limited the scope for 
standardisation of these products, leading to dispersed investment in different 
                                                                                                                                          
feasible. Thus, similar to cellular technology, wireless LAN technology targeted 
businesses rather than individual consumers first.  
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equipment for different frequency bands. This situation explains why, by the mid 1990s, 
“WLANs found almost no success in selling to enterprises or campus environments as 
wired LAN replacements or enablers of mobility” (Negus and Petrick 2009: 36). First, 
wireless LANs had less speed than wired LANs, achieving 2Mbs compared with over 
15Mbs in data transfer rates. This limitation derived from the nature of commercial 
microwave or spread spectrum technology itself, which had either power constraints 
and bandwidth constraints in the lower ISM bands or manufacturing cost constraints in 
higher microwave bands (LAN Times 1994). Second, wireless LANs equipment was 
priced at around $1,500 in the early 1990s, considerably more expensive than a $500 
Ethernet card (Negus and Petrick 2009: 36, Lemstra et al 2011: 113). Third, wireless 
LANs used proprietary and non-interoperable technologies, which maintained high 
manufacturing costs, high fragmentation of the market and low occupancy of the 
frequency bands opened, among other applications, for new wireless technologies. 
Thus, by the mid 1990s, wireless LANs using either spread spectrum, microwave or 
infrared technology were estimated at no more than 1% of the total LAN market 
(Valovic 1990).  
The heterogeneity of interest exhibited by the information technology industry in the 
United States in the 1990s was matched by a similarly diverse and concentrated mobile 
cellular communications industry in the EC/CEPT177. On the one hand, the mobile 
cellular communications industry in Europe was focused on improving their return on 
investment in GSM networks with a growing customer base (revisit Chapter 4.1). 
Additionally, the 900MHz band designated for ISM services in the United States was 
designated for GSM services in the CEPT, which limited international frequency 
harmonisation and, subsequently, the market potential of wireless LAN equipment 
manufactured for this band, such as the WaveLAN card produced by NCR. On the other 
hand, the mobile cellular communications industry in Europe had already invested in a 
competing technology for local wireless communications, standardised as Digital 
Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) in the CEPT in 1987 and, similar to 
                                                
177 The distribution of interests and resources in the electronic communications industry 
in the early 1990s also reflects differences in the growth of information technology and 
mobile communications on both sides of the Atlantic. The major players in information 
technology were based in the United States and, as a result, this market grew from the 
United States to the rest of the world. Conversely, the major players in mobile cellular 
communications were based in Europe and, as a result, this market grew from the 
EC/CEPT to the rest of the world.   
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the GSM standard, passed onwards to ETSI in 1988. Supported by the five largest 
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment in Europe – Alcatel, Ericsson, Phillips, 
Nokia and Siemens – DECT terminals were envisioned to connect to a wireless port 
when indoors and to a radio base station when outdoors. Because DECT had a radius of 
25-100m, compared with the 2-10km for GSM, it was developed to compete directly in 
the wireless LAN market and, as a result, received exclusive allocation in the 1,880-
1,900 MHz frequency range in the CEPT in 1993. Thus, the focus of the mobile cellular 
communications industry in Europe was on the development of pan-European standards 
with potential to create economies of scale at home and be exported abroad – such as 
GSM or DECT – rather than on investing in new research and development for spread 
spectrum technology.    
Overall, this initial distribution of economic interests and capabilities in information 
technology and mobile cellular communications in the early 1990s reveals why private 
actors had little incentives to coordinate their development and standardisation activity 
for wireless equipment using spread spectrum technologies in the ISM bands. On the 
one hand, both industry sectors were concentrated in a small number of private actors 
with relatively equal technology capabilities. On the other hand, these private actors had 
heterogeneous economic interests in different technologies (e.g. microwave, spread 
spectrum, time division178) to be deployed in different radio frequency ranges (e.g. 
900MHz and 18GHz) with different configurations of rivalry and excludability (e.g. 
900MHz in the US and in Europe). This fragmentation within the electronic 
communications industry and between the radio regions with two of the most developed 
electronic communications markets – i.e. Europe (Region 1) and Americas (Region 2) – 
raised the possibility to open the 2.4 GHz frequency band to spread spectrum 
technology in the CEPT in order to achieve international harmonisation of this 
frequency band for this type of technology. As it will be discussed in the next section, 
one of the main proponents of this measure was NCR/AT&T, who was actively 
involved in the standardisation of equipment for the 2.4 GHz band in the IEEE as well 
as in ETSI. However, as it will be revealed in the next section, operational rules of 
access and use of the 2.4 GHz band differed between the United States and the CEPT, 
                                                
178 As indicated above, time division refers to the TDMA technology used in GSM and 
DECT standards.  
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reflecting the interests of the established mobile cellular communications industry in 
Europe.  
  
6.2 The Process of Private Rule-Making in the 2.4 GHz Band 
The initial configuration of diversified economic interests combined with a relatively 
equal distribution of technology capabilities among a small number of industry actors, 
limited the private actors’ capacity to negotiate collective arrangements for harmonised 
access and use to the 2.4 GHz on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the 2.4 GHz band 
was opened to spread spectrum technologies in the early 1990s in the CEPT, following 
proposals by NCR/AT&T to harmonise the band across the United States and across 
Europe, rules of access onto the band differed between the two radio regions. These 
differences reflected the position of the telecommunications industry in Europe and 
reinforced, rather than challenged, the established positions of rivalry and excludability 
in the radio frequencies that could facilitate WLANs. In addition, these conditions of 
fragmentation intensified distributional concerns over the rate of use of the radio 
resource for WLAN equipment, leading to conflict over the technological specifications 
to be standardised in order to harvest the 2.4 GHz band for local area networks. 
Throughout the 1990s, three main standards were competing in the market for WLANs, 
each with different configurations of resource access and use embedded in them: IEEE 
802.11 for the 2.4 GHz band (based on Ethernet with spread spectrum radio access), 
ETSI HIPERLAN 1 for the 5 GHz band (based on Ethernet with GSM radio access) and 
IEEE Home RF for the 2.4 GHz band (based on Ethernet with shared wireless and 
DECT radio access). Although competition between them prevented the growth of the 
WLAN market throughout much of the 1990s, the activity of the information 
technology and telecommunications industry in the two formal associations – IEEE in 
the United States and ETSI in Europe – reconfigured the market into a situation of 
diversified interests and diversified technology capabilities. As in the previous case 
study (Chapter 5), this new configuration permitted the exchange of information about 
technology preferences across the two industry associations and paved the way for the 
creation of the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA) to further system 
interoperability and certification.  
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6.2.1 Negotiating Rules of Access 
Whereas the FFC opened the ISM bands (i.e. 900MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8GHz) to spread 
spectrum equipment in 1985, the CEPT in Europe finalised its recommendations for the 
opening of the 2.4 GHz ISM band only in 1992, following a series of negotiations 
regarding the technology specifications for the wideband data transmission systems to 
be allowed unlicensed access in this band. However, in 1992, the CEPT adopted the 
revised Recommendation T/R 10-01 for Wideband Data Transmission Systems Using 
Spread Spectrum Technology in the 2.5 GHz Band (CEPT 1991a), which stipulated 
that: 
“The band 2,400-2,500MHz be used on a non-interference and non-
protected basis for Wide Band Data Transmission Systems using spread-
spectrum technology with a minimum aggregate bit rate of 250kbit/s. The 
total power in this frequency range shall not exceed -10 dBW e.i.r.p 
[=100mW output power]179” (Art 1, CEPT 1991a, information in brackets 
added).  
In addition, CEPT Recommendation T/R 10-01 (1992) adopted similar rules of access 
onto the 2.4 GHz band as those featured in the FCC First Report and Order (1985), 
stipulating that CEPT member states “shall not require an individual license for the use 
of Wide Band Data Transmission Systems using spread-spectrum technology terminals” 
(Art 3, CEPT 1991a). Although CEPT Recommendation T/R 10-01 adopted a similar 
approach to opening the 2.4 GHz band for unlicensed access, it differed from the FCC 
Report and Order (1985) in its provision of power emissions permitted onto the band. 
Essentially, these differences translated into distinct rules of access onto the 2.4 GHz 
frequency band in the United States and across the CEPT, guided by the different 
configuration of interests of the mobile communications market in Europe.     
In 1990, the European Radicommunications Committee (ERC) of the European 
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) issued a report 
that discussed several technology pathways for the introduction of Radio Local Area 
Networks (RLANs or WLANs)180. These technology pathways reflected the 
                                                
179 It should be noted that -10dbW e.i.r.p  (effective isotropic radiated power) is one 
way of measuring the power limit for electronic devices. This measure is equal to 
100mW/MHz output power.  
180 The purpose of the study was based on “an increasing need for the introduction of 
computer terminals and peripheral equipment into the business and industrial 
environments. Currently, information is exchanged between such equipment by cable, 
resulting in a rigid hardware structure” (CEPT 1991a). In this context, WLANs were 
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fragmentation of the industry in electronic communications as well as the position of 
European industry actors in the wider sector: 
“[…] the ERC has come to the preliminary view that more than one 
technology and frequency band would be necessary to meet the 
requirements of the various applications” (CEPT 1991b).  
The ERC Report on the Harmonisation of Frequency Bands to be Designated for Radio 
Local Area Networks (CEPT 1991b) suggested three technology and frequency 
combinations that would meet these requirements: a) spread spectrum technology (in 
the ISM bands with limited bandwidth); b) microwave technology (in the 18GHz band 
with balanced bandwidth and penetration capacity) and c) infrared technology (in the 
over 50GHz bands with considerable bandwidth). It is clear that these options 
corresponded with the three technology preferences of the information technology 
industry in the United States at the time. In particular, they represented the preference of 
Motorola for microwave technology in the higher frequency bands and the preference of 
NCR for spread spectrum technology in the lower ISM frequency bands. At the time, 
NCR had a specific interest in the promotion of spread spectrum technology in the 2.4 
GHz band in Europe, as this frequency range required the least alterations to its WLAN 
equipment produced for the 900MHz band in the United States. This explains why, in 
the early 1990s, representatives of NCR were leading proposals to standardise wireless 
LANs in the IEEE in the United States (in Working Group IEEE 802.11) as well as in 
ETSI in Europe (in Technical Committee ETSI RES 10).  
However, the European industry responded in a reserved manner to the proposal to open 
the 2.4 GHz band for spread spectrum technologies because the established 
telecommunications industry in the CEPT was already promoting DECT systems based 
on TDMA, as a direct competitor of the WaveLAN products promoted by NCR. 
Industry representatives confirmed this position at the time. Representing NCR, C. 
Links (2011) certified that “Olivetti […] had a vested interest in DECT and considered 
wireless LAN a potential competitor” (Links qtd in Lemstra et al 2011: 119). Similarly, 
representing Olivetti, A. Bud (1993) noted “There is no question that you can build 
radio LANs with spread spectrum and they work. It’s a valid technology for doing it 
but, in our view, DECT is much better. DECT is a fully open, interworking network, 
and spread spectrum isn’t” (Bud qtd in Woolnough 1993).  
                                                                                                                                          
viewed by the ERC “as a way of replacing cables for the connection of data networks” 
(CEPT 1991b).  
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Table 6.2 Frequency Allocations in the 2.4 GHz Band in Selected States/ Regions 
Source: Based on Eroglu (1998)  
This competitive stance between the two technologies – i.e. spread spectrum versus 
time division – was translated into the regulation of the 2.4 GHz band in the CEPT in 
the early 1990s. The ERC Report (CEPT 1991b) on wireless LANs made clear 
reference that, in Europe, “the DECT system has been developed in the 1,880-
1,900MHz band offering speech and data facilities which may meet some of the RLAN 
requirements” (CEPT 1991b). This position reflected the trade-offs in the electronic 
communications sector at the time. On the one hand, rules of access onto the 2.4 GHz 
frequency band were to be altered in order to allow the deployment of commercial 
spread spectrum applications in the 2.4 GHz band and, subsequently, the international 
harmonisation of this band as proposed by NCR. On the other hand, rules of access onto 
the 2.4 GHz frequency band stipulated different output power levels – i.e. 1W in the US 
and 100mW in the CEPT – so that this low power and low range technology did not 
disrupt the position of greater power or greater range technologies (e.g. DECT) already 
deployed in other parts of the radio spectrum. This position was reinforced in CEPT 
Recommendation T/R 10-01 (CEPT 1991a), which opened the harmonised 2.4 GHz 
frequency band to wideband data transmission systems using spread spectrum 
technology but contextualised it in a manner that would reflect positions of interest in 
the development of WLANs in Europe. In particular, CEPT Recommendation T/R 10-
01 was amended in 1992 to reflect the start of the High Performance Radio LAN 
(HIPERLAN) standardisation project in ETSI – a competing technology facilitating 
higher data rates and, subsequently, higher output powers, which would be singularly 
deployed in the 5 GHz frequency range:   
“However, it is recognised that the future ETSI HIPERLAN standard, 
requiring higher data rates, will necessitate a more predictable sharing 
environment. Therefore, CEPT is in the process of developing a separate 
Recommendation for HIPERLANs operating in the 5 GHz range and in the 
2.4 GHz Allocations Maximum Output 
Power 
Maximum Channel 
Bandwidth 
Standard 
United States 1W (FHSS and DSSS) 1 MHz IEEE 802.11 
CEPT 10 mW 100 kHz ETS 300 328 
Japan 10 mW 20 MHz - 
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band 17.1-17.3GHz. The DECT system developed by ETSI also provides 
RLAN facilities” (CEPT 1991a, Introduction).  
This provision showed that, when defining rules of access in the 2.4 GHz frequency 
pool at the regional level in Europe, the positions of rivalry of established industry 
actors in the wider radio spectrum were considered in order to reflect previous or future 
investments in technology systems such as DECT (1,880-1900MHZ band) or 
HIPERLAN (5 GHz and 17GHz bands). In doing so, CEPT Recommendation T/R 10-
01 (1991a) reinforced, rather than challenged, the established positions of rivalry and 
excludability in the radio frequencies that could facilitate WLANs. In fact, the limit of 
100mW output power for devices using spread spectrum technology in 2.4 GHz band 
doesn’t only reveal a restriction on considerations of interference in order to reduce 
coordination problems but, possibly, a restriction on considerations of competition in 
order to minimise distributional issues in the wider radio resource with consequences in 
the wireless equipment market. In this context, the next section provides further 
evidence that the opening of the 2.4 GHz band in the CEPT did not lead to an 
immediate increase in the rate of use of this frequency band or, more specifically, to an 
immediate increase in the efficient use of this band. Rather, the operation of the 2.4 
GHz frequency pool as a public common – i.e. with unlicensed but with power 
conditioned access for several applications – escalated the problem of distributing use 
of the resource according to the technology capabilities of established industry actors, 
leading to limited coordination in the standardisation and certification of WLAN 
equipment to be deployed in these open bands.   
 
6.2.2 Negotiating Rules of Use 
The harmonisation of rules permitting the deployment of spread spectrum devices on 
the 2.4 GHz band in the CEPT did not lead to an immediate increase in the use of this 
band by this technology. Instead, it intensified distributional concerns over the rate of 
use of the radio resource for WLAN equipment along the technology capabilities of the 
established information technology and telecommunications industry. Because these 
established manufacturers had diverging interests and relatively equal technology 
capabilities, they could not agree on a single set of specifications to encompass all their 
technology preferences for WLAN. This lack of coordination manifested itself in the 
creation of complex standards for wireless LAN products to be deployed in differe
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bands and with different technology specifications, depending on their supporting 
interests. Three of these standards were the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard for spread 
spectrum in the 2.4 GHz band, the ETSI HIPERLAN standard developed for the 5 GHz 
band and the IEEE HomeRF standard developed as a hybrid between IEEE 802.11 
WLAN and DECT for the 2.4 GHz band. Similar to the first case study presented in this 
thesis (Chapter 3) the complexity of these standards resulted from the relatively equal 
distribution of technology capabilities among industry actors supporting them. Unlike 
the first case study (Chapter 3) – where the single GSM standard was agreed for the 
900MHz frequency pool – the diversity of economic interests among these private 
actors, distributed across different bands, led to a lack of industry coordination in 
equipment standardisation and certification and, subsequently, to limited use of this 
technology in the 2.4 GHz and the 5 GHz band.   
The IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard was developed in the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), soon after the IEEE Ethernet Working Group (IEEE 
802.3) rejected the proposal made by NCR to standardise a wireless extension to the 
system. Instead, NCR, represented by V. Hayes, created and chaired the IEEE 802.11 
Working Group for WLANs in 1990 (Lemstra and Hayes 2008: 10). The group was 
tasked to start the standardisation process from scratch and to agree on a new Media 
Access Control (MAC) layer and a Physical (PHY) layer, rather than relying on 
previous work conducted by the wired LAN industry. This meant that the technology 
preferences of the participants had to be negotiated and realigned. From the start, the 
IEEE Working Group 802.11 gathered representatives of established private actors in 
wired and wireless LAN, including NCR and Motorola, as well as potential users of 
WLAN technologies such as Olivetti and Apple. However, diversified interests in the 
group, combined with the relatively equal distribution of capabilities among them, led 
to a lack of agreement on a single technical specification related to the physical (PHY) 
layer (Lemstra and Hayes 2008: 10). Similar to the second case study addressed in this 
thesis (Chapter 4), the formal decision-making rules established in the IEEE prevented 
the industry from adopting a single standard. The Chairman of the IEEE 802.11 
Working Group, V. Hayes, recalls that two technologies were put to a vote for spread 
spectrum –frequency hopping versus direct sequence – and “neither of the two 
modulation techniques obtained the requisite 75 per cent level of support” (Hayes in 
Jakobs, Lemstra and Hayes 2011: 69). Subsequently, by the mid 1990s, the Working 
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Group proposed a standard with three physical layers, corresponding to the different 
industry actors backing then: an infrared layer supported by Motorola, a direct sequence 
spread spectrum supported by NCR and a frequency hopping spread spectrum support 
by Proxim. On the negotiations that took place in the IEEE 802.11 Working Group in 
the early 1990s, Negus and Petrick (2009) noted: 
“802.11 was focused primarily on developing a wireless version of the then 
successful 802.3 (Ethernet) wired networking standard being deployed in 
high volume across enterprise and campus environments. But the working 
group experienced internally the same frequency hopping versus direct 
sequence ‘battle’ that was happening in the marketplace for the proprietary 
products of the day. […] These three PHYs were not only incapable of 
interoperating with each other but also the direct sequence and frequency 
hopping PHYs, both at 2.4 GHz, caused significant mutual interference if 
co-located” (Negus and Petrick 2009: 41).   
By contrast, the standardisation of WLANs in Europe focused on the development of 
specifications for the 5 GHz, rather than the 2.4 GHz band. As explained in the previous 
section, a year after CEPT passed Recommendation T/R 10-01 (1991) on granting 
access to the 2.4 GHz band to equipment using spread spectrum technologies, it revised 
the Recommendation to note that:  
“there is also a requirement for RLAN systems operating in a predictable 
sharing environment and enabling medium and high capacity data transfer 
rates with good frequency re-use capability which would be met in 
frequency bands around 5 GHz and in the band 17.1-17.3 GHz for which 
ETSI had decided to develop a standard for a “High Performance European 
Radio LAN (HIPERLAN) and for which CEPT is intending to develop a 
Recommendation in 1992” (CEPT T/R 10-01) 
When breaking down this statement, it is revealed that the standardisation process for 
WLANs in Europe took a different route. Instead of developing a standard to compete 
with IEEE 802.11181 for the low power and implicitly, for the limited data transfer 
equipment, the industry in Europe focused on the development of a new WLAN 
standard with considerably higher capacity for data transfers – i.e. HIPERLAN (20 
Mb/s). However, because of interference restrictions in the ISM bands – such as the 2.4 
GHz band – new spectrum allocations had to be made in higher bands at 5 GHz and 17 
GHz bands, which would provide for less competition in the radio resource 
environment and, most importantly, the potential to develop a new range of wireless 
                                                
181 It can be considered surprising that this competitive route was not selected, taking 
into account that regional competition between standards was, and still is, commonplace 
in technology markets, especially in communications markets.  
 233 
LANs that would directly compete with the wired LANs (Ethernet) in data transfer 
rates. This strategic positioning was promoted by NCR, who proposed the creation of an 
ad hoc working group for HIPERLAN in ETSI, via the CEPT: 
“Hayes [Vic Hayes] was invited to participate as industry representative in 
the CEPT project team on RLAN [Radio LAN or Wireless LAN], and in 
the ETSI Radio Equipment and Systems (ETSI RES) ad hoc committee on 
RLAN. This provided the NCR team […] with a unique position from 
which to leverage its activities in the IEEE and ETSI, and to align as far as 
(politically) possible the activities in the two standards-setting bodies” 
(Jakobs, Lemstra and Hayes 2011: 69).  
Although the development of ETSI HIPERLAN 1 was completed in 1996, following 
initial cooperation with IEEE 802.11, the standard was considered too complex and too 
costly compared with existing technologies and, subsequently, was not adopted by the 
market (Table 6.3). Thus, although the rules of access to the radio resource were 
changed for HIPERLANs to ensure their de facto exclusivity in the 5 GHz and 17 GHz 
band, the complexity of the standard prevented it from being deployed in the market for 
WLANs. The fragmentation of the wireless LAN market, with interests for different 
bands and different technologies, restricted the response of the market to HIPERLAN. 
Similar to the situation in IEEE 802.11, the diversity of interests in ETSI HIPERLAN 
contributed to the complexity of the standard. Participants in ETSI RES 10 – the group 
that standardised HIPERLAN 1 from 1992 to 1996 – represented both the established 
information technology industry (NCR, Motorola, Apple and Olivetti) as well as some 
of the established industry players in telecommunications in Europe (BT, Deutsche 
Bundespost), leading to the creation of a standard that based its architecture on the 
Ethernet standard – similar to IEEE 802.11, but borrowed the modulation technology 
for radio transmission from GSM (Mallick 2003: 61).  
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Table 6.3 Main WLAN Standards of First Generation 
Source: Lemstra et al (2009), Pareek (2006) 
A third standard for WLANs received the support of established players in the 
information technology and telecommunications market in the 1990s. Entitled 
HomeRF, the standard was promoted, in the mid 1990s, by a consortium of established 
information technology developers (Proxim, Intel, IBM and Microsoft) and established 
telecommunications developers (Siemens, Motorola, Philips). HomeRF was designed to 
integrate elements of the IEEE 802.11 technology (frequency hopping) with elements of 
the DECT technology (TDMA) used in telecommunications. As Jakobs et al (2011) 
noted, the standard was proposed because the industry felt that the IEEE 802.11 
standard did not integrate telephony services in its specifications (Jakobs, Lemstra and 
Hayes 2011: 70). Although WLAN equipment based on the HomeRF standard was 
produced in the late 1990s, its specifications came in direct competition with the IEEE 
802.11 standard (direct sequence versus frequency hopping) as well as with the 
HIPERLAN standard (2.4 GHz versus 5 GHz).  
Overall, the configuration of the industry around the three standards described above – 
IEEE 802.11, ETSI HIPERLAN 1 and HomeRF – reveal three important considerations 
about the relationship between preferences for technology specifications and the 
configuration of operational rules in the radio resource. On the one hand, the 
diversification of economic interests in harvesting different frequency bands for the 
development of different technologies led to the fragmentation of the radio resource 
and, subsequently, to difficulties in building economies of scale that could drive down 
prices for WLANs. On the other hand, the entry of telecommunications developers in 
the standardisation process for WLANs shifted the distribution of technology 
capabilities in the industry from a relatively equal distribution among a small number of 
Standard Modulation Data Rate Main Industry 
Developers 
IEEE 802.11 Infrared 1-2 Mb/s Motorola 
FHSS 
Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum  
1-2 Mb/s Proxim 
DSSS 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
1-2 Mb/s NCR 
HIPERLAN 1 CSMA/CA 24 Mb/s NCR, Apple, Plessey 
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developers in information technology to more diversified capabilities entering the 
standardisation process. The next sections explore the extent to which this new 
configuration of diversified interests and diversified technology capabilities increased 
the exchange of information about technology preferences across the industry, creating 
a momentum for the adoption of the IEEE 802.11 family of standards by key industry 
players and resulting in a stronger industry position to leverage a change in operational 
rules of the 5 GHz band at the global level.    
 
6.3 The Process of Private Rule-Making in the 5 GHz Band 
In the late 1990s, the industry for Wireless LANs remained highly diversified in both 
economic preferences for harvesting different frequency bands (2.4 GHz, 5 GHz) as 
well as in the distribution of technology capabilities for different standards such as 
IEEE 802.11, HomeRF or HIPERLAN. However, towards the late 1990s, 
standardisation work in the IEEE and in ETSI revealed key benefits and limitations of 
each technology configuration, which prevented them from establishing a strong market 
presence, similar to the Ethernet standard in the market for wired LANs. The core issue 
was that wireless LANs using spread spectrum technologies – such as IEEE 802.11 or 
HomeRF – were cheaper to produce, but, because of the non-interference and non-
protected conditions they were operating under in the 2.4 GHz band, could not deliver 
the higher data transfer rates achieved by wired LANs based on the Ethernet standard. 
Conversely, wireless LANs using time division technologies – such as HIPERLAN – 
were considerably more costly to produce but, because they were the only technologies 
operating in the 5 GHz band, could have higher rates of use as well as de facto 
exclusivity in the band, enabling higher data transmission rates. Subsequently, the ideal 
scenario for a standard to take the lead in the market would be to either change rules of 
access in order to secure de facto exclusivity in the resource, similar to the 5 GHz and 
17 GHz bands for HIPERLAN in the CEPT, or to change rules of use during the 
standardisation process, in order to secure technology exclusivity in harvesting the 
resource and, implicitly, a strong position in the market.  
 
 236 
6.3.1 Negotiating Rules of Management and Exclusion  
In the late 1990s, industry actors active in the wireless LAN market were pursuing a 
combination of standardisation strategies in collaborative, rather than competitive, 
arrangements. The involvement of the telecommunications companies changed 
dynamics in the standardisation process from competition to collaboration because: 
“[…] telecommunications companies have a long tradition of fighting for 
their rights and tend to allocate ample funding to defend their cases. 
Computer companies, however, operate with much lower margins and 
typically allocate lower budgets to standardisation efforts” (Lemstra et al 
2009: 113).  
Two strategies were adopted by a number of key actors participating in the 
standardisation of WLANs. First, the practice of dual membership in the IEEE and 
ETSI (Lavie, Lechner and Singh 2012), with or without voting rights in the Working 
Groups, strengthened information exchanges about basic technology specifications of 
the standards, achieving higher levels of consensus than possible under the formal 
majority rules established in these associations. Second, the creation of a WLAN family 
of standards that would integrate technology capabilities developed in both IEEE 
802.11 and in ETSI BRAN (Table 6.4). Third, the establishment of a private 
certification body to approve interoperability of systems and quality of equipment, as a 
form of self-monitoring. These arrangements gave the WLAN industry considerable 
leverage to negotiate a rule change in the global allocation of the lower 5 GHz band in 
favour of primary use for mobile communications (WLANs) at WRC-03.   
The creation of the HomeRF consortium in 1997, using a combined method of IEEE 
802.11 frequency hopping spread spectrum and DECT time division access technology, 
gave a lead to HomeRF equipment in the WLAN market in the United States. This 
position determined some members of the HomeRF Consortium to negotiate a change 
of rules of access onto the 2.4 GHz band in favour of wideband frequency hopping, in 
order to secure greater transfer rates (wideband) and effective exclusivity (frequency 
hopping) in the 2.4 GHz band in the United States. This strategy was perceived to 
enable new products into the marketplace, with more competitive data transfer rates of 
10Mb/s – compared with only 2Mb/s for initial HomeRF equipment, and to allow the 
consortium to move from the home market to the business market (Negus and Petrick 
2009: 49).  
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The strategy of industry actors in ETSI and IEEE 802.11 was different than the one 
pursued by the HomeRF Consortium in the late 1990s. Similar to the previous case 
study presented in this thesis (Chapter 5), industry actors participating in the 
standardisation of ETSI HIPERLAN and in the standardisation of IEEE 802.11 altered 
their strategies to integrate, rather than exclude, variants of WLANs in the wider mobile 
communications infrastructure and to coordinate this standardisation activity across the 
two associations.  
Following the limited impact of ETSI HIPERLAN 1 on the development of new high 
capacity WLANs for the 5 GHz band in Europe, a new project – entitled HIPERLAN 2 
– was set up in ETSI Broadband Radio Access Networks (ETSI BRAN) in April 1997. 
HIPERLAN 2 differed from HIPERLAN 1 in two ways. First, it was promoted by both 
mobile telecommunications industry (Ericsson, Nokia, Telia) and computing industry 
(Dell, Bosch). Second, and partly because it was promoted by the mobile 
communications industry, it was interlinked and integrated in the wider infrastructure of 
cellular systems in order limit disruption between the two technologies (revisit Chapter 
6). The decision to interlink the two systems is based on the gradual development of 
technology capabilities in wireless local area networking by the mobile communications 
industry. For instance, by the late 1990s, both Ericsson and Nokia were promoting 
Bluetooth as a wireless local area technology that would compete with other local area 
networks with low data capacity, including the original IEEE 802.11 (Haartsen 
2000)182. Also, Nokia was actively engaged in the development of 3G-WLAN 
interworking at the radio level, which redefined the two technologies – i.e. wide area 
cellular networks and local area networks – as complementary rather than exclusive 
technologies (Ahmavaara et al 2003). This approach, encouraged by the 
telecommunications industry involved in the development of WLANs, modified private 
actor strategies from standardising with the aim to exclude certain technologies to 
standardising with the aim to integrate certain technologies183.  
                                                
182 Six founding members set up the Bluetooth Consortium in May 1998: Ericsson, 
Intel, IBM, Nokia and Toshiba.  
183 Another way of thinking about this shift in industry strategies is to consider the 
pressures of short-term competition between specifications for the same technology 
(e.g. HomeRF versus IEEE 802.11 as WLAN standard) and long-term competition 
between specifications for different systems (e.g. wide area mobile cellular 
communications systems versus local area networks).  
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The decision to interlink wide area and local area network specifications was coupled 
with a strategy to integrate variants of WLAN standards with different performance 
characteristics by aligning, as much as possible, the standardisation work in ETSI 
BRAN (on HIPERLAN 2) and in IEEE 802.11. In the late 1990s, Lucent Technologies, 
who received the development of radio communication work from NCR following the 
1996 AT&T trivestiture (Jakobs et al 2011: 147), actively carried out this strategy by 
coordinating the standardisation process in both IEEE 802.11 and ETSI BRAN. 
Although there was no formal agreement of cooperation between ETSI BRAN and 
IEEE 802.11, the technology exchange that took place between the two industry 
associations is evidenced in three ways. Participants in the standardisation process had 
dual membership, with or without voting rights, in the two working groups (Lavie, 
Lechner and Singh 2012: 8-10). This informal coordination ensured industry alignment 
on two important configurations of inclusion/exclusion in wireless communications 
markets: a) alignment on the physical layer (PHY) for high capacity WLANs, which 
would set a single method of modulating digital signals – OFDM184, which would 
inevitably affect the rate of use of the radio resource for other unlicensed participants, 
and b) alignment on the radio resource – 5 GHz – on which high capacity WLANs can 
be deployed and potentially harmonised at international level. 
The IEEE 802.11 Working Group spearheaded the alignment process on the technology 
specifications for high capacity WLANs. From 1997 to 1999, the IEEE 802.11 was 
working on two projects for high capacity WLANs. One was to be deployed in the 2.4 
GHz band, with a capacity of up to 10Mb/s. This standard – entitled IEEE 802.11b – 
was envisioned as closest to the original proposal made by NCR/Lucent Technologies 
in the early 1990s. The main aim of the standard was to be based on existing direct 
sequence spread spectrum technology, to be affordable and quick to produce, in order to 
enter the market prior to any evolutions of the HomeRF standard, which maintained a 
data transfer rate of 2Mb/s. Following an agreement between Lucent Technologies and 
Apple to supply WLAN chips based on the IEEE 802.11b standard for 2.4 GHz band in 
1998, the IEEE 802.11b standard was successfully rolled over into the market with a 
considerable data capacity advantage (Table 6.4). As Negus and Petrick (2009) noted: 
                                                
184 OFDM is a digital modulation technique using orthogonal multicarrier technology, 
which splits the signal across different narrowband channels. It is not a spread spectrum 
technology.  
 239 
“[…] during 2000 the price gap between the two technologies [IEEE 
802.11 and HomeRF] narrowed considerably and 802.11b achieved 
widespread adoption including in the consumer market [which was 
dominated by HomeRF]. Because the competitive 10Mb/s HomeRF 
products did not become commercially available until mid-2001, by the 
end of 2001, 802.11b products took over the entire WLAN market” (Negus 
and Petrick 2009: 48).   
However, in conjunction with the development of medium capacity185 IEEE 802.11b for 
the 2.4 GHz band, the Working Group coordinated with ETSI BRAN for the 
development of a high capacity standard similar to HIPERLAN 2, which could achieve 
up to 54 Mb/s in the 5 GHz band across the CEPT (Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4 Main WLAN Standards of Second Generation 
Source: Lemstra et al (2009), Pareek (2006) 
The position taken in the IEEE 802.11 Working Group in 1997 was to propose the 
opening of the lower 5 GHz band in the United States under similar conditions to those 
adopted by the CEPT for the harmonised introduction of HIPERLAN in the lower 5 
GHz band. If similar rules of access to ETSI HIPERLAN in 5 GHz band were 
replicated in the United States, allowing for technologies other than spread spectrum, 
with their respective power limits, to operate in the band, then higher data capacity 
systems for local area networks could be deployed simultaneously for the two markets – 
Europe and the United States – with de facto primacy of access. Thus, in January 1997, 
the FFC opened the lower 5 GHz band under a set of rules for the Unlicensed National 
Information Infrastructure (U-NII) similar to HIPERLAN (FCC 1997). A year later, 
ETSI BRAN and IEEE 802.11 were putting forward high capacity standards based on 
                                                
185 The data transfer rate in the 2.4 GHz band was limited by the power levels 
applications operating in the ISM bands had to adhere to. Revisit Section 6.2.2. 
Standard Modulation Data Rate Main Industry Developers 
IEEE 802.11b DSSS Up to 11 Mb/s in 2.4 GHz Lucent, 3Com,Nokia, Symbols, 
Aironet, Intersil  
IEEE 802.11a OFDM Up to 54 Mb/s in 5 GHz Lucent, 3Com,Nokia, Symbols, 
Aironet, Intersil  
HomeRF FHSS 
(with DECT) 
Up to 10 Mb/s in 2.4 GHz Proxim, Intel, Siemens, 
Motorola, Philips  
Bluetooth FHSS  Up to 2 Mb/s in 2.4 GHz Ericsson, Intel, IBM, Nokia, 
Toshiba 
HIPERLAN 2 OFDM Up to 54 Mb/s in 5 GHz Bosch, Nokia, Ericsson, Dell 
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the OFDM modulation technology, which as Negus and Petrick noted, is not a spread 
spectrum technology (Negus and Petrick 2009: 45).  
Although the HIPERLAN standard and the IEEE 802.11a standard at 54Mb/s did not 
have the same media access technology, they were aligned enough to reconfigure the 
fragmented WLAN market around the development of two types of technology – spread 
spectrum for low data rates and multiplexing for high data rates – and around two 
frequency bands – 2.4 GHz band and 5 GHz band – both unlicensed but with 
considerably different rules of access specific to the two technologies. In addition, 
because IEEE 802.11 – at higher data rates of 11 Mb/s for the 2.4 GHz band and 
54Mb/s for the 5 GHz band – were rolled out quickly in the market, they achieved 
strong market positions by the mid 2000s. The next sections look at how the minimum 
alignment between the standardisation process in ETSI and in IEEE 802.11 contributed 
to the allocation of half of the 5 GHz band to WLANs on a primary basis at WRC-03, 
changing rules of access onto the 5 GHz band at global level for a technology that, at 
least theoretically, requires no protection from interference. Similarly, the next sections 
show how this industry alignment, strengthened by the integration of local area and 
wide area cellular networks, led to a change in rules of use of the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz 
bands around a single family of WLAN standards – IEEE 802.11 – with a private 
certification procedure in the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), which 
marketed equipment compatible with the IEEE 802.11 family of standards under the 
brand Wi-Fi.  
 
6.3.2 Negotiating Rules of Access 
In 2003, the World Radiocommunications Conference (WRC-03) allocated 455 MHz of 
spectrum in the 5 GHz band to international use by WLAN systems on a primary/co-
primary basis: a) indoor WLAN use in the 5,150-5,250 MHz band (100 MHz) and b) 
indoor/outdoor WLAN use in the 5,250-5,350 MHz band (355 MHz) (Resolution 229, 
WRC-03). This allocation of WLANs to half of the 5 GHz band sealed the rules of 
access already established in the lower 5 GHz bands for high capacity systems in the 
United States and across Europe and, essentially, extended them at the global level.  
The position of the industry in driving this global allocation, through regulatory 
alignment at the regional level, is important to investigate for two reasons. First, there is 
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an inherent contradiction between WLANs as non-protected and non-interference 
allocations to public commons such as the ISM bands and WLANs that, by virtue of 
their primary or co-primary status in international allocations, become private 
commons, themselves protected against interference by other services. Second, there is 
an inherent contradiction between WLANs with international allocations in one 
frequency pool (5 GHz band) and WLANs without international allocations in another 
frequency pool (2.4 GHz band). As in the previous cases analysed in this thesis, 
differences in operational rules of access in frequency pool, such as the 2.4 GHz and 5 
GHz bands, are given by configurations embedded in the technology systems deployed 
in order to harvest the resource for different markets. Thus, the main point of difference 
between WLANs standardised for the 2.4 GHz band and WLANs standardised for the 5 
GHz band is the data transfer capacity rate, which is considerably higher in the latter 
type of WLANs. Because high data transfer rates employed in interactive multimedia 
services, for instance, could not be produced at affordable levels, using low power and 
low emission spread spectrum, other technologies – i.e. OFDM – were used, which are 
not spread spectrum. Because of this technology configuration, however, rules of access 
and use also have to be altered.  
In the late 1990s, OFDM was, essentially, a new generation of modulation techniques. 
Its main use, at the time, was in digital broadcasting (DVB-T) and, a few years later, in 
fourth generation radio access interfaces for IMT-2000 and IMT-Advanced systems 
such as Long Term Evolution (LTE). As a frequency division multiplexing technology, 
OFDM requires multiple frequencies to which it assigns narrow signals, a fundamental 
difference from spread spectrum techniques, such as direct sequence (DSSS), which 
spread the signal in a single frequency. Thus, OFDM produces considerable more 
interference than spread spectrum and, conversely, requires more protection from 
interference than spread spectrum techniques, which explains the need to secure WLAN 
allocations in the 5 GHz band and not the 2.4 GHz band at international level. Lemstra, 
Hayes and van der Steen (2009) explain why securing primary status for HIPERLAN 
specifications was important for industry developers with investments in this 
technology: 
“[…] European Administrations were unhappy with the prospect that an 
incumbent user that received primary status at a WRC, on the promise that 
they could comply with the rules stated for HIPERLANs in the 5 GHz 
band, would subsequently be forced to reduce the permitted power for the 
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HIPERLAN devices from 1000 mW without limits to 200 mW, and to 
indoor use. By requesting and obtaining an allocation at primary level for 
WLANs through the WRC, non-interference with existing WLANs would 
have to be assured for all new applications in that frequency band” 
(Lemstra et al 2009: 112).  
The position put forward by Lemstra et al (2009), which was promoted by industry 
members in conjunction with the CEPT and the FCC (Negus and Petrick 2009: 37), 
describes the process by which changes in one aspect of the specifications of a 
technology or standard affect, as in the case of WLANs for 5 GHz, operational rules of 
access to frequency bands deploying, in theory, the same system. The rules of access 
adopted, at global level, for the 5 GHz band also reflect how two systems delivering the 
same service – i.e. mobile communications in wireless local area networks – can be 
managed as a public common based on non-protection from interference (spread 
spectrum) or as a private common based on primary protection from interference 
(frequency multiplexing).  
 
6.3.3 Negotiating Rules of Use 
By securing primary access to the 5 GHz frequency bands at global level, the WLAN 
industry had secured de facto exclusivity on the band. This allowed for a considerably 
more stable and secure frequency environment in which WLANs could develop without 
the threat of interference by other devices using the band.  
A further step to prevent interference from other non-IEEE 802.11 devices that could 
populate the band, by simply abiding to power levels of use, was to create a certification 
association that would act as a self-monitoring and self-promotion mechanism. Thus, in 
August 1999, only a few months prior to the approval of the IEEE 802.11 standard for 
the 2.4 GHz band (IEEE 802.11b) and for the 5 GHz band (IEEE 802.11a), six of the 
WLAN industry representatives that took part in the IEEE 802.11 Work Group set up 
the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), a not-for-profit industry 
association with responsibility to certify WLAN equipment based on the IEEE 802.11 
family of standards, through a process of interoperability compliance testing (Wi-Fi 
Alliance 1999).  
In short, WECA became an informal association that monitored industry compliance 
with the standard, ensuring that power levels and other emissions specified in the IEEE 
802.11 family of standards are abided by, ensuring protection from interference. A seal 
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of approval from WECA signified a seal of safe use of the public common at 2.4 GHz 
as well as the private common at 5 GHz. In 2002, a year before WRC-03, and with over 
100 industry members, WECA changes its name to the Wi-Fi Alliance, with 
responsibility to brand every equipment interoperable and compliant with the IEEE 
802.11 standard as Wi-Fi. Thus, in this process, the Wi-Fi Alliance became a self-
monitoring association that ensured conformance with given parameters of use of the 
radio resource, as agreed by the industry in conjunction with public regulators. The 
monitoring role of the Wi-Fi Alliance ensured that the set of common rules of the radio 
resource were applied in the regional public commons established at 2.4 GHz and the 
international private commons established at 5 GHz, minimising the public process of 
reporting interference from a potentially “harmful” device.  
 
6.4 The Impact of Private Association on the Choice of Property System 
This section discusses the relationship between the organisation of the electronic 
communications industry and the development of operational and collective choice 
rights in the 2.4 GHz band and the 5 GHz band. It pays particular attention to the way in 
which private coordination between the information technology and the mobile 
communications industry led to an alignment of economic interests for the emergence 
of IEEE 802.11 as the de facto standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs) and 
for its integration with wide area mobile cellular communications systems. It discusses 
the extent to which this private coordination shaped industry preferences for operational 
rules based on conditioned common use and primary access as specified in the IEEE 
802.11a/ ETSI HIPERLAN 2 configurations for the 5 GHz band.   
 
6.4.1 The Nature of Private Association 
In the 1990s, the emergence of multiple standards for wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) revealed low level of industry coordination for the deployment of this 
technology. However, towards the late 1990s, standardisation work in the IEEE and in 
ETSI revealed key benefits and limitations of each technology configurations and, most 
importantly, of combining elements of these technologies as well as of integrating them 
with the existing mobile telecommunications infrastructure as inclusive, rather than as 
exclusive, systems. Two important steps, which were discussed above, were taken in 
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this case. First, interworking specifications between wide area mobile cellular 
communications networks, as specified by 3GPP, and wireless local area networks, as 
specified by IEEE 802.11 and ETSI BRAN, was implemented. In 2003, the 3GPP 
proposed this approach and reported: 
“3GPP has […] taken the initiative to develop a cellular-WLAN 
interworking architecture as an add-on to the existing 3GPP cellular system 
specifications […]. The main driver is to enable 3GPP system operators to 
provide public WLAN access as an integral component of their total 
service offering to their subscribers” (Ahmavaara et al 2003: 74).  
The second step towards coordination was the agreement on a single method of 
modulating digital signals for wideband WLANs, based on OFDM, in both IEEE 
802.11 and ETSI BRAN. The alignment of the computing and mobile communications 
industry on OFDM, as the single choice of specification for modulating digital signals, 
shaped the industry preference in favour of stricter rules of access for wideband 
WLANs in the 5 GHz band. Because OFDM was not a spread spectrum technology, it 
conditioned protection from interference rather than, as in the case spread spectrum, 
non-protection and non-interference. Noting on the role of the Wi-Fi Alliance in this 
allocation of the 5 GHz band for wireless mobile services on a primary basis, Lemstra, 
Hayes and van der Steen (2009) noted that: 
“Lucent Techologies, through Vic Hayes, understood, on the one hand, the 
importance of this allocation for the future of Wi-Fi and, on the other hand, 
the significant effort it would take to coalesce the industry to make this 
allocation come true. […] At the beginning of 2001, Hayes successfully 
started a rally in the one-year old Wi-Fi Alliance to establish a committee 
with sufficient decision power to be able to act quickly in response to the 
events that would develop at the regulatory agencies […]” (Lemstra, Hayes 
and van der Steen 2009: 112-113).  
This depiction of events reveals the relationship between the organisation of the 
industry, the choice of a particular technology system and the configuration of 
operational rules of access and use in a frequency pool. It is indicative of the reasons 
behind the different approach in the allocation of WLANs in the 2.4 GHz band and in 
the 5 GHz band, reflecting a particular technology configuration, which would respond 
to a unified economic interest (i.e. high speed data rates for wireless LANs) and a single 
technology capability (i.e. OFDM).     
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6.4.2 The Nature of Property Arrangements in the 2.4 GHz and the 5 GHz 
Frequency Pools 
The difference in the regulation of the 2.4 GHz and the 5 GHz bands reveals important 
considerations about the relationship between the configuration of industry actors and 
the property arrangements that result from their organisation. Table 6.5 provides a 
summary of the configuration of property arrangements that resulted in the 2.4 GHz and 
5 GHz bands for the deployment of WLANs in the early 2000s.  
Table 6.5 The Configuration of Property Arrangements in the 2.4 GHz Regional Pool 
and the 5 GHz Frequency Pool for the Deployment of WLANs 
 
At the operational level, the main difference between the two configurations of property 
arrangements rests with the higher level of exclusive access provided to WLANs in the 
5 GHz band, as derived from the allocation of mobile communications on a primary 
basis at the WRC-03. In short, this changed the status of WLANs from non-protected 
(in the 2.4 GHz band) to protected (in the 5 GHz band), informed by the initial 
allocations to HIPERLANs in the lower 5 GHz band in the CEPT.  
Similar to the previous case study (Chapter 5), there are three collective choice rules 
that the industry, organised in IEEE 802.11 and in ETSI BRAN, established in order to 
align preferences for this “protected” allocation for WLANs of second generation in the 
Property Right Property Arrangements in the 2.4 GHz band and the 5 GHz band for WLANs 
Operational 
Rights 
Access Rights to access the 2.4 GHz band is open to low emission devices – i.e. public 
common – with minimum conditions of non-protection and non-interference (ISM 
services).  
Rights to access the lower 5 GHz band is given on a co-primary basis to mobile 
communications services at global level (WRC-03).  
Use In both 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz, rights of use are conditioned on power and interference 
levels. They are given by the technology configuration of the equipment, based on 
spectrum requirement: a) spread spectrum (accepts interference), b) orthogonal 
frequency division (needs protection from interference).  
Collective 
Choice Rights 
Management Limited coordination in 2.4 GHz band at initial stage. 
Increased coordination between industry associations representing information 
technology and telecommunications industry – i.e. IEEE 802.11 and ETSI BRAN –
for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz in second generation WLANs. Dual membership in IEEE 
802.11 and ETSI BRAN, information exchange on system configurations before 
setting operational rules for the 5 GHz band (WRC-03). Technology co-existence, 
rather than technology excludability, between mobile cellular communications 
systems for wide areas (3GPP) and local areas (ETSI BRAN and IEEE 802.11).  
Mutual monitoring through certification of quality and interoperability in Wi-Fi 
Alliance.  
Exclusion No right to exclude in 2.4 GHz band (ISM services).  
Right to exclude in 5 GHz band derived from co-primary status for WLANs 
(WRC-03).  
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5 GHz band. First, participants in IEEE 802.11 and in ETSI BRAN established informal 
mechanisms of information exchange on the main configurations of the two standards 
being developed, simultaneously, for the 2.4 GHz band and the 5 GHz band. Second, 
the decision to create a family of standards that would integrate, rather than exclude, 
standards with different data transfer capabilities and different technology 
configurations under the aegis of IEEE 802.11 – direct sequence spread spectrum 
(DSSS) for the 2.4 GHz band on a non-protected basis, as required in ISM bands and 
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) for the 5 GHz band on a protected 
basis. In creating standards for high data transfers in WLANs, based on the minimum 
harmonisation of the physical layers in IEEE 802.11 and ETSI HIPERLAN 2, the 
information technology and the telecommunications industry could commit to the 
development of the market for this equipment and could leverage an allocation on a 
protected primary basis at WRC-03. Third, the role of the Wi-Fi Alliance in certifying 
and branding products, which met the specifications of the IEEE 802.11 family of 
standards, created a mechanism of monitoring and developing the market. 
   
6.5 Conclusions 
This case has traced the process leading to the definition of different operational rules 
for the deployment of wireless local area networks (WLANs) in the 2.4 GHz band and 
in the 5 GHz band. The case suggests that industry actors with asymmetric preferences 
for economic activity in different bands of the radio resource, coupled with a relatively 
symmetric distribution of technology capabilities among them, will find it difficult to 
arrange private cooperation in order to harvest a common pool resource more 
efficiently. This was the case of the information technology industry in the early 1990s, 
when their heterogeneous preferences for the deployment of competing technologies in 
different bands prevented them from arriving to the definition of a standard in the IEEE 
802.11 working group and, subsequently, from driving down the cost of manufacturing 
WLAN equipment to be deployed in the 2.4 GHz band. The case is particularly relevant 
because, as it is revealed, a public actor had opened the 2.4 GHz band for technologies 
upon which WLANs could be and, indeed, was developed. The case is also relevant 
because it uncovers the configuration of group attributes – i.e. heterogeneity of interests 
and homogeneity of capabilities – that appears to block, rather than facilitate, 
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coordination for harvesting the radio resource, even in conditions when the resource is 
already regulated as a public common, i.e. conditioned common use and open access.   
However, the gradual diversification of the electronic communications market, with the 
particular entry of mobile telecommunications developers in the provision of data 
services, changed this initial configuration of interests, gradually, over the 1990s. A 
new configuration of interests and capabilities was taking shape in IEEE 802.11 and in 
ETSI BRAN, which revealed a diversification of interests for two different bands (2.4 
GHz and 5 GHz) as well as a diversification of technology capabilities based on 
information technologies and mobile communications systems. This situation of 
increased diversification, coupled with pressures from the HomeRF Consortium to 
change regulations in the 2.4 GHz via the public actor in the United States, increased 
the level of communication between IEEE 802.11 and ETSI BRAN, leading to an 
alignment on the basic specifications – OFDM in the physical layer – for high capacity 
WLANs. The information exchange between the two associations – IEEE 802.11 and 
ETSI BRAN – facilitated an alignment of technology preferences for inclusive rather 
than exclusive technologies based on a family of standard in IEEE 802.11. These 
measures, coupled with the establishment of the Wi-Fi Alliance as a private certification 
mechanism, provided the mobile telecommunications and the information technology 
industry with considerable leverage to change the allocation of the 5 GHz band to 
mobile communications (also WLANs), on a co-primary basis, at the global level. By 
changing the allocation status of WLANs to primary services at the international level, 
the electronic communications industry increased the level of de facto excludability of 
these services in the designated bands, creating a private common in the 5 GHz band, 
based on conditioned common use and exclusive access.  
Overall, this case contributes to our understanding of dynamics of coordination inside a 
transnational common pool in two ways. Similar to the previous case study (Chapter 5), 
it reveals that heterogeneity of interests and capabilities does not inhibit coordination. 
On the contrary, it facilitates communication and information exchanges between 
industry parties and industry associations, which results in greater coordination to 
change operational rules of access – i.e. greater protection from interference by other 
services as a form of de facto exclusivity – in the 5 GHz band for WLANs.   
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Chapter 7.  Conclusion 
This thesis has set out to inquire into the determinants of property arrangements in 
transnational common pool resources. It has focused on explaining variation in property 
arrangements in a single transnational common pool resource – i.e. the electromagnetic 
radio spectrum – across some of the frequency bands the radio resource is divided into 
and across time. There are three theoretical assumptions that informed the question and 
design of this study. These assumptions have been challenged throughout this study. 
The first assumption is that public entities are the central actors who initiate and define 
the regulation of transnational commons in order to overcome problems of collective 
action that arise in this type of resource. The second assumption is that private entities 
cannot successfully organise to define stable and comprehensive rules to access and use 
a transnational common such as the radio spectrum, especially when their economic 
interests and technology capabilities are highly diversified. The third assumption is that 
private entities wishing to extract economic value from a common resource have a 
preference for individual exclusive property rights in order to secure single use and 
exclusive access to the resource. The radio spectrum186 has provided good ground to test 
these theoretical assumptions. On the one hand, public entities manage the radio 
resource on their sovereign territory and coordinate it, internationally, on principles of 
non-interference and interconnection. On the other hand, private entities manage the 
radio resource by utilising it as input in the production of other common goods187 of a 
transnational nature, such as mobile communications.   
So, who truly runs the radio commons?  
This thesis makes three key findings about the regulation of the radio resource as a type 
of transnational common pool resource. First, this research finds that private actors, 
such as service operators and equipment manufacturers, are very active in defining rules 
of operation in the radio resource, by negotiating technology arrangements with 
                                                
186 As previously explained, in supra note 6, this thesis looks only at the regulation of 
the commercial electromagnetic radio spectrum rather than the entire radio spectrum, 
most of which is used for public defence, scientific, etc purposes.  
187 As previously explained, in supra note 7, this thesis adopts the definition of 
“transnational common goods” put forward by Holzinger (2008). “Common goods will 
be used as a synonym for all goods that are not purely private. […] Common goods are 
defined by the presence of externalities”. As Holzinger (2008) noted, “this definition 
has the advantage of capturing a number of different notions of goods such as pure 
public goods, club goods, CPRs, congestibles or network goods” (Holzinger 2008: 28). 
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embedded configurations of access and use of a given frequency band. These 
negotiations take place in industry associations at transnational level, which transcend 
rule-making at the domestic level and interact with regional or international polities – 
such as the European Union (EU) or the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
– in a polycentric system of governance comprising both public and private entities with 
different responsibilities for defining, monitoring and enforcing rules of access and 
rules of use in the radio resource (Figure 7.1).  
Figure 7.1 Matrix of Main Findings by Case Study 
 
Second, this research finds that private actors can organise to solve distributional 
problems of collective action in transnational frequency bands, even in conditions of 
highly diversified economic interests and technology capabilities. Far from leading to 
collective inaction, the complexity of this situation makes industry actors exchange 
more technical information and engage in more comprehensive mutual monitoring, 
before setting operational rules of access and use in a given frequency band.  
Third, this research finds that private actors interested in extracting economic value 
from a given frequency band are not primarily concerned with the individualisation of a 
property right but with the excludability of the right in the radio resource. Far from 
exhibiting a unique preference for individual exclusive property, private actors with 
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diversified economic interests and technology capabilities can opt for flexible rights of 
use as long as their right of access is exclusively ensured in a given frequency band.   
These findings speak to three specialist literatures in the field of public policy. The 
evidence about the role of private actors as rule makers in the organisation of the radio 
spectrum, even in conditions of diverse interests and capabilities, speaks to the literature 
on collective action and, specifically, the collective protection or provision of 
transnational common goods. The evidence about the nature of cooperation in industry 
associations188, organised to negotiate and define rights of use and rights of access onto 
the radio resource, speaks to the literature on transnational private regulation. The 
evidence about the interaction between this associative mode of governance and other 
polities speaks to the wider governance literature and, specifically, to the literature 
exploring governance in the European Union (EU).     
The following sections provide a detailed analysis of this evidence and its contribution 
to the specialist literature. Before providing a more detailed analysis of this evidence, it 
is important to recall that, by design, this research has been conducted as a theory 
testing exercise with a small n sample in order to verify determinants (i.e. public or 
private actors) of a type of outcome (i.e. property arrangements) and the causal 
mechanisms in this process. Thus, the main purpose of these findings is to enrich 
existing theories concerned with the provision or protection of transnational common 
goods.  
 
7.1 Collective Action in Transnational Commons 
This research has been designed as an inquiry into the nature of collective action for 
managing the radio spectrum as a transnational common pool resource and for 
providing mobile communication systems as transnational common goods, benefiting 
from the use of radio frequencies as input to their production. The following sections 
discuss the findings of this research in relation to four questions in the literature on 
collective action in transnational commons. First, whether problems of collective action 
recognised in the protection and provision of common goods apply to the management 
                                                
188 This thesis adopts a wide definition of industry associations, which includes 
professional bodies, certification bodies and standardisation bodies belonging to a 
single industry sector, (e.g. electronic communications).  
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of the radio spectrum (Holzinger 2008, Ostrom 2003). Second, whether the need for 
external intervention in the provision of stable institutions to regulate access and use of 
common pool resources is confirmed in the case of the radio spectrum (Hardin 1968, 
Hardin 1998, Ostrom 2010, Pennington 2012). Third, whether, in the absence of 
external intervention, the diverse distribution of private interests and capabilities is 
more likely to inhibit the collective regulation of a common pool resource such as the 
radio spectrum (Libecap 1995, Martin 1995, Varughese and Ostrom 2001). Fourth, 
whether private actors are more likely to prefer institutional outcomes that resemble 
individual exclusive property when managing a common pool resource such as the radio 
spectrum, in order to maximise individual withdrawal rates from the resource 
(Faulhaber and Farber 2003).  
 
7.1.1 Collective Action Problems in Transnational Commons 
This thesis has demonstrated that, in a state of nature, the radio spectrum is a common 
pool resource exposed to problems of collective action resulting from the competitive 
extraction of frequency units by resource users (i.e. rivalry of consumption) as well as 
from the difficulty to exclude beneficiaries that would not contribute to maintaining the 
resource or to internalising the costs of interference as a negative externality produced 
during the use of the radio resource (i.e. non-excludability). This thesis has also 
demonstrated that, due to the borderless nature of electromagnetic radio waves, 
problems of collective action in the radio resource are uploaded to the international 
level, where several types of conflict are revealed, including complementarity conflicts 
which affect rival use (Case I, Case II, Case III), excludable conflicts which affect 
access (Case I, Case III, Case IV), consumptive conflicts which affect the rate of use 
(Case III), as well as negative externality conflicts which affect interference levels 
(Case IV).  
This finding indicates that problems of collective action in transnational commons are 
more diverse than defection problems, which result in the “tragedy of the commons” 
(Hardin 1968). Using the typology of problems of collective action provided by 
Holzinger (2008: 154-159), the radio spectrum exhibits three types of problems at the 
transnational level. First, defection problems that have been solved by both public and 
private actors during the allocation of international frequency bands to communication 
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services rather than to sovereign states, together with the adoption of the principles of 
minimum intercommunication and non-interference (revisit Chapter 1). Second, 
distributional problems that concern the degree of rivalry and excludability in a given 
radio frequency pool and that have been witnessed, to different levels, in all of the cases 
put forward in this thesis. As previously noted, distributional problems concern “partial 
conflict over the valuation of outcomes” (i.e. which degree of rivalry and excludability 
in a frequency pool) rather than conflict over a strategy to achieve a single equilibrium 
(i.e. whether to collaborate or not to collaborate in the management of a frequency pool) 
(Holzinger 2008: 155, Martin 1995). Third, disagreement problems that concern the 
degree of rivalry within a given radio frequency pool and that have been witnessed in 
some of the cases put forward in this thesis (Case I and Case II). These disagreement 
problems, which have been previously referred to as “battles of the systems”189 in 
studies of telecommunication standardisation (Schmidt and Werle 1998), do not 
concern the collective welfare of a common resource. Interestingly, in the radio 
spectrum, distributional problems concerning the degree of rivalry and excludability in 
a given frequency pool and disagreement problems concerning rivalry over the system 
to be used in order to extract value from a frequency pool are generally resolved 
simultaneously, due to the technology-dependent nature of this resource (Wormbs 
2011). This explains the eventual creation of complex standards (e.g. GSM in Case I, 
UMTS in Case II) or complex systems (e.g. IMT-2000 in Case II, LTE/SAE in Case III) 
that are aimed to solve both relative (i.e. distributional, disagreement) and absolute 
conflict (i.e. collaboration).       
These findings make two contributions to the growing literature concerned with 
problems of collective action in transnational common goods (Abbott 2012, Héritier 
2002, Holzinger 2008, Hoffman 2013, Ostrom 2009). First, they confirm that defection 
problems between rational actors, which can lead to tragedies of the commons, are not 
endemic to all common resources (Bromley et al 1992, Ostrom 1990) and have, 
potentially, been overstated when considering who can solve them, at what decision-
making level and by what institutional means (Ostrom 1998, Udehn 1993). Second, 
they reveal the predominance of distributional and disagreement problems in the radio 
spectrum, as an example of a transnational common good where there is considerable 
                                                
189 As Werle (2001) noted, they are a variant of the “battle of the sexes” and refer to 
conflict over telecommunications standards between companies that sell competing 
systems.  
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conflict over which property arrangement should prevail (i.e. what degree of rivalry and 
excludability), but there is limited conflict over whether there should be a property 
arrangement aimed to achieve the stable and sustainable extraction of the radio resource 
without harmful interference or congestion. Libecap (1995) confirmed this point of 
view, that “in the absence of serious disputes over the aggregate gains […] of assigning 
or modifying property rights to an open-access resource, the problem of collective 
action is one of distribution, achieving agreement on the individual share of resource 
rents that are implicit in the assignment of property rights” (Libecap 1995: 165).  
In sum, the current thesis reveals that the nature of collective action problems in 
common goods and, specifically, in transnational common goods needs considerable 
attention before prescribing policy solution that might, in fact, respond to other 
problems. Dealing with different types of conflict, at different decision-making levels, 
and by different institutional means, has been recently identified in the regulation of the 
climate (Hoffman 2013) and has been promoted by “building blocks” approaches, 
which recognise the importance of dealing with functional policy issues in the 
regulation of global public goods (Falkner et al 2010). The current study confirms that a 
“building blocks” model – which, in the case of climate change, advocates dealing with 
different problems such as adaptation, mitigation or technology transfers by different 
institutional means (Falkner et al 2010: 259) – can also be witnessed in the management 
of the radio spectrum, where defection problems are dealt with by international 
regulation and distributional or disagreement problems are dealt with separately, by 
transnational regulation, originating from private actors. Thus, the current study 
confirms that these models can potentially become more effective at matching the 
nature of the collective action problem to the institutional arrangement that best 
responds to the problem, without framing it as a global defection problem, which 
inevitably leads to the underprovision or underprotection of a transnational common 
good.    
 
7.1.2 The Need for External Regulation of Transnational Commons 
One of the central claims of the collective action literature initiated by G. Hardin (1968) 
is that only an external entity with governing capacity can regulate the resource in order 
to avoid a tragedy of the commons. This proposal is specifically linked to the premise 
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that, in the absence of exclusion mechanisms imposed by an external regulator (Hardin 
1998), individual users will extract as much of the resource as possible to the point of 
congestion or depletion (Pennington 2012: 23).  
The current study disproves this claim on two grounds. The requirement for an external 
authority to solve problems of collective action in the radio spectrum does not verify 
when analysing the origin of the international regulation of the radio resource (designed 
to resolve defection problems) or when analysing the origin of the transnational 
regulation of the radio resource (designed to resolve distributional and, at times, 
disagreement problems). First, both public and private entities coordinated their 
strategies to define the Radio Regulations (ITU) in the absence of an international body 
to impose the administration of this resource (revisit Chapter 1). Second, individual 
users initiated and negotiated rules for solving distributional problems about the degree 
of rivalry and excludability in a given frequency band in the absence of an external 
body with competence to propose such rules (Case I) as well as, most interestingly, in 
the presence of an external body with competence to do so (Case II, Case III, Case IV 
(5GHz)). Specifically, the case studies analysed in this thesis show little correlation 
between the presence of the European Commission – as an external entity with formal 
competence to initiate the transnational regulation of a radio frequency band in the 
geography of interest (i.e. the European region) – and the ability or willingness of 
individual users to engage in transnational private cooperation over rules to access and 
use a given frequency pool (revisit Figure 7.1).   
These findings make two contributions to the collective action literature. First, they 
confirm that the classic assumption about the inability of rational individuals to 
overcome dilemmas of protection and provision of common goods has been overstated 
as a universal principle of economic behaviour (Ostrom 2008). As Ostrom noted: 
“The classic models have been used to view those who are involved in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game or other social dilemmas as always trapped in the 
situation without capabilities to change the structure themselves. This 
analytical step was a retrogressive step in the theories used to analyse the 
human condition. Whether or not the individuals, who are in a situation, 
have capacities to transform the external variables affecting their own 
situation varies dramatically from one situation to the next. It is an 
empirical condition that varies from situation to situation rather than a 
logical universality” (Ostrom 2010: 649).  
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Second, these findings align with the growing evidence in the collective action literature 
that disproves the need for external bodies, such as governments, to “impose a 
management structure over the [common] resource” (Pennington 2012: 23), under the 
premise that the circumstances of this social dilemmas will inevitably lead to the 
underprotection of the common pool or the underprovision of the common goods 
(Agrawal 2003, Ostrom 1990). For global commons, such as the radio resource, the 
oceans or the climate, these findings indicate that the presence of an external entity – 
with capacity to impose rules and regulations onto public entities (i.e. states) or private 
entities (i.e. firms operating across states) wishing to extract economic value from a 
common resource – is not a requirement in all situations when the protection of the 
transnational common is needed. However, the normative implications of this 
proposition require careful consideration. The findings of this thesis, which highlight 
the limited need for external intervention in the provision of stable institutions to 
regulate access and use of the radio resource, do not make claims about the efficiency of 
this collective regulation over the external regulation of a common resource or the 
general capacity of individual entities to achieve sustainable collective regulation in all 
social circumstances related to the protection or provision of common goods. In this 
case, the sustainability of institutions in transnational radio frequencies refers to their 
ability to be maintained at the level agreed upon by a user collective, without leading to 
problems of collective action pertaining to the original issue that the regulation tried to 
solve, be it a coordination, distributional or disagreement problem of collective action. 
Thus, the findings put forward in this thesis pertain to showing the non-generalisable 
character of rational theories of collective action rather than the generalisable character 
of its alternatives.  
 
7.1.3 The Conditions for Internal Regulation of Transnational Commons 
The claim that, under certain circumstances, individual users can initiate, define and 
redefine operational rules to access and use a transnational common pool, in the absence 
of an external regulator, brings to question the conditions that might enable or inhibit 
their ability to solve such problems of collective action. The current study addressed 
this question by testing the impact of two widely theorised attributes of a user group on 
their ability to regulate a common pool resource in a sustainable manner (Holzinger 
2008, Keohane and Ostrom 1995, Olson 1965). These attributes pertain to the diversity 
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of interests and capabilities within a group of resource users willing to extract economic 
value from a given resource pool at transnational level (revisit Chapter 1). However, a 
limitation of theoretical expectations regarding the impact of heterogeneity on collective 
action is that it has led to contradictory findings when analysing the protection or 
provision of common goods at local and at international level (revisit Chapter 2). On 
the one hand, studies of local commons190 find that heterogeneity of interests or 
capabilities inhibits the ability of individuals to define collective rules to operate in a 
common pool (Martin 1995: 73). On the other hand, studies looking at international 
common goods191 find that heterogeneity of capabilities, as a proxy for power in 
negotiations, can either inhibit individuals to define collective rules to operate in a 
common if these capabilities are highly dispersed among members of the group (Martin 
1995: 75) or can enable individuals to define collective rules to operate in a common if 
such capabilities are highly concentrated among few members of the group (Martin 
1995: 78-79). Thus, the current study has aimed to test the impact of heterogeneity of 
economic interests and technology capabilities on private cooperation in the regulation 
of the radio spectrum in order to reveal whether theoretical expectations derived from 
the analysis of local commons or international common goods apply.    
The current study makes two findings on the relationship between these group 
characteristics and a group’s ability to initiate and sustain collective action in the 
transnational radio spectrum. First, the current study finds that homogeneity of 
economic interests among a group of resource users might enable them to define 
operational rules to access and use a frequency pool but might not enable them to 
safeguard these operational rules with collective choice arrangements. Specifically, in 
Case I and Case II, private users did not establish comprehensive collective choice rules 
of management (e.g. ETSI SMG on declaring essential patents in Case II) and rules of 
exclusion (e.g. entry of Motorola in GSM MoU in Case I), which disrupted operational 
rules of access and use agreed upon by the group of users (revisit Figure 7.1). This 
finding disproves theoretical expectations in the study of local commons that predict a 
positive relationship between homogeneity of interests within a group and its ability to 
                                                
190 These studies refer to natural common pool resources of a local nature, such as 
grazing grounds, forests, water basins, which are administered by local communities 
rather than central administrations belonging to the state.  
191 These studies refer to the protection of common goods such as the climate, the 
oceans or to the provision of common goods such as tax coordination. They have been 
primarily concerned with cooperation between states rather than non-state actors.  
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define and sustain rules to govern a common pool resource (Baland and Platteau 1999, 
Libecap 1989, Libecap 1995).    
Second, the current study finds that heterogeneity of technology capabilities in a large 
group of resource users, even when combined with heterogeneity of economic interests, 
does not inhibit the group’s ability to define operational rules to access and use a 
frequency pool. This finding disproves theoretical expectations in the study of local 
commons that predict a negative relationship between heterogeneity of interests and 
capabilities within a group and its ability to sustain rules of operation and management 
in a common pool resource (Libecap 1995, Varughese and Ostrom 2001). This finding 
also disproves theoretical expectations in the study of international commons that 
assume a positive relationship between the concentration of capabilities in the hands of 
a few non-competing members of the group and the ability of the group to define and 
stabilise rule systems in the commons (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, Krasner 1991, 
Martin 1995). Surprisingly, in Case III and Case IV (5GHz), private users establish 
collective choice rules that stabilise their commitments to operational rules of use and 
access of the frequency pool. This increased level of commitment to operational rules is 
facilitated by three, otherwise recognised, mechanisms for sustaining operational 
institutions in the governance of common pool resources (Agrawal 2003, Ostrom 1990: 
90-102): 
a. Equitable participation in decision making on system design by direct frequency 
users – i.e. both service operators and system developers (Case III) 
b. Information exchange about technology preferences via informal interest 
associations (WWRF in Case III) or via informal communication venues 
between formal interest associations (ETSI BRAN and IEEE 802.11 in Case IV 
(5GHz)).  
c. Mutual monitoring of commitments to operational rules during the system 
design process (NGMN and LTE/SAE Alliance in Case III, Wi-Fi Alliance in 
Case IV).  
These findings carry three implications to the literature exploring the relationship 
between heterogeneity and collective action in the management of common pool 
resources. First, this thesis finds a weak relationship between heterogeneity and 
collective action among private users of a common pool resource. This holds for both 
heterogeneity of economic interests and heterogeneity of technology capabilities, as 
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well as for the situations, as in Case III and Case IV (5GHz), when heterogeneity of 
interests is combined with heterogeneity of capabilities in a resource user group. In fact, 
in Case III and Case IV (5GHz), private users are aware of their situation of internal 
heterogeneity and, subsequently, engage in the design of more comprehensive rules of 
management, such as equitable participation in decision making, information exchange 
and mutual monitoring of commitments to operational rules during the system design 
process. The situation presented in Case III and Case IV (5GHz) confirms that, at least 
when distributional problems in the commons are concerned, heterogeneity of interests 
or capabilities is not an inhibitor of collective action but “a challenge that can be 
overcome by good institutional design when the interests of those controlling collective 
choice mechanisms are benefited by investing time and effort to craft better rules” 
(Varughese and Ostrom 2001: 747). In fact, in Case III and Case IV (5GHz), 
heterogeneity creates an environment of uncertainty, which appears to drive private 
actors to invest in mechanisms of information exchange and mutual monitoring in order 
to secure their commitments to operational rules for the given frequency bands. Thus, 
the surprising finding of these two cases is that group heterogeneity does not inhibit 
private cooperation to supply operational rules in the commons (Poteete and Ostrom 
2004). On the contrary, it appears that, in these situations, private users devise 
collective choice rules to ensure and monitor their commitments to operational rules in 
a given frequency band.  
This points at the second implication of these findings for the wider discussion about 
individual and collective rationality in the use of a common pool resource. In Case III 
and Case IV (5GHz), private actors interested in harvesting a frequency pool appear to 
define their economic interests in terms of both relative (i.e. distributional) and absolute 
(i.e. collaborative) gains (Snidal 1991). In this case, private resource users reveal a more 
complex motivational structure for their behaviour, which allows them to change the 
internal structure of incentives within the group (Ostrom 2008, Ostrom 2010). For 
instance, in Case III, ensuring access to an enlarged frequency pool for the deployment 
of IMT mobile communication systems appears to take precedence over relative gains 
concerning individual withdrawal rates from competing communications systems that 
make up the IMT family of standards. This finding indicates that the analysis of the 
motivational structure of a group of resource users could be more relevant than the 
distribution of economic interests or technology capabilities within the group.  
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However, this thesis shows that, although the distribution of interests or capabilities 
might not be, per se, a strong indicator of collective action in the management of 
common pool resources, economic interests and technology capabilities do matter in 
order to understand the specific design of operational and collective choice rules in the 
commons. This is the third contribution of the current study to the collective action 
literature exploring the conditions for internal regulation of common pool resources. 
Specifically, all cases analysed in this thesis reveal an important link between the 
technology capabilities that private actors hold and wish to deploy in the market for 
mobile communications and their internal negotiations about the withdrawal 
mechanisms (i.e. internal rivalry) and the exclusion mechanism (i.e. excludability) to be 
set in place for a given frequency band at either regional or global level. This triangular 
relationship between technology capabilities as enabling the extraction of resource 
units, the construction of rule systems as well as the creation of markets derived the 
sustained governance of a common pool resource has not been sufficiently explored in 
studies of local or global commons, which remain focused on the most desirable 
institutional design for a given common good – i.e. climate, oceans, radio spectrum – 
rather than on the relationship between positions in the resource and positions in the 
markets derived from activity in the resource.  
 
7.1.4 The Choice of Property Solutions in Transnational Commons  
The evidence discussed so far has revealed that, by means of negotiating the 
configuration of technology systems used to extract value from the radio resource, 
private users are able to define rule systems in transnational frequency pools without the 
need for external intervention. These rule systems specify a bundle of property 
arrangements that, in common pool resources, comprise rights of access and rights of 
use of a common pool (i.e. operational rights) as well as rights of management and 
rights of exclusion from the common pool (i.e. collective choice rights192) (Cole and 
Ostrom 2012, Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Given the role of private users in defining 
rules to govern the commons, the question remains whether these actors are more likely 
to prefer institutional outcomes that resemble individual exclusive property when 
                                                
192 As previously indicated, see supra note 17, this thesis does not focus on the process 
by which rights of alienation are defined. This is because the right of alienation is 
defined by public actors at state level, rather than at transnational or international level. 
 260 
managing a common pool resource such as the radio spectrum, in order to maximise 
individual withdrawal rates from the resource. 
This thesis has made two findings regarding the choice of property solutions in the radio 
spectrum. The first finding indicates that, in negotiations about rule systems for the 
creation and utilisation of frequency pools at transnational level, private actors are able 
to agree exclusion methods for their preferred operations and are able to choose, 
strategically, whether these exclusion mechanism should be placed at regional (Case I, 
Case II) or at global level (Case III, Case IV (5GHz). This is an interesting finding, 
since the “tragedy of the commons” literature proposes intervention by an external body 
(Hardin 1998), either through government control or through privatisation, as a 
mechanism to ensure the conservation of a resource pool, due to the supposed inability 
of individual users to agree collective exclusion mechanisms (Pennington 2012: 23-24).  
This relates to the second finding, which shows that private actors are concerned with 
the individualisation of their property rights in only two of the four cases analysed in 
this thesis, where there is internal disagreement over individual withdrawal rates 
resulting from competing technology specifications to be deployed in regional 
frequency pools (Case I and Case II). In Case III and Case IV (5GHz), when private 
actors negotiate more comprehensive collective choice mechanisms to mitigate internal 
conflict, they appear less concerned with the individualisation of their property rights 
and more concerned with the establishment of system exclusivity (i.e. IMT systems in 
Case III) or technology exclusivity (i.e. OFDMA in Case IV (5GHz)) in the largest 
possible frequency pools – i.e. the global frequency pool.  
These findings carry two main implications for the literature on property rights in 
common pool resources and, particularly, in transnational common pool resources. 
First, these findings confirm that property arrangements in the commons can take the 
form of both individual exclusive rights (Case I, Case II) and common exclusive rights 
(Case III, Case IV), depending on the economic interests exhibited in technology 
negotiations, which focus either on individual withdrawal rates in a regional frequency 
pool (i.e. rivalry as in Case I and Case II) or on common exclusion of others from a 
global frequency pool (i.e. excludability as in Case III and Case IV). These findings 
confirm that both types of property arrangements – i.e. individual exclusive property 
and common exclusive property – should be recognised as private property that is 
exclusive to either an individual or a group of individuals (McKean 2000, Pennington 
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2012). Indeed, in two of the four case studies analysed in the current study, private 
actors prefer individual private property when they have not invested in the creation of 
comprehensive collective choice arrangements – i.e. weak information exchange and 
monitoring of patents in GSM MoU in Case I and in ETSI SMG in Case II – because, in 
itself, individual private property minimises the requirement for further negotiation and 
investment in agreements between resource users (Pennington 2012: 30). Conversely, in 
the other two cases analysed in the current study, private actors prefer flexible or 
common private property when they have invested in the creation of comprehensive 
collective choice arrangements – i.e. inclusive decision-making, information exchange 
and mutual monitoring of the system configuration for IMT-2000 and IMT-Advanced 
in Case III and for IEEE 802.11 in the Wi-Fi Alliance in Case IV (5GHz) – because 
common private property facilitates flexibility over future rates of use in larger 
frequency pool (i.e. global pools). In all cases, however, private actors are interested in 
limiting access of outsiders to their preferred frequency pool and they achieve this by 
defining resource boundaries tied to technology specifications (Case I, Case II, Case IV 
(5GHz)) or system specifications (Case III). This finding illustrates, once again, the 
relevance of technology capabilities in negotiations among resource users and confirms 
the position that technology systems are used in the commons not only “to extract value 
[from the resource] but also to establish and sustain property systems on [it]” (Ostrom 
in Buck 1998: xiii).   
These findings also carry a second implication for the wider discussion about 
interactions between the private and public regulation of transnational common goods 
(see Section 7.2). The current study shows that, by simply changing the analytical focus 
from the domestic regulation to the transnational regulation of the radio resource, we 
observe that private users are considerably more active in the initiation, negotiation and 
definition of property specifications in this resource. This finding is relevant to the 
extensive literature on the regulation of the radio spectrum at domestic level, where 
private resource users gain usufruct rights to the radio resource through a variety of 
mechanisms – e.g. licenses (non-transferable), licenses (with second markets) or 
conditioned open access – from a public regulator (Cave 2006, Brito 2006, Benkler 
2012). Far from challenging the contribution of this literature to the development of 
policies aimed to ensure the efficient allocation of usufruct rights in the radio resource, 
the current study reveals that some aspects of the rights that make up the bundle of 
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property arrangements in the radio resource can be determined at levels of decision-
making that supersede the state, such as the transnational level. The current study 
reveals that, due to the global nature of the radio resource, private actors are specifically 
interested in negotiating rules that establish forms of collective property exclusion – 
based on technology, services or systems – at rule-making levels that supersede the 
state. In this situation, aspects of the excludability of a property right in the radio 
resource – which is a defining principle of property in the commons because of its 
purpose to establish boundaries that prevent interference (pollution) or overuse 
(crowding) – are negotiated outside the boundaries of the state. This finding confirms 
that collective property rights can be established in global commons, especially if 
different parts of a bundle of property arrangements are defined at different levels of 
rule making. As German and Keeler (2012) noted, interactions between these property 
regimes193 – e.g. interactions between usufruct rights and collective rights in the radio 
commons – have not been sufficiently explored in the study of local and global 
commons. The next section takes these findings forward and explores their contribution 
to the wider debate about the origin and authority of these transnational private regimes 
and their interaction with established polities at the domestic, regional and international 
level.   
 
7.2 The Scope for Private Regulation of Transnational Commons 
This thesis has revealed the capacity of private resource users to initiate, negotiate and 
define operational and, sometimes, collective choice arrangements in the radio resource. 
These operational rules, which inform the rate of use of a frequency band as well as the 
principles of excludability that apply to it, form the transnational private regulation of 
the radio spectrum, which is legitimated by domestic, regional (EU) and international 
polities. This section considers the dynamics between the private regulation of the radio 
spectrum and other polities with authority to regulate the radio resource. First, the 
section considers the extent to which private resource users, organised in industry 
associations such as GSMA (Case I), NGMN (Case III) or the Wi-Fi Alliance (Case 
                                                
193 German and Keeler (2012: 573) referred to these interactions as “hybrid institutions” 
or “institutional arrangements governing the interdependencies among discrete property 
holders and regimes, whether defined by structure (linkages among entities with 
jurisdiction over discrete property regimes) or mode of governance (balance between 
self-organisation and formal regulation as complementary instruments of governance)”.  
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IV), engage in private regulatory governance. Specifically, it evaluates the role of 
industry actors as rule makers, monitors or enforcers of a private regime for the 
governance of the transnational radio resource. Second, it considers the extent to which 
this associative regime interacts with other polities such as governments, regional 
executives (European Commission) and international organisations (International 
Telecommunications Union). Specifically, it considers the nature of complementarity 
between private and public regimes for the provision and protection of common goods 
such as the radio resource.  
In order to evaluate the contribution of these findings to the governance literature and, 
more specifically, to the transnational private regulation literature, it is important to 
understand the principles of difference between transnational private regimes and other 
types of regimes. Scott, Cafaggi and Senden (2011) define the three features of a 
transnational private regime as follows. First, they are “transnational, rather than 
international, in the sense that their effects cross borders, but are not constituted through 
cooperation of states as reflected in treaties” (2011: 3). Second, they are private or 
“non-state in the sense that key actors in such regimes include both civil society or non-
governmental organisations and firms (both individually and in associations)” (2011: 3). 
Third, they are regimes because they “address activities characterised in some instances 
by market-oriented needs for intervention and coordination, as with technical standards, 
but also provide a response to broader political conflicts over the appropriate balance 
between states and markets in determining such matters as entitlements to the protection 
of human rights and conservation of the environment” (Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 
2011: 4).       
 
7.2.1 Associative Governance in Transnational Commons 
The current study confirms that private resource users, organised in formal (e.g. GSMA 
in Case I) and informal industry associations (LTE/SAE Alliance, MIB in Case III), 
have articulated a transnational private regime that meets the conditions established by 
Scott, Cafaggi and Senden (2011). This finding goes back to the role of private resource 
users – i.e. service operators and equipment manufacturers of electronic 
communications – as initiators, negotiators and creators of rules of access and rules of 
use (i.e. operational rules) in the radio resource during their negotiations about the 
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architecture of technology systems to be deployed in transnational frequency bands. 
This thesis reveals that, in all the cases analysed, private actors engage in rule making – 
i.e. the definition of rules of operation in frequency pools – irrespective of the presence 
or absence of a public actor with authority to set or coordinate the definition of rules in 
the regional radio resource.  
This finding confirms that private actors can hold public roles concerning the 
management of a transnational common good beyond regulatory spaces established at 
domestic or international level. Subsequently, the transnational regulation of the radio 
resource is a good example of rule making power derived from “the freedom of contract 
and association”, rather than from domestic or international law (Scott, Cafaggi and 
Senden 2011: 15). It reinforces the findings of a growing literature that reveals the 
substantive nature of private activity conducted by non-governmental organisations and 
businesses engaged in “regulatory standard-settings” in areas such as labour rights or 
the environment (Abbott and Snidal 2009). This regulatory activity differs from 
traditional standardisation processes between private actors at transnational level 
because it aims to produce property rights for regulatory rather than transactional 
purposes (Scott 2012: 1326). This thesis reveals the regulatory function of private 
actors, with ability and capacity to associate in order to set property arrangements in 
regional or global frequency pools, as well as with ability and capacity to set common 
standards in order to reduce transaction costs in future communications markets.  
In addition, this finding reinforces the position that private actors can serve both 
individual and collective interests (Ostrom 2008, Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011). This 
is not to say that the rule making process is neutral, which is confirmed by the hard 
bargaining process between firms with considerable presence in electronic 
communications markets. It simply implies that private entities can be both rule makers 
and rule abiders, equally interested in the preservation of a common resource (i.e. 
regional or global frequency pools free from collaborative or distributional problems of 
collective action) and interested in the production of common goods (i.e. mobile 
communications systems). This, once again, confirms that private actors have complex 
motivational structures, which can equally inform their profit maximisation behaviour 
and their resource conservation behaviour, without being mutually exclusive. Thus, the 
rule making activity of industry actors in the radio resource raises questions whether 
these actors are, by default, rent-seekers interested in “capturing governance 
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arrangements for their particularistic ends” (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 349). In the cases 
examined here, the difference between rule-making and rent-seeking could be 
particularly difficult to distinguish, especially because the property arrangements 
resulting from these private negotiations are products of distributive bargaining about 
the degree of rivalry and excludability in a limited frequency pool. The key, however, is 
to understand that the same bargaining process can have both regulatory purposes (i.e. 
establish property arrangements in the radio resource) and transactional purposes (i.e. 
reduce costs in communications markets by establishing compatibility standards). This 
distinction, which has been insufficiently explored in the electronic communications 
standardisation literature, shows that it is, in fact, inopportune to dismiss private 
regulation “on grounds that it indicates either cartelisation or capture” (Scott, Cafaggi 
and Senden 2011: 5). The findings of this thesis align with the growing evidence about 
the capacity of private actors to protect public goods such as the International Emissions 
Trading Association to mitigate climate change (Abbott 2012, Hoffman 2013) or to 
establish voluntary clubs that produce positive externalities such as the Kimberly 
Process Certification Scheme to control trade in diamonds from regions of conflict 
(Haufler 2009, Prakash and Potoski 2007). Thus, the findings of this thesis certify that 
private regulation is not solely concerned with the production of private good or club 
goods that benefit their members exclusively (Cafaggi 2012b).   
Lastly, this finding confirms the increasing capacity of industry actors, organised in 
industry associations, to diversify the range of solutions to public policy problems 
(Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 3). The cases put forward in this thesis confirm that a 
group of private resource users, organised in strategic industry associations, operate an 
internal logic promoting the collective self-interest, which fits the associative 
governance described, at the domestic level, by Streeck and Schmitter (1985). Once 
again, the evidence of collective self-interest does not imply that cleavages do not exist 
inside the formal or informal associations analysed in this thesis. On the contrary, 
negotiations within associations (e.g. GSM-CEPT in Case I) and between associations 
(e.g NGMN and LTE/SAE in Case III) confirm a continuous bargaining process over 
the degree of rivalry to be defined in a frequency pool. However, they also confirm a 
collective self-interest about the principles of excludability that should apply in a given 
frequency pool, which result in the establishment of resource boundaries at regional or 
global level. This form of associative governance differs from the “spontaneous 
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solidarity” exhibited by local communities in remote locations, the “dispersed 
competition” exhibited by firms wishing to reduce transaction costs in the market or the 
“hierarchical control” exhibited by public actors wishing to protect or provide public 
goods at domestic level (Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 9). Thus, the associative 
governance identified in the four cases of this thesis should be interpreted as a 
transnational private regime with a regulatory scope (i.e. establish property 
arrangements in transnational common pools) as well as a transactional scope (i.e. 
reducing costs of interaction in the mobile communications markets).       
 
7.2.2 Interactions between Associative and Domestic, Regional or International 
Polities 
The last finding of this thesis is concerned with the variation in associative governance 
across the four case studies examined here. The thesis finds that, in two cases (Case I 
and Case II), private actors do not invest in comprehensive collective choice 
arrangements designed to safeguard operational rules of access and use in a frequency 
pool. In these cases, private actors have limited self-monitoring capabilities to ensure 
information exchanges about technology capabilities (e.g. declaring essential patents in 
ETSI SMG in Case II) or to monitor the technical preferences of participants (e.g. 
inability of operators to monitor strategic alliances between manufacturers in GSM in 
Case I). Because, in these two cases, rules of use and exclusion from the frequency 
pools are not safeguarded by collective choice arrangements agreed internally, private 
actors rely on the regional public actor – i.e. the European Commission – to monitor 
and enforce these rules (i.e. Council Directive 87/372/EEC in Case I and Commission 
Decision 128/1999/EC in Case II). This formal legislation, which contains provisions 
for service or technology exclusivity in the frequency pool, has the aim to safeguard and 
legitimise the arrangements agreed upon by private resource users in their respective 
industry associations. In contrast, in Case III and Case IV (5GHz), private actors invest 
in more comprehensive collective choice rules, which allow them to monitor internal 
commitments to operational rules and to rely on public actors only for the enforcement 
of these arrangements, without the need to specify rules of technology or service 
exclusivity in the formal legislation. Thus, we find that private actors engage in rule-
making in all the cases in this thesis, but they vary in their ability to self-monitor 
commitments to these rules based upon their level of investment in collective choice 
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arrangements. When self-monitoring is weak, we find a stronger reliance on the public 
actor to safeguard their arrangements. Lastly, we find that, in all cases, private actors 
rely on public actors to legitimise and enforce the rules of access and rules of use they 
agree upon.  
These findings reveal the complex dynamics between associative modes of governance 
and other polities situated at domestic, regional (EU) and international level. First, they 
confirm that the rule making capacity of private actors is most developed at 
transnational level, because of “the weaker governmental dimension at global level” 
(Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011: 4). This position confirms that private actors behave 
differently at domestic level, where they might organise in order to lobby public actors 
for a particular configuration of usufruct rights in the radio resource, and at 
transnational level, where they organise in order to produce technical systems and 
operational rules for the deployment of these systems in regional or global frequency 
pools. These findings confirm that, by focusing solely on interactions between private 
and public actors at the domestic level, there is a tendency to overstate the presence of 
regulatory capture (Novak 2014) as well as to overstate the motif of private actors to 
capture public rule makers (Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011, Scott 2012).  
This position is confirmed by the findings put forward in this thesis, which reveal that 
the presence of the European Commission – as an agenda setter at the regional level – 
does not reduce the willingness of industry actors to engage in private rule making. On 
the contrary, in Case II, industry actors engage in private rule making in order to shift 
the technology preference of the European Commission for a revolutionary B-ISDN 
system in favour of the industry preference for an evolutionary GSM system, so as to 
maintain their preferred configuration of rivalry and excludability in the frequency band 
of interest. These findings have two implications for the EU governance literature. First, 
they question the vision of the European Commission as the corporate actor who 
initiates and coordinates corrective measures for the negative and positive integration of 
the single market (Fuchs 1995). Second, they support the presence of a multi-level 
governance approach in the European Union (Eising 2004, Fuchs 1994), with 
considerable variability across policy issues, based on the capacity of private interests to 
organise within the EU polity (Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999, Knill 2001) as well as on 
their willingness to organise at other levels of decision-making. In fact, these findings 
confirm the presence of vertical cooperation between the associative regimes 
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established by transnational private regulation in the radio resource and regional polities 
such as the EU (Case I and Case II) or international polities such as the ITU (Case II, 
Case III and Case IV). They confirm that, increasingly, regulatory standards developed 
by private actors in transnational regimes are legitimised, incorporated and endorsed by 
domestic or regional legislators in a form of “vertical complementarity” (Cafaggi 2014), 
rather than being created by those jurisdictions themselves. Similar evidence of vertical 
complementarity has been found in the regulation of advertising, civil aviation and food 
safety certification (Cafaggi 2014, Scott 2012). However, domestic, regional and 
international polities have a key role in this relationship because they confer statutory 
recognition to private regimes that, often, lack this legitimation due to their 
transnational nature (Abbott and Snidal 2009, Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011, Scott 
2012).   
Overall, this thesis has found considerable evidence of associative governance by 
private actors involved in the initiation, negotiation and definition of rules of use and 
rules of access (i.e. operational rules), which regulate the radio spectrum as a global 
common. However, the thesis has also revealed that this transnational private regime, 
which originates with industry actors, relies on the authority of domestic, regional and 
international polities in order to be legitimated. These findings contribute to the 
evidence base on the hybrid nature of governance and the polycentric distribution of 
authority between public and private actors in the provision and production of 
transnational common goods (Ostrom 2010, Scott, Cafaggi and Senden 2011). They 
support the capacity of private actors to sustain policy-making functions, while 
substantiating the existence of mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive, 
jurisdictions that contribute to the definition, monitoring and enforcement of property 
arrangements in transnational commons.  
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